Rigoli v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rigoli v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCAFC 29

Citation: Rigoli v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCAFC 29
Appeal from: Commissioner of Taxation v Rigoli [2013] FCA 784
Parties: LITTLE JOE RIGOLI v THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
File number: VID 891 of 2013
Judges: EDMONDS, JESSUP AND MCKERRACHER JJ
Date of judgment: 18 March 2014
Catchwords:

INCOME TAX – appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – objection decisions – whether the taxpayer discharged the burden of proving assessments made pursuant to s 167 were excessive within the meaning of s 14ZZK(b)(i) of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) – taxpayer does not discharge burden of proof by merely challenging the basis upon which the assessment was based – “concession” by taxpayer does not amount to probative evidence to discharge the burden of proof – burden of proof to be discharged by proving actual taxable income to establish excessiveness of assessment under s 167 – applicant did not provide AAT with a probative foundation upon which factual conclusions could be reached

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether remittal of the proceeding to the AAT was futile – remittal of the proceeding to the AAT was expressly within the statutory discretion under s 44(4) and (5) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – no submissions arguing against remittal were made before the primary judge – proceeding to be remitted to the AAT – proceeding to be heard and determined on the evidence before the AAT in the proceeding which resulted in the original decision

Legislation: Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 166, 167
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 14ZZK
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 43, 44
Cases cited: Commissioner of Taxation v Dalco (1990) 168 CLR 614
Gashi v Commissioner of Taxation (2013) 209 FCR 301
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Ma v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 37 FCR 225
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Gungor (1982) 42 ALR 209
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Thiyagarajah (2000) 199 CLR 343
Peacock v Repatriation Commission (2007) 161 FCR 256
Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2013) 296 ALR 307
Repatriation Commission v Nation (1995) 57 FCR 25
Rigoli and Commissioner of Taxation [2012] AATA 757
Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286
Date of hearing: 12 February 2014
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 36
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr D Clough with Mr M Bearman
Solicitor for the Appellant: Lennon Mazzeo
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms D Harding SC with Ms A Lee
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 891 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

LITTLE JOE RIGOLI
Appellant/Cross-Respondent

AND:

THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent/Cross-Appellant

JUDGES:

EDMONDS, JESSUP AND MCKERRACHER JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

18 MARCH 2014

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Details
Case
[2014] FCAFC 29
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Rigoli v Commissioner of Taxation, the taxpayer, Mr Rigoli, appealed against decisions made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that upheld the Commissioner's assessments of income tax for the fiscal years ending on 30 June 1994 to 30 June 2001. The primary issue before the court was whether the AAT had erred in law by not holding that Mr Rigoli had failed to discharge his burden of proof that the Commissioner's assessments were excessive, as required by s 14ZZK(b)(i) of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth). Additionally, the court was required to determine whether the proceeding should be remitted back to the AAT or if such a remittal would be futile.

The court found that Mr Rigoli had not discharged his burden of proving that the Commissioner's assessments were excessive, as he had failed to provide the AAT with a probative foundation upon which factual conclusions could be reached. The court held that it was not sufficient for Mr Rigoli to merely challenge the basis upon which the assessment was based or to offer a "concession" without evidence. Instead, the burden of proof fell on Mr Rigoli to prove his actual taxable income to establish the excessiveness of the assessment under s 167.

Regarding the remittal of the proceeding to the AAT, the court held that remittal was expressly within the statutory discretion under s 44(4) and (5) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The court noted that no submissions were made to the primary judge arguing against remittal, and thus, there was no error in the exercise of the discretion. However, the court also proposed to introduce a limitation on the nature of the proceeding which the AAT will conduct, to ensure that the remittal is not futile.

The court dismissed the appeal and supplemented the orders made by Pagone J on 7 August 2013 by adding an order that the remitted proceeding be heard and determined on the evidence which was before the Tribunal in the proceeding which resulted in its decision of 1 November 2012. The cross-appeal was dismissed, and there was no order as to the costs of the cross-appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

2. The orders made by Pagone J on 7 August 2013 be supplemented by the addition of the following order:

4. In the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, subject to any order of the Tribunal for proper cause, the remitted proceeding be heard and determined on the evidence which was before the Tribunal in the proceeding which resulted in its decision of 1 November 2012.

