May v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

May v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2015] FCAFC 93

Citation: May v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2015] FCAFC 93
Appeal from: May v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2014] FCA 406
Parties:

BENJAMIN JAMES EDWARDS MAY v MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION

BENJAMIN JAMES EDWARDS MAY v MILITARY REHABILITATION AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION & ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File numbers: NSD 485 of 2014
NSD 945 of 2014
Judges: ALLSOP CJ, KENNY, BESANKO, ROBERTSON AND MORTIMER JJ
Date of judgment: 30 June 2015
Catchwords:

WORKERS COMPENSATION – whether the appellant suffered an “injury” within the definition of s 4(1)(b) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) – whether the primary judge erred in failing to identify errors of law in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s (Tribunal) decision – whether the Tribunal erred in the construction of the word “injury” by giving meaning to the word only by reference to certain specific remarks made in Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska 200 CLR 286 at [35] – whether “injury” requires a specific finding of “sudden or identifiable physiological change” – whether the Tribunal erred in requiring proof of causal contribution of employment to the injury suffered temporally in the course of employment – whether the Tribunal erred in misdirecting itself as to evidence required for a finding of “injury”.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – whether grounds of appeal state a question of law – whether an appeal on a question of law encompasses a so-called question of mixed fact and law – whether appeal competent – whether pursuant to s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) the Court may exercise its appellate jurisdiction dealing with a question of law that had not been previously raised before the primary judge – whether there is prejudice, issue estoppel or Anshun estoppel arising from hearing the further judicial review application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and s 5 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), together with the appeal.

Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5 and 16
Compensation (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1971 (Cth) ss 5, 27 and 29
Commonwealth Employees’ Compensation Act 1930 (Cth) ss 4, 9 and 10
Commonwealth Employees’ Compensation Act 1948 (Cth) ss 4, 9 and 10
Commonwealth Employees’ Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)
Commonwealth Workmen’s Compensation Act 1912 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 20 and 24
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4 and 14
Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897 (UK)
Workmen’s Compensation Act 1906 (UK) s 8
Workers’ Compensation Act 1916 (Qld) s 3
Workers Compensation Act 1926 (NSW) ss 6 and 7
Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) s 9A
Workers’ Compensation Act 1951 (ACT) s 7
Cases cited: Accident Compensation Commission v McIntosh [1991] 2 VR 253
Adelaide Stevedoring Co Ltd v Forst [1940] HCA 45; 64 CLR…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCAFC 93
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of May v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission involved an appeal against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) in a workers' compensation claim. The appellant, Mr May, claimed that he suffered an "injury" as defined in s 4(1)(b) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) due to vaccinations he received during his service in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). The Tribunal denied his claim, finding that there was no specific condition or cause identified for his symptoms, and therefore could not connect the claimed condition with his employment. The primary judge upheld the Tribunal's decision, but Mr May appealed, arguing that the primary judge erred in not identifying certain questions of law in the Tribunal's decision.

The legal issues before the court included whether the Tribunal correctly interpreted the definition of "injury" in the Act, whether it required a specific finding of "sudden or identifiable physiological change," and if the Tribunal erred in requiring proof of a causal contribution of employment to the injury suffered. The court was also asked to determine if the Tribunal misdirected itself regarding the evidence required for a finding of "injury." Additionally, the court examined whether the appeal on a question of law encompassed a question of mixed fact and law, and whether there was prejudice or estoppel arising from the further judicial review application.

The court found that the primary judge had erred in not identifying certain questions of law in the Tribunal's decision. The court held that the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation of the word "injury" by relying solely on specific remarks in a previous case, Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska. The court concluded that a different Tribunal, properly instructed, may take a different approach to the evidence presented by Mr May. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration. The court also dismissed the further judicial review application as unnecessary but awarded Mr May his costs of propounding the application.

The orders made by the court included allowing the appeal, setting aside the primary judge's orders, and remitting the matter to the Tribunal for determination according to law. The court also ordered that the respondent pay Mr May's costs of the appeal and the further judicial review application. The court extended the time for filing the further judicial review application and dismissed the application, ordering the respondent to pay Mr May's costs thereof.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave be granted to the appellant to rely upon the amended notice of appeal filed on 15 October 2014.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The orders of the Court made on 30 April 2014 be set aside, and in lieu thereof order that:

(a) the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 14 December 2011 be set aside;

(b) the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for determination according to law; and

(c) the respondent pay the appellant’s costs.

4. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

1. The time in which the applicant be permitted to file an application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) be extended to 15 October 2014.

2. The application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) be heard and determined by the Full Court of the Federal Court, together with the applicant’s appeal from the decision of the Court (Buchanan J) dated 30 April 2014.

