Phillips v Commissioner for Superannuation

Case [2005] FCAFC 2


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Phillips v Commissioner for Superannuation [2005] FCAFC 2

EVIDENCE – appeal – fresh evidence – whether evidence would have assisted in demonstrating an error of law – whether evidence would have produced an opposite result.

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – where supplementary submissions received after hearing – where submissions were not considered by primary Judge – whether denial of natural justice.

SUPERANNUATION – determination of retirement benefits – issuing of a benefit classification certificate based on answers to questions put in pre-employment medical examination – failure to properly answer questions – whether real and substantial connection between retirement condition and pre-employment medical conditions.

Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth) s 16AC, s 66(2)

Eastman v Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) (2003) 214 CLR 318 followed

Phillips v Commissioner for Superannuation [2004] FCA 28 affirmed
Repatriation Commission v Thompson (1988) 44 FCR 20 followed
Servos v Repatriation Commission (1995) 56 FCR 377 followed
Waterford v The Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 followed
Commissioner for Superannuation v Benham (1989) 22 FCR 413 followed

GAIL ROSLYNNE PHILLIPS v COMMISSIONER FOR SUPERANNUATION
Q39 of 2004

SPENDER, MADGWICK & FINKELSTEIN JJ
11 FEBRUARY 2005
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q39 of 2004

BETWEEN:

GAIL ROSLYNNE PHILLIPS
APPELLANT

AND:

COMMISSIONER FOR SUPERANNUATION
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SPENDER, MADGWICK & FINKELSTEIN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

11 FEBRUARY 2005

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.Appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q39 of 2004

BETWEEN:

GAIL ROSLYNNE PHILLIPS
APPELLANT

AND:

COMMISSIONER FOR SUPERANNUATION
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SPENDER, MADGWICK & FINKELSTEIN JJ

DATE:

11 FEBRUARY 2005

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal under s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Act 1975 (‘the AAT Act’) from a single Judge of this Court, given on 30 January 2004 (see Phillips v Commissioner for Superannuation [2004] FCA 28), dismissing an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) on 8 January 2003.

  2. By its decision, the Tribunal varied some aspects of an earlier decision of a delegate of the Commissioner for Superannuation, the respondent, who had reduced the superannuation entitlements of the appellant after her retirement on the ground of invalidity. The effect of the variation was, however, merely to affirm the substance of the respondent’s decision that the appellant’s superannuation entitlement be reduced, pursuant to s 66(2) of the Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth) (‘the Act’).

  3. The background to these proceedings is set out in both the Tribunal’s decision and the judgment of the primary Judge.  In essence, in 1983, the appellant commenced employment with the Commonwealth Public Service (‘CPS’), but retired in 1988 on invalidity grounds.  In 1983, the appellant had undertaken a medical examination and completed a questionnaire entitled ‘Statement of Personal Medical History’ in which she indicated that the only disability…

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AGLC
Phillips v Commissioner for Superannuation [2005] FCAFC 2
Case
[2005] FCAFC 2
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Phillips v Commissioner for Superannuation, the Tribunal evaluated the evidence of two psychiatrists, Dr O'Brien and Dr Frank Varghese, to determine if the appellant's OCD, which led to her retirement, was substantially contributed to by her PD and MDD conditions, conditions specified in her BCC. The Tribunal found Dr O'Brien's evidence more credible and concluded that a link existed between the appellant's retirement condition and the conditions listed in the BCC.

The primary issues before the court involved whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the law in making its findings. The appellant did not challenge the legal basis of the Tribunal's decision, but rather focused on factual disputes regarding the retirement condition and the date of retirement. The court found that the Tribunal's conclusions were legally sound, particularly in its determination that the appellant had not properly answered the questionnaire, and that the Tribunal had the authority to specify different conditions in the substitute BCC. Importantly, the court held that s 66(2)(c) did not necessitate a causal relationship between the appellant's OCD and the conditions specified in the BCC, but only required a connection between the two conditions.

The court ultimately dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. This decision underscores the requirement for a substantial connection rather than a causal link between the incapacity and the specified conditions, aligning with the interpretation provided by the Full Federal Court in Commissioner for Superannuation v Benham.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. Appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal was satisfied that the evidence of Dr O’Brien (a consulting psychiatrist who had treated the appellant during the period of February to December 1987) was to be preferred to the evidence of Dr Frank Varghese (a consultant psychiatrist who saw the appellant on 22 November 2001) and was sufficient to establish that the appellant’s OCD (the ground for her retirement) was ‘substantially contributed’ to by her PD and MDD conditions, which would have been specified in the BCC. DECISION OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE Before the primary Judge, the appellant raised no question of law. She adumbrated two concerns relating to her ‘retirement condition’, however the primary Judge indicated that the appellant’s retirement condition was not in dispute. The appellant raised a third issue in relation to choosing the date of her retirement but, as noted by the primary Judge, this did not form part of the reviewable decision that gave the Tribunal its jurisdiction and was not raised by the appellant before the Tribunal. The primary Judge also considered whether the Tribunal’s conclusions might have been vitiated by error of law and found that it was open to the Tribunal to find, as it did, that the appellant had failed properly to answer the questionnaire, and that the Court could not review that finding. Her Honour further found that it was within the Tribunal’s power to direct that different conditions be specified in the substitute BCC. Finally, her Honour gave consideration to the Tribunal’s determination that there was a link between the condition that caused the appellant’s incapacity and subsequent retirement and the conditions listed on the BCC. The primary Judge observed that s 66(2)(c) raises two distinct and alternate questions. The first question is whether the appellant’s incapacity was caused or substantially contributed to by a condition or conditions specified in the BCC. Her Honour found that this question must be answered in the negative, as it was accepted on both sides that the retirement incapacity was caused by OCD, whereas the substitute BCC specified PD and MDD. The primary Judge then considered the next question, namely whether there was a connection between OCD and either or both of PD and MDD. In answering this question, her Honour said (at [39]):‘S66(2)(c) does not require a causal connection between the [appellant’s] OCD and the conditions specified in the BCC, it requires only a connection between the two conditions. In Commissioner for Superannuation v Benham (1989) 22 FCR 413…, the Full Federal Court identified the correct approach at 421:“The construction which should be adopted, in the case of this Act, is a reading of s 66(2)(c) as referring to cases where there is a real and substantial connection between the certified condition and the condition that caused or substantially contributed to the incapacity.”The Court expressly rejected any necessity for a causal relationship between the two conditions.’ (emphasis supplied by us)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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