Chief Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Buckle

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BRENNAN CJ,
TOOHEY, GAUDRON, McHUGH AND GUMMOW JJ

CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF STAMP DUTIES  APPELLANT

AND

WILLIAM FRANCIS BUCKLE & ORS  RESPONDENTS

Chief Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Buckle [1998] HCA 4
23 January 1998
S171/96

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation:

A H Slater QC with H R Sorensen for the appellant (instructed by
I V Knight, Crown Solicitor for New South Wales)

R W White with P P Wines for the respondents (instructed by
Mallesons Stephen Jaques)

Notice:  This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Chief Commissioner of Stamp Duties v William Francis Buckle & Ors

Stamp duties - Deed of settlement establishing discretionary trust - Trust property comprised land purchased with proceeds of two loans - Duty assessed on supplemental deed altering destination of corpus of trust property in default of appointment - Ad valorem duty payable in respect of "unencumbered value of the property ... conveyed" - Identification of property conveyed - Whether duty payable on unencumbered value of assets which comprised the trust fund or amount which took into account vicissitudes inherent under the deed of settlement.

Trusts and trustees - Nature of trustee's right of exoneration and recoupment - Whether trustee's right constitutes beneficial interest in trust assets - Whether trustee's right an encumbrance on the interests of beneficiaries conveyed which is to be disregarded for purposes of s 66(1) of the Stamp Duties Act 1920 (NSW).

Stamp Duties Act 1920 (NSW), ss 65, 66.

  1. BRENNAN CJ, TOOHEY, GAUDRON, McHUGH AND GUMMOW JJ.   This is an appeal from a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal[1]. The appellant ("the Chief Commissioner") is charged by s 8(1) of the Stamp Duties Act 1920 (NSW) ("the Act") with the due administration of that statute. By majority (Kirby P and Sheller JA, Powell JA dissenting), the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the Chief Commissioner against a decision of a Master sitting in the Administrative Law Division of the Supreme Court.

  2. The Master had upheld an appeal by the respondents under s 124 of the Act[2].  The appeal to the Supreme Court had been by way of rehearing[3] of an objection to an assessment to duty in the sum of $208,581 upon an instrument dated 11 June 1993 ("the Supplemental Deed"). This was assessed to duty as a conveyance within the meaning of s 65 of the Act and was chargeable in accordance with s 66(1) with ad valorem duty in respect of the unencumbered value of the property thereby conveyed. In this Court, the Chief Commissioner seeks orders the effect of which would be to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeal and to dismiss the appeal to the Supreme Court which the respondents instituted under ss 124 and 124A…

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Details
Case
[1998] HCA 4
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Chief Commissioner of Stamp Duties appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision concerning stamp duty assessed on a supplemental deed altering the destination of a discretionary trust's corpus. The dispute centred on how to value the "unencumbered value of the property conveyed" for the purposes of ad valorem duty under the *Stamp Duties Act 1920* (NSW). The trust property comprised land purchased with loan proceeds, and the Commissioner sought to assess duty on the unencumbered value of the assets, taking into account potential liabilities inherent in the trust deed.

The legal issues before the High Court were twofold: first, how to interpret the phrase "unencumbered value" in section 66(1) of the *Stamp Duties Act 1920* (NSW) in the context of a discretionary trust and its assets; and second, whether a trustee's right of exoneration and recoupment constitutes a beneficial interest in the trust assets or an encumbrance on the interests of beneficiaries that should be disregarded for duty assessment.

The Court considered the meaning of "encumbrances" in the context of property and liabilities, drawing on *Wallace v Love* and *Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (Quigley's Case)*. It concluded that "unencumbered value" in section 66(1) refers to security interests, charges, or liabilities that attach to the property itself, rather than general debts or expenses of the trust. The Court clarified that the supplemental deed did not convey the entirety of the trust fund, but rather interests of a lesser nature, the present value of which must reflect the inherent uncertainties and vicissitudes of the discretionary trust structure. The trustee's right of exoneration and recoupment was not considered an encumbrance in the relevant sense for the purpose of duty assessment.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

