Agius v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Agius v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 707

Citation: Agius v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 707
Appeal from: Agius and Commissioner of Taxation [2014] AATA 854
Parties: ROBERT AGIUS v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
File number: NSD 1327 of 2014
Judge: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 14 July 2015
Catchwords: TAXATION – appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) – where the appellant had lodged objections to default assessments under s 167 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal failed to apply the relevant tests in concluding that the appellant’s income had an Australian source – whether there was evidence to support the Tribunal’s findings that the appellant received amounts other than in the categories identified by the appellant – whether the Tribunal misconstrued the appellant’s burden of proof under s 14ZZK of the Tax Administration Act 1953
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 44(1), 92(1)(b), 128D, 167, 190(b)

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 6-5, 6-5(3), 995-1

Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 14ZZK

Cases cited:

Agius and Commissioner of Taxation [2014] AATA 854

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321

Commissioner of Taxation v Glennan [1999] FCA 297; (1999) 90 FCR 538

Dalco v Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 88 ATC 4131

Dalco v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 82 ALR 669

Esquire Nominees Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1937] HCA 67; (1973) 129 CLR 177

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dalco [1990] HCA 3; (1990) 168 CLR 164

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v French [1957] HCA 73; (1957) 98 CLR 398

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Mitchum [1965] HCA 23; (1965) 113 CLR 401

Commissioner of Taxation v Rigoli [2013] FCA 784

George v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1952] HCA 21; (1952) 86 CLR 183

Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92

Kumagai Gumi Company Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 235; (1990) 90 FCR 274

Ma v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1992] FCA 359; (1992) 37 FCR 225

May v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2015] FCAFC 93

Nathan v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1918] HCA 45; (1918) 25 CLR 183

Rigoli v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCAFC 29; (2014) 141 ALD 529

Tariff Reinsurances Limited v The Commissioner of Taxes (Victoria) [1938] HCA 21; (1938) 59 CLR 194

Trautwein v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1936] HCA 77; (1936) 56 CLR 63

Waterford v Commonwealth [1987] HCA 25; (1987) 163 CLR 54

Watson v Commissioner of Taxation 1930 HCA 28; [1930] 44 CLR 94

Date of hearing: 28 April 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 63
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr N Kulkarni
Solicitor for the Applicant: Butlers Business Lawyers Pty Ltd
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D McGovern SC with Mr A O’Brien
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 707
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a citizen of Vanuatu, appealed against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) in relation to objections he lodged against default assessments issued by the Commissioner of Taxation. The assessments were based on the Commissioner’s opinion that, although the appellant was not a resident of Australia, he had derived Australian-sourced income. The appellant argued that the AAT erred in applying the relevant tests in concluding that the income had an Australian source, that there was no evidence to support the AAT’s findings that the appellant received amounts other than in the categories identified by him, and that the AAT misconstrued his burden of proof under the Taxation Administration Act 1953.

