R&B Investments Pty Ltd (Trustee) v Blue Sky (Reserved Question)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

R&B Investments Pty Ltd (Trustee) v Blue Sky (Reserved Question) [2024] FCAFC 89  

File number: NSD 665 of 2022
Judgment of: MURPHY, BEACH, LEE JJ
Date of judgment: 5 July 2024
Catchwords: REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS – open class securities class action consolidated on terms – pending application for approval of notice to group members prior to opt-out – where common fund order proposed which would provide for the distribution of funds to a solicitor otherwise than as payment for costs and disbursements incurred in relation to the conduct of the proceeding – where extant controversy as to power to make Solicitors’ CFO – where question reserved to the Full Court pursuant to s 25(6) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – amended reserved question answered “yes”
Legislation:

Constitution s 109

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Pts IVA, VB, ss 5(2), 23, 25(6), 33J(1), 37M, 37M(3), 33V, 33V(1), 33V(2), 33X, 33X(1)(a), 33X(6), 33Y, 33Z, 33Z(1),

33Z(1)(g), 33Z(1)(f), 33Z(2), 33ZF, 33ZG, 33ZJ, 33ZJ(2)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 9.21

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 78B, 79

Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015 (NSW) rr 4.1.1, 4.1.3, 8.1, 9, 10, 11, 12, 12.2, 12.2(i)

Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) Pt 9.2, ss 183, 183(1)

Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 33ZDA

Courts and Legal Services 1990 (UK) s 58AA

Commonwealth, Second Reading Speech, House of Representatives, 14 November 1991

Cases cited:

Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission [1992] HCA 10; (1992) 175 CLR 564

Allen v G8 Education Ltd [2022] VSC 32

BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster [2019] HCA 45; (2019) 269 CLR 574

Bogan v Estate of Peter Smedley (Deceased) [2022] VSC 201

Bogan v The Estate of Peter John Smedley (Deceased) [2023] VSCA 256

Bogan v The Estate of Peter John Smedley (Deceased) (No 3) [2023] VSC 103

Bolitho v Banksia Securities Ltd (No 18) (remitter) [2021] VSC 666; (2021) 69 VR 28

Brewster v BMW Australia Ltd [2020] NSWCA 272

Campbells Cash & Carry Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 41; (2006) 229 CLR 386

Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186

Davaria v 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 183; (2020) 281 FCR 501

Dyczynski v Gibson [2020] FCAFC 120; (2020) 280 FCR 583

Elliott-Carde v McDonald’s Australia Limited [2023] FCAFC 162; (2023) 301 FCR 1

Fox v Westpac Banking Corporation [2021] VSC 573; (2021) 69 VR 487

Galactic Seven Eleven Litigation Holdings LLC v Davaria [2024] FCAFC 54

Gawler v FleetPartners Group Ltd [2024] VSC 365

Gill v Ethicon Sarl (No 12) [2023] FCA 902

Hegarty v Keogh (No 2) [2023] SASCA 30

Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd [2022] FCAFC 68; (2022) 292 FCR 336

Kilah v Medibank Private Limited [2024] VSC 152

Klemweb Nominees Pty Ltd v BHP Group Ltd [2019] FCAFC 107; (2019) 369 ALR 583

Masson v Parsons [2019] HCA 21; (2019) 266 CLR 554

Matthews v AusNet Electricity…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCAFC 89
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R&B Investments Pty Ltd (Trustee) v Blue Sky (Reserved Question), the Full Court was required to address a contentious issue arising from a securities class action against Blue Sky Alternative Investments Limited and several other respondents. The primary legal issue concerned the Court's authority to make a common fund order (CFO) that would compensate solicitors for their involvement in funding the class action beyond merely reimbursing costs and disbursements. This question was pivotal as it influenced the potential remuneration of the solicitors involved, specifically Banton Group and Shine Lawyers, who had agreed to fund the litigation in anticipation of the class action's consolidation.

The court examined whether such a CFO could be legally justified under the statutory provisions of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), specifically within Part IVA, which governs representative proceedings. The opposing respondents argued that the Court lacked the power to make such an order, whereas the applicants and their solicitors believed that the power to do so existed. The court's analysis focused on whether the proposed CFO was within the legal boundaries set by the relevant statutes and whether the Court had the requisite authority to approve such an order. The Full Court concluded that the Court did indeed possess the statutory power to make a CFO that compensates solicitors beyond merely reimbursing costs and disbursements.

