Legal Research
Cases
State Superannuation Board v Trade Practices Commission

State Superannuation Board v Trade Practices Commission

Link copied

Case Copied 14 December 1982 38 min read

Contents

On this page

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gibbs C.J., Mason, Murphy, Wilson and Deane JJ.

STATE SUPERANNUATION BOARD v. TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION

(1982) 150 CLR 282

14 December 1982

Constitutional Law (Cth)—Crown—Trade Practices

Constitutional Law (Cth)—Powers of the Commonwealth Parliament—Financial or trading corporations formed within the Commonwealth—State Superannuation Board established by statute to administer fund to provide pensions for public servants—Whether financial corporation—Purpose of formation—Activities—Principal and characteristic activity—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 51 (xx)—Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s. 4(1)—Superannuation Act 1958 (Vict.), ss. 6, 7, 49, 53. Crown—Statutes—Presumption that Crown in right of State not bound by Commonwealth statute—Superannuation Board established by statute to administer fund to provide pensions for State public servants—Whether Crown in right of State—Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss. 4(1), 47—Superannuation Act 1958 (Vict.), ss. 6, 7, 49, 53. Trade Practices—Corporation—Financial corporation—Notice served on State Superannuation Board requiring provision of information and documents—Whether Board a financial corporation—Presumption that Crown in right of State not bound by Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)—Whether Board represents Crown—Superannuation Act 1958 (Vict.), ss. 6, 7, 49, 53—Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss. 47, 155.

Decisions

December 14.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
GIBBS C.J. AND WILSON J. The history of this case and the facts that are relevant to its determination are set out in the judgment of the majority of the Court. We can therefore address the issues immediately. (at p289)

2. The primary question is whether the appellant ("the Board") is a financial corporation within the meaning of s. 51(xx) of the Constitution and thus subject to the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), as amended; see the definitions of "corporation" and "financial corporation" in s. 4(1) of that Act. (at p289)

3. The words "trading" and "financial" in s. 51(xx) are not terms of art, carrying some specialized legal meaning. They are ordinary words intended to identify particular types of corporation. The concept of "trading corporation" has been the subject of discussion in two earlier decisions of this Court: Reg. v. Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte St. George County Council (1974) 130 CLR 533 ("St. George"); Reg. v. Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte W.A. National Football League (1979) 143 CLR 190 ("Adamson"). The judgments in those cases reflect a difference of judicial opinion as to the relative importance attaching to the criteria for determining whether or not a corporation is a trading corporation for constitutional purposes. The concept of "financial corporation" has not hitherto required the consideration of the Court. Nevertheless, in our opinion, the considerations which are material to the elucidation of the meaning and application of the term "trading corporation" are likewise material to the identification of a financial corporation, after making due allowance, of course, for the difference in function between them. The decisions to which we have referred therefore afford valuable guidance in the present case. (at p289)

4. In St. George, a county council was established under the Local Government Act 1919 (N.S.W.) for…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read State Superannuation Board v Trade Practices Commission and more:

Read every judgment in full
Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
Download judgments as PDF or Word

Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details

Case: [1982] HCA 72
Decision Date: 14 December 1982

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The State Superannuation Board (the applicant) sought judicial review of a decision made by the Trade Practices Commission (the respondent) under the *Trade Practices Act 1974* (Cth). The dispute concerned the Commission's refusal to grant an authorisation for certain conduct, specifically the Board's proposed scheme for the investment of superannuation funds. The matter came before the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Commission had erred in law in refusing to grant the authorisation. This required the Court to consider the proper interpretation and application of the provisions of the *Trade Practices Act 1974* relating to authorisations, particularly the public benefit test and the assessment of whether the proposed conduct would result in a substantial lessening of competition.

The Court's reasoning focused on the statutory framework for authorisations, which requires the Commission to balance potential detriments against public benefits. The judges examined the evidence presented regarding the likely impact of the Board's investment scheme on competition within the relevant markets. They applied principles of administrative law concerning the review of decisions made by statutory bodies, considering whether the Commission had taken into account irrelevant considerations or failed to take into account relevant ones, and whether its decision was otherwise affected by an error of law.

The High Court found that the Commission had not erred in law in its refusal to grant the authorisation. Consequently, the application for judicial review was dismissed.

Orders