FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Commissioner of Patents v Sherman [2008] FCAFC 182
PATENTS – appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) against the Commissioner’s decision on an opposition to a grant of patent – whether tender of evidence as to the Commissioner’s decision, including the material on which it was based, inadmissible in the trial in this Court – whether Evidence Act1995 (Cth) applies to such evidence – nature of opposition proceeding before the Commissioner – nature of appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act – effect of s 160(a) of the Patents Act – effect of O 58 r 8 of the Federal Court Rules – admissibility of evidence at the trial governed by Evidence Act1995 (Cth)
EVIDENCE – admissibility of evidence as to the Commissioner’s decision and the material on which it was based – whether evidence as to the Commissioner’s decision irrelevant – whether evidence as to the material on which the Commissioner’s decision was based inadmissible as hearsay – evidence about the Commissioner’s decision relevant as jurisdictional fact and as the opinion of a person with technical expertise – this evidence and material on which the Commissioner’s decision was based is admissible under the Evidence Act1995 (Cth)
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether leave to appeal against evidentiary ruling ought to be granted – case raises a matter of public importance – leave granted
Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 60(4), 160
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 4(1), 8(1), 9(1), 48(1)(b), 56(2), 59, 60, 76, 77, 79, 140, 190(3)(b)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 24(1A), 38(1)
Federal Court Rules (Cth) O 58 r 8Epeabaka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 150 ALR 397 referred to
Jafferjee v Scarlett (1937) 57 CLR 115 cited
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation v Reynolds Metal Company (1969) 120 CLR 136 referred to
Commissioner of Patents v Microcell Limited (1959) 102 CLR 232 cited
Denison Manufacturing Company v Monarch Marking Systems Incorporated (1983) 76 FLR 200 cited
F Hoffman-La Roche AG v New England Biolabs Inc (2000) 99 FCR 56 referred to
Caroma Sales Pty Ltd v Philmac Pty Ltd [1972-73] ALR 427 referred to
Brickwood Holdings Pty Ltd v ACI Operations Pty Ltd [1983] 2 VR 587 referred to
European Community v Commissioner of Patents (2006) 68 IPR 539 referred to
Cadbury Schweppes Plc v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (2006) 69 IPR 584 cited
Commissioner of Patents v Emperor Sports Pty Ltd (2006) 149 FCR 386 referred to
E I Du Pont de Nemours and Company v ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd (2003) 128 FCR 392 referred to
E I Du Pont de Nemours and Company v ICI Chemical Industries Plc (2002) 54 IPR 304 referred to
Neumann v Sons of the Desert SL [2008] FCA 1183 cited
Titan Mining & Engineering Pty Ltd v Arnall’s Engineering Pty Ltd (1988) 12 NSWLR 73 referred to
R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 cited
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- Case
- [2008] FCAFC 182
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the Evidence Act applied to the appeal proceedings, and if so, to what extent it should be applied. Specifically, the court needed to decide if the Commissioner's evidence, including the delegate's affidavit and exhibits, could be admitted under the Evidence Act or if there were exceptions that allowed for broader admissibility of evidence in patent appeal proceedings.
The court found that the Evidence Act did apply to the appeal proceedings, contrary to the Commissioner's argument that other provisions allowed for a broader admissibility of evidence. The court held that sections 8(1) and 160(a) of the relevant Acts did not exempt the appeal from the ordinary rules of evidence. Moreover, the court ruled that the delegate's opinions on novelty and inventive step were irrelevant and inadmissible, as were certain exhibits deemed as previous representations. However, the Rork citation was found admissible as evidence of prior art, provided its publication before the priority date could be proven.
Ultimately, the court granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, setting aside the primary judge's ruling that restricted the admissibility of certain evidence. The court ordered that the Commissioner's affidavit, including all exhibits, be admitted into evidence. The parties were further directed to file and serve any submissions on costs within 14 days of the decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal be granted.
2. The appeal be allowed.
3. The ruling by the primary judge – that all but the first sentence of par 6, and pars 7 and 8 of the affidavit of Dr Steven Barker sworn on 14 February 2008 not be allowed to be read and that the tender of exhibits SB-2 and SB-3 to Dr Barker’s affidavit be rejected – be set aside; and in lieu thereof, order that the whole of the affidavit of Dr Barker including exhibits be admitted into evidence.
4. The parties file and serve any submissions on costs they wish to make within 14 days of the date hereof.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: HEEREY, KENNY AND MIDDLETON JJ
Secondly, the Commissioner submitted that, in any event, exhibits “SB-2” and “SB-3” and paragraphs 6 (in its entirety), 7 and 8 of the Barker affidavit were admissible under the Evidence Act.CONSIDERATION Section 8(1) of the Evidence Act is one of a number of provisions in Pt 1.2 of the Evidence Act that concern the application of that Act. Section 8(1) relevantly provides that the Evidence Act “does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act”. Thus, where a provision of the Evidence Act is expressly and directly inconsistent with the provision of some other enactment, the provision of the other enactment will prevail. Having regard to their statutory context, we agree with Finkelstein J in Epeabaka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 150 ALR 397 at 409, that s 8(1) (and s 9(1)) disclose a legislative intention that, where a relevant court is not required to observe the rules of evidence, the Evidence Act will not operate so as to impose that obligation. As we explain below, we do not consider that s 160(a) operates to take evidence led on an appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act outside the ordinary rules of evidence and, in particular, the Evidence Act. Accordingly, s 8(1) of the Evidence Act is inapplicable. In considering whether s 160(a) of the Patents Act discloses a legislative intention that the Court is not required to observe the rules of evidence in an appeal under s 60(4) of that Act, we first take account of the nature of a proceeding of this kind. The fundamental principles governing an appeal against the Commissioner’s decision on an opposition to a grant of a patent are well settled. First, an appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act in not an appeal in the strict sense. Rather, it is a proceeding in the original jurisdiction of the Court and is conducted as a rehearing (sometimes referred to as a hearing de novo): see Jafferjee v Scarlett (1937) 57 CLR 115 at 119 per Latham CJ; and Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation v Reynolds Metal Company (1969) 120 CLR 136 at 142 per Kitto J. The Court upholds the opposition only if clearly satisfied that the patent, if granted, would be invalid: see Commissioner of Patents v Microcell Limited (1959) 102 CLR 232 at 251 per Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar, Taylor and Windeyer JJ; and Denison Manufacturing Company v Monarch Marking Systems Incorporated (1983) 76 FLR 200 at 201 per Smithers J and 215 per Franki J. An appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act is different from some other “appeals” (as referred to in some other enactments) against administrative decisions that may be brought to this Court, where the Court decides whether the decision was correct in law, having regard to the evidence that was before the decision-maker at the time of making the decision. In an appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act, the Court does not ask this question. Secondly, on an appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act, subject to the Court’s direction, the parties may lead evidence-in-chief. The position of the opponent is relatively clear. As Emmett J said in F Hoffman-La Roche AG v New England Biolabs Inc (2000) 99 FCR 56 at [30], “[i]t would … be open to an opponent simply to tender the material that was before the Commissioner” and the “Court could, subject to all proper objections, admit that evidence”, although the opponent is not bound to this course.