FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Nellie & Nellie [2024] FedCFamC1A 171
Appeal from: Nellie & Nellie (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 198
Nellie & Nellie (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC1F 367
Appeal numbers: NAA 97 of 2024
NAA 141 of 2024File number: SYC 8520 of 2022 Judgment of: MCCLELLAND DCJ, TREE & ALTOBELLI JJ Date of judgment: 27 September 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – ARBITRATION – Property – Where the appellant seeks to appeal the decision to dismiss his application for review of a registered arbitral award pursuant to s 13J of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Where the grounds of appeal do not identify any error in respect to a question of law on the part of the primary judge – Where the complaints raised by the appellant merely reflect the submissions made on review before the primary judge – Adequacy of reasons – Where the appellant complains that there was no transcript from the arbitral hearing – Where the appellant was at liberty to supplement that deficiency in the record, but did not do so – Where the absence of transcript is not a passport to a new trial – Appeal dismissed – Appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal in a fixed sum.
FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – COSTS – Where costs orders were made in the absence of the appellant – Where the appellant appeals those orders – Where it is contended that given the existence of a substantive appeal, it was practically reasonable to request that the appellate court address the primary judge’s costs judgment – Where the appellant has not exhausted all reasonably available remedial options at first instance before appealing the primary judge’s decision – Costs appeal dismissed.
Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 13E, 13J, 75(2), 79, 117
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 10.13, 12.17
Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW) s 38
Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 (NSW) s 34A
Cases cited: Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172; [2000] HCA 40
Beale & Harvie [2023] FedCFamC1A 181
Bhatnagar & Riju [2018] FamCAFC 144
Bonnett & Bonnett [2021] FedCFamC1A 95
Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37
Byrnes v Brisconnections Management Co Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 1432
Day Ford Pty Ltd v Sciacca [1990] 2 Qd R 209
Director-General, Department of Ageing, Disability and Home Care v Lambert (2009) 74 NSWLR 523; [2009] NSWCA 102
Elliott & Hopkins (No 2) (2023) FLC 94-157; [2023] FedCFamC1A 142
Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250; [1998] HCA 68
Housing Commission (NSW) v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd and Penrith Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378
Keaty & Swann [2023] FedCFamC1F 178
Lorde & Chu [2014] FamCAFC 228
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- AGLC
- Nellie & Nellie [2024] FedCFamC1A 171
- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC1A 171
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court identified several legal issues, primarily concerning the adequacy of reasons provided by the arbitrator, and the appellant’s failure to identify any error in law on the part of the primary judge. The court noted that the appellant’s complaints mirrored the submissions made before the primary judge and did not identify any legal error. Additionally, the court found that the absence of a transcript from the arbitral hearing was not a valid ground for appeal, as the appellant could have supplemented the record but chose not to. The court also examined the costs appeal, noting that the appellant had not exhausted all available remedial options before appealing the costs order.
The court concluded that the primary judge had not erred in dismissing the application for review, as the arbitrator had considered relevant factors in making his decision. The court further determined that the appellant’s complaints about the arbitrator’s reasons were not sufficient grounds for overturning the primary judge’s decision. Regarding the costs appeal, the court held that the appellant had not demonstrated that it was practically reasonable to request the appellate court to address the primary judge’s costs judgment, given the existence of a substantive appeal. The court dismissed both appeals and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs in a fixed sum of $11,600.
Orders
Orders of the court
NAA 97 of 2024
NAA 141 of 2024
SYC 8520 of 2022
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTION
BETWEEN:
MR NELLIE
Appellant
AND:
MS NELLIE
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
MCCLELLAND DCJ, TREE & ALTOBELLI JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
27 SEPTEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. Appeal NAA 97 of 2024 is dismissed.
2. Appeal NAA 141 of 2024 is dismissed.
THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS THAT:
3. The appellant is to pay the costs of the respondent in the fixed sum of $11,600.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Aside from the most exceptional circumstances, such as claims of procedural irregularity in a trial judge’s hearing, the appeal must be contained to those alleged errors that were the focus of the first instance proceedings.[7]CONSIDERATION[7] Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68 at 71.Ground 1 – Failure to consider all s 75(2) factors This Ground of Appeal relates to paragraph 6 of the appellant’s application for review which has been extracted at [8]. Ground 1 is without merit as it is based upon a false premise. At no stage of the proceedings was the appellant “precluded” from asserting that the arbitrator failed to address or had overlooked a relevant s 75(2) factor in determining that there should be a 2 per cent adjustment to the respondent over and above contribution considerations. This is made clear in the judgment of the primary judge (at [52]), where the primary judge includes extracts from [139]–[146] of the Arbitral Award. In those paragraphs, the arbitrator set out a number of s 75(2) factors that he considered to be relevant to his decision. These factors included the age of the parties, the absence of children to the relationship, and significantly, that the respondent deposed to being in poor health whereas the appellant gave no evidence of disability or ill health. As is the case where a judicial officer is presiding, it is unnecessary for an arbitrator who is exercising a discretion, to detail each factor which he or she has found to be relevant or irrelevant, nor is an arbitrator required to make an explicit finding on each disputed piece of evidence.[8][8] Housing Commission (NSW) v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd and Penrith Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378 at 385. It is also of no consequence that the arbitrator did not specifically refer to s 75(2)(b) of the Act,[9] which requires a consideration of “the income, property and financial resources of each of the parties”.[9] Elliott & Hopkins (No 2) (2023) FLC 94-157 at [38]. As noted by counsel for the respondent, a reading of the Arbitral Award as a whole,[10] establishes that the arbitrator was well aware of the parties’ property and financial resources, having determined the balance sheet of the parties’ property and the s 79(4) adjustment that he made. Further, as the primary judge noted at [55]–[56], referencing [156] of the Arbitral Award, the arbitrator implicitly considered s 75(2)(b) of the Act when determining the justice and equity of the overall property adjustment. Accordingly, there was no error on the part of the primary judge in rejecting the assertion that there was an error of law on the part of the arbitrator, as contended at paragraph 6 of the appellant’s review application.[10] Bonnett & Bonnett [2021] FedCFamC1A 95 at [22]. During the course of the appeal, counsel for the appellant suggested that Ground 1 can be construed as an assertion that the primary judge erred by precluding the appellant from asserting error on the part of the arbitrator due to the appellant’s inability to identify such error through “transcript, affidavit evidence, or by way of the arbitrators’ notes” (at [54]). There was no such preclusion. Even if so construed, this Ground of Appeal is without merit.