The court considered the appellant’s arguments and found that the AAT had applied the correct legal principles in determining the source of income. The court held that the AAT was entitled to consider the totality of the evidence before it and to draw its own conclusions on the question of source. The court also held that there was evidence to support the AAT’s findings that the appellant had received amounts other than those identified by him, and that the AAT had not misconstrued the appellant’s burden of proof under the Taxation Administration Act 1953. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is convenient to summarise the relevant reasons of the AAT before considering the questions of law and grounds of appeal. AAT’s decision and reasons summarised The AAT outlined the relevant background facts as follows. The appellant is a citizen of Vanuatu. In 2012 he was convicted in Australia of conspiring with another accountant, the late Owen T Daniel, and others to defraud the Commonwealth/dishonestly cause a loss to the Commonwealth between 1997 and 2006. He is currently serving a term of imprisonment. The Commissioner assessed the appellant to Australian income tax for the income years 1997 to 2006 inclusively. The assessments were default assessments under s 167 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (the ITAA 1936). The assessments were based on the Commissioner’s opinion that, although the appellant was not a resident of Australia during those years, he had derived Australian-sourced income. Under s 6-5 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (the ITAA 1997), a taxpayer’s assessable income includes income according to ordinary concepts, which is called ordinary income. Section 6-5(3) relevantly provided:(3) If you are a foreign resident, your assessable income includes:(a)the *ordinary income you *derived directly or indirectly from all *Australian sources during the income year; and…(The asterisked terms are defined terms.) “Australian source” was defined in s 995-1 as follows:*ordinary income or *statutory income has an Australian source if, and only if, it is *derived from a source in Australia for the purposes of [the ITAA 1936].(The asterisked terms are defined terms). The Australian-sourced income which the Commissioner considered that the appellant had earned related to dealings which the appellant had had with Mr Daniel and his clients and related transactions. The notices of assessment for the 2001 to 2006 years included administrative penalties at a rate of 75 per cent. The appellant lodged objections against the default assessments. He was partly successful in respect of some of the relevant years but, in other years, the Commissioner increased his taxable income by reference to other amounts which the Commissioner considered to represent the appellant’s Australian-sourced income. Amended assessments ultimately issued. The appellant sought a review by the AAT of the objection decisions. One of the primary issues raised in the review was whether the appellant was a resident of Australia during the relevant years. The AAT found that he was not. That finding is not challenged in the appeal and nothing more needs to be said about it. The second primary issue related to how much, if any, of the appellant’s income during the relevant years was from Australian sources. This issue needed to be determined in considering whether the appellant had discharged his burden under s 14ZZK of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (the TA Act) of proving that the assessments were excessive. At the relevant time, s 14ZZK provided:14ZZK Grounds of objection and burden of proofOn an application for review of a reviewable objection decision:(a)the applicant is, unless the Tribunal orders otherwise, limited to the grounds stated in the taxation objection to which the decision relates; and(b)the applicant has the burden of proving that:(i)if the taxation decision concerned is an assessment (other than a franking assessment) – the assessment is excessive; or(ii)if the taxation decision concerned is a franking assessment – the assessment is incorrect; or(iii)in any other case – the taxation decision concerned should not have been made or should have been made differently.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant raised the following grounds of appeal:1.The Tribunal applied the wrong legal test at [92] and [93] in reaching the conclusion that the income earned by the Moore Stephens/PKF Vanuatu partnership and by IFTC had an Australian source.2.The Tribunal should have determined the question of source by reference to where the contracts generating the income of the Moore Stephens/PKF Vanuatu partnership and IFTC were negotiated and concluded, where the services pursuant to those contracts were provided and where the payments under those contracts were made and not simply where some portion of the work was performed.3.There was no evidence before the Tribunal to support the findings made at [96], [98] and [99] that the Applicant had received amounts other than amounts in the categories of income identified by the Applicant at [77] and amounts in the form of dividends from IFTC found by the Tribunal at [80].4.The Tribunal erred in making the findings at [96], [98] and [99] that the Applicant had received amounts other than amounts in the categories of income identified by the Applicant at [77] and amounts in the form of dividends from IFTC found by the Tribunal at [80] because those findings were not open on the evidence.5.The Tribunal misconstrued the nature of the burden of proof in section 14ZZK of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 in circumstances where the Respondent fixed the amount of the assessments on grossly erroneous bases (including multiple counting of alleged amounts of income) and there was no evidence that the Applicant had received any amounts other than those identified by the Applicant at [77] and found by the Tribunal at [80].6.The Tribunal misconstrued at [73] what the Applicant needed to establish in order to discharge that burden of proof on the balance of probabilities in circumstances where the calculation of the assessments by the Respondent was erroneous and there was no evidence that the Applicant had received any amounts other than those identified by the Applicant at [77] and found by the Tribunal at [80].7.The Tribunal erred in failing to exclude from the amount of the assessments those amounts in the categories of income in respect of which it was not reasonably open to conclude that the income had an Australian source. Consideration(a) Wrong legal test on source of income? (Grounds 1 and 2) The appellant argued that the AAT failed to apply the relevant tests in concluding that income earned by IFTC and PKF had an Australian source. While accepting that it is well settled that whether or not income has an Australian source is a question of fact (see Nathan at 189-190), the appellant argued that the AAT misapplied “long established” principles in determining the source of income. In particular, in the case of business income, the appellant submitted that:… the critical question is “what the [business entity] does in order to obtain the profits in questions” [citing Tariff Reinsurances Limited v The Commissioner of Taxes (Victoria) [1938] HCA 21; (1938) 59 CLR 194 at 205 per Latham CJ] and the relevant criteria include where the contracts generating the income were negotiated and concluded, where the services pursuant to those contracts were performed and where payments under those contracts were made [citing inter alia French at 422 per Taylor J; and Esquire Nominees Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1937] HCA 67; (1973) 129 CLR 177 (Esquire Nominees) at 224-225 per Stephen J]. None of these criteria compel a particular conclusion as to source in a given case and do not establish absolute rules of law [citing inter alia Esquire Nominees at 192 per Gibbs J]. It is for the tribunal of fact, having considered and applied those tests, to draw the ultimate conclusion on source. However, a finding on source without applying those tests involves an error in principle [citing Kumagai Gumi Company Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 235; (1990) 90 FCR 274 (Kumagai Gumi) at [47] per Hill J].