Court of Appeal
New South Wales
Case Title: O'Sullivan Partners (Advisory) Pty Ltd v Foggo Medium Neutral Citation: [2012] NSWCA 40 Hearing Date(s): 7 February 2012 Decision Date: 19 March 2012 Jurisdiction: Before: Campbell JA at [1]
Macfarlan JA at [101]
Young JA at [102]Decision: Appeal dismissed with costs.
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]Catchwords: CONTRACTS - construction and interpretation of - contractual right to have discretions exercised - extent of discretion - where contract provided for payment of bonus at the discretion of the Remuneration Committee - discretion held to constitute a discretion to allocate bonus and a discretion to pay the bonus - appellant informed respondent in writing that he would be 'paid' bonus of $300,000 - appellant argued that bonus had only been allocated, and discretion to pay reserved - held, on evidence, that both discretions had been exercised in favour of the respondent
CONTRACTS - construction and interpretation of - contractual right to have discretions exercised - extent of discretion - where contract provided for payment of bonus at the discretion of the Remuneration Committee - bonus allocated on certain conditions, including provision for claw back - discretionary nature of contractual right extended to allocating bonuses conditionally
CONTRACTS - disclaimer - availability - where contract provided for payment of bonus at the discretion of the Remuneration Committee - bonus allocated on certain conditions, including provision for claw back - respondent communicated his dissatisfaction with conditions attaching to bonus - appellant did not pay bonus - appellant argued that the respondent had disclaimed an entitlement to the bonus - held that no disclaimer of individual rights under a contract not by deed, in circumstances not amounting to variation of contract, estoppel, election or waiver
CONTRACTS - offer and acceptance - purported exercise of contractual rights not an offer - attempted variation of contractual rights not accepted - no variation of contract
EQUITY - assignments - voluntary - disclaimer - principles of effecting disclaimer generally where one party is equitably assigned undesirable property
EQUITY - equitable personal obligation attached to a transfer of property - enforceability
WORDS AND PHRASES - "disclaimer", "abandonment", "renunciation", "waiver"
Legislation Cited: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)Cases Cited: Agricultural and Rural Finance v Gardiner [2008] HCA 57; (2008) 238 CLR 570
Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175
Bluebottle UK Limited v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] HCA 54; (2007) 232 CLR 598
Brejwo v Public Trustee of New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 115
Burns Philp Hardware Ltd v Howard Chia Pty Ltd (1987)
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- Case
- [2012] NSWCA 40
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were: first, the extent of the Remuneration Committee's discretion under the contract, specifically whether it encompassed both the allocation and the payment of the bonus; and second, whether the respondent had effectively disclaimed his contractual entitlement to the bonus. The court was required to determine the legal principles governing contractual discretions and the requirements for an effective disclaimer of contractual rights.
The court reasoned that the contractual language indicated that the Remuneration Committee's discretion extended to both allocating the bonus and deciding whether to pay it. However, the court found that the appellant had, in writing, informed the respondent that he would be "paid" a bonus of $300,000, which constituted an exercise of both discretions in favour of the respondent. Regarding the disclaimer, the court held that the principles of disclaimer, as discussed in cases concerning gifts and statutory powers of liquidators and trustees in bankruptcy, did not apply to the purported disclaimer of specific contractual rights by a party to a contract not under deed. The court found that the respondent's actions did not amount to a variation of the contract, estoppel, election, or waiver, and therefore, no effective disclaimer had occurred.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs.
