Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 133

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for preliminary discovery – circumstantial information regarding conduct of former employees on establishing competing business – whether O 15A r 6(b) is determined by test of “bare pleadable case” – scope of discretion to refuse relief – commercial sensitivity of documents – relevance of delay ­– alleged unfairness

WORDS AND PHRASES – “bare pleadable case”, “sufficient information”  

Federal Court Rules O 15A r 6

Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 2065 reversed
Austrac Operations Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (2003) ATPR 41-960 cited
C7 Pty Ltd v Foxtel Management Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1864 discussed
Dartberg Pty Ltd v Wealthcare Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 450 cited
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 cited
Electricity Retail Corporation v Griffin Energy Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1810 cited
George v Rockett  (1990) 170 CLR 104 cited
Griffin Energy Pty Ltd v Western Power Corporation [2006] FCA 1241 cited
Hooper v Kirella Pty Ltd (1999) 96 FCR 1 cited
House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 cited
Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Civil Aviation Authority (1995) 217 ALR 33 cited
John Holland Services Pty Ltd v Terranora Group Management Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 679 cited
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 applied
Malouf v Malouf [1999] FCA 710 cited
Minister for Health and Aged Care v Harrington Associates Ltd [1999] FCA 549 cited
Page Kirkland Management Pty Limited (ABN 46 097 111 245) [2006] FCA 288 cited
Paxus Services Ltd v People BankPty Ltd (1990) 99 ALR 728 cited
St George Bank Ltd v Rabo Australia Ltd (2004) 211 ALR 147 cited
Western Bulk Carriers (Australia) Pty Ltd v Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd [2002] FCA 1520 cited

Jacob, I H (ed), Bullen and Leake and Jacob's Precedents of Pleading (12th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1975)

OPTIVER AUSTRALIA PTY LTD v TIBRA TRADING PTY LTD & ORS

NSD 84 OF 2008

HEEREY, GYLES AND MIDDLETON JJ
21 JULY 2008
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 84 OF 2008

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

OPTIVER AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Applicant

AND:

TIBRA TRADING PTY LTD
First Respondent

TIBRA CAPITAL PTY LTD
Second Respondent

TIBRA CAPITAL MANAGEMENT PTY LTD
Third Respondent

TIBRA GLOBAL SERVICES PTY LTD
Fourth Respondent

DINESH BHANDARI
Fifth Respondent

GLENN WILLIAMSON
Sixth Respondent

TIMOTHY BERRY
Seventh Respondent

ANDREW KING
Eighth Respondent

KINSEY COTTON
Ninth Respondent

JUDGES:

HEEREY, GYLES AND MIDDLETON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

21 JULY 2008

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant have leave to appeal.

2.The appeal is allowed.

3.The order of the primary judge made on 21 December 2007 is set aside.

4.The matter be remitted to the primary judge for orders to be made in accordance with these reasons.

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Details
Case
[2008] FCAFC 133
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd, Optiver sought an order for preliminary discovery against Tibra and several former employees, alleging wrongful disclosure of confidential information and passing it on to Tibra. The dispute was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary legal issue before the court was whether Optiver had established a reasonable cause to believe it may have a right to obtain relief from Tibra, and whether the application met the requirements of Order 15A Rule 6. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the requirements of Order 15A Rule 6(b) were satisfied, which pertains to the necessity of preliminary discovery to enable the applicant to decide whether to commence proceedings.

The court found that Optiver had provided sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable cause to believe that it may have a right to obtain relief. This included the resignation of several key employees and their subsequent involvement in a successful rival business, along with the discovery of concerning emails. The court held that it was not necessary for Optiver to prove every element of the potential causes of action, but rather to demonstrate a reasonable belief in the existence of a right to relief. The court emphasised that the requirement was not to establish a prima facie case but rather a reasonable cause to believe in the existence of a right. The court further found that the evidence provided by Optiver was enough to incline the mind towards the matter of fact in question, despite Tibra’s arguments regarding the shortcomings of the evidence.

However, the court also held that the requirements of Order 15A Rule 6(b) were not satisfied, as Optiver had already obtained enough information to decide whether to commence proceedings. The court stressed that preliminary discovery is not meant to procure documents that will strengthen an applicant’s decision to commence proceedings but rather to furnish it with information reasonably necessary to enable that decision. Once an applicant has obtained sufficient information to plead its case, it is no longer entitled to preliminary discovery. The court concluded that Optiver had crossed the threshold of a bare pleadable case and did not satisfy Order 15A Rule 6(b).

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the primary judge, and remitted the matter back to the primary judge for orders in accordance with the court's reasons. The respondents were ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant have leave to appeal.

