Energy Beverages LLC v Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Energy Beverages LLC v Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd (No 2) [2022] FCA 394

File number(s): NSD 1711 of 2019
NSD 1858 of 2019
NSD 63 of 2021
Judgment of: HALLEY J
Date of judgment: 14 April 2022
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for stay of dismissal orders pursuant to r 36.08 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules) – whether stay or rectification of the Trade Marks Register more suitable course pending determination of appeal – consideration of Woolworths Ltd v BP plc (2006) 150 FCR 134; [2006] FCAFC 52 and Woolworths Ltd v BP plc (No 2) (2006) 154 FCR 97; [2006] FCAFC 132 – preservation of status quo and subject matter of appeal – whether stay in public interest – application granted

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for stay of costs orders pursuant to r 36.08 of the Rules – stay of costs order not necessary or appropriate – application dismissed

COSTS – application for indemnity costs pursuant to s 43(3)(g) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) – principles in respect of Calderbank offers – where appellant party did not accept offer by respondent to settle proceedings – whether rejection of offer unreasonable or imprudent – where appellant would have been in materially better position if it had accepted offer – application granted

COSTS – application for costs of stay and indemnity costs applications – neither party wholly successful – no order as to costs in respect of stay and indemnity costs applications

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for suppression orders pursuant to s 37AF of the FCA Act – whether necessary to prevent prejudice to proper administration of justice – consideration of public policy – application granted

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AG, 43

Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth) r 36.08

Cases cited:

Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd(Receivers Appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685

Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Limited v ACPA Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCAFC 112

Beling v Sixty International S.A. (No 2) [2015] FCA 355

Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333

Cantor v Audi Australia Pty Limited (No 4) [2019] FCA 1633

Centor Australia Pty Ltd v RMD Industries Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 1407

CGU Insurance Limited v Corrections Corporation of Australia Staff Superannuation Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 173

Dukemaster Pty Ltd v Bluehive Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 1

Elliott v State of Victoria (Department of Education & Training) [2018] FCA 1029

Energy Beverages LLC v Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 113

Hazeldene’s Chicken Farm Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority (No 2) (2005) 13 VR 435; [2005] VSCA 298

Merial Inc v Intervet International BV (No 4) (2017) 124 IPR 1; [2017] FCA 223

Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporation (1996) 67 FCR 65

Red Bull Australia Pty Limited v Sydneywide Distributors Pty Limited t/as Sydneywide Bottlers Australia [2001] FCA 1750

Re…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 394
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Energy Beverages LLC (EB) applied to the Federal Court for a stay of dismissal orders and a stay of costs orders, as well as for indemnity costs and suppression orders, in proceedings against Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd (Cantarella). EB argued that the Federal Court had the power to rectify the Trade Marks Register if its appeals were successful, but that a stay was a more suitable course pending the determination of the appeals. Cantarella opposed the applications on the basis that the appeals had no reasonable prospect of success and that the applications were brought late. The Court was required to determine whether a stay or rectification of the Register was the more suitable course pending the determination of the appeals, whether the applications for a stay and for indemnity costs were appropriate, and whether suppression orders were necessary.

The Court found that while the Federal Court has the power to rectify the Register if an appeal is successful, the more appropriate mechanism to preserve the status quo and the subject matter of the appeal is a stay of the dismissal orders. The Court noted that the Register accurately records the present position, but that the questions of whether the MOTHERSKY mark should proceed to grant and the MOTHERLAND mark should remain on the Register have not yet been finally determined. The Court also found that the applications for a stay and for indemnity costs were appropriate, as EB had an arguable case on appeal and would be in a materially better position if it had accepted Cantarella's offer to settle the proceedings. However, the Court found that Cantarella was not wholly successful in the proceedings and therefore there would be no order as to costs in respect of the stay and indemnity costs applications. Finally, the Court found that suppression orders were necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The Court made the following orders: the dismissal orders and costs orders were stayed until the determination of the appeals; EB was ordered to pay Cantarella's costs up to 30 June 2021 and on an indemnity basis from 30 June 2021; there was no order as to costs in respect of the stay and indemnity costs applications; and suppression orders were made to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

Orders

Orders of the court

2. Order 1 made on 18 February 2022 in this proceeding dismissing the amended notice of appeal (Dismissal Order) be stayed until determination of the application for leave to appeal and any subsequent appeal.

3. Order 2 made on 18 February 2022 in this proceeding requiring the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs, as taxed or agreed (Costs Order) be varied to provide that the appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs, as taxed or agreed, up to 30 June 2021 and the appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs on an indemnity basis as and from 30 June 2021.

4. There be no costs orders with respect to the applications by the appellant for a stay of the Dismissal Order and the Costs Order and the respondent’s application for an indemnity costs order.

5. Pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, publication or other disclosure of the following is prohibited, other than to the parties and their legal representatives in this proceeding for a period of 5 years from the date of this order:

(a) the parts of Confidential Annexures SMG-005 and 006 to the affidavit of Sue Maree Gilchrist affirmed on 8 March 2022 that are highlighted in pink, blue, red and green in the Annexures to the “Appellant’s submissions in support of suppression order” dated 5 April 2022 (Appellant’s Suppression Submissions);

(b) the parts of the “Appellant’s Confidential Submissions in Answer on Costs” dated 22 March 2022 that are highlighted in pink, blue, red and green in the Annexures to the Appellant’s Suppression Submissions;

(c) the parts of the “Respondent’s Submissions on Further Costs Orders” dated 8 March 2022 that are highlighted in pink, blue, red and green in the Annexures to the Appellant’s Suppression Submissions; and

(d) the Confidential Annexure to the reasons for judgment delivered on 14 April 2022 accompanying these orders (Confidential Judgment Annexure).

6. To give effect to Order 5, Confidential Annexures SMG-005 and 006 to the affidavit of Sue Maree Gilchrist affirmed on 8 March 2022, the “Appellant’s Confidential Submissions in Answer on Costs” dated 22 March 2022 and the “Respondent’s Submissions on Further Costs Orders” dated 8 March 2022 be removed from the Court file forthwith and replaced with appropriately redacted versions, to be prepared by the appellants within 14 days of the making of this order in accordance with r 2.29 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The unredacted versions and the Confidential Judgment Annexure are to be stored in a sealed envelope in the Court file.