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The law concerning disclaimer finds its most familiar fields of application concerning transfers of property, where the transferee is a volunteer. In his illuminating discussion of disclaimer, Professor Crago identified its field of operation as follows: "There are many circumstances in which a person may wish to reject (or 'disclaim') a proffered gift. This article considers the nature, requirements for, and the legal consequences of an effective disclaimer. It will be seen that these elements vary according to the nature of the gift and the type of property comprising it, and in particular whether the gift operates at common law, in equity by way of trust, or under the provisions of the will." (Neville Crago, "Principles of Disclaimer of Gifts" The University of Western Australia Law Review , vol 28 (1999) at 65). As well, a liquidator of a company has a power to disclaim certain of the property of a company under s 568 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Even in this statutory usage of disclaimer, it is "property of the company" that can be disclaimed. Sub-s ection 568(1)(f) makes clear that the property that can be disclaimed includes " a contract" , but the power to disclaim must be exercised in relation to the whole of the contract, not in relation to specific rights that arise under it. As well a liquidator does not have any entitlement to receive the company's property by virtue of any consideration he has given or any contractual right that he has against the company. Section 133 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) confers on a trustee in bankruptcy a similar power to disclaim a contract of a bankrupt, but again the power exists in relation only to the whole of the contract, not in relation to specific rights under it. The Full Federal Court (Lee, Merkel and Healy JJ) discussed the general law relating to disclaimer in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Ramsden [2005] FCAFC 39; 2005 ATC 4136 at [31], but that discussion is all in terms of disclaiming a gift of an item of property. The same can be said of the discussion of disclaimer in In re Paradise Motor Co Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 1125; Re Boyd (deceased) v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1966] NZLR 1109 and Tantau v MacFarlane [2010] NSWSC 224 at [77]-[121]. In support of his submission that the Respondent had disclaimed the bonus, Mr Finch relied on the decisions in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Cornell (1946) 73 CLR 394, MSP Nominees Pty Limited v Commissioner of Stamps (South Australia) [1999] HCA 51; (1999) 198 CLR 494 and the judgment of Mahoney JA in Burns Philp Hardware Ltd v Howard Chia Pty Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 642 at 646. It is necessary to examine those cases in some detail to ascertain what can be drawn from them for present purposes. Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Cornell is a decision of Latham CJ sitting as a single judge. Mr Cornell was divorced from his wife. She had remarried, and become Mrs Corfield. He was bound by a deed to pay her a particular monthly payment. For the purpose of reducing his income tax he wanted to establish a trust of certain shares that he held. That trust was to be one whereby the income of those shares would be held for Mrs Corfield, and other rights concerning the shares held for other members of his family. He proposed that the amount of trust income would reduce pro tanto his obligation to make maintenance payments to Mrs Corfield. The shares were actually transferred to the intended trustees. A draft deed of trust was prepared, and submitted to Mrs Corfield's solicitors. However, they wrote saying they objected to the proposal for creating a trust, because it would increase their client's taxation liabilities. Latham CJ held that, in the circumstances, the income of the shares remained part of Mr Cornell's taxable income because no fully constituted trust had come into existence. He continued, at 401-2: If, however, it were held that a trust had been created by the transfer of the shares with the intention of conferring benefits upon Mrs Corfield and some sufficiently identifiable members of the taxpayer's family, the case for the taxpayer would nevertheless fail because, as Holroyd J in Townson v Tickell (1819) 3 B & Ald 31, at p 38 [106 ER 575, at p 577] said (speaking of a devise):-'I think that an estate cannot be forced on a man. A devise, however, being prima facie for the devisee's benefit, he is supposed to assent to it, until he does some act to show his dissent. The law presumes that he will assent until the contrary be proved; when the contrary, however, is proved, it shows that he never did assent to the devise, and, consequently, that the estate never was in him.' Best J said (1819) 3 B & Ald, at p 39 [106 ER, at p 578]:-'It seems to be contrary to common sense to say, that an estate should vest in a man not assenting to it: there must be the assent of the party, before any interest in the property can pass to him.' The same case shows that the dissent need not be evidenced by disclaimer in a court of record or by deed; any evidence of actual dissent is sufficient. The law was stated with equal definiteness in Standing v Bowring (1885) 31 Ch D 282, at p 288, where it was held that, when there is a transfer of property to a person, it vests in him even before he knows of the transfer, 'subject to his right when informed of it to say, if he pleases, "I will not take it." When informed of it he may repudiate it, but it vests in him until he so repudiates it.' See also London & County Banking Co v London & River Plate Bank (1888) 21 QBD 535; Mallott v Wilson (1903) 2 Ch 494."