2. The appeal is allowed.

3. The order of the primary judge made on 21 December 2007 is set aside.

4. The matter be remitted to the primary judge for orders to be made in accordance with these reasons.

5. The costs of and incidental to the hearings on 3 October and 30 November 2007 be dealt with by the primary judge on remitter.

6. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

There normally will be little scope for refusal of relief where the requirements of O 15A r 6 have been met. The remedy is beneficial and should not be refused, save for good cause. In our opinion, it would have been, and would be, wrong in principle to decline relief in the circumstances of the present case, if it be concluded that the requirements of O 15A r 6 were met. Admission of evidence Tibra’s amended notice of contention alleged wrongful admission of certain evidence. At the hearing, counsel for Tibra did not press that contention, rather putting it that the evidence, having been admitted, did not prove the relevant matter. Reasonable cause to believe Optiver’s amended notice of contention claims that his Honour erred in finding that Optiver had established under par (a) of O 15A r 6 that there was a reasonable cause to believe that Optiver had or may have had a right to obtain relief from Tibra. Senior counsel for Tibra relied upon the objective nature of the test to be satisfied. However, the requirement to be established is a reasonable cause to believe that the applicant has or may have a right to relief, not a conclusion that a prima facie case in fact exists (see Hely J in St George Bank Ltd at [26]; George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104). It was not incumbent upon Optiver to establish every element of the relevant causes of action, but a reasonable cause to believe that it “has or may have” the right to relief alleged. Of course, this is not to say that it is not necessary to examine the various elements of the potential cause of action that is sought to be relied upon to determine whether there is a reasonable cause to believe that each of the necessary elements exist (see Austrac Operations Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (2003) ATPR 41-960 at [11]; Leighton Contractors Pty Limited (ABN 98 000 893 667) v Page Kirkland Management Pty Limited (ABN 46 097 111 245) [2006] FCA 288 at [5]; Dartberg Pty Ltd v Wealthcare Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 450 at [44]). Nor can an application for preliminary discovery be sustained without evidence that must incline the mind towards the matter of fact in question (see Austrac at [37]; John Holland Services Pty Ltd v Terranora Group Management Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 679 at [13]–[14], [17], [73]; Dartberg at [44]). Before his Honour Tibra argued that there were significant shortcomings in the evidence in this regard. On the appeal, senior counsel for Tibra elaborated on these alleged shortcomings at some length. We do not think it necessary in the circumstances to review these arguments, which in essence go to the ultimate merits of Optiver’s case. Optiver of course accepts that it does not have the evidence to support a case – that is the raison d’être for the present application. However, there is sufficient evidence, irrespective of the shortcomings relied upon by Tibra, to conclude that there is reasonable cause to believe Optiver may have a right to obtain relief. Five employees leave a business which depends on highly sophisticated software skills and set up a rival which achieves swift success in the circumstances set out previously. One of the emails which excited Optiver’s suspicions was sent by Mr King to a private address on the day of his resignation. It was in the following terms (the format has been varied to assist readability):External influences that could cause an error trade:(things we need to check)general things· make sure we don’t lose information from feeds, or keep wrong information due to other factorso eg. instrument leg being wrong in combo, not sending flags on.o we should send on as much information that we can verify, or turn the instrument off.· are there other places where this could occur?· how do we handle zombie tcp connections to market links? need heartbeats badly, otherwise we could be trading off incorrect base prices.instrument feeds –· various parameters being wrong · base instrument change not handled properly· dividend contract change not handled (this isn’t handled at present is it??)· underlying change not handled properly· feedcode change not handled properly· do we handle instrument changed feeds etc. properly during start up?· race conditions with volatility changes in different instruments causing trades where one instrument uses old vol, other uses new vol.· is there any way we can know a trader just selected a bunch of instruments and changed their offsets all at the same time (can’t do anything about it in orc, but should think about it in tiger) eg. atomic operations.theoretical data· incorrect theos for some reason (eg. 0% wind down) – check delta and gamma etc. are reasonable, and that the base price specified is within a certain percentage of our current base.· different instruments within an underlying having different theos due to race conditionso (fix with grouped messages etc.)· dividend changes / rates changes etc. will lead to error trades. we need to be able to detect these correctly.o can’t we just listen to feeds from orc?actions· stupid trade deltas etc. with crazy amountso should have limits in front end, or possibly in back end.o that will mean we need to add action replies· cancel all orders – probably need to add an “Are you sure?” in CubClient once we have quoting and stuff in place.mlp feeds· is there any way we can better handle lost trade feeds? should match up trades to orders and check they correlate or something. could cause our position to be exceeded or something without realising· busted market linkso check if we get an order insert reply without an error that we get an order status feed within x seconds or something?o tearing, but would have shown up the om problem earlier.