3. The said application be dismissed, the first respondent to pay the applicant’s costs thereof.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Background

Background to the litigation

We are satisfied the appellant has established error in the decision of the learned primary judge, and that certain questions of law identified by the appellant should be answered favourably to him.Factual background The appellant enlisted in the RAAF on 6 November 1998 and was discharged on 30 July 2004 at the rank of Officer Cadet. Between 10 November 1998 and 30 March 2000, the appellant received various vaccinations in the course of his employment in the RAAF. The Tribunal’s factual findings on the sequence of events experienced by the appellant after the vaccinations were set out at [53] of the reasons:Mr May has described the symptoms he experienced following the vaccinations he received on 10 November 1998. It is clear from the medical tests that Mr May underwent before he was accepted for entry into the RAAF as an officer cadet, that he was healthy and very fit. Mr May states that within 30 to 60 minutes of receiving the vaccinations, he began to experience symptoms and that these increased over the next few days. He says his tongue felt swollen, he felt dizzy and experienced nausea and diarrhoea. There are clinical notes on his reporting sick from 22 November 1998 and these notes appear to record the symptoms as described by Mr May at the time. The medical opinions recorded in the notes […] indicate that Mr May’s treating doctors thought that he was probably suffering from a viral illness and possibly bacterial gastroenteritis. Thereafter, he had a history of infections, particularly of the upper respiratory tract, which, on some occasions required hospital treatment. The primary judge also referred to what occurred at [28] of his reasons: … After the first set of vaccinations which occurred during his RAAF service he was diagnosed with a viral illness. The following year (1999), he was again diagnosed with a viral illness. In 2000 Mr May was found to need gammaglobulin treatment for persistent lymphopenia (low lymphocytes count). It was suggested then that the treatment would be lifelong but in 2001 the treatment was found to be no longer necessary. In the succeeding years Mr May underwent a series of investigatory procedures which produced no clear identification of the cause of his symptoms. The appellant’s claim was summarised by the Tribunal at [2] of its reasons:… On 29 November 2002, Mr May lodged a claim for rehabilitation and compensation dated 20 November 2002 in respect of “low immunity, fatigue, illnesses, dizziness” which he claimed was caused by vaccinations received in the course of his employment in the RAAF. On 11 March 2003, a MRCC delegate denied Mr May’s claim noting that specialists who had examined Mr May had been unable to diagnose any specific condition or determine a cause for his symptoms, and the delegate was therefore unable to connect the claimed condition with his RAAF service. Following an application for review, on 22 April 2010, the MRCC reconsidered but affirmed the decision of 11 March 2003 denying the appellant’s claim. Relevant legislative framework

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge’s conclusions (at [76]) that “there was no legal error, arising from any wrongly decided questions of law or otherwise, which vitiates those findings of fact” cannot, in our respectful opinion, be accepted. CONCLUSION This was, as the Tribunal observed, a difficult case. It is appropriate in our opinion for another Tribunal, differently constituted, to consider again whether the appellant has suffered an injury within the meaning of s 4 of the SRC Act and whether the injury arose out of or in the course of his employment. It is not appropriate to remit other than the whole dispute for reconsideration. Given the Tribunal’s findings about the appellant’s vertigo, this matter comes close to a case where there may only be one answer. However, we accept that a differently constituted Tribunal, properly instructed about what needs to be established to come within the concept of “injury”, may take a different approach to significant aspects of the evidence, including the appellant’s accounts of what he experienced. Accordingly, we consider it more appropriate for a new Tribunal, rather than this Court under s 44(7) of the AAT Act, to determine the question. Our conclusion on the appeal from the learned primary judge means that no consideration need be given to substantive orders under s 16 of the AD(JR) Act, or s 39B of the Judiciary Act. If we had dismissed the s 44 appeal on substantive grounds, then given the view we take about the overlap between s 44 of the AAT Act and jurisdictional, and non jurisdictional error, it may have been unlikely that the appellant would have succeeded on judicial review, even putting to one side issue and Anshun estoppel. Nevertheless there were costs associated with the further judicial review application that were necessitated by the position taken by the respondent. The application should be dismissed as unnecessary, but the appellant should have his costs of propounding the application.Orders We would make the following orders:In the appeal (NSD 485 of 2014): 1.Leave be granted to the appellant to rely upon the amended notice of appeal filed on 15 October 2014.2. The appeal be allowed.3. The orders of the Court made on 30 April 2014 be set aside, and in lieu thereof order that:(a) the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 14 December 2011 be set aside;(b) the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for determination according to law; and(c) the respondent pay the appellant’s costs.4. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the appeal. In the further judicial review application (NSD 945 of 2014): 1. The time in which the applicant be permitted to file an application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) be extended to 15 October 2014.2. The application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) be heard and determined by the Full Court of the Federal Court, together with the applicant’s appeal from the decision of the Court (Buchanan J) dated 30 April 2014.3. The said application be dismissed, the first respondent to pay the applicant’s costs thereof.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established