Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd [2022] FCAFC 68

Appeal from:

Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 805

Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] FCA 1687

File number: NSD 1387 of 2020
Judgment of: RARES, WIGNEY AND LEE JJ
Date of judgment: 29 April 2022
Catchwords:

DEFAMATION – whether pleaded imputations conveyed by matter complained of – where matter complained of named applicant doctors and later made generalised defamatory assertions as to misconduct not specifically attributed to applicants – whether ordinary reasonable reader would understand imputations conveyed in respect of applicants

HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – whether s 17(2) of the Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW) has application in a federal court – consideration of the principles concerning the relationship between State laws and the exercise of federal jurisdiction – whether s 17(2) Royal Commissions Act purports to regulate the exercise of federal jurisdiction – whether a law of the Commonwealth “otherwise provide[s]” within the meaning of s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) – s 17(2) Royal Commissions Act directly and logically inconsistent with s 56(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – whether a finding that s 17(2) of the Royal Commissions Act has no application in a proceeding being conducted in a federal court infringes the principle in Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31 or in some way produces an outcome inconsistent with s 118 of the Constitution

EVIDENCE – statutory construction – Royal Commissions Act s 17(2) – whether s 17(2) prevents evidence given and documents produced under compulsion by applicant to Royal Commission being admissible against applicant

DEFAMATION – defence of qualified privilege – Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 30 – whether conduct of publisher in publishing independent author’s book could be found reasonable in circumstances where no evidence led of publisher’s state of mind as to content of book – where author failed to seek comment from applicant or put his side of story – where publisher chose to omit relevant information that favoured applicant – whether publication reasonable in circumstances if publisher relied only on adverse findings by Royal Commission without making enquiries of applicant or putting his side of the story

DEFAMATION – Defamation Act s 10 – whether conduct of appeal against orders dismissing proceeding with costs is assertion, continuation or enforcement of deceased’s cause of action for defamation – whether surviving appellant who gave undertaking at trial to pay deceased’s costs could challenge order dismissing deceased’s proceeding with costs – whether cause of action in defamation merged in judgment creating independent rights and obligations

EVIDENCE – hearsay notices issued pursuant to s 67 of the Evidence Act – consideration of the strictures of s 67 of the Evidence Act and cl 6 of the Evidence Regulations 2018 (Cth)

EVIDENCE – where the primary judge admitted and relied upon the reports of four dead experts who gave evidence to the Royal Commission –…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCAFC 68
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd, the respondents, including HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd and others, appealed against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia which had found that they were liable to pay damages for defamation. The case concerned allegations of misconduct in the treatment of patients at a mental health facility, published in a book by the author. The applicants, Dr Gill and Mr Herron, sought to have the decision overturned and the proceeding dismissed with costs. The respondents sought to have the decision affirmed. The legal issues in the case centred on the admissibility of evidence given and documents produced under compulsion by the applicants to a Royal Commission, the scope of s 17(2) of the Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW), and the application of s 56 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The court considered the principles concerning the relationship between State laws and the exercise of federal jurisdiction, and whether s 17(2) of the Royal Commissions Act was directly and logically inconsistent with s 56 of the Evidence Act. The court also examined the defence of qualified privilege under the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) and the assertion, continuation or enforcement of a cause of action for defamation.
The court found that the primary judge erred in admitting and relying upon the reports of the dead experts who gave evidence to the Royal Commission. It held that the reports did not fall within a hearsay exception or otherwise satisfy the statutory precondition to admissibility in s 79 of the Evidence Act. The court also found that the primary judge erred in failing to exclude the reports of the dead experts pursuant to s 135 of the Evidence Act or limit the weight to be attributed to them. The court held that the decision-making process was too intricate to unpack and put back together, and that it was superficial to conclude that if the evidence directly referenced in support of a finding of truth was not impugned the finding of truth should stand. The court further held that the Full Court was not in a position to consider the discretionary exclusion of the Royal Commission Material in an omnibus fashion. The court found that the primary judge erred in concluding that the ordinary reasonable reader would not have understood the passage on p 184 to refer to both Mr Herron and Dr Gill, and that Imputation M was conveyed about each of them. The court held that the Full Court was not in a position to consider the discretionary exclusion of the Royal Commission Material in an omnibus fashion.
The court held that s 17(2) of the Royal Commissions Act did not preclude the publishers from tendering in evidence two documents that Dr Gill contended had been produced by him to the Royal Commission under compulsion pursuant to s 17(1). The court held that the primary judge’s finding of truth in respect of Imputation E was based on a three line statement made by Dr Barclay to the Royal Commission, which could not be tested in cross-examination. The court held that the Full Court was not in a position to consider the discretionary exclusion of the Royal Commission Material in an omnibus fashion, and that if the alternative s 17 argument advanced by Dr Gill was successful, the extent of the properly admitted Royal Commission Material on the question of substantial truth may be different than those Royal Commission Material before the primary judge in reaching her conclusions.
The court held that the Full Court was not in a position to consider the discretionary exclusion of the Royal Commission Material in an omnibus fashion. The court held that the Full Court was not in a position to consider the discretionary exclusion of the Royal Commission Material in an omnibus fashion. The court held that the Full Court was not in a position to consider the discretionary exclusion of the Royal Commission Material in an omnibus fashion. In the light of the above, Dr Gill was entitled to a retrial on the defence of substantial truth in respect of Imputations E, F, G, H, J, K, L and M.
The orders of the court were that on or before 4 May 2022 the parties file and serve any submissions limited to 2 pages as to the form of orders to dispose of the appeal. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. On or before 4 May 2022 the parties file and serve any submissions limited to 2 pages as to the form of orders to dispose of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

