Merial Inc v Intervet International BV (No 4)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Merial, Inc. v Intervet International B.V. (No 4) [2017] FCA 223

File number: VID 399 of 2015
Judge: MOSHINSKY J
Date of judgment: 9 March 2017
Catchwords: PATENTS – appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) – form of orders – whether declarations should be made – whether applicant for patent should have 60 days in which to apply to the Commissioner of Patents to amend its notice of entitlement – whether successful opponent should have part of its costs on an indemnity basis because of Calderbank letter
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 22, 31, 43

Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth)

Patents Act 1952 (Cth), ss 40, 59, 60

Patents Act1990 (Cth) ss 40, 59, 60, 102, 104, 105, 112, 112A

Cases cited:

Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175

Apotex Pty Ltd v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 2) (2009) 83 IPR 42

Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300

Bowen Investments Pty Ltd v Tabcorp Holdings Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCAFC 107

Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd v American Can Co [1980] VR 143

Brosnan v Katke [2016] FCAFC 156

Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333

Centor Australia Pty Ltd v RMD Industries Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 1407

Commissioner of Patents v Sherman (2008) 172 FCR 394

DSI Australia (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Garford Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 268

Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru (No 2) (2015) 327 ALR 192

Iluka Midwest Ltd v Technological Resources Pty Ltd (2002) 116 FCR 218

John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1

Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534

Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Pty Ltd (2016) 117 IPR 415

L Oertling Ltd’s Application for a Patent [1959] RPC 148

Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Genentech Inc (2016) 118 IPR 498

Merial, Inc v Intervet International B.V. [2016] FCA 1047

Merial, Inc v Intervet International B.V. (No 3) [2017] FCA 21

New England Biolabs Inc v F Hoffman-La Roche AG (2003) 60 IPR 83

New England Biolabs Inc v F Hoffman-La Roche AG (2004) 141 FCR 1

Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship (2013) 251 CLR 322

Queensland North Australia Pty Ltd v Takeovers Panel (No 2) (2015) 236 FCR 370

R v Smith (Commissioner of Patents); Ex parte Mole Engineering Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 340

Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) (2001) 115 FCR 229

Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 216 CLR 53

Veda Advantage Ltd v Malouf Group Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 2) (2016) 118 IPR 156

Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Date of last submissions: 22 February 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Intellectual Property
Sub-area: Patents and associated Statutes
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 56
Counsel for the…
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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 223
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Merial Inc v Intervet International BV (No 4), the Federal Court of Australia was asked to decide on the appropriate form of orders in relation to a patent dispute. The primary issue was whether declarations should be made, whether the patent application should be prevented from proceeding to grant, and whether the respondent should have 60 days to apply to the Commissioner of Patents to amend the application. Additionally, the court had to consider the costs implications of the case, including whether the successful opponent should have part of its costs on an indemnity basis due to a Calderbank letter.

The court found that the proposed declarations by the appellant, Merial, did not add significant value to the orders already proposed. The court held that it was not appropriate to make declarations about alternative conclusions that were not dispositive of the appeal. Furthermore, the court decided that the patent application should not proceed to grant, and that the respondent, Intervet, should not have 60 days to apply to the Commissioner of Patents to amend the application. Regarding costs, the court ordered that Merial pay the respondent's costs in relation to the grounds of lack of novelty, lack of fair basis, and lack of clarity. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the proceeding, excluding the aforementioned grounds.

The final orders of the court were as follows: (1) the appeal was allowed; (2) the decision of the Commissioner of Patents by her delegate in relation to the patent application was set aside, except as to costs; (3) Merial's opposition to the patent application was upheld; (4) the patent application would not proceed to grant; and (5) specific cost orders were made, with Merial paying the respondent's costs for certain grounds and the respondent paying the appellant's costs of the proceeding, excluding those grounds. All costs were to be on a party and party basis and be taxed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The decision of the Commissioner of Patents by her delegate in relation to patent application 2009203180 (the Patent Application) given on 10 July 2015 at IP Australia, Discovery House, Phillip ACT 2606 Australia (save as to costs) be set aside.

