Legal Research
Cases
R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex Parte Hardiman

R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex Parte Hardiman

Link copied

Case Copied 15 May 1980 34 min read

Contents

On this page

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gibbs, Stephen, Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ.

THE QUEEN v. AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING TRIBUNAL; Ex parte HARDIMAN

(1980) 144 CLR 13

15 May 1980

Broadcasting and Television—Administrative Bodies

Broadcasting and Television—Licence for commercial television—Prescribed interest held by company—Acquisition of shares by another company—Inquiry by Australian Broadcasting Tribunal—Duty to investigate matters relevant to inquiry—Contraventions of Act—Acquisition of beneficial entitlement to prescribed interest—Broadcasting and Television Act 1942 (Cth), ss. 25, 91, 91A, 92 (1) (a), (2), (3) (a), 92F. Administrative Bodies—Broadcasting—Supervisory authority—Inquiry—Procedure—Duty to investigate matters relevant to inquiry—Duty to summon evidence—Cross-examination of witnesses—Broadcasting and Television Act 1942 (Cth), ss. 16 (1) (c), 25, 92F (4), (4A), 106A.

Decision

May 15.
THE COURT delivered the following written judgment: -
This is an application to make absolute an order nisi for mandamus and prohibition granted by Stephen J. directed to the respondent Tribunal, its members, Control Investments Pty. Ltd. ("Control"), certain companies associated with Control, Mr. K. R. Murdoch and the Producers &Directors Guild of Australia, being parties to an inquiry before the Tribunal into an application by Control under s. 92F (2) of the Broadcasting and Television Act 1942, as amended ("the Act"). Control is and was at all material times a wholly-owned subsidiary of The News Corporation Ltd. ("News"). By letter dated 10th March 1980 addressed to the Tribunal, Control made application for approval pursuant to s. 92F (2) of the Act, of its acquisition of an interest of up to 38,560,981 ordinary shares in Ansett Transport Industries Ltd. ("A.T.I."), being one-half of the issued capital of that company. (at p19)

2. The prosecutors represent the Australian Labor Party and comprise the members of the Administrative Committee of the Victorian Branch of the Party and the members of the National Executive of the Party. The prosecutors were considered by the Tribunal to be persons having an interest in the inquiry and were, with the approval of the Tribunal, represented at the inquiry by counsel pursuant to s. 22 of the Act. (at p19)

3. For present purposes the importance of the acquisition of A.T.I. shares by Control is that it gives, or will give, that company "shareholding interests" within the meaning of s. 92F (1) in Austarama Television Pty. Ltd. ("Austarama"), the holder of the commercial television licence for Channel 10 (ATV) Melbourne, amounting to a "prescribed interest" in the licence within the meaning of s. 91 (2). This result comes about because Austarama is a wholly-owned subsidiary of A.T.I. It was and is common ground that the acquisition is a transaction within s. 92F (1) and that it was appropriate for Control to seek the Tribunal's approval of the transaction under s. 92F (2). (at p19)

4. The prosecutors claim mandamus because the Tribunal failed to investigate the matters which it is required to investigate by ss. 25 (1) and 92F (4A) of the Act. They seek prohibition because, amongst other things, the Tribunal failed to allow the prosecutors a reasonable opportunity to present their case…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex Parte Hardiman and more:

Read every judgment in full
Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
Download judgments as PDF or Word

Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details

Case: [1980] HCA 13
Decision Date: 15 May 1980

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an application for a writ of prohibition brought by Mr. Hardiman against the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal. The dispute arose from the Tribunal's decision to grant a television broadcasting licence to a company, Television Broadcasters Limited, in circumstances where Mr. Hardiman alleged the Tribunal had failed to properly consider certain objections he had lodged.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal, in exercising its statutory power to grant a broadcasting licence, was required to afford a hearing to objectors whose objections were considered by the Tribunal to be frivolous or vexatious. This involved an interpretation of the Broadcasting and Television Act 1942 (Cth) and the principles of natural justice.

The Court, in a joint judgment, held that the Tribunal was not obliged to grant a hearing to every objector, even if their objections were ultimately found to be frivolous or vexatious. Their Honours reasoned that the Act conferred a discretion on the Tribunal to determine the relevance and weight of objections, and that requiring a hearing in all circumstances would unduly impede the Tribunal's administrative efficiency. The principles of natural justice, while requiring a fair hearing, did not extend to a right to be heard on matters that were demonstrably without substance. The Court found that the Tribunal had acted within its powers in dismissing Mr. Hardiman's objections without a formal hearing, as they were considered to be lacking in substance.

Orders