Rossi v Qantas Airways Limited (No 4)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rossi v Qantas Airways Limited (No 4) [2023] FCA 1008

File number: NSD 1549 of 2019
Judgment of: BANKS-SMITH J
Date of judgment: 28 August 2023
Catchwords: CAPACITY - compromise of litigation by deed - personal autonomy - where applicant asserts incapacity and seeks to have deed declared void - where applicant bears onus of establishing was handicapped person within prescribed definition - issue and context specific assessment of capacity - events occurred in 2008 - use of lay and expert evidence in retrospective assessment - whether onus satisfied
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 60, 136, 140

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 23.13

Accident Compensation Act1985 (Vic) s 103

County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 78

County Court Rules of Procedure in Civil Proceedings 1999 (Vic) O 15

Cases cited:

A v N [2012] NSWSC 354

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mitchell (No 2) [2020] FCA 1098

Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Bull v Fulton (1942) 66 CLR 295

Croft v Sanders [2019] NSWCA 303

Dalle-Molle v Manos [2004] SASC 102; (2004) 88 SASR 193

Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21; (2011) 243 CLR 588

Drivas v Jakopovic [2019] NSWCA 218; (2019) 100 NSWLR 505

Flageul v WeDrive Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1666

Gibbons v Wright (1954) 91 CLR 423

Goddard Elliott (A Firm) v Fritsch [2012] VSC 87

Guthrie v Spence [2009] NSWCA 369; (2009) 78 NSWLR 225

Hanna v Raoul [2018] NSWCA 201

Herron v HarperCollins Publishers Australia Pty Ltd [2022] FCAFC 68; (2022) 292 FCR 336

Hobhouse v Macarthur-Onslow [2016] NSWSC 1831

Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305; (2001) 52 NSWLR 705

Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co [2003] 1 WLR 1511

Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 5) [2015] FCA 571

Matthews v SPI Electrical (Ruling No 38) [2014] VSC 102

Murphy v Doman [2003] NSWCA 249; (2003) 58 NSWLR 51

Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297

R v Kucma [2005] VSCA 58; (2005) 11 VR 472

Re Erdogan's Application; Erdogan v Ekici [2012] VSC 256; (2012) 36 VR 579

Re Griffith (decd); Easter v Griffith(1995) 217 ALR 284

Rossi v Qantas Airways Limited (No 2) [2020] FCA 1080

Scott v Scott [2012] NSWSC 1541

Secretary, Department of Health v Southern Cross Directories Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 1592

Setka v Gregor (No 2) [2011] FCAFC 90; (2011) 195 FCR 203

Slaveski v State of Victoria [2009] VSC 596; (2009) 25 VR 160

Starr v Miller [2021] NSWSC 426

Starr v Miller [2022] NSWCA 46

TJ (on behalf of the Yindjibarndi People) v Western Australia (No 3) [2015] FCA 1359

Treasury Wine Estates Vinters Limited v Pearson [2019] FCAFC 21; (2019) 268 FCR 12

Vishniakov v Lay [2019] VSC 403; (2019) 58 VR 375

Zorbas v Sidiropoulous(No 2) [2009] NSWCA 197

Division: General Division
Registry:
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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 1008
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Rossi v Qantas Airways Limited (No 4) is a case where the plaintiff, Ms Rossi, sought to have a deed of settlement declared void on the basis that she lacked the mental capacity to enter into the agreement. The dispute involved a settlement between the plaintiff and the defendant, Qantas Airways Limited, in relation to a personal injury claim arising from an incident in 2008. The primary legal issue before the court was whether Ms Rossi had the mental capacity to understand the general purport of the compromise reflected in the deed of settlement when it was executed on 29 October 2008.

The court considered the role of both lay and expert evidence in determining capacity, noting that while medical evidence can be helpful, it is not determinative. The decision ultimately rested on the totality of the evidence, including lay observations and expert opinions, to ascertain whether Ms Rossi's ability to manage her affairs in relation to the proceeding was substantially impeded. The court rejected Ms Rossi's argument that she lacked the capacity to understand the general nature of the compromise if it had been explained to her. The court found that Ms Rossi's major depressive disorder, while significant, did not necessarily equate to an inability to comprehend the settlement's basic terms and implications.

In conclusion, the court dismissed Ms Rossi's application to have the deed of settlement declared void and to be recognised as a handicapped person under the relevant rules. The court found that Ms Rossi had the requisite mental capacity to understand the general nature of the compromise if it had been properly explained to her. The court's decision underscored the importance of a contextual and specific assessment of capacity, rather than a broad evaluation of mental health status.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant's application for an order declaring her to be a handicapped person within the meaning of O 15 of the County Court Rules of Procedure in Civil Proceedings 1999 (Vic) and for an order declaring void the deed of settlement made between the parties on 29 October 2008 is dismissed.