7. No access is to be granted to any third party to the Confidential Judgment Annexure or the unredacted version of the documents listed in Order 6 above for a period of 5 years from the date of this order, or without leave of a judge of the Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Finally, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make suppression orders to the effect of the reformulated request made by EB on 5 April 2022. By reason of the making of those suppression orders it has been necessary to redact parts of these reasons for judgment and prepare a confidential annexure to these reasons. That confidential annexure is also to be subject to the suppression orders. In the confidential annexure, those parts of the judgment which have been redacted have been reinserted in the paragraphs of these reasons from which they have been removed and they have been underlined to distinguish them from the unredacted parts of those paragraphs in these reasons.Evidence EB relied on an affidavit of Ms Miriam Cecily Zanker sworn on 22 March 2022 in support of the application for suppression orders, an affidavit of Ms Courtney Ann White dated 28 March 2022 and subsequently affirmed on 29 March 2022 in support of the stay applications and an affidavit of Ms Alexa Lewis dated 4 April 2022 in support of its application for suppression orders. None of these witnesses were cross examined. Cantarella relied on two affidavits of Ms Sue Maree Gilchrist, the first affirmed on 8 March 2022 and the second dated 28 March 2022 and subsequently affirmed on 29 March 2022. These affidavits were read in opposition to the stay applications and in support of the indemnity costs application. Ms Gilchrist was not cross examined.STAY OF DISMISSAL ORDERSPrinciples Rule 36.08 of the Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth) provides:36.08 Stay of execution or proceedings under judgment appealed from(1) An appeal does not:(a) operate as a stay of execution or a stay of any proceeding under the judgment the subject of the appeal; or(b)invalidate any proceedings already taken.(2) However, an appellant or interested person may apply to the Court for an order to stay the execution of the proceeding until the appeal is heard and determined. (3) An application may be heard under subrule (2) even though the court from which the appeal is brought has previously refused an application of a similar kind. The principles governing the exercise of the Court’s discretion to grant a stay are well settled. The starting point is that a successful party is entitled to the benefit of the judgment that it has obtained and the existence of an arguable case on appeal does not of itself justify the grant of a stay: Red Bull Australia Pty Limited v Sydneywide Distributors Pty Limited t/as Sydneywide Bottlers Australia [2001] FCA 1750 at [6] (Hely J) citing Starborne Holdings Pty Ltd v Radferry Pty Ltd (Cooper J, 21 May 1998, unreported). It is not necessary to show any “special” or “exceptional circumstances”; it is sufficient if an applicant for a stay can demonstrate a reason or an appropriate case to justify the exercise of the discretion to grant a stay: Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd(Receivers Appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 at 693-4 (Kirby P, as his Honour then was, Hope and McHugh JJ); Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporation (1996) 67 FCR 65 at 66 (Burchett, Heerey and Whitlam JJ).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Rule 36.08 of the Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth) provides:36.08 Stay of execution or proceedings under judgment appealed from(1) An appeal does not:(a) operate as a stay of execution or a stay of any proceeding under the judgment the subject of the appeal; or(b)invalidate any proceedings already taken.(2) However, an appellant or interested person may apply to the Court for an order to stay the execution of the proceeding until the appeal is heard and determined. (3) An application may be heard under subrule (2) even though the court from which the appeal is brought has previously refused an application of a similar kind. The principles governing the exercise of the Court’s discretion to grant a stay are well settled. The starting point is that a successful party is entitled to the benefit of the judgment that it has obtained and the existence of an arguable case on appeal does not of itself justify the grant of a stay: Red Bull Australia Pty Limited v Sydneywide Distributors Pty Limited t/as Sydneywide Bottlers Australia [2001] FCA 1750 at [6] (Hely J) citing Starborne Holdings Pty Ltd v Radferry Pty Ltd (Cooper J, 21 May 1998, unreported). It is not necessary to show any “special” or “exceptional circumstances”; it is sufficient if an applicant for a stay can demonstrate a reason or an appropriate case to justify the exercise of the discretion to grant a stay: Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd(Receivers Appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 at 693-4 (Kirby P, as his Honour then was, Hope and McHugh JJ); Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporation (1996) 67 FCR 65 at 66 (Burchett, Heerey and Whitlam JJ). There has been limited judicial consideration of whether a stay or reliance on the Court’s power to rectify the Register is the more suitable course pending the determination of an appeal from orders made by a primary judge that trade marks should proceed to registration or be removed from the Register. The only substantive consideration of this issue would appear to be the decisions of the Full Court in Woolworths Ltd v BP plc (2006) 150 FCR 134; [2006] FCAFC 52 (Woolworths No 1) and Woolworths No 2. In Woolworths No 1, Sundberg and Bennett JJ confirmed at [48] that the Court does have power to cause removal of trade marks from the Register if an appeal is successful and that it has an inherent power to preserve the subject matter of the appeal from orders permitting a trade mark to proceed to registration. In Woolworths No 2, Heerey, Allsop, as his Honour then was, and Young JJ stated:154BP submitted that, even if Woolworths establishes that the trade mark application ought to have been rejected, the Court should as a matter of discretion decline to order rectification of the Register. BP submitted that to do so would be unjust and prejudicial to it. It also submitted that the registration of the marks had transformed the nature of the proceedings, that any challenge to the registrations should now be argued on the basis of the different test that would apply in rectification proceedings.155We reject BP’s submission. The proceeding at trial was an opposition to registration; this Court is entertaining an appeal from the trial judge’s decision. It would be an unsatisfactory situation if, following the grant of leave to appeal under s 195(2) and having heard substantive argument on the merits, this Court should decline to exercise its power to correct a legal error in the Register by virtue only of the fact of registration of the trade marks in the interim. It was not possible for Woolworths to apply for rectification at the time of trial, as the trade marks had not yet been entered on the Register. The possibility of rectification proceedings arose after the primary judge had made his findings and the trade marks had been registered.156 It is true that Woolworths could have, and probably should have, applied for a stay pending the outcome of its application for leave to appeal and any subsequent appeal. But we do not consider that this circumstance provides sufficient grounds to refuse Woolworths the relief to which it would otherwise be entitled. As Sundberg J and Bennett J noted in the leave application, if the trade marks should not have been registered, they should not remain on the Register; this is not only in Woolworths’ interests, it is also in the public interest. We consider that maintenance of the integrity of the register far outweighs any prejudice of the kind to which BP points.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Fifth, Cantarella submits that there is no risk of irreparable harm to EB if no stay is granted and it is ultimately successful because the Court has the power to remove the MOTHERSKY mark from the Register and reinstate the MOTHERLAND mark to the Register. It submits that Woolworths No 1 and Woolworths No 2 only stand for the proposition that the Court has the power to rectify the Register, not that an affected party should apply for a stay because it is a better vehicle for the preservation of the subject matter of the appeal than the power to rectify. Consideration In determining whether to grant a stay of the Dismissal Orders pending the determination of the applications for leave to appeal and any subsequent appeals, the fundamental consideration is the preservation of the status quo and the subject matter of the appeal. Allied to that consideration is the integrity of the Register. The relevant question is not whether the Court has power to rectify the Register if the appeals are successful but rather what is the more appropriate mechanism to preserve the status quo and the subject matter of the appeal. Notwithstanding the success achieved by Cantarella before the Delegates and in this Court, the status quo is that the MOTHERSKY mark has not yet proceeded to grant and the MOTHERLAND mark is registered. The filing of an application for leave to appeal has had the practical effect of postponing the final determination of the opposition to the MOTHERSKY mark proceeding to grant and the MOTHERLAND mark being removed from the Register. In that sense the Register does accurately record the present position; the questions of whether the MOTHERSKY mark should proceed to grant and the MOTHERLAND mark should remain on the Register have not yet been finally determined. I am satisfied that there is currently no material misleading of the public or offence to the public interest. Contrary to the position advanced by Cantarella, I do not accept that the statement by Heerey, Allsop and Young JJ in Woolworths No 2 at [156] that “Woolworths could have, and probably should have, applied for a stay pending the outcome of its application for leave to appeal” can be construed as an observation directed at the uncertainty prior to Woolworths No 1 about the ability of the Court to correct the Register if an appeal were successful. In context, it is clear that the statement at [156] was directed at the submission made by BP that it would now be unjust and prejudicial to rectify the Register, that registration of the marks had now transformed the nature of the proceedings, and that any challenge should now be argued on the basis of the different test that would apply for rectification proceedings. As is made clear from the balance of [156], their Honours were simply stating that the failure to apply for a stay in the context of the alleged prejudice to BP was not a sufficient basis to refuse the relief that Woolworths was seeking. It is also necessary to consider the balance of convenience, including prejudice, in determining whether to grant a stay of the Dismissal Orders in the MOTHERSKY and MOTHERLAND appeals. Both EB and Cantarella were only able to point to potential and hypothetical prejudice.