FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Neumann v Sons of the Desert SL [2008] FCA 1183
HERBERT NEUMANN v SONS OF THE DESERT SL
VID 333 of 2007
RYAN J
11 AUGUST 2008
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 333 of 2007
BETWEEN:
HERBERT NEUMANN
ApplicantAND:
SONS OF THE DESERT SL
RespondentJUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 AUGUST 2008
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The decision of the Registrar of Trade Marks by his delegate of 2 April 2007 be set aside.
3.The opposition to registration of trade mark application No 977941 (“the Application”) be allowed.
4.The registration of the Application be refused.
5.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceedings before the Registrar of Trade Marks, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 333 OF 2007
BETWEEN:
HERBERT NEUMANN
Applicant
AND:
SONS OF THE DESERT SL
Respondent
JUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE:
11 AUGUST 2008
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Trade Marks by his delegate, Mr Iain Thomson (“the Delegate”), given on 2 April 2007, whereby the applicant’s opposition to registration of trade mark application No. 977941 (“the Application”) by the respondent was dismissed.
The Court’s jurisdiction to hear this appeal arises under s 191 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (“the Act”). Although referred to as an “appeal”, this proceeding is by way of an application for the exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction and is conducted as a rehearing. There is no presumption of the correctness of the Registrar’s decision but due weight is to be given to his opinion as that of a person expert in the evaluation of the relevant facts and the application to those facts of the principles which can be derived from the Act.
Background
In 1998, the applicant, Joseba Andoni Galdeano Del Sel and Beat Alexander Steffan discussed the incorporation of a company to be called Lucky Charm Distribuciones Tarifa SL (“Lucky Charm”), in which they were to be joint shareholders. They proposed that Lucky Charm should be a vehicle for marketing casual wear and clothing under the “EL NIÑO” brand and specifically agreed that Lucky Charm itself would not own any trade marks but that the three of them would personally own the trade marks in equal shares and that the ownership of shares in Lucky Charm would always reflect the ownership of the trade marks. It was also agreed, that when Lucky Charm expanded beyond Europe, they would obtain trade mark registrations in other countries in the names of the joint owners of the original marks.
On 25 September 1998, Lucky Charm was duly incorporated with the applicant, Mr Galdeano and Mr Steffan as the only three shareholders. Thereafter, several Spanish and…
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- Case
- [2008] FCA 1183
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in the appeal was whether the applicant and Mr Galdeano were joint owners of the trade mark in question, and whether the applicant had standing to oppose the registration on that basis. The applicant argued that under sections 42 and 57 of the Act, exclusive use of the trade mark by Mr Galdeano would be contrary to law, as it would breach the agreement of joint ownership. The applicant also contended under section 58 of the Act that the applicant for the trade mark was not the true owner because, by agreement, the applicant and Mr Galdeano were joint owners.
The Full Federal Court found in favour of the applicant, holding that the Delegate had erred in excluding the oral and implied agreements as to the joint ownership of the trade mark. The Court held that the August 2002 agreements were not entire contracts governing the ownership of trade marks by the parties, and that there was evidence of an agreement to jointly own the trade mark in all jurisdictions. The Court set aside the Registrar’s decision, allowed the applicant’s opposition to the registration, and refused the registration of the trade mark application.
The final orders of the Court were that the appeal be allowed, the decision of the Registrar be set aside, the opposition to registration be allowed, the registration be refused, and the respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceedings before the Registrar of Trade Marks.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The decision of the Registrar of Trade Marks by his delegate of 2 April 2007 be set aside.
3. The opposition to registration of trade mark application No 977941 (“the Application”) be allowed.
4. The registration of the Application be refused.
5. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceedings before the Registrar of Trade Marks, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: RYAN J
There was no appearance on behalf of the respondent on the hearing of this appeal.Consideration The applicant did not rely upon the evidence which had been before the Delegate but recognised that the Court might wish to have regard to it. In Malibu Boats West Inc v Catanese (2000) 51 IPR 134, the headnote recites that Finkelstein J held;‘(ii)There are two possible approaches as to on what evidence the court determines an appeal from the registrar:(a)the evidence comprises all that was before the registrar, together with any additional evidence that the parties seek to adduce. By permitting a party to adduce “further evidence”, the implication is that the material before the registrar must necessarily be before the court hearing the appeal (at [7]); and(b)the material that was before the registrar should be brought before the court. If the parties agree, that evidence can be used on the appeal. If the parties are not in agreement about the use of the evidence … the evidence or so much of it as a party wishes to adduce must be tendered again. In addition, further evidence can be led. The appeal must then be decided on the evidence before the court even if it presents a case that is different from that which was before the registrar (at [8]).’ The appellant in the Malibu Boats case did not seek to rely upon all of the evidence that had been before the registrar. Finkelstein J observed, at [10] that;‘Such a course might present difficulty in a case where there is no opponent, and the registrar does not appear, because the court may be asked to make findings that it would not make if all the material that had been before the registrar were before the court. It is in just such a case that the court will be assisted by the intervention of the registrar.’ Counsel for the applicant referred to par 3.65 of Shanahan’s Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off (3rd ed.), where it is noted that;‘The owner of the trade mark would generally be found to be the trader whose goods or services are distinguished by the use of the trade mark. That trader would be the owner at common law, for it would be he or she who would exclude others through proceedings for passing off. But the inquiry will usually be complicated by other factors … The issue may well have been concluded by agreement, either express or to be inferred from the conduct and relationship of the parties. On occasion, indeed it will be found that the trade mark is jointly owned.’ According to the applicant, the present is such a case. In parallel proceedings in New Zealand, the applicant had been unsuccessful in his opposition before the Assistant Commissioner of Trade Marks but ultimately succeeded on appeal. The New Zealand High Court had to consider whether or not the application for registration of the trade mark had been made in bad faith, which turned upon whether the applicant and Mr Galdeano were co-owners of the trade mark. Andrews J concluded as follows;‘I accept the appellant’s [Mr Neumann’s] evidence that … Galdeano and he are co-owners of the El Niño trade marks incorporating the seated boy device not only in Spain and the European Union, but also in any territory in the world. In so finding, I have not found it necessary to refer to the August 2002 agreements. Accordingly, I find that … Galdeano and [Mr Neumann, the present applicant] are co-owners of the trade mark for which the respondent [Sons of the Desert SL, the present respondent] applied for registration in New Zealand.’