Lynn v Australian Financial Complaints Authority

Link copied
Case Copied 73 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Lynn v Australian Financial Complaints Authority [2025] FCA 175

File number: WAD 279 of 2023
Judgment of: BANKS-SMITH J
Date of judgment: 13 March 2025
Catchwords: SUPERANNUATION – death benefit – appeal from decision of trustee of superannuation fund to distribute whole of death benefit to wife of deceased member – where marriage had broken down – deceased member had made non-binding death benefit nomination naming four children and two step-children as beneficiaries – complaint brought by daughters to Australian Financial Complaints Authority – AFCA not satisfied that trustee's decision was fair and reasonable in the circumstances – AFCA upheld complaint and determined that benefit be distributed between wife and six children – appeal by wife from decision of AFCA – meaning of 'dependant' – matters to be taken into account when considering whether potential beneficiary has reasonable expectation of financial support – nature of AFCA's statutory task – whether appellant accorded procedural fairness by AFCA – no error of law on part of AFCA made out – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 761A, 1053-1058, Part 7.10A

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 121

Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Ascic v Comcare [2020] FCAFC 105

BQG21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs[2023] FCA 865

Brown v Repatriation Commission (1985) 7 FCR 302

Bullivant v Australian Meat Industry Superannuation Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1588

Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee [2003] FCAFC 143; (2003) 131 FCR 28

Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409

Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92; (2015) 233 FCR 315

ISG Financial Services Ltd v Australian Financial Complaints Authority Ltd; ANLP Pty Ltd atf AP Superannuation Fund v ISG Financial Services Ltd (No 2) [2022] QSC 281; (2022) 12 QR 639

MetLife Insurance Limited v Australian Financial Complaints Authority (No 3) [2022] FCA 849

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Gungor (1982) 42 ALR 209

MZXLD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1912

Notesco Pty Ltd v Australian Financial Complaints Authority Ltd [2022] NSWSC 285

Ogawa v Australian Information Commissioner [2014] FCA 229

Phillips v Commissioner for Superannuation [2005] FCAFC 2

Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17; (2020) 275 CLR 582

QSuper Board v Australian Financial Complaints Authority Limited [2020] FCAFC 55; (2020) 276 FCR 97

R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13

Resolution LifeAustralasia Limited v Mitchell [2024] FCA 310

Rushton v Commonwealth Superannuation Corporation (No 3) [2021] FCA 358

Servos v Repatriation Commission (1995) 56 FCR 377

Wan v BT Funds Management Limited [2022] FCA 302

Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54

Division: General Division
Registry: Western Australia
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Number of paragraphs: 173
Date of last submissions: 3 February 2025
Date of hearing: 10 December 2024
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Lynn v Australian Financial Complaints Authority and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2025] FCA 175
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Lynn v Australian Financial Complaints Authority involved Consuella Lynn, the appellant, who was contesting the decision of the Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA) that the death benefit of her late husband, Mr. Lynn, should be distributed between her and his six children, rather than solely to her. The central issue was whether the distribution of the death benefit should adhere to Mr. Lynn's non-binding nomination or whether it should follow the statutory provisions and the trustee's assessment of financial dependency. The court had to determine if AFCA's decision was fair, reasonable, and in accordance with the applicable statutes and procedural fairness.

The court examined whether AFCA correctly applied the relevant provisions of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) and the terms of the trust deed. It found that AFCA appropriately identified Ms. Lynn as a potential beneficiary under the Trust Deed and the SIS Act, despite the breakdown in her marriage with Mr. Lynn. The court also considered whether AFCA had sufficient evidence to conclude that the six children were not financially dependent on Mr. Lynn at the time of his death. The court held that AFCA was entitled to consider the expectation of ongoing financial support and Mr. Lynn's wishes as expressed in the non-binding nomination. The court rejected Ms. Lynn's argument that AFCA misapplied the law or failed to consider relevant evidence, finding that AFCA's decision was supported by the evidence and was in line with the statutory requirements.

