Commissioner of Taxation v Ramsden

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Ramsden

[2005] FCAFC 39

TAXATION – whether taxpayers “presently entitled” to income distributed under a trust deed – whether taxpayers had disclaimed their interests in income under the deed – whether interests in income and in corpus under the deed constituted a single gift to be disclaimed in its entirety – whether reasonable time for disclaimer had elapsed.

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 97, 97(1)(a)
Taxation Administration Act 1953(Cth) s 14ZZO

BRK (Bris) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2001) ATC 4111 cited
Case X30 (1990) 90 ATC 287 cited
Chief Commissioner of Stamp Duties for NSW v Buckle (1998) 192 CLR 226 cited
Commissioner of Taxation v Marbray Nominees Pty Ltd (1985) 81 FLR 280 cited
Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520 cited
East Finchley v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 90 ALR 457 cited
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Cornell (1946) 73 CLR 394 cited
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Vegners (1989) 89 ATC 5274 cited
Hardoon v Belilious [1901] AC 118 cited
Harmer v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 173 CLR 264 cited
Hodge v Griffiths [1940] Ch 260 cited
In re Gulbenkian’s Settlements (No 2), Re Stephens v Maun [1970] 1 Ch 408 explained
In re Pearce (Deceased) [1926] NZLR 698 cited
J W Broomhead (Vic) Pty Ltd (in liq) v J W Broomhead Pty Ltd [1985] VR 891 cited
Kiwi Brands Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 90 FCR 64 cited
Lady Nass v Westminster Bank Ltd [1940] AC 366 cited
Lewis v Lohse [2003] QCA 199 cited
MSP Nominees Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamps (South Australia) (1999) 198 CLR 494 cited
Re Paradise Motor Co Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 1125 cited
Re Stratton’s Disclaimer [1958] Ch 42 cited
Trustees of the Estate Mortgage Fighting Fund Trust v Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 102 FCR 15 cited
Vegners v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 91 ATC 4213 cited

Crago Principles of Disclaimer of Gifts 28 WALR 65
Theobald on Wills 15th Ed
Ford & Lee Principles of the Law of Trusts
Hardingham & Baxt Discretionary Trust (2nd Ed)

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v TAMARA RAMSDEN
Q 99 OF 2004

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v TROY HART
Q 98 OF 2004

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v PHILIP HART
Q 97 OF 2004

LEE, MERKEL & HELY JJ
15 MARCH 2005
PERTH (HEARD IN BRISBANE)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 99 OF 2004

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
APPELLANT

AND:

TAMARA RAMSDEN
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

LEE, MERKEL & HELY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

15 MARCH 2005

WHERE MADE:

PERTH (HEARD IN BRISBANE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCAFC 39
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Commissioner of Taxation v Ramsden, the respondents, Tamara Ramsden, Philip Hart, and Troy Hart, challenged the Commissioner of Taxation's assessment of their income tax for the year ended 30 June 1996. The primary issue was whether the respondents effectively disclaimed their interests in a distribution of $429,000 from a discretionary trust to the Adcock Practice Trust, thereby avoiding any inclusion of that amount in their assessable income under section 97(1)(a) of the ITAA. The primary judge ruled in favour of the respondents, finding their disclaimers to be effective, and the Commissioner appealed this decision to the court.

The central legal question was whether the respondents' disclaimers of their interests in the trust distribution were valid and effective. The respondents argued that they had the right to disclaim their interests at any time, even after the issue of the notices of assessment, and the court needed to determine if such a disclaimer could negate the respondents' present entitlement to the trust income under the relevant tax provisions. The Commissioner conceded that if the disclaimers were effective, then the respondents' present entitlement to the trust income would be negated. Therefore, the court's task was to assess the validity and effectiveness of the respondents' disclaimers.

