Commissioner of Patents v Sherman

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commissioner of Patents v Sherman [2008] FCAFC 182

PATENTS – appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) against the Commissioner’s decision on an opposition to a grant of patent – whether tender of evidence as to the Commissioner’s decision, including the material on which it was based, inadmissible in the trial in this Court – whether Evidence Act1995 (Cth) applies to such evidence – nature of opposition proceeding before the Commissioner – nature of appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act – effect of s 160(a) of the Patents Act – effect of O 58 r 8 of the Federal Court Rules – admissibility of evidence at the trial governed by Evidence Act1995 (Cth)

EVIDENCE – admissibility of evidence as to the Commissioner’s decision and the material on which it was based – whether evidence as to the Commissioner’s decision irrelevant – whether evidence as to the material on which the Commissioner’s decision was based inadmissible as hearsay – evidence about the Commissioner’s decision relevant as jurisdictional fact and as the opinion of a person with technical expertise – this evidence and material on which the Commissioner’s decision was based is admissible under the Evidence Act1995 (Cth)

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether leave to appeal against evidentiary ruling ought to be granted – case raises a matter of public importance – leave granted

Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 60(4), 160
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 4(1), 8(1), 9(1), 48(1)(b), 56(2), 59, 60, 76, 77, 79, 140, 190(3)(b)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 24(1A), 38(1)
Federal Court Rules (Cth) O 58 r 8

Epeabaka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 150 ALR 397 referred to
Jafferjee v Scarlett (1937) 57 CLR 115 cited
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation v Reynolds Metal Company (1969) 120 CLR 136 referred to
Commissioner of Patents v Microcell Limited (1959) 102 CLR 232 cited
Denison Manufacturing Company v Monarch Marking Systems Incorporated (1983) 76 FLR 200 cited
F Hoffman-La Roche AG v New England Biolabs Inc (2000) 99 FCR 56 referred to
Caroma Sales Pty Ltd v Philmac Pty Ltd [1972-73] ALR 427 referred to
Brickwood Holdings Pty Ltd v ACI Operations Pty Ltd [1983] 2 VR 587 referred to
European Community v Commissioner of Patents (2006) 68 IPR 539 referred to
Cadbury Schweppes Plc v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (2006) 69 IPR 584 cited
Commissioner of Patents v Emperor Sports Pty Ltd (2006) 149 FCR 386 referred to
E I Du Pont de Nemours and Company v ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd (2003) 128 FCR 392 referred to
E I Du Pont de Nemours and Company v ICI Chemical Industries Plc (2002) 54 IPR 304 referred to
Neumann v Sons of the Desert SL [2008] FCA 1183 cited
Titan Mining & Engineering Pty Ltd v Arnall’s Engineering Pty Ltd (1988) 12 NSWLR 73 referred to
R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 cited

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Details
Case
[2008] FCAFC 182
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Commissioner of Patents v Sherman, the central issue was the admissibility of certain evidence during an appeal against the Commissioner of Patents' decision to oppose the grant of a patent. Bernard Charles Sherman appealed the Commissioner's decision to uphold Merck & Co Inc's opposition to the grant of a patent, which was based on claims of lack of novelty and inventive step. The crux of the dispute was the extent to which the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) applied to the proceedings and whether the evidence from the opposition proceedings should be admissible.

The legal issues before the court included whether the Evidence Act applied to the appeal proceedings, and if so, to what extent it should be applied. Specifically, the court needed to decide if the Commissioner's evidence, including the delegate's affidavit and exhibits, could be admitted under the Evidence Act or if there were exceptions that allowed for broader admissibility of evidence in patent appeal proceedings.

The court found that the Evidence Act did apply to the appeal proceedings, contrary to the Commissioner's argument that other provisions allowed for a broader admissibility of evidence. The court held that sections 8(1) and 160(a) of the relevant Acts did not exempt the appeal from the ordinary rules of evidence. Moreover, the court ruled that the delegate's opinions on novelty and inventive step were irrelevant and inadmissible, as were certain exhibits deemed as previous representations. However, the Rork citation was found admissible as evidence of prior art, provided its publication before the priority date could be proven.

Ultimately, the court granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, setting aside the primary judge's ruling that restricted the admissibility of certain evidence. The court ordered that the Commissioner's affidavit, including all exhibits, be admitted into evidence. The parties were further directed to file and serve any submissions on costs within 14 days of the decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal be granted.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The ruling by the primary judge – that all but the first sentence of par 6, and pars 7 and 8 of the affidavit of Dr Steven Barker sworn on 14 February 2008 not be allowed to be read and that the tender of exhibits SB-2 and SB-3 to Dr Barker’s affidavit be rejected – be set aside; and in lieu thereof, order that the whole of the affidavit of Dr Barker including exhibits be admitted into evidence.

