Galactic Seven Eleven Litigation Holdings LLC v Davaria

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Galactic Seven Eleven Litigation Holdings LLC v Davaria [2024] FCAFC 54

Appeal from: Davaria Pty Limited v 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd (No 13) [2023] FCA 84
File number(s): VID 209 of 2023
VID 210 of 2023
Judgment of: MURPHY, LEE AND COLVIN JJ
Date of judgment: 2 May 2024
Catchwords: REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS – whether power to make a common fund order at the stage of settlement approval – the proper exercise of the discretion under s 33V(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – appeal allowed.
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 33V
Cases cited:

Asirifi-Otchere v Swann Insurance (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] FCA 1885; (2020) 385 ALR 625

Augusta Pool 1 UK Limited v Williamson (2023) 111 NSWLR 378

BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster [2019] HCA 45; 269 CLR 574

Brewster v BMW Australia Ltd [2020] NSWCA 272

Cantor v Audi Australia Pty Ltd (No 5) [2020] FCA 637

Clime Capital Limited v UGL Pty Limited [2020] FCA 66

Commonwealth of Australia v SCI Operations Pty Ltd (1998) 192 CLR 285

Court v Spotless Group Holdings Limited [2020] FCA 1730

Davaria Pty Ltd v 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 183; 281 FCR 501

Davaria Pty Ltd v 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd (No 13) [2023] FCA 84

Elliott-Carde v McDonald’s Australia Ltd [2023] FCAFC 162

Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22; 230 CLR 89

FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342

Fisher (trustee for the Tramik Super Fund Trust) v Vocus Group Limited (No 2) [2020] FCA 579

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499

Klemweb Nominees Pty Ltd (as trustee for the Klemweb Superannuation Fund) v BHP Group Limited [2019] FCAFC 107; 369 ALR 583

Kuterba v Sirtex Medical Limited (No 3) [2019] FCA 1374

Luke v Aveo Group Ltd (No 3) [2023] FCA 1665

McNamara v Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal (2005) 221 CLR 646

Minister for Immigration v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541

Money Max Int Pty Ltd (Trustee) v QBE Insurance Group Limited [2016] FCAFC 148; 245 FCR 191

Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513

Owners of “Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Co Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404

Perera v GetSwift Ltd [2018] FCAFC 202; (2018) 263 FCR 92

Petersen Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland Limited (No 3) [2018] FCA 1842

Uren v RMBL Investments Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 647

Vocus Group Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 579

Webb v GetSwift Limited (No 7) [2023] FCA 90; 165 ACSR 560

Webster (Trustee) v Murray Goulburn Co-Operative Co Limited (No 4) [2020] FCA 1053

Wong v SilkfieldPty Ltd [1999] HCA 48; 199 CLR 255

Ginnane T, “Indefinite Terms and Broad Discretion is: Statutory Interpretation Against an Indefinite Variety of Facts” in Barnes J (ed), The Coherence of Statutory Interpretation (2019)

Grave D, Adams…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCAFC 54
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Galactic Seven Eleven Litigation Holdings LLC v Davaria, the primary issue was the approval of a settlement involving the class action representative, Galactic Seven Eleven Litigation Holdings LLC, and the defendant, Davaria. The court was tasked with determining the appropriateness of a common fund order (CFO) as opposed to a fixed entitlement order (FEO) for the litigation funding commission, as well as the quantum of the commission. The case was heard and determined in the Federal Court of Australia.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the power to make a common fund order at the stage of settlement approval was permissible under section 33V(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), and if so, how the discretion should be exercised. The court also needed to assess the evidence presented by Galactic regarding the risks and costs involved in funding the proceedings, as well as the expert opinion provided by Mr. McGing, which was accepted by the primary judge.

In its decision, the court held that the primary judge was entitled to consider the strong reasons expressed by the majority in Brewster for favouring a FEO over a CFO, and to weigh this heavily against the making of a CFO in the sum of $24.5 million. The court found that the primary judge's decision to set aside the CFO and instead approve a FEO in the amount of $24.5 million was not an unreasonable exercise of the discretion under section 33V(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The court concluded that a funding commission of $24.5 million was commercially realistic and properly reflected the costs and risks Galactic took on by funding the proceeding.

