Carter v Commissioner of Taxation [2020] FCAFC 150
File number:
NSD 134 of 2020
Judgment of:
JAGOT, DAVIES AND THAWLEY JJ
Date of judgment:
10 September 2020
Catchwords:
TAXATION – application for an extension of time to appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) from a decision on a review under s 14ZZK of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) – purported distribution of trust income – whether Tribunal erred in holding there was no resolution distributing trust income – where consent of Guardian required for distribution – where Guardian did not know of her appointment as Guardian – held no distribution of trust income – disclaimers by default beneficiaries – whether disclaimers effective – effect of delay – third disclaimers were effective – whether disclaimers operated retrospectively for the purposes of s 97 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – held disclaimers operated retrospectively – appeal allowed
The Trustee for the Whitby Trust and Commissioner of Taxation [2019] AATA 5637
Hubbard M, Protectors of Trusts (Oxford University Press, 2013)
Thomas G, Thomas on Powers (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2012)
Tucker L, Le Poidevin N, Brightwell J, Lewin on Trusts (20th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2020)
Division:
General Division
Registry:
New South Wales
National Practice Area:
Taxation
Number of paragraphs:
112
Date of hearing:
17 August 2020
Counsel for the Applicants:
J Evans QC with D Lewis
Solicitor for the Applicants:
O’Loughlin Westhoff
Counsel for the Respondent:
N Williams SC with C Thompson
Solicitor for…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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In Carter v Commissioner of Taxation, the parties contested a decision regarding the distribution of trust income and the validity of disclaimers by default beneficiaries. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) erred in its decision that there was no resolution distributing trust income, and whether the disclaimers by the default beneficiaries were effective and operated retrospectively.
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the AAT correctly held that there was no resolution distributing trust income where the consent of a Guardian was required but was not obtained. Additionally, the court had to decide whether the disclaimers by the default beneficiaries were effective, and if they operated retrospectively for the purposes of section 97 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. The court also needed to consider the effect of the delay in making the disclaimers.
The court found that there was no resolution distributing trust income as the Guardian did not know of her appointment and therefore could not consent to the distribution. The court held that the third disclaimers by the default beneficiaries were effective and operated retrospectively. The court reasoned that the disclaimers were complete rejections of the gifts or entitlements and that there was no tacit acceptance due to the circumstances of the case and the promptness of the disclaimers. The court concluded that the disclaimers operated retrospectively, as if the entitlements never arose.
The Federal Court allowed the appeal, set aside the AAT's decision, and in lieu thereof allowed the objections of the applicants to the assessments for the 2014 income year. The court ordered the respondent to pay the applicants’ costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The decision of the Tribunal dated 23 December 2019 affirming the decisions under review be set aside, and in lieu thereof the objections of each of the applicants to the assessments for the 2014 income year be allowed.
3. The respondent pay the applicants’ costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Section 1305 of the Corporations Act provides:Admissibility of books in evidence(1) A book kept by a body corporate under a requirement of this Act is admissible in evidence in any proceeding and is prima facie evidence of any matter stated or recorded in the book.(2) A document purporting to be a book kept by a body corporate is, unless the contrary is proved, taken to be a book kept as mentioned in subsection (1). The word “books” is defined by s 9 of the Corporations Act to include “financial records”, which in turn is defined by s 9 in the following way:financial records includes: (a)invoices, receipts, orders for the payment of money, bills of exchange, cheques, promissory notes and vouchers; and (b) documents of prime entry; and(c) working papers and other documents needed to explain: (i) the methods by which financial statements are made up; and (ii) adjustments to be made in preparing financial statements. Section 286 of the Corporations Act sets out what financial records a company must keep (note excluded):(1)A company, registered scheme or disclosing entity must keep written financial records that: (a)correctly record and explain its transactions and financial position and performance; and (b)would enable true and fair financial statements to be prepared and audited. The obligation to keep financial records of transactions extends to transactions undertaken as trustee. Assuming that the minutes of meeting fell within the scope of s 1305 of the Corporations Act, the minutes constitute “prima facie evidence” of any matter stated in them. To state the obvious, the minutes are not evidence of matters not stated in them. For example, the minutes of meeting are not prima facie evidence that a quorum was present or that the resolution was validly passed. (Other provisions, such as s 1322(2) of the Corporations Act, might cure irregularities, but that is a different point.) Section 1305 was addressed in some detail by Austin J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2009] NSWSC 1229; 236 FLR 1 at [395] to [398]:[395]The defendants referred to the definition of the words “prima facie” in the Macquarie Dictionary (2nd revised ed), as meaning “at first appearance; at first view, before investigation”. They compared that with the definition of “prima facie evidence” as “evidence sufficient to establish a fact, or to raise a presumption of fact, unless rebutted”. They submitted that the former meaning is the one intended in s 1305, and that the words “prima facie” are not used in the sense that, absent some satisfactory contrary evidence on the part of the defendants, the matters said to be recorded in the books have been conclusively proved.[396]In my view the true meaning of the words “prima facie” lies between the alternatives identified in the defendants’ submission. The statement in s 1305(1) that the company’s books are prima facie evidence of a matter stated or recorded in them does more than merely to convey that they are the starting point to proof or a “first view”. All other things being equal, the fact that a matter is stated in a book kept by a company is sufficient to prove that matter in civil proceedings. That does not reverse the onus of proof in the proceedings in any general way, but it means that the tendering of the book is evidence of the matter recorded in it, and that matter will be thereby proven unless other evidence convinces the tribunal of fact to the contrary, on the balance of probabilities.[397]Section 1305(1) does not make the company’s books conclusive evidence of the matters they contain, in the sense of requiring the tribunal of fact to make a finding in terms of the content of the books in the absence of proof to the contrary by the opposing party. The books are prima facie evidence of the matters stated in them, but the weight of that evidence is to be measured in accordance with the common sense of the tribunal of fact (Malek HM, Auburn J, Bagshaw R, Phipson on Evidence (16th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 2005), at [7-17]).[398]In my view it would be open to the tribunal of fact to find that the prima facie evidence constituted by the company’s books is outweighed by other evidence (including evidence adduced by the proponent of the books, even if the opponent does not give evidence about them); or by some quality or characteristic of the books themselves, even if there is no other evidence. In particular, if a book has the appearance of a draft or (being electronic) has a file title indicating that it is a draft, that alone may be sufficient (all other things being equal) for the tribunal of fact to reject the book as evidence of the matter stated in it, notwithstanding that the book is prima facie evidence of that matter; a fortiori if, in addition to having the appearance of a draft, the book contains inconsistencies or ambiguities or the matter otherwise demands explanation.
