Freeman v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Freeman v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2018] FCA 394

Appeal from: Freeman and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (Compensation) [2016] AATA 741
File number: VID 1250 of 2016
Judge: KENNY J
Date of judgment: 22 March 2018
Catchwords: WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – appeal under s 44 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) of decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) which affirmed a decision of the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission to refuse the applicant’s claim for compensation for malignant melanoma under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (SRC Act) – whether denial of procedural fairness or breach of s 39(1) AAT Act – whether misconstruction of “disease” and “injury” in s 4(1) of the SRC Act– whether no evidence to support finding of fact – whether Tribunal’s conclusion legally unreasonable – whether Tribunal’s reasons were inadequate – applicant’s grounds not made out – appeal dismissed.  
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Accident Compensation Commission v McIntosh [1991] 2 VR 253

Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 72; 225 CLR 88

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; 170 CLR 321

Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee [2003] FCAFC 143; 131 FCR 28

Comcare Australia  v Lees (1997) 151 ALR 647

Comcare v Mooi [1996] FCA 508; 69 FCR 439; 137 ALR 690

De Simone v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCAFC 181; 77 ATR 936

Ekinci v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2014] FCAFC 180; 227 FCR 459

Commissioner of Taxation v Osborne (1990) 26 FCR 63; 95 ALR 654

Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92; 233 FCR 315

Howes v Comcare [2016] FCA 1521

Jagroop v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 123; 225 FCR 482

Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Limited v Petkoska [2000] HCA 45; 200 CLR 286

Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; 159 CLR 550

Kirkpatrick v Commonwealth of Australia [1985] FCA 594; 9 FCR 36

Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 32; 241 CLR 390

Martinez v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 528; 177 FCR 337

May v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2015] FCAFC 93; 233 FCR 397

McMullen v Commissioner for Superannuation [1985] FCA 143; 61 ALR 189

Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May [2016] HCA 19; 257 CLR 468

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28; 240 FCR 158

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 394
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Freeman v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission, the applicant, Ms Freeman, appealed a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that affirmed the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission's (MRCC) refusal of her claim for compensation for malignant melanoma under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth). The central legal issues before the court were whether the AAT's decision was procedurally unfair, whether there was a breach of section 39(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), whether there was a misconstruction of "disease" and "injury" in the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988, whether there was no evidence to support the AAT's finding, and whether the AAT's conclusion was legally unreasonable. The court examined the AAT's reasoning and found that it had not erred in its interpretation of the relevant statutory terms. The court further held that the AAT's decision was not procedurally unfair, and there was sufficient evidence to support the AAT's finding. The court also found that the AAT's conclusion was not legally unreasonable. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and no order was made as to costs.

The reasoning of the AAT was meticulously examined, and it was determined that the Tribunal had not failed to provide procedural fairness or contravene section 39(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The court found that the AAT was not obliged to afford the parties an opportunity to inspect the dictionary extracts and make submissions, as the Tribunal had acted under section 33(1)(c) of the Act. Additionally, the court held that the AAT's interpretation of "disease" and "injury" was not erroneous, as it was consistent with the statutory definitions provided in the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support the AAT's finding, and the AAT's conclusion was not legally unreasonable. As a result, the appeal was dismissed, and no order was made as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave be granted to amend the Amended Notice of Appeal From a Tribunal to add proposed ground 3(c).