3. The appellant’s opposition to the Patent Application be upheld.

4. The Patent Application not proceed to grant.

5. In relation to costs:

(a) Nothing in these costs orders affects existing costs orders for the payment of costs thrown away.

(b) In relation to the appellant’s interlocutory application pursuant to s 31A(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) seeking summary judgment, the appellant pay the respondent’s costs thrown away (if any) by reason of the application.

(c) In relation to the appellant’s third amended interlocutory application dated 18 August 2016 for leave to file and serve a fourth amended notice of appeal in the form annexed to that application (which was dismissed on 19 August 2016), the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

(d) The appellant pay the respondent’s costs in relation to the grounds of lack of novelty, lack of fair basis and lack of clarity.

(e) The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the proceeding (other than the grounds of lack of novelty, lack of fair basis and lack of clarity).

(f) For the avoidance of doubt, the costs ordered on 8 February 2016 to be costs in the cause form part of the costs of the proceeding to be paid by the respondent to the appellant under (e) above.

(g) All costs referred to herein be on a party and party basis and be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Fullagar J continued (at 147-148):If the Commissioner decides so much of the opposition proceeding as is susceptible of decision at the time, and at the same time decides what things may be done in the future conduct of the opposition proceedings, I am of opinion that this constitutes “a decision of the Commissioner under this section” within the meaning of sub-section (5) on any view, because I think it is indeed a deciding of “the case” as it presently subsists as a matter or proceeding capable of present resolution. It does in my view decide the case so far as the case is at that time fully constituted. If on opposition proceedings the Commissioner concludes as follows and expresses the conclusions expressly or by necessary implication: −(1) The invention of the present specification is shown to be not novel. (2) The present specification does not define the invention. (3) These defects can on the material before me be cured by amendment. (4) I give leave to amend. (5)I shall decide nothing further until I see whether amendments are brought in and if brought in are ultimately allowed. I shall not give any final decision yet – then if the lack of novelty and lack of s 40 definition are the only grounds of the opposition, such a decision appears to me to decide “the case” as the case is at the time of the decision fully constituted. But I wish to say expressly that I would consider (3) and (4) and (5) above to be in most imaginable circumstances part of the decision of “the case”. In my view the matters dealt with in (3) and (4) are matters in the case, and with (5), and perhaps a reservation of costs, would cover the whole case as then constituted, and would leave the whole case as then constituted decided. The word “finally” does not appear in the statute, and in my opinion should not be imported in order to base an argument upon its supposed presence.(Emphasis added.) In Iluka Midwest Ltd v Technological Resources Pty Ltd (2002) 116 FCR 218, Merkel J considered the Mole Engineering case, Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd v American Can Co and the United Kingdom authorities referred to in those cases. In the Iluka Midwest case, the respondent (Technological Resources) filed a patent application which was opposed by the applicant (Iluka). The delegate of the Commissioner of Patents found that the patent application had a number of deficiencies but these could be overcome by amendment. At a second hearing, Iluka argued that the application to amend should be refused on various grounds. At this hearing, the parties agreed that it was open to the delegate to address only those issues arising out of the specific deficiencies identified in the earlier decision and anything consequential upon the amendments designed to correct those deficiencies. The delegate allowed the amendments and found that they overcame the earlier deficiencies. Iluka appealed to the Court against both decisions. Merkel J held (at [44]-[45]) that, to the extent that issues have been determined by an interim decision in a manner that is unfavourable to the interests of a party, it is incumbent upon that party, if it so desires, to appeal the decision; if it fails to do so then it is not open to that party to appeal, whether directly or indirectly, against the interim decision of the Commissioner out of time without leave of the Court; accordingly, an appeal out of time against the interim decision without leave would be incompetent. In the course of his reasons, Merkel J set out (at [46] and [48]) what was dealt with in each of the interim decision and the final decision. His Honour then said (at [50]):In