Rossi v Qantas Airways Limited (No 5)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rossi v Qantas Airways Limited (No 5) [2023] FCA 1484

File number: NSD 1549 of 2019
Judgment of: BANKS-SMITH J
Date of judgment: 27 November 2023
Catchwords: COSTS - application for indemnity costs - Calderbank offer - where applicant did not accept offer by respondent to settle proceeding - whether rejection of offer unreasonable - where offer made in context of separate determination of issue - where objective assessment of offer required prediction as to a number of interdependent applications - costs to be paid on party and party basis only
Legislation:

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PO

Federal CourtRules 2011 (Cth) r 25.01

County Court Rules of Procedure in Civil Proceedings 1999 (Vic) O 15.08

Cases cited:

Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Limited v ACPA Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCAFC 112

Black v Tomislav Lipova BHNF Maria Lipovac [1998] FCA 699; (1998) 217 ALR 386

Centor Australia Pty Ltd v RMD Industries Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 1407

Daebo Shipping Co Ltd v The Ship Go Star (No 2) [2011] FCA 1544

Firstmac Limited v Zip Co Limited (No 2) [2023] FCA 1074

Gibbons v Wright (1954) 91 CLR 423

Hazeldene's Chicken Farm Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority (No 2) [2005] VSCA 298; (2005) 13 VR 435

Merial Inc v Intervet International BV (No 4) [2017] FCA 223

Rossi v Qantas Airways Limited (No 2) [2020] FCA 1080

Rossi v Qantas Airways Limited (No 4) [2023] FCA 1008

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 42
Date of hearing: 2 November 2023
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms A Costin
Solicitor for the Applicant: Harmers Workplace Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A Smorchevsky
Solicitor for the Respondent: Ashurst Australia

ORDERS

NSD 1549 of 2019
BETWEEN:

SARA ROSSI

Applicant

AND:

QANTAS AIRWAYS LIMITED

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

BANKS-SMITH J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 NOVEMBER 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant is to pay the respondent's cost of the proceeding, to be assessed if not agreed on a party and party basis.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BANKS-SMITH J:

  1. On 28 August 2023 I delivered judgment relating to a separate issue in this proceeding:  Rossi v Qantas Airways Limited (No 4) [2023] FCA 1008 (Rossi (No 4)).  The judgment determined the preliminary question of whether Ms Rossi lacked mental capacity and was a handicapped person, within the meaning of the relevant rule in force in Victoria, when she signed a settlement deed (Deed) with Qantas.  I was not satisfied that Ms Rossi lacked mental capacity at the relevant time.

  2. Ms Rossi had accepted that it would be necessary to have the Deed set aside in order to pursue the underlying proceeding, which was a claim for leave to bring an application under the Australian Human Rights…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 1484
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved a costs application brought by the respondent, Qantas Airways Limited, against the applicant, Ms Rossi. The dispute arose from a series of proceedings initiated by Ms Rossi against Qantas, involving allegations of sex discrimination and sexual harassment. The matter before the court was an application for indemnity costs following Ms Rossi's unsuccessful attempt to have the Federal Court set aside a deed that had been entered into by the parties. Qantas had made a Calderbank offer to Ms Rossi, proposing to settle the proceeding on terms that would have concluded the deed application and precluded further action by Ms Rossi. Ms Rossi rejected the offer and ultimately failed in her application to set aside the deed.

The central legal issue was whether Ms Rossi's rejection of Qantas's Calderbank offer was unreasonable. The court had to determine this by assessing the reasonableness of Ms Rossi's decision in light of the evidence and the circumstances at the time the offer was made. The court noted that the offer came at a stage when there was a separate determination of an issue pending, and it would have concluded the deed application, which sought only declaratory relief. Ms Rossi argued that the offer's rejection was unreasonable because it would have precluded her from proceeding with other applications, but the court found that an objective assessment of the offer required a prediction of the outcome of several interdependent applications. The court had to consider the value of having the deed declared void, the prospects of the leave application, and if leave were granted, the prospects of the substantive application for relief. The court concluded that while there were some difficulties with Ms Rossi's submissions, the rejection of the offer was unreasonable given the objective assessment of the prospects of success in the various applications.

The court found that Ms Rossi's rejection of the Calderbank offer was unreasonable and ordered that she pay Qantas's costs of the proceeding. The costs were to be assessed on a party and party basis if not agreed upon. This decision underscores the importance of objectively assessing the reasonableness of rejecting a settlement offer, particularly in light of the risks and uncertainties inherent in litigation.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant is to pay the respondent's cost of the proceeding, to be assessed if not agreed on a party and party basis.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

However, the gravamen of Ms Rossi's submissions, developed during the costs hearing before me, was that it was difficult to assess the reasonableness of the Offer when it would have the effect of concluding the Deed application (which relevantly sought only declaratory relief). It was said in effect that when the Offer was made, there remained a particular value to Ms Rossi in having the Deed application resolved and the Deed declared void, because she could not proceed to the 'next step' without that relief. Furthermore, it was necessary to consider that value together with the prospects of the leave application and, if leave were granted, the prospects of the substantive application for relief.Conclusion There were some difficulties with Ms Rossi's submissions. For example, to the extent Ms Rossi purported to rely on her 'personal experience of the relevant facts' and subjective views of events, such reliance was misplaced. As Siopis J noted in Daebo Shipping Co Ltd v The Ship Go Star (No 2) [2011] FCA 1544:[23]In my view, it does not follow from the fact that a party subjectively believes that it has a reasonable case, that its rejection of an otherwise reasonable offer of compromise, will be reasonable. The question of whether a party has acted reasonably in rejecting an offer of compromise involves an objective assessment of the prospects of success in the context of the fact that litigation is a risky and unpredictable endeavour, and that even cases with reasonable prospects of success, will fail. … As to the Deed proceeding, I recognize that the medical evidence exchanged prior to trial appeared to offer some support for Ms Rossi's case, at least on its face. I accept that such evidence was not before Gleeson J. However, it ought to have been obvious in assessing such evidence that there was a real risk as to whether underlying assumptions relied upon by the experts would be established, and in circumstances where the reliability of Ms Rossi's evidence was a live issue. There was also lay evidence that conflicted with that of Ms Rossi. Objectively, the capacity proceeding was risky and unpredictable, but it is not the case that there was no prospect of success. As to the question of delay and the prospect of any grant of leave to pursue the underlying proceeding, the submission that any delay was not Ms Rossi's fault was put only at a very general level. It was based on some of the evidence in the Deed proceeding that indicated Ms Rossi contacted many solicitors before securing representation. However, the nature of her communications with the other firms and the basis upon which they declined to act were not readily apparent. I do take into account, however, that had I found that Ms Rossi was handicapped by mental incapacity at the relevant time, that finding may have had an impact on the manner in which delay might have been assessed. This in turn would be relevant to prospects. As to the underlying proceeding, on the limited information about quantum, it is apparent that $100,000 was significantly less than the amount Ms Rossi was pursuing. However, the prospect of establishing many of the claims must be viewed conservatively. In Rossi (No 2), Gleeson J summarised the nine matters said by Ms Rossi to constitute sex discrimination and the four matters said to comprise sexual harassment (at [27]-[39]). It is apparent from that summary that most of the claimed events occurred more than twenty years ago and involved many third parties. There is a real prospect that Ms Rossi would be unable to establish the claims after such an effluxion of time, although it appears that there are some written records from the time.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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