With respect, there was no basis for the primary judge to conclude that the ordinary reasonable reader would not have understood the passage on p 184 to refer to both Mr Herron and Dr Gill. Read in the context of chapter 14 as a whole, Imputation M was conveyed about each of Mr Herron and Dr Gill. 2. THE OPERATION OF S 56 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT ISSUE I have had the advantage of reading the reasons of Lee J on the operation of s 56 of the Evidence Act issue and agree with them. 3. THE S 17(2) OF THE ROYAL COMMISSIONS ACT ISSUE On the third day of the trial, the primary judge ruled that s 17(2) of the Royal Commissions Act (the NSW Act) did not preclude the publishers from tendering in evidence two documents that Dr Gill contended had been produced by him to the Royal Commission under compulsion pursuant to s 17(1): Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 805. At the time of the Royal Commission proceeding, s 17 provided:17 Answers and documents(1)A witness summoned to attend or appearing before the commission shall not be excused from answering any question or producing any document or other thing on the ground that the answer or production may criminate or tend to criminate him, or on the ground of privilege, or on any other ground.(2)An answer made, or document or other thing produced by a witness to or before the commission shall not, except as otherwise provided in this section, be admissible in evidence against that person in any civil or criminal proceedings.(3)Nothing in this section shall be deemed to render inadmissible:(a)any answer, document or other thing in proceedings for an offence against this Act,(b)any answer, document or other thing in any civil or criminal proceedings if the witness was willing to give the answer or produce the document or other thing irrespective of the provisions of subsection (1),(c)any book, document, or writing in civil proceedings for or in respect of any right or liability conferred or imposed by the document or other thing.(4)This section shall not have effect unless in the letters patent by which the commission is issued, or in other letters patent under the Public Seal, the Governor declares that the section shall apply to and with respect to the inquiry.… I will consider each of these findings in turn.The Fawdry meeting In canvassing the evidence of Ms Fawdry (at J [103]–[105]), her Honour noted that “Ms Fawdry recalled an occasion where she, Dr Gill, Mr Herron and Mollie Sansom (the receptionist) were in the Matron’s office discussing Mr Hart”. To the best of her recollection the conversation in the Matron’s office was as follows:In that conversation [it] was being discussed about how they could disguise the fact that Barry’s ECT wasn’t signed. The ECT authority was on the bottom of the identification sheet - the front page of the notes, and so it was sort of, like, I guess, a half an A4 size, and that wasn’t signed. So I can recall someone suggesting that perhaps we could - they could put a pathology report over the top of it to disguise the fact that that particular form wasn’t signed for.

Decision

Reasons for decision

To the extent it is necessary, I am fortified in this view by reason of:(1)the fact that there are, with respect, difficulties with ascribing weight to some of the evidence relied upon to sustain a finding of truth in respect of those imputations which might be said to lay on the outer limits of the penumbra. For example, the primary judge’s finding of truth in respect of Imputation E was based on a three line statement made by Dr Barclay to the Royal Commission. The difficulty is that this evidence is in much the same boat as that of the Dead Experts, and critically, Dr Barclay’s evidence could not be tested in cross-examination.(2)the impracticality of the Full Court, for reasons explained above, considering the discretionary exclusion of the Royal Commission Material in some sort of omnibus fashion. Given the reasons of Rares and Wigney JJ, it is at least possible that if the alternative s 17 argument advanced by Dr Gill is successful (that is, parts of the Royal Commission Materials should be the subject of discretionary exclusion), the extent of the properly admitted Royal Commission Materials on the question of substantial truth may be different than those Royal Commission Materials before the primary judge in reaching her conclusions. E CONCLUSION AND ORDERS In the light of the above, Dr Gill is entitled to a retrial on the defence of substantial truth in respect of Imputations E, F, G, H, J, K, L and M. I agree with what Rares J has said about the position of Mr Herron and with the form of orders proposed by Rares J.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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