my view, in the context of the statutory scheme in respect of an opposition, the interim decision is to be taken as dealing with and generally deciding the grounds of novelty and fair basis under ss 18 and 40 which were stated to be Iluka’s grounds of opposition, rather than only with the specific grounds of novelty and fair basis particularised, argued or pressed by Iluka at the hearing before the Delegate. In that regard it is relevant that the opposition is a proceeding between the applicant and the opponent in which the Commissioner is to adjudicate on whether the patent application should be granted (see s 61(1)). A patent is not to be granted if the invention is not novel or the claims are not fairly based on the specification (ss 18 and 40). In that context it is appropriate to view the interim and final decisions as relating to the grounds of opposition of novelty and fair basis generally, and as not restricted to novelty and fair basis as particularised, argued or pressed at the hearing. A narrow approach to the decisions (that is, deciding only the matters particularised, argued or pressed) is not consistent with their content, would tend to undermine the statutory objective of finality and expedition, is inconsistent with the approach to opposition proceedings taken in the English and Australian cases (and, in particular, with the view taken by Fullagar J (at 147-148) in BHP v American Can) about matters decided by an interim decision and is not mandated by the Act. Thus, prima facie, it does not appear to be open to Iluka, without leave, to rely upon the grounds of novelty or fair basis not pursued at the first hearing, the grounds of novelty or fair basis pursued at the first hearing, or any new novelty or fair basis grounds that were only applicable to the unamended application, as such grounds must be taken as having been decided by the interim decision.(Bold emphasis added.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The parties have filed written submissions, and responding written submissions, on the form of orders they consider appropriate to give effect to the Reasons. Apart from an order that the appeal be allowed, the parties are in dispute as to the appropriate form of orders. The issues between them fall under the following headings:(a)whether declarations should be made;(b)whether an order should be made that the Patent Application not proceed to grant or whether Intervet should have 60 days in which to apply to the Commissioner of Patents to amend the application; and(c)costs.I will address each of these in turn.Whether declarations should be made Merial seeks orders to the effect that the appeal be allowed; the decision of the Commissioner of Patents by her delegate be reversed (or set aside); and Merial’s opposition to the Patent Application be upheld. Merial also seeks declarations that:(a)Intervet is not entitled to a grant of a patent for the alleged invention as described in the application, and claimed in claims 1 to 17 of the application; and(b)the alleged invention as claimed in claim 1 of the application and claims 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16 and 17, insofar as they are dependent on claim 1 of the application, does not involve an inventive step. Merial submits that: the proposed declarations clearly state the grounds of opposition that were established by Merial; it is appropriate that there be a clear statement of the grounds on which the decision is based, including the extent to which they were established; this is particularly so, given Intervet’s attempt to preserve an opportunity to amend; and the declarations have utility as a statement of the basis for the grant of the other relief: see DSI Australia (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Garford Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 268 at [4], citing Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 216 CLR 53 at [95]. In the circumstances of the present case, I do not see any utility in the proposed declarations. In addition to an order that the appeal be allowed, I propose to order that the decision of the Commissioner of Patents by her delegate be set aside; and that Merial’s opposition to the Patent Application be upheld. If these orders are made, then the first proposed declaration adds very little to what is covered by the other orders. It merely details the successful ground of opposition, which is set out in the Reasons. Further, the second proposed declaration would set out alternative conclusions which were not necessary for the disposition of the appeal. I do not think it appropriate to make declarations about alternative conclusions which were not dispositive. For these reasons, I do not propose to make declarations.Whether an order should be made that the Patent Application not proceed to grant; whether Intervet should have 60 days in which to apply to the Commissioner of Patents to amend the application Merial seeks (as its proposed order 5) an order that the Patent Application not proceed to grant.