The court examined the respondents' disclaimers in light of established legal principles. It found that the respondents had the right to reject gifts and discretionary benefits under a trust, and that such disclaimers did not require formal documentation. The court also noted that a beneficiary could disclaim an entitlement even if they were unaware of it, provided they acted to disclaim it upon becoming aware. The primary judge concluded that the respondents had effectively disclaimed their interests in the trust distribution, as they had consistently disputed any entitlement and had not acted to accept the distribution.

Based on the evidence and legal principles, the court found that the respondents' disclaimers were effective and valid. Consequently, the court allowed the Commissioner's appeal, set aside the primary judge's orders, and dismissed the respondents' appeal with costs. The court ordered the respondents to pay the Commissioner's costs of the appeal, reflecting the outcome in favour of the Commissioner on the issue of the validity of the disclaimers.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by the primary judge be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that the ‘appeal’ to this Court be dismissed with costs.

3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Section 97(1)(a) of the ITAA provides:‘Where a beneficiary of a trust estate who is not under any legal disability is presently entitled to a share of the income of the trust estate – (a) the assessable income of the beneficiary shall include –(i)so much of the share of the net income of the trust estate as is attributable to a period when the beneficiary was a resident; and(ii)so much of that share of the net income of the trust estate as is attributable to a period when the beneficiary was not a resident and is also attributable to sources in Australia; and…’Background The Trust is a discretionary trust constituted by a deed of settlement (‘the Deed’) made on 1 June 1981 and at material times Steve Hart Family Holdings Pty Ltd (‘the Trustee’) was the Trustee of the Trust. Under the Deed:- in each Accounting Period (i.e. a period of 12 months ending on 30 June in each year), or as soon as practicable thereafter, the Trustee is required to determine the net income of the Trust Fund (cl 3(a));- at any time prior to the expiration of each Accounting Period until the Vesting Day, the Trustee may (inter alia) pay, apply or set aside all or part of the net income of the Trust Fund for that Accounting Period for (inter alia) any one or more of the General Beneficiaries (as defined in cl 1(b)) (cl 3(b));-General Beneficiaries as defined included the Specified Beneficiaries; -the Trustee holds so much of the net income of the Trust Fund for each Accounting Period as shall not be the subject of a determination effectively made at or prior to the end of such Accounting Period pursuant to cl 3(b) in trust successively for the persons described in pars (a),(b) and (c) of cl 4, as though the last day of such Accounting Period were the Vesting Day (cl 3(e));- the first to take under cl 4(a), (b) and (c) are the Specified Beneficiaries (as defined in cl 1(a) and the Schedule) who take as tenants in common in equal shares, descendants of a Specified Beneficiary taking the share of a Specified Beneficiary who does not survive to the Vesting Day (cl 4(a)). All of the named Specified Beneficiaries (Steven Irvine Hart, Troy Benjamin Hart, Philip Anthony Hart and Tammy Anne Petersen (now Tamara Ramsden)) survived to 30 June 1996;- any amount set aside by the Trustee pursuant to cl 3(b) or held by the trustee pursuant to cl 3(e) is excluded from the Trust Fund, and is thenceforth held by the trustee in a separate trust fund (called a derivative trust fund) (cl 3(f)); and- on the Vesting Day the Trustee holds the Trust Fund and the income thereof in trust for such of the General Beneficiaries as the Trustee may appoint and in default of appointment for the Special Beneficiaries’ interests in common (cl 4(a)). In the year ended 30 June 1996 the Trustee purported to distribute an amount of $429,000 to the Adcock Practice Trust (‘the Adcock Trust’) pursuant to the provisions of cl 3(b) of the Deed . The minutes of a meeting of directors of the Trustee dated 30 June 1996 recorded as follows, in relation to the appropriation of Trust income: ‘APPROPRIATION OF Resolved that the Income of the Trust for TRUST INCOME: the Year Ended 30 June, 1996 be appropriated, set aside and applied to the beneficiaries:STEVE HART FAMILY HLDGS NO. 2 $ 17,295 STEVE HART FAMILY HLDGS NO. 3 $ 6,639 UNLIMITED AEROBATIC DISC TRUST $ 34,810THE ADCOCK PRACTICE TRUST $429,000 TROY B HART $ 4,750 STEVEN I HART THE BALANCEVARIATION OF Resolved that should the Commissioner of TaxationINCOME disallow any amount as a deduction or include any amount in the assessable income of the Trust, such amount or amounts are to be deemed to be distributed on 30th June, 1996 in the same proportions as listed above to the beneficiaries listed above.’

