Commissioner of Taxation v Ross

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commissioner of Taxation v Ross [2021] FCA 766

Appeal from: Re MJPV and Commissioner of Taxation [2020] AATA 1527
File number: QUD 165 of 2020
Judgment of: DERRINGTON  J
Date of judgment: 9 July 2021
Catchwords:

TAXATION – onus of proof – appeal from decisions of Administrative Appeals Tribunal setting aside objection decisions relating to assessments – default assessments pursuant to s 167 of Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – whether Tribunal failed to apply correct onus pursuant to s 14ZZK of Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) – whether taxpayers could satisfy onus by establishing errors in asset betterment methodology adopted by Commissioner – whether taxpayers could satisfy onus by establishing amounts included in asset betterment statement were not assessable income – whether taxpayers could satisfy onus by otherwise conceding unexplained amounts represented assessable income – whether Commissioner had agreed to confine issues in dispute before Tribunal – effect of concessions by Commissioner to Tribunal that amounts included in asset betterment statements were not unexplained wealth or were overstated – whether properly instructed Tribunal could have been satisfied that taxpayers had established true taxable income on evidence adduced below – where taxpayers adduced document as aide-memoire purporting to summarise evidence – whether document could explain unexplained wealth – whether document could establish taxpayers’ true taxable income – appeal allowed

TAXATION – standard of proof – where Tribunal remitted objection decisions to Commissioner for reconsideration with direction to take account of “possibility” of double counting in asset betterment statements – whether Tribunal failed to apply correct standard of proof – appeal allowed

TAXATION – grounds of objection – whether Tribunal considered matters not raised in taxpayer’s grounds of objection – whether Tribunal impliedly granted leave to amend grounds – whether Commissioner joined issue on new matters in submissions – appeal allowed in part

TAXATION – administrative penalties – where taxpayer assessed for penalties for multiple income years – whether Tribunal erred in purporting to exercise discretion to set aside penalty uplift imposed by s 284-220(1)(c) of Sch 1 to Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) – whether imposition of uplift depended on base penalty amount being worked out under relevant items in s 284-90(1) before conduct giving rise to further penalty – appeal allowed

TAXATION – remission of penalties – scope of considerations relevant to discretion to remit – whether scope of relevant considerations temporally limited – whether Tribunal erred in taking into account death of taxpayer after hearing concluded in remitting penalties imposed on him and his spouse – appeal allowed

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – procedural fairness – whether Tribunal denied Commissioner procedural fairness by considering matter arising after hearing concluded – whether Tribunal failed to provide opportunity to make submissions on new matter – appeal allowed 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – whether Tribunal denied taxpayers procedural fairness – where significant delay between hearing of evidence and delivery of decisions and reasons – whether delay gives rise to real and substantial risk that Tribunal’s capacity to assess matters was…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 766
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Commissioner of Taxation v Ross involved an appeal by the Commissioner against decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that set aside objection decisions relating to assessments made pursuant to s 167 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). The primary legal issues included whether the AAT failed to apply the correct onus of proof under s 14ZZK of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), whether the taxpayers could satisfy the onus by establishing errors in the asset betterment methodology adopted by the Commissioner, and whether the Commissioner had agreed to confine the issues before the AAT. Additionally, the case addressed the standard of proof applied by the AAT, the scope of relevant considerations in remitting penalties, and issues of procedural fairness.

The court found that the AAT had not applied the correct onus of proof and had failed to consider the standard of proof required in the context of the asset betterment statements. It was also determined that the AAT had not properly considered the concessions made by the Commissioner and had remitted the objection decisions to the Commissioner for reconsideration without correctly applying the relevant legislative provisions. Furthermore, the AAT was found to have failed to provide procedural fairness by considering matters arising after the hearing concluded and by not providing an opportunity for the Commissioner to make submissions on new matters. The court also found that the AAT had denied the taxpayers procedural fairness due to a significant delay in delivering its decisions and reasons, which gave rise to a real and substantial risk that the Tribunal’s capacity to assess matters was impaired.

As a result, the court allowed the Commissioner’s appeal and the taxpayers’ cross-appeal, set aside the AAT’s decisions, and remitted the matters to the AAT for re-hearing according to law and in accordance with the reasons provided, without the hearing of further evidence. The court also ordered the parties to file and serve written submissions on the question of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s appeal be allowed.

2. The respondents’ cross-appeal be allowed.

3. The decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 6 May 2020 be set aside.

4. Matters numbered 2016/4850 – 2016/4859 and 2016/4915 – 2016/4918 be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for re-hearing according to law and in accordance with these reasons without the hearing of further evidence.

5. The parties file and serve written submissions on the question of costs limited to five pages within 14 days from the date of the delivery of these reasons.

6. The parties file and serve written submissions in reply on the question of costs limited to three pages within 21 days from the date of the delivery of these reasons.