The Federal Court dismissed the appeal, confirming the decision of AFCA that the death benefit should be distributed between Ms. Lynn and the six children. The court also refused Ms. Lynn's application to rely on fresh evidence that was not before AFCA, adhering to the principle that new evidence cannot be introduced on appeal unless it was available at the time of the original decision. The court ordered the parties to confer on costs and, if they were unable to agree, to have the issues of quantum determined by a registrar of the Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant's application to rely on fresh evidence on the appeal is refused.

2. Appeal dismissed.

3. The parties are to confer as to costs and provide a joint minute of proposed orders within 14 days, failing which orders will be made as to costs, including referring issues of quantum for determination by a registrar of this Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

'Child' is defined to include a step-child, an adopted child and a child within the meaning of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).Background facts Before turning to the various decisions that led to and include the Determination, I note some relevant background facts. On 1 November 2006 Mr Lynn's former superannuation fund (which he joined on 1 June 2006) became part of the AustralianSuper trust fund. On 8 September 2007 Mr Lynn and Ms Lynn were married. On 2 February 2018 Mr Lynn made a non-binding death benefit nomination. It provided that Sarah and Kate were to receive 16% of the benefit each, and Tye, Ben, Christina and Bethany were to receive 17% each. On 8 March 2019 Mr Lynn executed a will leaving his estate to Ms Lynn. On 19 August 2020 consent orders were made by the Family Court, reciting that the parties had separated on 5 June 2020 and encompassing a property and financial settlement. On 11 March 2021 Mr and Mrs Lynn signed a minute of consent orders to discharge the orders made 19 August 2020. The orders were made by the Family Court of Western Australia on 16 April 2021. On 10 December 2021 Mr Lynn obtained an interim FVRO against Ms Lynn valid until March 2022. On 12 December 2021 Mr Lynn asked his lawyer by email to prepare a new will with his four daughters as equal beneficiaries. On 30 December 2021 Ms Lynn obtained an interim FVRO against Mr Lynn. That same day police officers attended Mr Lynn's residence to serve the interim FVRO and found him deceased inside the house. The coroner reported that Mr Lynn died of natural causes. On 10 February 2022 Kate (the youngest daughter, who had received certain payments from her father prior to his death) graduated from university.Trustee's initial decision On 9 September 2022 the trustee notified the relevant parties of its decision to pay the entire benefit to Mr Lynn's LPR. On 9 September 2022 Ms Lynn notified the trustee that she objected to the trustee's decision, seeking payment of the benefit to herself. On 4 November 2022 Christina notified the trustee that she objected to the trustee's decision, seeking payment of the benefit in equal shares to Mr Lynn's four daughters.Trustee's amended decision On 5 December 2022 the trustee notified the relevant potential beneficiaries that it had amended its decision and would pay the entire benefit to Ms Lynn, rather than the LPR. It gave the following reasons:The evidence provided is somewhat inconsistent to the views of the various parties. We acknowledge the 'email' Will document and family violence order dated in December 2021 is indicative of the deceased and Consuella being separated at the time of the deceased passing.However, the other information provided including bank statements, death certificate, marriage certificate and declared consent orders support Consuella was the deceased legal spouse at the date of his passing and she was financially dependant on the deceased to support the joint mortgages and property cost in which they held together. This is that Consuella could have reasonably expected that financial support to maintain these properties including the mortgages would have continued had the deceased not passed.We also acknowledge that the deceased was supporting Kate Lynn financially by way of $500 cash per month for a period of 6 months. We are of the view that these payments do not adequately support that Kate was financially dependant on the deceased as the payments do not support an ongoing period of financial reliance and that the payments were to stop after a set period of time.These payments are considered a gift and not ongoing financial support which was expected to continue. As such we believe the evidence supports Kate Lynn, Christina Barnes, Sarah Lynn, Bethany Le Coultre not to meet the definition of being a financial dependant or interdependent to the deceased at his time of death.The Trustee's decision is based on the evidence presented and it is satisfied that as Consuella Lynn was the deceased member's lawful spouse at the time of his death, has provided evidence of her financial dependence, and as such is the higher claimant.