The appeal was allowed, and the court set aside the CFO previously ordered by Justice O'Callaghan. Instead, a FEO was made in the amount of $24.5 million for Galactic's litigation funding commission. Additionally, Galactic's costs of the appeal, including those of the contradictor, were to be paid from the settlement sum.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. Order 20 of the orders of the Honourable Justice O’Callaghan made on 8 March 2023 be set aside.

3. Pursuant to s 33V(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), for the purposes of the Settlement Scheme, the amount payable to the Appellant from the Settlement Sum on account of the Appellant’s litigation funding commission in respect of the proceedings be fixed in the amount of $24,500,000 ($24.5 million).

4. The Appellant’s costs of the appeal, including the costs of the Contradictor, be paid from the Settlement Sum.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Without breaching the confidentiality of the counsels’ opinions or the Confidential Opinion, in my view the proceedings were large, highly complex, strenuously defended, expensive to conduct, and involved substantial risks on liability and quantum. The proceedings involved a high level of risk that for some reason or another they would not be successful, or that they would be successful but not to the extent that justified the huge expenditure and risk needed to obtain such an outcome. This consideration points in favour of approving a funding commission in approximately the quantum that Galactic seeks.Mr McGing’s evidence In relation to the risks associated with funding the proceeding, it is appropriate that I also deal with Mr McGing’s evidence, which the primary judge accepted. That should not, however, be understood as an acceptance that his evidence was appropriate or necessary to determine the settlement approval application. In my view it was not. Mr McGing opined that determining a fair and reasonable return for a funder must be driven by the inputs specific to that funder, applying ordinary investment and insurance principles. The specific inputs on which Mr McGing based his opinion were: (a) the total legal costs incurred by Galactic; (b) the adverse costs and related security for costs paid by Galactic; and (c) Galactic’s expenses for running the case. Mr McGing assessed the fair and reasonable investment return for Galactic by way of a funding commission as a percentage of capital at risk, under various scenarios. He used four categories of capital invested, being: (i) legal fees incurred before settlement; (ii) legal fees incurred after settlement; (iii) adverse costs and related security for costs; and (iv) Galactic’s expenses for running the case. I have no difficulty with that approach. Mr McGing said that:(a)a funder’s remuneration should be linked to the amount of capital invested in the case, the time horizon over which the capital is committed and/or subject to risk, and the level of risk over the time horizon; (b)the interaction of those elements is an important consideration in determining what constitutes a fair and reasonable investment return for a funder, including return of the capital invested; and(c)a funder will make its assessment at the time of deciding to commit capital to the case, although subsequent events will determine the actual capital that must be committed and the actual investment returns. In Mr McGing’s opinion: (a)if a funder incurred legal costs of $17.6 million (being the reasonable costs approved in this case); (b)paid security for costs of $6.9 million (being the amount Galactic paid in this case); and(c)putting to one side the funder’s internal expenses (as Mr McGing had not been provided with enough evidence with respect to Galactic’s internal expenses),the funder had capital at risk of $24.6 million. In that scenario (which represented the top end of the range) Mr McGing assessed that the central reasonable return for Galactic was a funding commission of $17.2 million (on top of the return to it of the legal costs, security for costs and expenses it had paid to run the case).

