Hastie Group Limited (in liq) v Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd (Formerly Brookfield Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd) (No 4)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hastie Group Limited (in liq) v Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd (Formerly Brookfield Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd) (No 4) [2022] FCA 1575

File number: VID 1277 of 2017
VID 237 of 2022
Judgment of: MIDDLETON J
Date of judgment: 22 December 2022
Catchwords:

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – action for debt brought by companies in liquidation and liquidator against numerous respondents – matters of principle common to various claims determined in “liability trial” – orders made reflecting reasons as to liability – refusal of relief sought by applicants under Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) Sch 2 s 90-15 – refusal of declaratory relief sought by applicants – dismissal of claims seeking amounts drawn down under bank guarantees or return of bank guarantees – dismissal of claims found to be statute-barred because of limitation period – dismissal of claims no longer pressed by applicants

CORPORATIONS –action for debt brought by companies in liquidation and liquidator against numerous respondents – matters of principle common to various claims determined in ‘liability trial’ – orders made reflecting reasons as to liability – refusal of relief sought at liability trial by liquidator under Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) Sch 2 s 90-15 – refusal of declaratory relief sought by applicants – dismissal of claims seeking amounts drawn down under bank guarantees or return of bank guarantees – dismissal of claims found to be statute-barred because of limitation period – dismissal of claims no longer pressed by applicants

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – declaration sought by applicants – declaration refused – issue subject of sought declaration not pleaded and not a real controversy in dispute

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 54A – consideration of referral of questions to a referee – potential necessity for prior determination of evidentiary issues – Kadam v MiiResorts Group 1 Pty Ltd (No 4) (2017) 252 FCR 298; [2017] FCA 1139 considered

COSTS – application by respondents for costs forthwith of liability trial and for costs on indemnity basis – submission that applicants’ claims in wilful disregard of clearly established law – Calderbank offers or offers of settlement made – held: costs in respect of dismissed claims ordered to be paid forthwith on ordinary basis, with reservation of rights to pursue costs on indemnity basis for respondents who made Calderbank offers or offers of settlement

CORPORATIONS – winding up by the court – ss 459A and 467B of Corporations Act – application for order for winding up by the court where company already being wound up voluntarily – stay sought by applicants – held: application dismissed

Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Ainsworth v Criminal justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564

Ajkay v Hickey & Co Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 822

Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Ltd v ACPA Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCAFC 112

Australasian Conference Assoc Ltd…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1575
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Hastie Group Limited (in liquidation) and the liquidator of Hastie Group Limited versus Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd (formerly Brookfield Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd) and others, the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with adjudicating on various claims brought forth by the companies in liquidation and their liquidator. The central dispute involved matters of principle common to various claims that were determined during a liability trial. The court had to decide on the relief sought by the liquidator under the Corporations Act, the validity of declaratory relief, the enforceability of bank guarantee claims, the impact of limitation periods on certain claims, and the status of claims that were no longer being pursued by the applicants. Furthermore, the court considered whether certain evidentiary issues needed resolution before referring matters to a referee and evaluated applications for costs and winding up orders.

The court ruled that the liquidator's proposed orders and directions, though not formally applied for, should be dismissed as they were inconsistent with the court's findings on liability. The court also dismissed Lendlease's application for summary judgment, noting that the usual costs order should follow the event of an unsuccessful interlocutory application. Regarding the proposed declaration on the surplus proceeds of bank guarantees, the court exercised its discretion and declined to make such a declaration as it was not pleaded and did not represent a real controversy in the dispute. The court also highlighted the implications of s 1305 of the Corporations Act, emphasizing that while company books could be prima facie evidence of recorded matters, they were not conclusive without considering the context and any contradictory evidence.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the proceeding, mandate the plaintiffs to pay the costs of respondents who were granted leave to appear or filed submissions, and to dismiss the winding up proceeding without staying it. Costs for the dismissed claims were ordered to be paid forthwith on an ordinary basis, reserving the right for respondents who made Calderbank offers or settlement offers to pursue indemnity costs. The court refrained from appointing a referee and deferred decisions on evidentiary issues to a future docket judge, pending the outcome of ordered mediations.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The proceeding be dismissed.

2. The Plaintiffs are to pay the costs of and incidental to this proceeding of any Respondent in proceeding VID1277 of 2017 which was granted leave to appear in this proceeding or which filed submissions in this proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves a series of claims brought by Hastie Group Limited (in liquidation) and its liquidator against various respondents, including Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd. The claims relate to bank guarantees, debts, and other financial matters stemming from the financial dealings between the Hastie Group and the respondents. The factual background includes the issuance and drawing down of bank guarantees, financial transactions, and the subsequent liquidation of Hastie Group Limited. The Hastie Group and its liquidator seek various forms of relief, including the return of amounts drawn under bank guarantees, declarations regarding their rights, and damages for breach of contract or other wrongs. The respondents deny liability and assert various defences, including statute of limitations and the assertion that the claims are statute-barred.