7. Liberty to apply.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Despite the Commissioner’s submission that this Court should substitute for the Tribunal’s decision with respect to the taxpayers’ applications a decision that the applications be dismissed and his objection decisions be affirmed, I am not satisfied that the Court has the power to do so in the circumstances of this case. The appeals should therefore be remitted to the Tribunal for re-hearing but, by reason of the matters discussed at the conclusion of these reasons, that hearing should occur without the hearing of further evidence.BACKGROUND In October 2015, the Commissioner concluded a covert audit of the affairs of Mr Shane Ross and Mrs Alexandra Ross. It was covert in the sense that it was undertaken without notice to either taxpayer. The audit of Mr Ross’s affairs concluded that he had failed to disclose assessable income over the subject income years in an amount totalling approximately $843,989, resulting in a tax shortfall amount of $353,042. In respect of Mrs Ross, the audit concluded she had failed to disclose assessable income in an amount totalling approximately $466,080, resulting in a tax shortfall of $192,420. In consequence upon the conclusions reached in the audit, the Commissioner made default and amended assessments for Mr and Mrs Ross. In relation to Mr Ross, amended assessments were made on 27 October 2015 for the 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2014 income years. For each of those income years, the assessments were made pursuant to s 167 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (the ITAA36). In the case of Mrs Ross, a default assessment was made for the 2013 income year and an amended assessment was made for the 2014 income year, each on 28 October 2015. These assessments were also made pursuant to s 167 of the ITAA36. In addition, the Commissioner assessed each of Mr and Mrs Ross for administrative penalties. In respect of Mr Ross, the Commissioner assessed administrative penalties at a rate of 75% of the shortfall amounts for relevant income years, with an uplift of 20% for the income years after the 2009 income year. Similarly, Mrs Ross was assessed for administrative penalties at a rate of 75% of the shortfall amounts for the 2013 and 2014 income years. The results of the audit were disclosed to Mr and Mrs Ross in letters dated 27 October 2015 which explained the basis on which the Commissioner had made the amended and default assessments and assessed the taxpayers for penalties, and included the “Asset Betterment Statement” prepared in respect of each of them on which the assessments were based. On 4 March 2016, objections were lodged on behalf of Mr and Mrs Ross’s in respect of the assessments and penalty assessments. On 15 July 2016, the Commissioner gave Mr Ross a notice of objection decision disallowing his objections in full. On 18 July 2016, the Commissioner gave Mrs Ross a notice of objection decision disallowing her objections in full.Proceedings in the Tribunal On 13 September 2016, Mr Ross commenced proceedings in the Tribunal seeking a review of the Commissioner’s objection decision. On 15 September 2016, Mrs Ross commenced similar proceedings in which she sought review of the Commissioner’s objection decision in relation to her. These proceedings were heard together in the Tribunal and it is appropriate to adopt the nomenclature used by the Commissioner in his written submissions in describing the combined proceedings as “the Tribunal proceedings”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Further, in line with the decision in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Gungor (1982) 63 FLR 441, an order setting aside the Tribunal’s determinations on the Commissioner’s appeal is one which conforms to and reflects the error of law on which the appeal succeeded. The same cannot be said of the relief sought by the Commissioner that the Court make orders that the appeals to the Tribunal be dismissed. That would necessarily be reflective of the factual determination that the evidence before the Tribunal could not satisfy the onus under s 14ZZK(b)(i). Should a remitted hearing be on the hearing of further evidence? The next question is whether, if the matter were remitted to the Tribunal, it should be on the basis that it be reheard on a hearing of the same or further evidence. Although the parties had different positions on this, neither made any substantial submission as to how the issue ought to be decided. The taxpayers’ seek an order that they be entitled to adduce further evidence on the re-hearing and that apparently underpins a desire to advance a new case based on additional material. It is not immediately clear why they should be given that second chance, merely due to the Tribunal’s delay in delivering its decisions. In this context, it is relevant that the taxpayers did not indicate the nature or extent of the further evidence which they wished to adduce before the Tribunal. All that was said that they should be at liberty to do so. With respect, that is inadequate given they were aware of the Commissioner’s submission that it would be futile to remit the matter for re-hearing. A further difficulty is that by the evidence adduced at the original hearing they have already purported to assert the sources of their income and how it came to be transferred to and from their bank accounts. That evidence was, in part, shown to be erroneous and, otherwise, not believed. Necessarily, in order to secure a different outcome it is likely that they will be required to adduce evidence which contradicts that which they adduced at the first hearing. This case is not similar to many before the Tribunal where the facts might be constantly evolving, such as claims by persons who have suffered illness or injury, where new evidence might throw light on a developing situation. Here, any new evidence which might be advanced must necessarily be evidence which could have been obtained for the earlier hearing. That being so, the absence of any explanation as to why it was not then made available militates strongly against exercising a discretion to allow additional material on any remitted hearing. A reason for remitting the matter for hearing on new evidence would exist had it been demonstrated that the passage of time had adversely impacted upon the Tribunal’s credit