Decision
Reasons for decision
The operative provisions of the Third Disclaimers were to the following effect:1. I hereby disclaim absolutely and irrevocably any and all of my right title and interest (whether vested or contingent) conferred by the Trust deed to or in the income, or any part of the income, including without limitation all those rights to income under the Trust deed I owned before the commencement of the income year commencing 1 July 2010, which gave rise to an alleged present entitlement to a share of the income of the Trust for each of the years ending 30 June 2011 to 30 June 2014 (and whether or not those disclaimed rights might also give rise to a present entitlement to a share of the income of the Trust in any other years).2. Without limiting the generality of the disclaimer in paragraph 1, I disclaim absolutely and irrevocably any and all of my right title and interest conferred by clause 3. 7 of the Trust deed. The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal summarised the relevant principles applicable to the disclaimer of gifts in orthodox terms. Accordingly, the Tribunal recorded at [128] that:(a) until disclaimed, a beneficiary’s entitlement to income under a trust remains effective and attracts the operation of s 97 of the 1936 Assessment Act from the moment it arises even if the beneficiary is unaware of it: [Ramsden at [30]];(b) an effective disclaimer of a gift or an entitlement:(i) operates by way of avoidance, not disposition, [Ramsden at [45]] and (ii) defeats the donor’s intention to give the relevant property to the donee, or create an interest in that property in favour of the donee, on the terms of the donor intended: [Ramsden at [45]]; (c) because of (b), a beneficiary may disclaim an entitlement on becoming aware of it, with the effect that the disclaimer operates retrospectively as if the entitlement never arose, and not as an acceptance and disposition at the time of the disclaimer: [Ramsden at [30]];(d) there must be a complete rejection of the gift or entitlement for the disclaimer to be effective because a qualified disclaimer may be seen as or constitute a form of acceptance of or assent to the gift or entitlement, [Ramsden at [31]] and in this regard it becomes necessary as a matter of construction to identify what the relevant gift is [Ramsden at [31]];(e) a periodical (usually annual) appointment or distribution of income or capital from a discretionary trust by reason of exercise of discretionary powers to do so is a stand-alone gift, or creation of an entitlement, when the power is exercised [Ramsden at [35] and [36]];(f) each appointment or distribution being an independent gift or creation of an entitlement, an object of a discretionary trust is entitled to accept or reject a discretionary appointment or distribution of either income or capital, and may accept one or more and disclaim others [Ramsden at [36]]; (g) an entitlement as a taker in default of appointment is a vested interest liable to be divested by exercise of a discretion, and is a gift or entitlement that arises by operation of the terms of the trust separate from any gift or entitlement that might arise upon exercise of a discretionary power of appointment or discretionary power to distribute [Ramsden at [37]];(h) an entitlement of a taker in default of appointment can also be disclaimed [Ramsden at [40] and [61]]; (i) one gift or entitlement having the same general origin, in the sense of coming from the same trust estate, can be retained and another disclaimed, and the fact of retention of an earlier one does not automatically prevent future disclaimers of later gifts or entitlements [Ramsden at [37]]. However, the retention of one type of gift or entitlement may have an impact on assertions as to knowledge of the relevant trust and entitlements, and whether there has been a delay in disclaiming that prevents a subsequent disclaimer operating to avoid the gift or entitlement [Ramsden at [37]]. It follows that disclaimer of one gift or entitlement would similarly not automatically prevent a future disclaimer of a different gift or entitlement, but would have the same effect on assessment of relevant knowledge going to whether there has been delay and whether a subsequent disclaimer operates to avoid the gift or entitlement;(j) to disclaim a gift or entitlement as a taker in default of appointment, it is necessary to disclaim the entirety of the gift or entitlement, namely the gift or entitlement created by the terms of the trust, and not the annual manifestation of it arising upon a failure to appoint elsewhere. An attempt to disclaim year by year without disclaiming the gift or entitlement in a manner that disclaims it entirely and permanently is ineffective [Ramsden at [42]];(k) a beneficiary loses the right to disclaim the gift or entitlement if it is accepted [Ramsden at [51] and [52]];(l) a gift or entitlement can be accepted by overt conduct [Ramsden at [53]]; and(m) failure to disclaim within a reasonable period of becoming aware of a gift or entitlement can, having regard to the circumstances of the case, be treated as tacit or inferred acceptance of the gift or entitlement [Ramsden at [53] and [55], Lewski v Commissioner of Taxation (2017) 254 FCR 14 at [141]]. It is necessary to look at all of the circumstances and the time that has elapsed to see whether acceptance of the gift or entitlement should be inferred from the absence of dissent [Ramsden at [55]]; and(n) a beneficiary of a gift is fixed with knowledge of the gift and its basis vicariously on the basis that the knowledge of an adviser, which may be the only source or repository of relevant knowledge [Ramsden at [59]].