HUGH AND GUMMOW JJ (dissent)
More assistance in the present appeal is provided by a decision upon s 66 of the Act in Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (Quigley's Case)[17]. The settlor, Mr Quigley, had vested interests under certain settlements. These included undivided moieties under two settlements. One moiety was subject to a life interest in Mr Quigley's stepmother. All of his interests he then settled by deed dated 16 November 1925 on trust for himself for life with remainder to other persons. The first undivided moiety and the reversionary interest of Mr Quigley in the second moiety were provisionally accepted at values which were not specified as the value of the whole of the assets bound by the two earlier settlements[18]. The taxpayer submitted that the 1925 deed should be assessed to duty on a basis which deducted from the value of the property conveyed the value of the life interest Mr Quigley created thereby in his own favour. The submission was rejected. There was no pre‑existing life interest in Mr Quigley which remained unaffected. Rather, he settled the whole of his interests under the earlier settlements and thereby created a new life interest[19]. What was valued was the whole of the interests settled in 1925. These were the relevant property upon which s 66(1) operated. The property was not the whole of the assets of the earlier settlements in which Mr Quigley held his interests.[17] (1926) 38 CLR 272.[18] See (1926) 38 CLR 272 at 273.[19] (1926) 38 CLR 272 at 277‑278. See also DKLR Holding Co (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 431 at 443‑444, 450‑451.Conclusion with respect to stamp duty The operation of the Supplemental Deed and the bearing of the Act upon it are to be understood against the background of the provisions of the Deed of Settlement to which we have referred. The trustee held the Trust Fund upon what might compendiously be described as a discretionary trust. Beneficial interests arose thereunder only in the limited sense which was identified earlier in these reasons. The Supplemental Deed did not bring about the vesting in the second and third respondents of the whole of the Trust Fund in its then state of investment. Nor is it accurate to identify the legal operation of the Supplemental Deed as a "resettlement" of the entirety of beneficial interests which then existed in the Trust Fund as a whole, and to apply s 66 of the Act on that basis. The definition in s 65 identifies the conveyance charged with ad valorem duty as an instrument whereby property is transferred to or vested in or accrues to any person. The Supplemental Deed caused the vesting in the second and third respondents not of the Trust Fund but of interests of a lesser nature. These were vested interests in a technical sense. They might, given the presence in New South Wales of the trustee and the assets comprising the Trust Fund, and the broad definition in s 3(1) of "property", be treated as property in New South Wales within the meaning of the Act. However, their present value had to reflect the vicissitudes which were an essential element of the structure created by the Deed of Settlement.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

However, the construction of the phrase "unencumbered value" in respect of liabilities such as those of the trustee in this case was fully considered in the Court of Appeal and in submissions to this Court. Further, the related issue of the nature of the so‑called trustee's lien is of general importance. Accordingly, we shortly indicate our conclusions upon these matters. However, no issue arose, in the submissions concerning the trustee's lien, as to the subrogation of creditors of the trustee to the rights of the trustee. Nor was there any issue as to the personal right of a trustee against beneficiaries which in some circumstances may arise under the principles considered in Hardoon v Belilios[20].[20] [1901] AC 118."Unencumbered value" and the trustee's exoneration and recoupment We turn first to the phrase "unencumbered value" in s 66(1). In Wallace v Love[21], this Court considered a direction by a testator that the trustees distribute the estate in a certain way when and as soon as the estate should be free from all "encumbrances". By a majority (Knox CJ and Starke J, Higgins J dissenting), it was held that in this setting the term "encumbrances" included all debts of the estate whether secured or unsecured and whether incurred by the testator or by the trustees. Knox CJ and Starke J said[22]:"The word 'encumbrances', in its ordinary connotation, means that a person or estate is burdened with debts, obligations or responsibilities. True, the word is in law especially used to indicate a burden on property, a claim, lien or liability attached to property (see Oxford Dictionary, under title 'Encumbrance'). But when we remember that the whole estate of the testator is liable in the hands of his executor for payment of debts and the expense of administering his estate, it is not an extravagant use of language to say that his 'whole estate is not free from encumbrances' until those debts and expenses are paid."In the course of reaching the opposite result with respect to the particular will in question, Higgins J gave the following example[23]:"A trustee's obligation to a caretaker or to other employees or to solicitors or others is not a liability attached to property. It would not be even 'a debt' of the testator or of his estate. Judgment for it would not be given de bonis testatoris. It would be 'a debt' of the trustees personally, although, if rightly incurred, they would be entitled to be indemnified out of the trust estate as for a trust expense (Staniar v Evans[24])."[21] (1922) 31 CLR 156.[22] (1922) 31 CLR 156 at 164.[23] (1922) 31 CLR 156 at 172.[24] (1886) 34 Ch D 470. Section 66(1) charges the conveyance with ad valorem duty upon the property conveyed by means of that instrument. The effect of the Second Schedule, which is to be read in conjunction with s 66(1), in a case such as the present is to impose upon the instrument the same duty as if the unencumbered value were the amount of consideration for the conveyance. This suggests that "unencumbered" is used in s 66(1) not in a loose sense but to refer to security interests in, or charges or other liabilities which attach to, the property in question.