findings. That was not the case here. Although the Tribunal’s findings in relation to the specific transactions involved a rejection of the evidence of the taxpayers and their witnesses, that was the result of the objective, inherent implausibility of what they said rather than the manner in which they said it or their dispositions when giving evidence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal’s decisions on the applications for review were made on 6 May 2020 and reasons for decisions were given. As identified by Counsel for Mrs Ross, this was more than two and a quarter years from the last receipt of evidence on 1 February 2018 and just short of two and a half years since the hearing of the oral evidence of Mr and Mrs Ross.Tribunal’s decision At this point, there is no need to set out the Tribunal’s reasons in great detail. Where appropriate, relevant parts will be analysed in the reasons which follow. For present purposes, only a brief synopsis is required. First, the Tribunal noted in relation to Mr Ross that, for income years 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2013, the Commissioner relied upon the “fraud or evasion” exception in s 170 of the ITAA36 to the statutory time limit on the making of an amended assessment. It also observed that the taxpayer bore the onus of establishing that the Commissioner could not validly have formed the opinion that fraud or evasion had occurred. In relation to the 2014 income year, the amended assessment was made within the statutory time limit so the Commissioner had not needed to rely on the fraud or evasion exception. The Tribunal further noted that taxpayers claimed that they had done nothing wrong and alleged that the specific amounts which the Commissioner had assumed to be representative of assessable income should properly have been regarded as loans, gifts, the proceeds of recreational gambling, and the proceeds of sales of motor vehicles and components. It then briefly set out a consideration of the taxpayer’s obligation in s 14ZZK(b)(i) of the TAA to discharge the burden of establishing that an assessment was excessive. It also identified that the taxpayer must persuade the Tribunal what the correct assessment should be. After referring to the process of assessing evidence, the Tribunal acknowledged that there had been a “lengthy and regrettable delay in producing [its] reasons for decision”, but indicated that the Tribunal member was confident that he would be able to deal with the challenges posed by the delay by reference to his detailed notes, the transcript and the audio recordings of the hearing. The Tribunal then identified the possibility that the Commissioner’s calculations in the Asset Betterment Statement had involved some double counting of amounts based on Mr Ross’s transfer of funds between his several accounts. It noted that Mr Ross had provided a detailed analysis which “strongly suggest[ed]” that inter-account transfers were mistakenly taken into account in making the amended assessments, and indicated that the Commissioner would need to reconsider all of the assessments with a direction to exclude such transfers. Thereafter, it considered each of the income years in relation to Mr Ross and whether certain amounts should not have been included in his assessable income for the relevant income years. In summary, the findings of the Tribunal were as follows:(1)In relation to the 2009 income year, it was not persuaded that Mr Ross had discharged the onus of establishing that the sum of $93,000, which the Commissioner had included in the Asset Betterment Statement in making the amended assessment for that year, was a loan from an acquaintance. Further, having concluded that it was not a loan, as Mr Ross had claimed, the Tribunal determined he had not discharged the onus of showing that the Commissioner’s view that there was fraud or evasion should be overturned.(2)In relation to the 2010 income year, it determined that Mr Ross had discharged the onus of showing that the sum of approximately $8,000, of an amount of $63,473 which the Commissioner had identified as unexplained income, was a gain derived from gambling such that it ought not to have been included in the amended assessment. It also observed that Mr Ross did not dispute the balance of the amount included in his assessable income by the Commissioner or that the Commissioner had erred in determining that there was fraud or evasion in relation to that balance. (3)In relation to the 2012 income year, it concluded that Mr Ross had discharged the onus of establishing that certain payments which had been received by him from his mother were not income. However, he had not discharged that onus in relation to other payments, nor in establishing that the Commissioner should not have formed the opinion that there was fraud or evasion.(4)In relation to the 2013 income year, it determined that Mr Ross had not discharged the onus of establishing that the sum of $75,000, which the Commissioner included in the Asset Betterment Statement relating to Mr Ross, was a loan from an associate. Neither did it accept that the sum of $44,000 was the total of the funds received by Mr Ross as cash gifts in connection with his engagement to Mrs Ross. Similarly, it concluded that Mr Ross had not discharged the onus of showing that the totality of the sum of approximately $74,000 received by him in that year could be accounted for as the proceeds of gambling, nor that the Commissioner had erred in determining that there was fraud or evasion. However, it did accept that certain amounts claimed as being the proceeds of gambling (totalling $16,010.40) should be excluded from Mr Ross’s assessable income for that year.(5)In relation to the 2014 income year, the Commissioner had increased Mr Ross’s taxable income by $425,256 and the Tribunal concluded that Mr Ross had not discharged the onus of showing that the separate sums of $45,000, $50,000 or $140,000 which formed part of that increase were gifts or loans. It also concluded that Mr Ross had not discharged the onus of establishing that the sum of $132,500 received by him in that income year represented the proceeds of the sale of motor vehicles and an engine. It did, however, accept that he had discharged the onus in relation to the sum of $35,000 which he had claimed was a loan.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established