2. Failing agreement, the Court will hear submissions as to any other orders that should follow as a result of order 1 and as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Table of Contents

PART A - PRELIMINARY

[1]

Introduction

[1]

Amended originating application

[11]

Statutory framework

[12]

Brief chronology

[18]

PART B - PRINCIPLES

[38]

Preliminary - some examples

[38]

Principles - standard of mental capacity

[53]

Role of expert and lay evidence

[66]

PART C - INTRODUCTION TO ISSUES AND WITNESSES

[68]

Summary of respective cases

[68]

The approach to capacity

[70]

The witnesses

[75]

Conduct of trial

[84]

PART D - EVENTS

[85]

Formal claims against Qantas culminating in writ

[86]

MBC engaged to act

[94]

Psychiatric assessments

[103]

Change in the psychiatric assessments

[107]

Other events prior to the settlement conference

[126]

Letter informing Ms Rossi about the settlement conference

[126]

Ms Rossi's attempts to contact Mr McCristal

[128]

Appointment with Ms Allan 21 October 2008

[131]

Appointment with Dr Singleton 22 October 2008

[132]

27 October 2008 pre-conference meeting (Monday)

[133]

27 October 2008 settlement conference at Sparke Helmore

[146]

After the conference and leaving the building

[162]

28 October 2008 (Tuesday)

[167]

29 October 2008 settlement meeting continued (Wednesday)

[174]

After the conclusion of the settlement meeting

[198]

Ms Rossi's diary notes

[207]

The Deed

[209]

PART E - EVALUATING CERTAIN EVIDENCE

[216]

Ms Rossi

[216]

Mr McCristal

[223]

Mr Hutchinson

[231]

Ms Firth's affidavit

[232]

Limitation rulings

[233]

PART F - FINDINGS ABOUT EVENTS

[237]

Standard of proof

[237]

Certain findings

[239]

PART G - THE EXPERT EVIDENCE

[293]

Principles

[293]

Dr Singleton

[298]

Dr Singleton's lay and expert evidence

[302]

Evaluation of Dr Singleton's evidence

[312]

Ms Allan

[318]

Ms Allan's lay evidence

[323]

Ms Allan's expert evidence

[342]

Dr Parmegiani

[356]

Dr Lee

[377]

PART H - CONCLUSION

[394]

Orders

[416]

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

With that caution in mind, I consider that in this case the words 'managing her affairs in relation to the proceeding' as used in O 15 direct attention not to a broad range of issues and responsibilities, but to the compromise of Ms Rossi's proceeding against Qantas by the Deed, requiring a similar approach to that adopted in Gibbons v Wright and A v N. This is expanded upon at [70]‑[74] below.Role of expert and lay evidence Many of the cases that address mental capacity reinforce the principle that it is for the judge to decide, on the basis of the totality of the evidence, both lay and expert, whether the particular legal test for incapacity has been satisfied. It may be that lay evidence may be more compelling than retrospective expert medical evidence. Some of those cases are in the testamentary capacity category: Zorbas v Sidiropoulous(No 2) [2009] NSWCA 197 at [65]; Drivas v Jakopovic [2019] NSWCA 218; (2019) 100 NSWLR 505 at [52], [65]-[67]; Croft v Sanders [2019] NSWCA 303 at [86], [128]; and Starr v Miller [2021] NSWSC 426 at [462], [487]‑[489] (upheld on appeal in Starr v Miller [2022] NSWCA 46). The principles were also discussed more generally in Guthrie v Spence:[194]That Professor Quadrio's reports do not address the ultimate question posed by s 11(3)(b) is by no means fatal. The task of deciding whether a plaintiff was under a disability within the meaning of s 11(3)(b) is not the sort of matter that is capable of being solved by medical evidence alone, and there are limits on the assistance a judge can derive from medical evidence. In performing that task, medical evidence can sometimes be of great assistance in deciding whether a person has been suffering from an impairment of his or her mental condition. However, even that element of the definition could in some circumstances be proved by lay evidence, of enough instances of aberrant or inadequate behaviour. Medical evidence about the way in which a particular mental condition manifested itself could also be of assistance in concluding that it was by reason of an impairment of the plaintiff's mental condition that he or she was impeded in management of affairs in relation to the cause of action. Again, however, even that element could in some circumstances be proved by lay evidence, particularly when the impairment of mental condition was gross.[195]Even when medical evidence is available that bears upon whether a person had capacity, for some legal purpose, it is frequently expressed in terms appropriate for a medical diagnosis. Expert evidence can be very helpful in identifying the circumstances from which the diagnosed condition arises, and how it manifests itself in the patient's life. But the legal test for incapacity that is applicable in some particular litigious circumstance is usually not expressed in terms of medical diagnosis. It is for the judge to decide, on the basis of the totality of all the evidence, both lay and expert, whether the particular relevant legal test for incapacity has been satisfied. In Re Estate of Griffith (Dec'd); Easter v Griffith (1995) 217 ALR 284 at 295, Kirby P said, concerning testamentary incapacity:In judging the will propounded, and the challenge to it, the court must consider all of the facts proved which are relevant to the testamentary capacity of the testator. It must not be deflected into a consideration of medical evidence, still less of jargon, as to whether particular conditions such as 'delusion' or 'paranoia' have been established.Though these remarks were made in a dissenting judgment, they are a correct statement of principle. The same applies concerning s 11(3)(b).[196]The need for more than medical evidence to be taken into account in deciding whether incapacity has been established has been recognised, in litigious contexts outside that of limitations, in Kerr v Badran [2004] NSWSC 735 at [48]-[50]; Revie v Druitt [2005] NSWSC 902 at [34], Ric Developments Pty Ltd (t/as Lane Cove Poolmart) v Muir (2008) 71 NSWLR 593 at 598 [22], 603‑4 [48] and Zorbas v Sidiropoulous (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 197 at [65].[197]Deciding whether a particular plaintiff's ability to deal with the practical tasks of initiating litigation has been impeded is often a matter of inference rather than something proved by direct evidence. It could not be expected that the ordinary skill and training of a medical practitioner would inform them of the nuances of the test for disability that s 11(3)(b) poses, and here Professor Quadrio was given no help in trying to grasp them. Further, the question of whether a person has been substantially impeded in the management of his or her affairs in relation to the cause of action is a mixed question of fact and law, because it involves an evaluation of whether such impediments to management of affairs as have been shown to exist amount to the plaintiff being 'substantially impeded'. The evaluative element in making that decision is one for the judge alone. That is why Professor Quadrio's report by itself would not have been enough to establish the disability.[198]Where the ultimate issue for determination by a court involves a pure question of the existence of a medical condition, it may be appropriate and inevitable that an expert will address the ultimate issue directly. Where, as here, the ultimate issue involves other considerations, it will often be inappropriate to expect (or even invite) the expert to address that issue.PART C - INTRODUCTION TO ISSUES AND WITNESSESSummary of respective cases