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As to the third theme, a denial of procedural fairness is an error of law and an appeal from a decision-maker on the ground that the applicant was denied procedural fairness raises a question of law: Clements at [8]; Haritos at [202].Ms Lynn's application to rely on fresh evidence Before turning to the grounds relied upon by Ms Lynn, I must deal with her application pursued at the hearing to rely upon additional documents that were not before AFCA at the time it considered and made its decision. I have looked at and considered all of the documents in issue. Upon institution of the appeal, and as required by s 1057B of the Corporations Act, AFCA provided to this Court and Ms Lynn a list of documents that were before it in connection with its consideration of the Determination (284 items that pre-date the Determination). At a case management hearing, and having regard to the fact that Ms Lynn appeared in person and did not have the assistance of legal representation, I requested a registrar of this Court assist the parties in settling the index to Part C of the appeal book. This course was undertaken and Part C of the appeal book was then prepared by AFCA's solicitors for use on the appeal. It included in the 'Documents' section some 64 documents, all of which (bar one) pre-dated the Determination. The one document that post-dated the Determination is the letter from AFCA to Ms Lynn referred to at [107] above. There was no objection by the parties to the inclusion of these documents in Part C, nor to reference to them by the Court. However, Ms Lynn purported to provide further documents to the Court for the purpose of the appeal by attaching them by way of a schedule (which she referred to as an exhibit) to her reply submissions (Schedule documents). They were also included in Part C of the Appeal Book, which contained copies of all filed submissions. I indicated to the parties prior to the hearing that whether or not the Schedule documents would be accepted into evidence would be addressed at the hearing and in these reasons. As there was some dispute, I asked for a joint submission as to which of the Schedule documents had been before AFCA as at the date of its Determination. I received that schedule on 3 February 2025. As to the principles on adducing evidence that was not before a decision-maker such as AFCA, this is an appeal on a question of law as discussed at [15] above, and principles applicable to appeals under s 44 of the AAT Act guide the approach. In Servos v Repatriation Commission (1995) 56 FCR 377 Spender J considered to what extent evidence not before the tribunal at the time of its decision can be adduced on an appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act (as then in force). His Honour held that the jurisdiction of this Court did not permit the reception of further evidence that was not before the tribunal for the purpose of challenging a finding of fact (at 385):As s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act makes plain, only questions of law are to be considered at the Federal Court level. The policy of the legislation in my opinion is to make the decision of the tribunal final on questions of fact. It is inconsistent with that policy to seek to adduce evidence before the Federal Court for the consideration of the court on an application pursuant to s 44 of the Act, the object of which is to invite the court to disagree with a factual conclusion reached by that Tribunal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 4 November 2022 Christina notified the trustee that she objected to the trustee's decision, seeking payment of the benefit in equal shares to Mr Lynn's four daughters.Trustee's amended decision On 5 December 2022 the trustee notified the relevant potential beneficiaries that it had amended its decision and would pay the entire benefit to Ms Lynn, rather than the LPR. It gave the following reasons:The evidence provided is somewhat inconsistent to the views of the various parties. We acknowledge the 'email' Will document and family violence order dated in December 2021 is indicative of the deceased and Consuella being separated at the time of the deceased passing.However, the other information provided including bank statements, death certificate, marriage certificate and declared consent orders support Consuella was the deceased legal spouse at the date of his passing and she was financially dependant on the deceased to support the joint mortgages and property cost in which they held together. This is that Consuella could have reasonably expected that financial support to maintain these properties including the mortgages would have continued had the deceased not passed.We also acknowledge that the deceased was supporting Kate Lynn financially by way of $500 cash per