Elfar (formerly EGS21) v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Elfar (formerly EGS21) v Commonwealth of Australia [2022] FCA 1402

File number: QUD 394 of 2021
Judgment of: RANGIAH J
Date of judgment: 25 November 2022
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for preliminary discovery under r 7.23 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – potential right to relief arising from conduct of a compulsory examination under the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) – whether prospective applicant can establish reasonable belief of a right to obtain relief against prospective respondent – where prospective applicant sought to be permitted to rely upon documents the subject of a Harman obligation - prospective applicant not permitted to rely on documents the subject of the implied undertaking - where no evidence that the prospective applicant otherwise lacks sufficient information to decide whether to institute proceedings – application dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Whether prospective applicant’s pseudonym should be removed – where pseudonym unnecessary in circumstances where prospective applicant’s identity is readily discernible – where no basis for retaining pseudonym was identified by the parties – where prospective applicant did not object to removal of pseudonym – pseudonym removed  

Legislation:

Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) ss 7, 7A, 7C(1)(b), 8(1), 9(1), 18(1), 18(2), 24A, 25A, 28(1), 28(1A), 28(7), 30, 36(1), 47(1), 49, 57 and 59

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5

Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) ss 11.2A(1), (2) 307.1(1)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 17, 37AE, 37AF, 37AG(1),(2), and Pt VAA

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 7.21 and 7.23,

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth)

Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564

Australian Crime Commission v OK (2010) 185 FCR 258

Australian Medic-Care Co Ltd v Hamilton Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd (No 3) [2008] FCA 976

Bailey v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1995] 1 Qd R 476

Bondelmonte v Bondelmonte [2017] FamCA 924; (2017) 57 Fam LR 567

Clifford v Vegas Enterprises Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1204

Commissioner of Taxation v Rawson Finances Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 628

DBH v Australian Crime Commission [2014] QCA 265

Elfar v ACC (No 5) [2014] QSC

Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10

Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421

Golding v The Queen; Elfar v The Queen [2020] HCASL 28

Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (1988) 19 WAR 316

Harman v Secretary of State for Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280

Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125

Holpitt Pty Ltd v Varimu Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 576

Ogawa (formerly Ms PD) v President of the Australian Human Rights Commission (Pseudonym) [2022] FCAFC 160

Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd (2008) 169 FCR 435

Patrick v Capital Finance Pty Ltd (No 4) [2003] FCA 436

Paxus Services Ltd v People Bank Pty Ltd (1990) 99 ALR 728

Poole v Australian Pacific Touring Pty Ltd [2017] FCA…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1402
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Elfar (formerly EGS21) v Commonwealth of Australia, the applicant sought an order for preliminary discovery against the Commonwealth of Australia under rule 7.23 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The applicant argued that he had a potential right to relief arising from the conduct of a compulsory examination under the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth). The court was required to determine whether the applicant could establish a reasonable belief of a right to obtain relief against the respondent, and whether the applicant reasonably believed that inspection of certain documents would assist in making the decision as to whether to start a proceeding in the court to obtain that relief.

The court found that the applicant could not establish a reasonable belief of a right to obtain relief against the respondent. The court noted that the applicant had not provided any evidence that he lacked sufficient information to decide whether to institute proceedings. Additionally, the court held that the applicant could not rely on documents that were subject to a Harman obligation owed to the Supreme Court of Queensland. As a result, the application for preliminary discovery was dismissed. The court also found that the applicant's pseudonym was unnecessary in circumstances where his identity was readily discernible, and the pseudonym was removed.

The court ordered that the name Terrance Elfar be substituted as the name of the prospective applicant in the proceeding. The court also ordered that the Commonwealth of Australia be substituted as the prospective respondent, as the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission is not a legal entity. The court further ordered that certain documents be not disclosed to any person other than the prospective respondent without the order of the court, on the ground that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. The court also ordered that the prospective applicant's application for preliminary discovery be dismissed and that the prospective applicant pay the prospective respondent's costs of the application for preliminary discovery. The reasons for judgment of the court were not to be published until further order of the court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name Terrance Elfar be substituted as the name of the prospective applicant.

2. The Commonwealth of Australia be substituted as the prospective respondent.

3. The following documents are not to be disclosed to any person other than the prospective respondent without the order of the Court:

(a) the bundle of documents marked “Exhibit A” in the proceeding;

(b) the document entitled “Overview of the Violation of Enacted Protection Mechanisms within Commonwealth Statute Being the Australian Crime Commission Act (the ACC Act)”, marked “Exhibit B” in the proceeding; and

(c) the affidavit of EGS21 filed on 31 January 2022;

on the ground that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

4. Order 6 of the Orders made on 28 March 2022 be revoked.

5. The prospective applicant’s application for preliminary discovery be dismissed.

6. The prospective applicant pay the prospective respondent’s costs of the application for preliminary discovery.

7. By 4.30 pm on 2 December 2022, the parties are to notify the Court as to whether they seek to have any parts of the reasons for judgment of the Court redacted.