Decision

Reasons for decision

HEEREY, GYLES AND MIDDLETON JJ
Although Tibra had obtained a generous timetable for the preparation of evidence, including foreshadowed expert evidence, in the event they filed no evidence. They tendered a letter sent from their solicitors to Optiver’s solicitors setting out substantive arguments, but in the absence of evidence explaining the material in the letter it was of no use to his Honour.Decision of the primary judge His Honour held at [20]-[23] that the circumstances, in particular the first to the ninth respondents’ terminations or resignations, the subsequent establishment of a new and successful arbitrage business and the discovery of the two “worrying” emails, showed that Optiver had reasonable cause to believe that it may have a right to obtain relief. This belief, in his Honour’s view, went “beyond mere conjecture or supposition”. His Honour stressed that this view did not mean that Optiver’s belief was correctly held, in the sense that it was likely to be vindicated in the proceedings. Its evidence at this stage need only establish a tenable objective basis for its belief. His Honour however proceeded to find that the requirements of par (b) of O 15A r 6 were not satisfied. His Honour said (emphasis added):27 It is settled law that the purpose of preliminary discovery is not to procure documents that will strengthen an applicant’s decision to commence proceedings, but rather to furnish it with information which is reasonably necessary to enable that decision to be made: see Matrix Film Investment One Pty Ltd v Alameda Films LLC [2006] FCA 591 at [19]. In other words, once a prospective applicant has enough information to meet the threshold of “a bare pleadable case” (C7 Pty Ltd v Foxtel Management Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1864 at [44]), an order under O 15A r 6 is no longer appropriate. Simply because it may be difficult to ascertain the finer detail of those pleadings and assess with accuracy the likelihood of success does not mean the prospects of success in the litigation should be amplified for the prospective applicant through the effects of an invasive order for preliminary discovery. An applicant which is unsuccessful in its preliminary discovery application can always plead its case as best it can, acquire further information and documentation through the ordinary processes of discovery and issue of subpoenas, and then, if necessary, amend its pleadings to assert further or different breaches of its rights or abandon any grounds or causes of action no longer considered tenable.28 It follows that an applicant, upon obtaining enough information to plead its case, is no longer entitled to preliminary discovery. Delay may also be important: see Western Bulk Carriers (Aust) Pty Ltd v Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd [2002] FCA 1520 at [25]. Once an applicant has obtained information sufficient to plead its case, or has unnecessarily delayed that acquisition, preliminary discovery will not be ordered, and the proceedings must commence. The threshold, once crossed, arrests the preliminary discovery process: see Ricegrowers Co-Operative Ltd & Seatide Pty Ltd v ABC Containerline NV & MED Containerline Antwerp NV (1996) 138 ALR 480 at 484.29 Orders of preliminary discovery are not intended to convey a forensic or tactical advantage, but rather to clarify whether litigation is warranted. While preliminary discovery will be beneficial to an applicant to the extent it crystallises their cause of action, or in some cases the availability of a defence to an anticipated claim, it should not be oppressive to a prospective defendant. Preliminary discovery is a one-way transaction, in the sense that there is no reciprocal obligation to produce documents. Only the applicant receives documents, which is markedly different to ordinary discovery in the course of a legal proceeding. In practical terms, the handing over of information which may be highly sensitive can be commercially damaging to a business. It is appropriate to exercise caution not to unnecessarily burden a prospective defendant to the point where its unilateral disclosure of information in preliminary discovery injures its commercial position vis-à-vis a competitor, or confers an unfair advantage on that competitor.30 Two conclusions can be drawn from application of the above principles to the present facts. The first is that Optiver has crossed the threshold of “a bare pleadable case”, and therefore does not satisfy O 15A r 6(b).31 The information which Optiver has at present – in particular, the termination or resignation of the fifth to ninth respondents, their subsequent establishment of Tibra, the discovery of two emails by Mr Keldoulis, and Mr Shale’s calculations – sufficiently equips it to decide whether to commence proceedings. This information is a basis for substantially more than what is required to institute “a bare pleadable case”. Although Optiver’s initial pleadings may not be as comprehensive as they would be after preliminary discovery, this is not a reason to grant the application. It often occurs that pleadings, as initially drafted, are amended in light of extra information gleaned from discovery.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HEEREY, GYLES AND MIDDLETON JJ

Full text does not contain this section.