This case involves a "liability trial" where matters of principle common to various claims were determined. The proceeding was before the Federal Court of Australia, and it followed from prior mediations and negotiations that had failed. The court issued orders reflecting the reasons for liability and refused certain relief sought by the applicants, including declaratory relief and the return of amounts drawn under bank guarantees. The court also dismissed claims found to be statute-barred and those no longer pressed by the applicants. Further, the court considered an application for winding up by the court where the company was already being wound up voluntarily and dismissed that application. The respondents applied for costs, and the court ordered costs to be paid forthwith on an ordinary basis with a reservation of rights to pursue costs on an indemnity basis for respondents who made Calderbank offers or offers of settlement.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I observe that there is the possibility that the referee in conducting the inquiry may be directed not to be bound by the rules of evidence. I should express some disquiet with such a direction, although I note it has been made previously, as in Kadam. The problem I have is that the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Evidence Act’) is binding on the Court to apply, and the reference to a referee cannot override the operation of the Evidence Act upon the final decision of a Judge of this Court. In other words, at some stage of the judicial decision-making process, before a Judge accepts a report from a referee, the Judge must apply the provisions of the Evidence Act. In this proceeding, it may be that any evidentiary issues, such as in relation to s 1305 of the Corporations Act mentioned earlier, be determined by the Court before the reference is made by the Judge, so that only admissible material is allowed to be relied upon by the referee. Alternatively, but probably not as efficiently, the referee could consider all the material put before them, with the referee reserving evidentiary rulings for a later decision of the Court. As I am not now appointing a referee and not determining the exact terms of reference, I go no further than the above remarks. Of course, that future docket Judge will exercise their own discretion depending on all the circumstances existing after the outcome of the mediations that have been ordered to occur is known. THE WINDING UP PROCEEDING Each of the Respondents seek orders that the winding up proceeding (as defined in the Liability Reasons) be dismissed and that the Plaintiffs pay the costs of the Respondents who were given leave to appear in the proceeding. The Applicants seek orders that the winding up proceeding be stayed pending final orders in the main proceeding, and that costs be reserved. It is not appropriate to stay the winding up proceeding. The premise underlying the Application made in the winding up proceeding was the Applicants’ claims in relation to s 468 of the Act as part of its Bank Guarantee Case. To the extent that such claims were ever pleaded, those claims are now to be dismissed in the main proceeding. There is no utility in the winding up proceeding being stayed. As I indicated at J[442], the winding up proceeding should be dismissed, with costs in favour of the Respondents who were granted leave to appear. It was submitted by Grocon that costs should be granted on an indemnity basis. However, on the same basis as I discussed regarding indemnity costs in the main proceeding, I am not satisfied that there are any circumstances sufficient to justify awarding indemnity costs, and so I would only order costs on an ordinary basis. An issue arose as to whether the costs order in relation to the winding up proceeding should be made in the main proceeding, as the Application was borne out of the conduct of the main proceedings. I raised a possible issue in relation to the ordering of costs in the winding up proceeding at J[443]. However, no issue has been raised by the Applicants, and with the Court having power to make a costs order in favour of non-parties in appropriate circumstances, I see no reason (even to aid possible recovery) not to follow the usual course of ordering the incidence of costs in the winding up proceeding itself.DISPOSITION