8. The reasons for judgment of the Court not be published until further order of the Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The present application has its genesis in criminal proceedings taken against the prospective applicant in the Supreme Court of Queensland. It is necessary to describe those proceedings and other matters of background before considering the parties’ submissions.Background On about 12 October 2010, the prospective applicant was charged with importation into Australia of a commercial quantity of a border controlled drug, namely cocaine, in contravention of ss 11.2A(1) and (2) and 307.1(1) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth). On 19 October 2010, a summons was issued to the prospective applicant requiring him to attend an examination before an ACC examiner. On 28 October 2010, the prospective applicant was subjected to a compulsory examination (the compulsory examination). On 18 September 2013, Ann Lyons J of the Supreme Court of Queensland delivered a judgment in the criminal proceedings answering a preliminary question: R v Elfar (No 3) [2013] QSC. It is necessary to discuss that judgment in some detail. The preliminary question was:In circumstances where an accused is compulsorily examined or purportedly compulsorily examined by an examiner of the ACC after being charged, is it a fundamental defect in the trial process such that it justifies a stay of the proceedings on indictment? Her Honour noted that the essential allegations were that the prospective applicant and another person had collected a cargo of some 400 kg of cocaine about 320 nautical miles off Australia by boat and imported the cocaine into Australia. All five defendants had brought applications for a permanent stay of the indictment. The prospective applicant relied upon the unlawfulness of his examination by the ACC examiner on the basis of the judgment of the High Court in X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92. The prospective applicant argued for a stay on the basis that he had been unlawfully examined after he had been charged and that he could not now have a fair trial, or alternatively, on the basis that the unlawful compulsory examination had caused him prejudice. Justice Ann Lyons observed at [30]:Whilst the applicants acknowledge that the CDPP has indicated that the Crown Prosecutor has not had access to any of the interviews and that the examinations have been kept separate and isolated from the criminal case, the applicants still argue that the Court could never be satisfied that some information gleaned in the examinations has not been used derivatively in the investigation and preparation of the brief. At this point, it is necessary to outline some relevant provisions of the ACC Act in force at the time of the prospective applicant’s compulsory examination. Section 28(1) provided that an examiner appointed under that Act could summon a person to appear at an examination to give evidence. Section 30(2)(b) provided that a person appearing at an examination must not refuse or fail to answer a question that he or she was required to answer by the examiner. Section 30(6) made it an indictable offence for a person to refuse or fail to answer such a question. Section 25A(9) provided that an examiner could direct that any evidence given before the examiner must not be published, or be published only in a limited way. Section 25A(9) further provided that such a direction must be given if the failure to do so might prejudice the fair trial of a person who had been, or might be, charged with an offence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In these circumstances, I will order that “Terrance Elfar” be substituted as the name of the prospective applicant in this proceeding.Conclusion In these circumstances, the prospective applicant’s application for preliminary discovery must be dismissed. I will make orders for the substitution of the prospective applicant’s real name and for substitution of the prospective respondent. I will make orders preserving the confidentiality of the documents the prospective applicant sought to rely upon in this Court that are subject to Harman obligations owed to the Supreme Court. I will order that these reasons not be published until the parties have had an opportunity to make submissions as to whether any redactions of these reasons should be made. I will order that the prospective applicant pay the prospective respondent’s costs of the application for preliminary discovery.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd, the Full Court at [43] endorsed the opinion of Burchett J in Paxus Services Ltd v People Bank Pty Ltd (1990) 99 ALR 728 at 733 that:It would be unfortunate if a rule designed to amplify the court’s power to penetrate obscurities and uncertainties in the interests of justice were to be weakened by restrictive and unnecessary glosses. I think the rule is of a beneficial kind within the meaning of the well known principle of interpretation, and should be given the fullest scope its language will reasonably allow. The proper brake on any excesses in its use is the discretion of the court, which is required to be exercised in the particular circumstances of each case.(Citations omitted.)Consideration The following issues require or may require determination:·whether the Commonwealth of Australia should be substituted as the prospective respondent on the basis that the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission is not a legal entity;·whether the prospective applicant should be permitted to rely upon documents the subject of a Harman undertaking owed to the Supreme Court of Queensland;·whether the prospective applicant reasonably believes he may have the right to obtain relief against the prospective respondent: r 7.23(1)(a); ·whether the prospective applicant has insufficient information following reasonable inquiries of the prospective respondent to decide whether to start a proceeding in the Court to obtain that relief: r 7.23(1)(b); ·whether the prospective applicant reasonably believes that inspection of the documents would assist in making the decision as to whether to start a proceeding in the Court to obtain that relief: r 7.23(1)(c); ·whether the Court should refuse to make an order for preliminary discovery in the exercise of its discretion: r 7.23(2); and·whether the pseudonym used by the prospective applicant should be removed and his real name substituted.Whether the Commonwealth of Australia should be substituted as the prospective respondent The prospective applicant commenced the application against the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission. Section 7(1) of the ACC Act provides that the ACC is established. Section 7(1A) provides that the ACC may also be known by one or more names or acronyms specified in the regulations. The ACC has been known as the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission since 1 July 2016. It is, however, convenient to continue to refer to “the ACC” in these reasons. The first issue concerns an oral application made by Counsel for the ACC to substitute the Commonwealth of Australia as the prospective respondent on the basis that the ACC is not a juristic entity but is an emanation of the Commonwealth. The prospective applicant opposes that application. In State Superannuation Board v Trade Practices Commission (1982) 41 ALR 279, Ellicott J (the other members of the Court agreeing) held at 302:This leaves for consideration whether the appellant is the Crown or an emanation of the Crown in right of the State of Victoria and is therefore entitled to rely on the shield of the Crown.Whether a body set up by legislation is so entitled either generally or in particular respects depends on the intention of the legislature ascertained from the relevant legislation. The nature of the functions the body is established to perform, the capacity of the executive government to control its operations, the existence and degree of any external control over the exercise of its functions, the rights it has or others have over any assets committed to it and its obligation, if any, to supply information to the government, are all important matters to be taken into account.The question, in effect, is whether the body is the alter ego of the Crown. Therefore, if the functions conferred on it by statute are appropriate for the government to undertake, if the government has power under the legislation to control the exercise of those functions or the composition from time to time of its governing board or council, there will be strong grounds for holding that it is an emanation of the Crown.