month for a period of 6 months. We are of the view that these payments do not adequately support that Kate was financially dependant on the deceased as the payments do not support an ongoing period of financial reliance and that the payments were to stop after a set period of time.These payments are considered a gift and not ongoing financial support which was expected to continue. As such we believe the evidence supports Kate Lynn, Christina Barnes, Sarah Lynn, Bethany Le Coultre not to meet the definition of being a financial dependant or interdependent to the deceased at his time of death.The Trustee's decision is based on the evidence presented and it is satisfied that as Consuella Lynn was the deceased member's lawful spouse at the time of his death, has provided evidence of her financial dependence, and as such is the higher claimant. On 5 December 2022 the daughters lodged an objection with the trustee to the amended decision.An objection is lodged with AFCA but deferred On 19 December 2022 Sarah lodged a complaint by email with AFCA. Relevantly the email stated:I would like the decision made by Australian Super reviewed as I believe that it is not in line with my fathers wishes.The decision made that the benefit will be paid to his estranged wife, whom he had a family violence restraining order in place protecting him from, is not what he would have wanted.My opinion is supported by the fact that my father had in place a death benefit nomination, nominating his children and step children.The decision by Australian Super is not just in line with what my father wanted and the benefit being paid to his abuser is an injustice that I strongly reject and wish to have reviewed by a third party.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Accordingly, the appeal is to be determined having regard to the evidence that was before AFCA at the time of its decision.Consideration of issues raised by Ms LynnFirst theme – misapplication of provisions Ms Lynn contends that AFCA misapplied the provisions of the SIS Act and the Trust Deed in relation to her status as a spouse. It is apparent that AFCA well understood the need to consider and apply the terms of the Trust Deed and SIS Act. AFCA properly identified that each of Ms Lynn and the six children qualified as potential beneficiaries. Despite evidence as to the breakdown in the relationship between Mr Lynn and Ms Lynn, it accepted that Ms Lynn remained Mr Lynn's legal wife and qualified as a dependant under the Trust Deed and was to be considered in the distribution of the estate. Similarly AFCA properly identified that children and step-children fall within the definition of 'child' in the SIS Act as adopted by the Trust Deed. On that basis, all six children could be considered in the distribution of the benefit. No error is shown as to AFCA's understanding of the definition in the Trust Deed or SIS Act.Second theme – no or insufficient evidence for findings The question then arises as to the matters to which AFCA might have regard in reaching its decision. According to its reasons those matters included whether there was anyone who had an expectation of ongoing financial support or a right to look to the deceased for ongoing financial support had the deceased not died, as well as Mr Lynn's wishes. There is no doubt that AFCA was entitled to have regard to such matters. Expectations of future financial support on the part of dependants are relevant but not exhaustive: Bullivant v Australian Meat Industry Superannuation Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1588 at [49]. Similarly, AFCA was entitled to have regard to Mr Lynn's wishes as evidenced by the non-binding death benefit nomination (rule 24.9 of the Trust Deed). It was entitled to have regard to the circumstances regarding Mr Lynn's testamentary intentions, although such circumstances are not necessarily determinative of themselves: Bullivant at [51]; and Wan v BT Funds Management Limited [2022] FCA 302 at [106]. Most of Ms Lynn's submissions focus on whether evidence was sufficient or ought to have been taken into account by AFCA in coming to its decision. By this route it might be said that Ms Lynn is seeking to challenge factual findings made by AFCA rather than questions of law in the strict sense. However, as I indicated above, I will address her various complaints about the evidence, some of which were included in the written submissions and some of which were raised during the hearing. I should note that Ms Lynn's submissions were somewhat opaque and convoluted. That is not a criticism, as I have taken into account that Ms Lynn was not represented. It does, however, explain why not every submission or comment made by Ms Lynn is addressed separately in these reasons. There was much overlap, and some notable irrelevance and unfounded speculation. However, in my view the complaints relied upon by Ms Lynn are sensibly and practically covered by reference to the following matters.