The Full Court's decision was significant as it affirmed the Court's power to make a CFO that provides compensation to solicitors for their risks and efforts in funding the litigation. This ruling clarified an important aspect of representative proceedings and provided certainty for future class actions regarding the distribution of funds to solicitors. The court's decision also addressed the practical implications for the applicants and their solicitors, who had negotiated funding arrangements in anticipation of this ruling. The Full Court's affirmative answer to the reserved question ensured that the applicants could proceed with their proposed notice to group members and seek the anticipated remuneration for the solicitors' efforts.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Order 1 of orders dated 23 November 2023 made by Lee J reserving a question to the Full Court pursuant to s 25(6) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) be varied such that the question reserved be in the following terms:

Is it a licit exercise of power, pursuant to statutory powers conferred within Pt IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) for the Court, upon the settlement or judgment of a representative proceeding, to make an order (being a “common fund order”, as that term is defined in Davaria Pty Ltd v 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 183; (2020) 281 FCR 501 at [19], [22]–[30]) which would provide for the distribution of funds to a solicitor otherwise than as payment for costs and disbursements incurred in relation to the conduct of the proceeding?

2. The question reserved, as varied by Order 1, be answered “yes”.

3. Mr Shand, Mr Kain, and Ernst & Young pay the costs of the applicants of and incidental to the hearing of the reserved question.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

