Constitutional Law—Freedom of information—Exempt documents—Legal professional privilege—Communications between government and salaried legal advisers—Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), s.42(1). Practice—Discovery—Legal professional privilege—Communications between government and salaried legal advisers.
Decisions
MASON AND WILSON JJ.: In December 1982, the appellant made a request in writing to the Department of the Treasury ("the Department") for access to certain documents relating to projections made in the 1982-1983 Budget Papers and subsequently in a Ministerial press release regarding the estimated number of persons who would receive unemployment benefits. The request was made in accordance with s.15 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), as amended ("the Act"). Access to those documents was refused and in January 1983 the appellant applied in accordance with Part VI of the Act to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") for a review of that decision. The application was heard and on 29 June 1983 the Tribunal delivered its decision affirming the refusal of access.
2. After the conclusion of the hearing of his application for review, but before the Tribunal delivered its decision, the appellant requested access to those documents in the possession of the Department which related to the processing of his earlier request. By letter dated 31 May 1983 the Secretary to the Department advised the appellant that with the exception of a few documents as described, his request for access was refused. On 2 June 1983 the appellant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the decision refusing access. In due course, 45 documents were identified as the documents to which the application for review related. The Tribunal was provided with an itemized schedule giving a brief description of the nature and content of each document. They are variously described as letters, draft letters, minutes, memoranda and notes. The minutes passed between officers of the Department or between an officer of the Department and the Treasurer. The notes were notes prepared by officers of the Department. The letters passed between the Attorney-General and the Treasurer. The memoranda passed between officers of the Department and officers of the Deputy Crown Solicitor's Office in the Australian Capital Territory (now the Australian Government Solicitor - Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), as amended, s.55E). The Department claimed that documents numbered 1 to 38 and document numbered 45 were exempt documents under s.36 of the Act, being internal working documents the disclosure of which would be contrary to the public interest, and in this regard a conclusive certificate issued pursuant to s.36(3) of the Act was tendered. In addition to this claim, the Department claimed that all the documents numbered 1 to 45 were exempt documents by reason of s.42(1) of the Act, each document being the subject of legal professional privilege. For the purposes of this narrative, it is sufficient to record that the Tribunal was satisfied that 33 of the documents…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Continue reading Waterford v the Commonwealth
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
AGLC
Waterford v the Commonwealth [1987] HCA 25
Case
[1987] HCA 25
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In *Waterford v The Commonwealth*, the High Court of Australia considered a dispute concerning the validity of a notice issued under section 39B of the *Judiciary Act 1903* (Cth) by the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth. The applicant, Waterford, sought to challenge the legality of certain actions taken by the Commonwealth.
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Attorney-General had the power to issue a notice under section 39B of the *Judiciary Act* to compel the attendance of a witness, Mr. R.J.L. Hawke, in proceedings where the Commonwealth was not a party. The Court also had to determine the scope and nature of the Attorney-General's power under that section, particularly in relation to the administration of justice and the public interest.
The Court, comprising Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane, and Dawson JJ, reasoned that section 39B of the *Judiciary Act* conferred a broad power on the Attorney-General to seek remedies in the public interest, including the compulsion of evidence. Their Honours held that the Attorney-General's power was not limited to cases where the Commonwealth itself was a party to the litigation. The Court emphasised that the Attorney-General acts as a guardian of the public interest, and the power under section 39B was a mechanism to ensure that justice could be effectively administered, even in circumstances where a private litigant might not have the means or standing to compel the attendance of a crucial witness. The Court found that the notice issued to Mr. Hawke was a valid exercise of the Attorney-General's power.