4. The parties file and serve any submissions on costs they wish to make within 14 days of the date hereof.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons stated below, we would grant leave to appeal and allow the appeal.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The relevant factual and procedural background is as follows. On 1 March 2007, a delegate of the Commissioner of Patents gave a decision upholding the opposition by Merck & Co Inc to the grant of a patent arising from Patent Application No 697696 on the grounds of lack of novelty, inventive step and entitlement. On 22 March 2007, Bernard Charles Sherman filed a notice of an appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). Merck filed a notice of contention and a statement of grounds of opposition and particulars of objection, both of which Merck subsequently withdrew with leave. The Commissioner was added as a party to the appeal on the application of Mr Sherman. The Court subsequently made orders that the Commissioner file and serve the “evidence to which she proposes to draw the Court’s attention” and a “memorandum setting out the respects in which it will be submitted that that evidence should be of assistance to the Court”. In conformity with these orders, the Commissioner filed a memorandum dated 15 February 2008 and an affidavit of the delegate, Dr Steven Barker, sworn on 14 February 2008. The Barker affidavit is set out in full in the reasons for judgment of the primary judge: see Sherman v Commissioner of Patents [2008] FCA 1026 at [4]. In the 15 February 2008 memorandum, the Commissioner stated that she drew the Court’s attention to: (a) the decision of the delegate dated 1 March 2007;(b) the prior art citation WO 94/01093 (“the Rork citation”); and(c) the declaratory material filed by Merck in the opposition proceeding relating to the novelty and inventiveness of the claims in light of the Rork citation. Exhibited to the Barker affidavit were the delegate’s decision (“SB-1”), the Rork citation (“SB-2”) and what the delegate described as “copies of the declaratory evidence filed in the opposition proceeding by [Merck] and relied on by [him] in finding that the opposed application lacks novelty and inventive step in light of the Rork citation” and “a table [he had] prepared which identifies the relevant paragraphs within the declarations”. The declaratory material and the table were “SB-3”. By a notice of motion dated 3 April 2008, Mr Sherman sought, amongst other things, an order that the Barker affidavit and its exhibits not be admitted into evidence. Mr Sherman subsequently confined his challenge to paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Barker affidavit and exhibits “SB-2” and “SB-3”, stating that he did not object to the decision of the delegate (“SB-1”) being admitted (along with the application in suit, the entry in the Official Journal of Patents dated 15 October 1998 advertising acceptance of the application in suit, and the notice of opposition dated 14 January 1999). As indicated above, the motion was heard when the proceeding came on for trial on 20 June 2008. Also on this day, the Commissioner applied pursuant to O 58 r 8 of the Federal Court Rules (Cth) seeking to have the Barker affidavit and its exhibits admitted into evidence. The primary judge heard arguments and reserved his judgment, ultimately ruling that all but the first sentence of paragraph 6, and paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Barker affidavit should not be read and the tender of exhibits “SB-2” and “SB-3” should be rejected: Sherman at [26]. The Commissioner seeks leave to appeal against this ruling and requests that, if leave is granted, then the Court also determine the appeal. We have proceeded on this basis. THE PRIMARY JUDGE’S DECISION