Decision

Reasons for decision

I accept the submission that on occasion Dr Lee tended towards legal conclusion (by reference to a legal authority and by use of the expression 'on balance of probabilities'), but that does not colour his report from my perspective. I have ignored the reference to the authority, and take his use of the expression 'on balance of probabilities' to mean no more than reflecting that he considered it likely, or more probable than not, that Ms Rossi had the mental capacity to understand the effects or general nature of the Deed at the time of entering into it, if its effect or general nature had been explained to her.PART H - CONCLUSION As I said at the start, the question of capacity in this case has not been an easy one. I accept, having regard to the medical evidence and the observations of Ms Allan, that as at 29 October 2008, Ms Rossi had a major depressive disorder, but that does not answer the question. In the end, the focus must be on the application of the appropriate test for capacity having regard to the principles. It is to be recalled that in Gibbons v Wright the High Court addressed the question of capacity by asking whether the sisters concerned had been capable of understanding at least the general purport of the relevant instrument 'if the matter had been explained to them' (at 438). That explanation would be sufficient if it enables the person to understand the general purport of the transaction: Hanna v Raoul at [54], [161]. Having regard to the instrument in this case and the nature of a compromise, I have proceeded on the basis that it is sufficient that Ms Rossi had capacity to understand something of her prospects of success, that any claims against Qantas would be resolved and come to an end if a settlement was achieved, that there would be no necessity for a trial, and that she would be paid the relevant sums had such an explanation been given to her (see [71] above). The terms of the Deed were not unduly complex. Some of the evidence and submissions as to alleged duress by Mr McCristal and Mr Hutchinson and the complaints about Mr McCristal's conduct and advice had the tendency to divert attention from that central test. It is not necessary to descend into an analysis of whether Ms Rossi had the capacity to understand each and every term of the Deed, the basis for the conflicting medical reports or the range of all possible alternative settlements or pathways forward. To do so imposes too high a standard of what is required for the purpose of determining capacity. To do so does not answer the question of whether Ms Rossi had the capacity to understand the broad operation or general purport of the compromise reflected by the Deed. The fact that the settlement was objectively a good one is not a persuasive factor. A person with capacity is entitled to accept or reject a good offer. The rejection of a good offer might have some relevance in assessing capacity in a particular case, but it is not to the point in this case. Ms Rossi understood from 9 October 2008 and throughout the period 27 to 29 October 2008 that the purpose of the settlement meeting was to try to mediate and settle her dispute with Qantas prior to trial. It had no other purpose. She had previously been involved in an unsuccessful conciliation. She had made clear to Ms Allan and Dr Singleton that she was attending a mediation or settlement conference.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.