3. Otherwise, the cross-appeal be dismissed.

4. There be no order as to the costs of the cross-appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Commissioner contends that, although the provisions of s 44(4) and (5) of the AAT Act empower the Court to make such orders as it thinks appropriate by reason of its decision, the powers are not at large. The Commissioner relies on the following passage from Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Gungor (1982) 42 ALR 209 per Sheppard J (at 220.7), (a passage subsequently approved of by Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Thiyagarajah (2000) 1999 CLR 343) where Sheppard J had said of s 44(4) and (5):It is, in my opinion, not correct to say that this court is by these provisions given wide powers to make such order as it thinks fit. Implicit in its powers are a number of restrictions. The appeal is expressly limited to error of law, which alleged error is the sole matter before this court and is the only subject matter of any order made consequent on the appeal. The order which this court can make after hearing the appeal is also similarly restricted to an order which is appropriate by reason of its decision. It follows that the only order which can be properly made is one the propriety of which is circumscribed by and necessary to reflect this court's view on the alleged or found error of law. To go further I would see as amounting to exceeding the jurisdiction of this court under this section.(emphasis added) The point for the Commissioner is that in this case it was and remains impossible for the AAT to make, in relation to any year, findings about the amount of Mr Rigoli’s taxable income because he has not proven his actual taxable income for any year or provided the AAT with any probative foundation on which factual conclusions could be based. Had the AAT decided the questions of law as they were determined by the primary judge, it would have affirmed the decisions under review because Mr Rigoli had failed to discharge the burden of proof that the assessments were excessive. By reason of s 14ZZK(b) of the Administration Act, no other course was open to the AAT. It would be manifestly futile, the Commissioner argues, for this matter to be remitted to the AAT. For this argument to succeed, the Commissioner would have to satisfy this Court that the primary judge erred in the exercise of his discretion to remit the matter to the AAT. Remitting the matter back to the AAT was expressly within the statutory discretion under s 44(5) of the AAT Act (see [8]). It appears that no submissions were made to the primary judge to the effect that doing so would be futile and that his Honour should simply uphold the Commissioner’s assessment. In the absence of express submissions that the matter ought not be remitted for that reason, it is difficult to identify any error in the exercise of the discretion in the sense of House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 as explained by the plurality (at 504 – 505). Doubtless because the question of remittal was not raised before the primary judge, his Honour did not consider the practicalities of the course which he ordered. Now that the question has been raised, and debated, on the cross-appeal, and while we would not interfere with the exercise of his Honour’s discretion, we do propose to introduce a limitation on the nature of the proceeding which the AAT will then conduct. As noted by the Full Court in Repatriation Commission v Nation (1995) 57 FCR 25 (at 34), in circumstances where no condition is imposed as provided for in s 44(4) and s 44(5) of the AAT Act (to the effect that the AAT should not receive further evidence), the whole of the matter would be remitted to the AAT without limitation as to the presentation of further evidence or as to the scope of the matter to be dealt with. In Peacock v Repatriation Commission (2007) 161 FCR 256 it was also made clear (by Downes, Lander and Buchanan JJ) that an unqualified remittal, even for a matter to be determined according to law, would require the whole of the matter to be heard and decided again, and all questions of law and fact relevant to the claim to be considered and determined. As the Full Court noted in Peacock it would be a rare case in which a limitation on the remittal could be inferred simply from the reasons for judgment, when the terms of the remittal were unqualified. Thus the Full Court recommended that it may be appropriate, in any case in which ambiguity may arise, for the Court to specify whether it is remitting the whole case or only part, and, if the latter, which part. As the Court noted, parties should routinely put submissions on the topic.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The proceeding before the AAT was a review, pursuant to s 14ZZ(1)(a)(i) of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (Administration Act), of decisions made by the Commissioner on 19 December 2008 to disallow Mr Rigoli’s objections to the Commissioner’s assessments of income tax with respect to the fiscal years ending on 30 June 1994 to 30 June 2001. In that review, the AAT upheld the deductibility of certain depreciation items which had been disallowed by the Commissioner. In the Commissioner’s appeal from the AAT to this Court, it was contended that the AAT had erred in point of law by not holding that Mr Rigoli had not discharged his burden of proving the Commissioner’s assessments to be excessive, as required by s 14ZZK(b)(i) of the Administration Act. That contention was upheld by the primary judge. Whether his Honour was correct in this respect is the central issue in the present appeal.BACKGROUND Although Mr Rigoli carried on business in a partnership for several years, he failed to lodge personal or partnership income tax returns. This failure led the Commissioner to issue assessments to Mr Rigoli under s 167 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (1936 Act). Mr Rigoli, who did not keep any accounting or financial records in relation to the business, objected against the assessments on the ground that he had “no taxable income”. The objections were disallowed for the assessments with respect to the fiscal years ending on 30 June 1994 to 30 June 2001. At the commencement of the hearing in the AAT, counsel for Mr Rigoli stated that the amounts which had been identified by the Commissioner as Mr Rigoli’s assessable income were no longer challenged by Mr Rigoli. However, he maintained that he was entitled to claim deductions by way of depreciation allowance for a variety of items which the Commissioner had not allowed. In response, counsel for the Commissioner made it clear in the AAT and before the primary judge that a default assessment under s 167 was only “excessive” where the taxpayer had established what was the amount upon which income tax ought to be levied and that amount was less than the assessment. It was not open to Mr Rigoli to concede the Commissioner’s estimate of his assessable income and to confine the AAT review to the realm of deductions. The AAT upheld Mr Rigoli’s position on this point.KEY STATUTORY PROVISIONS It is convenient to examine the relevant statutory provisions which arise on the appeal. Section 14ZZK of the Administration Act provides:14ZZK Grounds of objection and burden of proofOn an application for review of a reviewable objection decision:(a)the applicant is, unless the Tribunal orders otherwise, limited to the grounds stated in the taxation objection to which the decision relates; and(b)the applicant has the burden of proving that: (i)if the taxation decision concerned is an assessment (other than a franking assessment or a starting base assessment) - the assessment is excessive; or(ii)if the taxation decision concerned is a franking assessment or a starting base assessment - the assessment is incorrect; or(iii)in any other case - the taxation decision concerned should not have been made or should have been made differently.