Decision

Reasons for decision

I accept that the Applicants’ Proposed Orders and Directions were not made by formal originating process in relation to the whole of the main proceeding. However, they did reflect the relief that the Applicants were seeking at this stage of the proceeding, being the liability trial. While there is no formal application for the Court to dismiss, it is appropriate that the orders of the Court formally refuse the granting of the relief sought by the Liquidator at the liability trial, consistent with my finding in the Liability Reasons that each proposed order in the Liquidator’s Proposed Orders and Directions was inappropriate (see J[450]-[453]).Dismissal of Lendlease’s summary judgment application It is not in dispute between the parties that Lendlease’s application for summary judgment is to be dismissed in light of the Liability Reasons. I therefore will dismiss the application for summary judgment, with costs following the event. Lendlease submitted that no real additional costs were incurred with respect to the application for summary judgment and that, in any event, the application was rejected on case management grounds in circumstances where the bank guarantee claims failed on a final basis: J [426]-[432]. Therefore, they submitted that the dismissal of the application could not justify any apportionment of costs in favour of the Applicants. Contrary to the submissions of Lendlease, the application for summary judgment was not dismissed solely on case management grounds: see J[429]. I see no reason to depart from the usual costs order to follow the event where there has been an unsuccessful separate interlocutory application, as is the case here. The taxing master will deal with an assessment of the costs when the other costs are evaluated.Applicants’ proposed declaration in relation to surplus proceeds of bank guarantees In their minute of proposed orders, the Applicants sought the following declaration: Each Hastie Entity has a right to return of such amounts drawn by a respondent on or after 28 May 2012 [the Appointment Date] on a bank guarantee purchased and provided to the respondent by that Hastie Entity, being funds drawn on that bank guarantee which are not required to meet that respondent’s claims against the said Hastie Entity. The proposed declaration was sought on the basis of the Court’s conclusion at J[386], which was relevantly as follows:[U]pon the Respondent’s demand on the bank guarantee and reception of the proceeds, the Respondent has an obligation to account to the Hastie Entity in respect of any surplus proceeds, that is, an obligation to return funds not required to meet its claims against the Hastie Entity: see, eg, Clough at [52]; Mainline at 353-354 and Cargill at 465 (per Potter LJ) and 471 (per Staughton LJ). Accordingly, the Hastie Entity has a corresponding right to return of such amounts… It is first important to recall that declarations are a discretionary remedy. As Gibbs J (as he then was) said in Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 (‘Forster’) at 437: It is neither possible nor desirable to fetter the broad discretion … by laying down rules as to the manner of its exercise.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Applicants in their submissions referred to the effect of s 1305 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the ‘Corporations Act’ or ‘Act’) in the main proceeding, relying on the dicta of Austin J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 236 FLR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229 (‘Rich’) at [396]-[400]. I referred to s 1305 of the Act in the Liability Reasons at J[220]-[222]. In light of some of the submissions of the parties (particularly the Applicants), I will highlight certain matters here just to make the position clear for the future conduct of the proceeding. The highlighted matters I consider should be kept in mind are emphasised below in the discourse of Austin J in Rich (my own emphasis):[395]The defendants referred to the definition of the words “prima facie” in the Macquarie Dictionary (2nd revised ed), as meaning “at first appearance; at first view, before investigation”. They compared that with the definition of “prima facie evidence” as “evidence sufficient to establish a fact, or to raise a presumption of fact, unless rebutted”. They submitted that the former meaning is the one intended in s 1305, and that the words “prima facie” are not used in the sense that, absent some satisfactory contrary evidence on the part of the defendants, the matters said to be recorded in the books have been conclusively proved.[396]In my view the true meaning of the words “prima facie” lies between the alternatives identified in the defendants’ submission. The statement in s 1305(1) that the company’s books are prima facie evidence of a matter stated or recorded in them does more than merely to convey that they are the starting point to proof or a “first view”. All other things being equal, the fact that a matter is stated in a book kept by a company is sufficient to prove that matter in civil proceedings. That does not reverse the onus of proof in the proceedings in any general way, but it means that the tendering of the book is evidence of the matter recorded in it, and that matter will be thereby proven unless other evidence convinces the tribunal of fact to the contrary, on the balance of probabilities.[397]Section 1305(1) does not make the company’s books conclusive evidence of the matters they contain, in the sense of requiring the tribunal of fact to make a finding in terms of the content of the books in the absence of proof to the contrary by the opposing party. The books are prima facie evidence of the matters stated in them, but the weight of that evidence is to be measured in accordance with the common sense of the tribunal of fact (Malek HM, Auburn J, Bagshaw R, Phipson on Evidence (16th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 2005), at [7-17]).[398]In my view it would be open to the tribunal of fact to find that the prima facie evidence constituted by the company’s books is outweighed by other evidence (including evidence adduced by the proponent of the books, even if the opponent does not give evidence about them); or by some quality or characteristic of the books themselves, even if there is no other evidence. In particular, if a book has the appearance of a draft or (being electronic) has a file title indicating that it is a draft, that alone may be sufficient (all other things being equal) for the tribunal of fact to reject the book as evidence of the matter stated in it, notwithstanding that the book is prima facie evidence of that matter; a fortiori if, in addition to having the appearance of a draft, the book contains inconsistencies or ambiguities or the matter otherwise demands explanation.…[400] Therefore s 1305(1) allows a company’s books to be introduced into evidence as they are, without any “authenticating” evidence by any witness, and allows the books to be relied upon to prove transactions recorded in them. But it does not elevate the matters contained in the books to a plane of probative value that requires the court to disregard the context in which the matters relied on appear in the tendered document. If, for example, there is some doubt as to whether a particular transaction is “recorded” in a book because of some uncertainty about the status of the document or ambiguity about what it contains, s 1305(1) does not overcome the problem.