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge resolved that question in favour of the respondents. The Commissioner abandoned the grounds of appeal which challenged the primary judge’s decision in this respect. Senior Counsel for the Commissioner conceded in the course of his submissions on the appeal that if an otherwise effective disclaimer of the interest in question was made, albeit after the issue of the notices of assessment, then that would be sufficient to negate a present entitlement on the part of the disclaiming beneficiary to a share in the income of the trust estate under s 97(1)(a) of the ITAA for the year ended 30 June 1996. Therefore, the question whether the operation of s 97(1)(a) is so qualified is not an issue the Court is required to decide in these appeals. The decision of the primary judge – was the interest effectively disclaimed? The primary judge found that the various disclaimers made by the respondents were effective to disclaim any interest which any respondent had in any part of the distribution of the $429,000. In so finding his Honour:(a)held that just as a person may not be compelled to accept a gift, a person cannot be compelled to accept the exercise of a power which a donee has conferred upon a trustee to make a gift in the person’s favour: In re Gulbenkian’s Settlement (No 2), Stephens v Maun [1970] 1 Ch 408, 418;(b)held that just as a person may disclaim an appointment of income made to the person as a discretionary beneficiary, the person is entitled to disclaim where the entitlement to income arises in default of an appointment by a trustee;(c)held that although an entitlement under a trust is valid notwithstanding that the beneficiary has no knowledge of it, the beneficiary may disclaim that entitlement on its coming to his or her knowledge: Vegners v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 91 ATC 4213, 4215;(d)accepted that the respondent was free to chose whether to avail herself of her entitlement to her share in the failed distribution until such time as she unequivocally disclaimed, or unequivocally accepted it: Re Stratton’s Disclaimer [1958] Ch 42, 54;(e)accepted that disclaimer need not be effected by a formal deed; any evidence of actual dissent is sufficient: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Cornell (1946) 73 CLR 394, 401-402;(f)held that a beneficiary of a discretionary trust may disclaim for each exercise of the discretion, that is to say that the fact that the beneficiary has accepted benefits previously does not bar a disclaimer in respect of later exercises of the discretion: In re Gulbenkian’s Settlement (No 2), Stephens v Maun [1970] 1 Ch 408;(g)held that the respondents at no stage accepted the interest in the sum of $429,000 which accrued to them under the terms of the Trust for the financial year ended 30 June 1996. The primary judge did not make a specific finding as to whether or not deeds of disclaimer were executed by the respondents on 7 April 2002. His Honour expressed his findings on disclaimer as follows; and there may be room for doubt as to whether the ‘various disclaimers’ includes the deeds which the respondents claim to have executed in April 2002:‘80 … The various disclaimers constitute an absolute rejection of the distribution to her (i.e. Tamara Ramsden) as a Specified Beneficiary in default of appointment of income by the Trustee. The notice of objection is consistent only with her contention that there was no interest in her in any part of the $429,000 that had been appointed to the Adcock Trust. A beneficiary will be taken to have accepted the interest where the beneficiary is made aware of it and does not, before a reasonable time has elapsed, seek to disclaim it: Hodge v Griffiths [1940] 1 Ch 260. The act of disclaimer must, usually, occur before any act constituting assent to the distribution. At all times the applicant has disputed that she had any entitlement to any part of the $429,000, and in my judgment she has at no time done any act signifying assent to the distribution to her.81 In my opinion, the disclaimer was effective to disclaim any interest she had in the distribution to her contended for by the Commissioner. 82 The same view follows in relation to the disclaimers by Philip Hart and by Troy Hart.’The Commissioner’s submissions on appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.