To make these limitations plain, we have amended the terms of the reserved question originally made by Lee J by deleting parts of the question (the deletions are those underlined at [1] above). B FACTUAL BACKGROUND As noted in the referral judgment, the issue as to this Court’s power to make a Solicitors’ CFO is a matter of controversy in this securities class action brought against Blue Sky Alternative Investments Limited (Blue Sky), a company in liquidation, and seven other respondents. Initially, there had been some ambiguity as to whether the power to make such an order was a live issue. As a consequence of an opaqueness as to the position adopted as to power by the respondents, on 15 November 2023, Lee J posed a specific question to be answered by each respondent. The question was marked MFI-1 and was in the following terms:Is it any respondent’s position in this proceeding that if a common fund order is proposed, which order provides for a payment to a solicitor or solicitors for “funding” the proceeding (that is, proposes an amount to be paid to solicitors over and above a payment representing costs and disbursements) that, by reason of that fact alone, such an order could not be characterised as being “just” and hence within power? It eventuated that Blue Sky, and the fifth to eighth respondents took no position concerning any want of power. However, the second, third and fourth respondents, namely Mr Shand, Mr Kain, and Ernst & Young (opposing respondents), contended (and continue to contend before the Full Court) that the Court is bereft of power to make any form of Solicitors’ CFO. This issue as to power arose because the applicants and two firms of solicitors (Banton Group and Shine Lawyers) negotiated arrangements for the conduct and funding of this class action in anticipation of two separate class actions being consolidated. The consolidation occurred pursuant to Order 1 of orders dated 24 March 2023 and both firms were granted leave to be jointly named as solicitors on the record for the applicants. The consolidation orders noted that the applicants would enter into a “cooperative litigation protocol” (Protocol) and the solicitors would enter into a “consolidation agreement” (Agreement) (the form of which was annexed to the orders). The Protocol provides by cl 5: 5 LAWYERS’ REMUNERATION5.1 The Applicants will request the Court:a)at an appropriate stage of the proceeding – to make orders that or to the effect that:ilegal costs and disbursements be shared among the Applicants and Group Members (Claimants) on a costs-equalisation basis (for instance, but without limitation, under section 33ZJ of the Act): (sic)iiBanton and Shine be further remunerated for their risks in funding the legal costs and disbursements by payment of such percentage of the Resolution Sum as may be approved by the Court (Solicitors' Common Fund Order or Solicitors’ CFO); andb)as early as practicable in the proceeding – orders that notice be given to the Claimants of the matters in (a) hereof.5.2 In default of orders pursuant to clause 5.1b) – the Applicants will:a)seek orders for a transfer of the proceeding to the Supreme Court of Victoria, and upon such transfer a Group Costs Order pursuant to section 33ZDA of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) (GCO); alternativelyb) seek commercial litigation funding.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reasons set out in R&B Investments Pty Ltd (Trustee) v Blue Sky Alternative Investments Limited (Administrators Appointed) (in liq) (Reserved Question) [2023] FCA 1499 (referral judgment), Lee J made an order that the following question be reserved to the Full Court pursuant to s 25(6) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Act): Is it a licit exercise of power, pursuant to statutory powers conferred within Pt IVA of the [Act], or otherwise, for the Court, upon the settlement or judgment of a representative proceeding, to make an order (being a “common fund order”, as that term is defined in Davaria Pty Ltd v 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 183; (2020) 281 FCR 501 at [19], [22]–[30]) which would provide for the distribution of funds or other property to a solicitor otherwise than as payment for costs and disbursements incurred in relation to the conduct of the proceeding? Before going further, it is worth making a preliminary point. The question reserved poses an inquiry into power and not into discretion. Put in broad terms, our focus is whether such an order can be made upon a settlement or upon a judgment in favour of some or all group members providing for such a distribution to a solicitor who has financed the class action (including by provision of security, and indemnity against adverse costs orders). We are not presented with the question as to whether such an order ought to be made in specified circumstances. The exercise of a judicial discretion allows a judge to make a choice between lawful, but different courses of action and the concept necessarily implies choice. As will become evident, given the way the relevant statutory provisions are expressed, if there is no power to make a “common fund order” providing for the distribution of funds or other property to a solicitor otherwise than as payment for costs and disbursements incurred in relation to the conduct of a class action (Solicitors’ CFO), that means it is necessary to conclude, irrespective of the circumstances existing at the time of making a proposed Solicitors’ CFO, such an order could not be within a conception of a lawful order. To ensure the Full Court is not engaged in dealing with abstract hypothetical issues, given this is a Pt IVA class action, and the applicants have indicated orally the sources of power upon which they propose to rely in seeking a Solicitors’ CFO in this case, these reasons deal only with the ambit of the statutory power to make such an order within Pt IVA of the Act. In doing so, we recognise Pt IVA is not a code (s 33ZG of the Act) and nothing in Pt IVA affects the Court’s powers under other provisions of the Act, including as a court of equity (see s 5(2) of the Act), and its power under s 23 to make orders of such kinds as the Court thinks appropriate. It follows we do not deal with, for example, the power of a court of equity to make an order analogous to a Solicitors’ CFO in a representative proceeding commenced under the Chancery rules reflected in r 9.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR) nor, following a “declassing” of a class action, when the statutory powers in Pt IVA are no longer available and a former group member may obtain a bilateral settlement of their individual claim or a judgment inter partes.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Protocol provides by cl 5: 5 LAWYERS’ REMUNERATION5.1 The Applicants will request the Court:a)at an appropriate stage of the proceeding – to make orders that or to the effect that:ilegal costs and disbursements be shared among the Applicants and Group Members (Claimants) on a costs-equalisation basis (for instance, but without limitation, under section 33ZJ of the Act): (sic)iiBanton and Shine be further remunerated for their risks in funding the legal costs and disbursements by payment of such percentage of the Resolution Sum as may be approved by the Court (Solicitors' Common Fund Order or Solicitors’ CFO); andb)as early as practicable in the proceeding – orders that notice be given to the Claimants of the matters in (a) hereof.5.2 In default of orders pursuant to clause 5.1b) – the Applicants will:a)seek orders for a transfer of the proceeding to the Supreme Court of Victoria, and upon such transfer a Group Costs Order pursuant to section 33ZDA of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) (GCO); alternativelyb) seek commercial litigation funding. Clause 2 of the Agreement deals with “Costs reimbursement and risk remuneration” and provides, by cl 2.1, that the solicitors will “…take all necessary steps to obtain the orders, alternatively funding, described in clause 5.1 of the Protocol”. In accordance with these arrangements, the applicants have instructed the solicitors, upon any settlement of judgment in favour of some or all group members, to seek a Solicitors’ CFO of the kind described in the reserved question. Against this background, and as will become evident, the issue of power is acute in this proceeding for three reasons: first, there is a part-heard application under ss 33X and 33Y of the Act, filed by the applicants, seeking orders notifying group members as to the basis upon which remuneration for the funding and conduct of the proceeding will be sought; secondly, if the proposed notice is approved, the arrangements between the applicants and their solicitors contemplate amendments to costs agreements, so as to oblige the solicitors to finance the proceeding (including by provision of security, and indemnity against adverse costs orders) and an acknowledgment that the applicants agree that the solicitors’ remuneration will be in the form and value as determined by a subsequent order of the Court; and thirdly, as is evident from the above, if the answer to the question posed is in the negative (that is, the Court lacks power to make a Solicitors’ CFO), the applicants have foreshadowed an application to cross-vest this proceeding to the Supreme Court of Victoria in order to seek what has been described as a “Group Costs Order” (GCO) pursuant to s 33ZDA of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) (SCA), or will proceed to attempt to obtain commercial litigation funding. C SHOULD THIS COURT ANSWER THE RESERVED QUESTION? Each of the opposing respondents contended that the Full Court should decline to answer the reserved question.