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

HEEREY, KENNY AND MIDDLETON JJ
As indicated above, the motion was heard when the proceeding came on for trial on 20 June 2008. Also on this day, the Commissioner applied pursuant to O 58 r 8 of the Federal Court Rules (Cth) seeking to have the Barker affidavit and its exhibits admitted into evidence. The primary judge heard arguments and reserved his judgment, ultimately ruling that all but the first sentence of paragraph 6, and paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Barker affidavit should not be read and the tender of exhibits “SB-2” and “SB-3” should be rejected: Sherman at [26]. The Commissioner seeks leave to appeal against this ruling and requests that, if leave is granted, then the Court also determine the appeal. We have proceeded on this basis. THE PRIMARY JUDGE’S DECISION The primary judge held that the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) applied in a proceeding by way of an appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act. His Honour rejected the proposition advanced by the Commissioner that the combined operation of s 8(1) of the Evidence Act and s 160(a) of the Patents Act meant that “all material that was before the delegate would be received into evidence in the court without further formality or requirement”: see Sherman at [13]. His Honour considered that there was “no reason to read [s 160] as implicitly travelling beyond its express terms, particularly where to do so would give rise to a conflict with other legislation expressly applicable to proceedings in the court”: see Sherman at [13]. The primary judge was also unpersuaded by the Commissioner’s argument that s 38(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and O 58 r 8(1) of the Rules evinced an intention that material admitted in opposition proceedings should be admissible on an appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act, without the need to comply with the Evidence Act. His Honour held that, even if O 58 r 8(1) of the Rules “permit[ted] the reception into evidence of all material that had been before the delegate in opposition proceedings under the Patents Act, it could not have that effect as a matter of law”; and, in any case, O 58 r 8(1) did not purport to have such an effect: see Sherman at [15]. The primary judge ruled that, save for the first sentence of paragraph 6 of the Barker affidavit, the balance of that paragraph was inadmissible under s 56(2) of the Evidence Act. This was because the delegate’s opinion on novelty and lack of inventive step was irrelevant, these being matters for the Court to decide: see Sherman at [20]. His Honour also held that the Rork citation was inadmissible as a previous representation within the meaning of s 59(1) of the Evidence Act: see Sherman at [21]. In this context, his Honour rejected the Commissioner’s submission, made in reliance on s 190(3)(b) of the Evidence Act, that the application of s 59(1) would cause or involve unnecessary expense or delay. His Honour held that there was no evidence before the Court to support this submission. His Honour accepted that the Rork citation (“SB-2”) would be admissible as evidence of the prior art base for the purposes of novelty and inventive step, and that the Commissioner had satisfied the requirements of s 48(1)(b) of the Evidence Act. His Honour held, however, that the Commissioner had not established that the Rork citation was publicly available before the priority date. If the Commissioner proved publication (or the matter were admitted), then the Rork citation would, in his Honour’s view, become admissible.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HEEREY, KENNY AND MIDDLETON JJ

Secondly, the Commissioner submitted that, in any event, exhibits “SB-2” and “SB-3” and paragraphs 6 (in its entirety), 7 and 8 of the Barker affidavit were admissible under the Evidence Act.CONSIDERATION Section 8(1) of the Evidence Act is one of a number of provisions in Pt 1.2 of the Evidence Act that concern the application of that Act. Section 8(1) relevantly provides that the Evidence Act “does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act”. Thus, where a provision of the Evidence Act is expressly and directly inconsistent with the provision of some other enactment, the provision of the other enactment will prevail. Having regard to their statutory context, we agree with Finkelstein J in Epeabaka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 150 ALR 397 at 409, that s 8(1) (and s 9(1)) disclose a legislative intention that, where a relevant court is not required to observe the rules of evidence, the Evidence Act will not operate so as to impose that obligation. As we explain below, we do not consider that s 160(a) operates to take evidence led on an appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act outside the ordinary rules of evidence and, in particular, the Evidence Act. Accordingly, s 8(1) of the Evidence Act is inapplicable. In considering whether s 160(a) of the Patents Act discloses a legislative intention that the Court is not required to observe the rules of evidence in an appeal under s 60(4) of that Act, we first take account of the nature of a proceeding of this kind. The fundamental principles governing an appeal against the Commissioner’s decision on an opposition to a grant of a patent are well settled. First, an appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act in not an appeal in the strict sense. Rather, it is a proceeding in the original jurisdiction of the Court and is conducted as a rehearing (sometimes referred to as a hearing de novo): see Jafferjee v Scarlett (1937) 57 CLR 115 at 119 per Latham CJ; and Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation v Reynolds Metal Company (1969) 120 CLR 136 at 142 per Kitto J. The Court upholds the opposition only if clearly satisfied that the patent, if granted, would be invalid: see Commissioner of Patents v Microcell Limited (1959) 102 CLR 232 at 251 per Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar, Taylor and Windeyer JJ; and Denison Manufacturing Company v Monarch Marking Systems Incorporated (1983) 76 FLR 200 at 201 per Smithers J and 215 per Franki J. An appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act is different from some other “appeals” (as referred to in some other enactments) against administrative decisions that may be brought to this Court, where the Court decides whether the decision was correct in law, having regard to the evidence that was before the decision-maker at the time of making the decision. In an appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act, the Court does not ask this question. Secondly, on an appeal under s 60(4) of the Patents Act, subject to the Court’s direction, the parties may lead evidence-in-chief. The position of the opponent is relatively clear. As Emmett J said in F Hoffman-La Roche AG v New England Biolabs Inc (2000) 99 FCR 56 at [30], “[i]t would … be open to an opponent simply to tender the material that was before the Commissioner” and the “Court could, subject to all proper objections, admit that evidence”, although the opponent is not bound to this course.