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is not possible to specify (and compare against) the likely recovery of group members who have signed LFAs because of the complexities in assessing quantum of losses claimed in the proceedings, including the individualised nature of the losses. It can though be accepted that, in the circumstances of the case, group members are likely to receive more “in hand” if a FEO is made rather than a CFO in the amount sought.CONCLUSION Having regard to the matters discussed above, I consider a funding commission of $24.5 million (representing 25% of the gross settlement) is commercially realistic and properly reflects the costs and risks that Galactic took on by funding the proceeding. I consider a CFO in the amount of $24.5 million to be “just” pursuant to s 33V(2) of the FCA Act. I have had the benefit of reading in draft the reasons of Murphy J. I write separately to emphasise an unusual aspect of this settlement approval application. Settlement approval applications are now commonplace. The legal principles relating to such applications have, over the last 30-odd years, become trite, and those principles have been applied in a broad range of factual contexts. Except in the rare case where a novel issue arises, there is no reason why approval applications should not be determined with alacrity. The Court does not second guess decisions made by a representative applicant unless there is an apparent problem. Settlement approval applications are rarely unsuccessful and usually come at a time where a settlement fund has been realised on behalf of group members, being a fund, which will, in due course, be distributed to group members by a scheme administrator. Usually, the distribution to a group member in satisfaction of an individual claim involves both a compromise and a pro rata deduction for legal and other costs; hence it only partially compensates a group member for the total sum of alleged loss. It follows that for every dollar spent at the terminus of a class action on a settlement approval application, a further dollar comes out of the fund. This necessarily means the group member receives less in exchange for the extinguishment of the group member’s claim. Despite this, one often sees prolix submissions and very lengthy affidavits filed. But this case is an outlier. On this approval application, as Murphy J points out, no less than 49 affidavits were filed, and expert evidence was adduced not only by Galactic, but also a contradictor. A judge needs to be able to rely upon those acting for the applicant (and any funder) to eschew filing unnecessary material. No doubt the primary judge found it unnecessary to consider vast amounts of the material filed in the case which, for understandable reasons, was not referred to in his Honour’s judgment. I have lost count of the number of times on settlement approval applications I have received lengthy submissions telling me things I either already know or have no interest in knowing. Sometimes, of course, it will be necessary for there to be close investigation and articulation of a bespoke legal or factual complication. This might require detailed submissions or an explanation on oath. But, at least in my experience, this is relatively rare.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On the Contradictor’s submissions, the primary judge having weighed all of the relevant considerations, it was permissible for him to attach significant weight to the strong reasons expressed by the majority in Brewster for favouring making a FEO over a CFO, and to see that as weighing heavily in the balance against the making of a CFO in the sum of $24.5 million (J [224]). And the primary judge’s reference to Galactic seeking a CFO “approaching double what it would be entitled to under the funding agreements” (J [226]) should be understood in light of the primary judge’s findings, not challenged in the appeal, that Galactic’s evidence did not support an additional payment of more than $10 million above its contractual entitlements under the LFAs it entered into with the applicants and approximately one third of the group members (J [197], [210], [217]).CONSIDERATION To establish that the primary judge fell into appealable error Galactic must establish that in exercising the discretion under s 33V(2) his Honour acted upon a wrong principle, allowed extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, mistook the facts, did not take into account some material consideration; or upon the facts, the primary judge’s decision is unreasonable or plainly unjust: House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499 at 504-505. For appealable error in the exercise of judicial discretion to be established it is not enough for this Court to find that it would have exercised the original discretion in a different way; the Court must be satisfied what was done by the primary judge amounted to a failure to exercise the discretion entrusted to the Court: Minister for Immigration v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541 at [37]-[38] (Gageler J, as his Honour then was). The primary judge’s reasons at J [224]-[226] are central to Ground 2 of the appeals. His Honour said (at J [224]):So much may be accepted, but in my view, however, the following important matters would weigh heavily in the balance against the making of a CFO in the sum of $24.5 million. In stating “[s]o much may be accepted” the primary judge can only have been referring to the submissions of Mr Finch SC for Galactic (set out by the primary judge at J [219]-[223]) in favour of the $24.5 million CFO Galactic sought. There, his Honour accepted the following submissions:(a)if a more reasonable assumption than the 15% risk of loss of capital invested pre-settlement adopted by Mr McGing is used that gives rise to an assessment of a reasonable funding commission in the ballpark of the $24.5 million sought by Galactic (at J [221]);(b)the Contradictor had made no reasoned criticism of the actual amount of $24.5 million, and did not contend that in the context of a $98 million settlement, where Galactic had incurred or paid legal costs approaching $20 million, and faced a risk of a substantial adverse costs order, that $24.5 million was self-evidently not reasonable (J [222]);(c)25% of the gross settlement sum, given the size of the settlement, is a reasonable rate of return which is often awarded to funders by the Court, and it is relevant to take into account the legitimate expectations of the investor (J [222]); and(d)the altered assumed risk of loss of capital invested pre-settlement from 15% to 20%, 25%, 30%, 35% or 40% (as done in Exhibit F5) should be seen as a reality check. Each of those increased risks were “within the realms of possibility” and show that a funding commission of $24.5 million is “in the right ballpark in terms of outcome” (J [223]).