2. The appeal under section 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) be dismissed.

3. There be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the appeal should be dismissed. BACKGROUND The background facts are set out in the Tribunal’s reasons for decision: see [2016] AATA 741 at [3]-[7]. They were stated to be as follows. Ms Freeman, who was born in 1970, moved from Melbourne to Townsville in 1976. Between January 1988 and September 1993, she worked as a bank teller in Townsville. In her work as a bank teller, she wore at different times shorts, long trousers, short and long skirts, and short-sleeved and long-sleeved shirts. Ms Freeman enlisted in the Army Reserve in July 1991 as a unit pay clerk/soldier. She served until September 1993 when she went to live in London. In 1995 she returned to Townsville. She re-enlisted in the Army Reserve in January 1996. She served in the Army Reserve until 3 November 1999 when she enlisted in the Regular Army. During her service in the Army Reserve, Ms Freeman was posted to Townsville and exposed to its tropical climate. Ms Freeman’s service in the Army Reserve required her to perform approximately 100 days per year in indoor and outdoor work. At different times, she wore a hat, short-sleeved, or long-sleeved shirt with the sleeves rolled up, and shorts or long trousers. She was not supplied with sunscreen during her service in the Army Reserve. In about September 1999 Ms Freeman had a wide excision of a level 2 melanoma from her anterior left upper thigh. She had first received treatment for that condition in July 1999. In 2010 she was diagnosed with left groin recurrent node positive melanoma, with one of 14 nodes positive, and she underwent a left radical groin dissection in September 2010. Since then Ms Freeman has had further recurrences of metastatic disease in her brain, left lung and right shoulder, and she has had further surgical and other treatment. The MRCC, which is the respondent in this appeal, also drew attention to the Tribunal’s references to Ms Freeman’s own statements, in a Solar Skin Damage Questionnaire (SSD Questionnaire), that prior to service her interests included indoor and outdoor basketball, sailing, bike riding, swimming, walking and hiking. The MRCC also referred to the Tribunal’s reference to Ms Freeman’s statement that she had holidayed for periods on Magnetic Island when she was growing up, as well as references to the fact that Ms Freeman apparently had a light skinned complexion, as noted in a report by Professor Richard Fox. As indicated, included in the documents before the Tribunal were various medical reports.PROCEDURAL HISTORY Ms Freeman lodged a claim on 11 March 2014 for compensation for malignant melanoma on her left thigh as a result of her exposure to sun during her service in the Army Reserve. On 12 September 2014 a delegate of the MRCC denied the claim on the basis that Ms Freeman’s service had not materially contributed to the contraction of the malignant melanoma. The MRCC subsequently reconsidered and affirmed that determination on 12 February 2015. The Tribunal affirmed the MRCC’s decision on 23 September 2016. There was no substantive oral hearing before the Tribunal and witnesses were not subject to any cross-examination. Rather, with the parties’ consent, the hearing of the matter proceeded before the Tribunal “on the papers”. The circumstances in which this occurred and some related matters are the subject of an affidavit sworn by Ms Freeman’s solicitor, Mr Michael Jorgensen, on 6 June 2017.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It does not seem to me that the Tribunal’s reference to Comcare v Mooi [1996] FCA 508; 69 FCR 439; 137 ALR 690 at 696, referring to the ordinary meaning of the word ‘disease’ (as indeed the Tribunal had noted at [32]) is sufficient to displace the conclusion that otherwise arises from the Tribunal’s reasons that the Tribunal appreciated that the word ‘disease’ was a statutory construct, as defined in s 4(1) of the SRC Act. Ground 2 of Ms Freeman’s appeal should be rejected.QUESTION 3: WAS THERE NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIBUNAL’S FINDING AT [80]? DID THE TRIBUNAL’S CONCLUSION LACK AN EVIDENT AND INTELLIGIBLE JUSTIFICATION?No evidence ground Under ground 3, Ms Freeman relied on the ‘no evidence’ ground of review. Whether there is no evidence to support a finding of fact is a question of law for the purposes of s 44 of the AAT Act: see Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 32; 241 CLR 390 at [90]-[91] and Comcare Australia v Lees (1997) 151 ALR 647 at 652-3. To succeed on the “no evidence” ground of review, Ms Freeman must show that there was no probative material before the Tribunal upon which a particular conclusion could properly be based: see Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; 170 CLR 321 at 355-356.Unreasonableness ground By an amendment to ground 3, Ms Freeman also sought to introduce an unreasonableness ground. By this ground, Ms Freeman sought to challenge the Tribunal’s conclusion at [80] of its reasons (see below) on the additional ground that it lacked an evident and intelligible justification or was otherwise legally unreasonable. The reference to “evident and intelligible justification” is a reference to an aspect of the error of law of unreasonableness formulated in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332 (Li) at [76]. At [76], Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ stated that “[u]nreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification”. Whilst noting the remarks of Griffiths J in Howes v Comcare [2016] FCA 1521 at [59], it may, for present purposes, be accepted that a ground of this kind may raise a question of law for s 44 purposes. The respondent accepted that the principles relating to unreasonableness deriving from Li – and discussed in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437 (Singh), Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1 (Stretton) and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28; 240 FCR 158 (Eden) – broadly applied to the concept of unreasonableness in the context of a s 44 appeal: see also Ekinci v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2014] FCAFC 180; 227 FCR 459 (Ekinci) at [70]. A useful though non-exhaustive statement concerning legal unreasonableness in the context of judicial review appears in Eden at [58]-[65]. It was said in Eden at [60] that:[T]here are two contexts in which the concept of legal unreasonableness may be employed. The first involves a conclusion after the identification of a recognised species of jurisdictional error in the decision making process, such as failing to have regard to a mandatory consideration, or having regard to an irrelevant consideration. The second involves an “outcome focused” conclusion without any specific jurisdictional error being identified: Li at [27]-[28] (French CJ), [72] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Singh at [44]; Stretton at [6] (Allsop CJ). Ms Freeman apparently sought to raise the second aspect.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The MRCC contended that the Tribunal’s failure to inform the parties that it was proposing to have regard to these extracts did not constitute either a breach of procedural fairness or a contravention of s 39(1) of the AAT Act. Consideration It may be accepted that an asserted failure to comply with s 39(1) of the AAT Act and to afford procedural fairness raises a question of law for the purposes of s 44 of the AAT Act: see Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92; 233 FCR 315 at [202] and Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee [2003] FCAFC 143; 131 FCR 28 at [8]. Section 39(1) of the AAT Act provides that, subject to presently immaterial exceptions, the Tribunal is required to “ensure that every party to a proceeding before the Tribunal is given a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case and, in particular, to inspect any documents to which the Tribunal proposes to have regard in reaching a decision in the proceeding and to make submissions in relation to those documents”. It may also be accepted that “the requirement contained in s 39 that the Tribunal shall ensure that a party to the proceedings before it be given a reasonable opportunity to present his [or her] case constitutes statutory recognition of an obligation which the law would, in any event, imply”: Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323 at 342; see also De Simone v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCAFC 181; 77 ATR 936 at [15]; Jagroop v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 123; 225 FCR 482 (Jagroop) at [32]; and O’Sullivan v Repatriation Commission [2003] FCA 397; 128 FCR 590 (O’Sullivan) at [45] (Sackville J). Broadly speaking, the common law would oblige the Tribunal to disclose information that is adverse, credible, relevant and significant: see Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; 159 CLR 550 at 573, 588 and 628‑629 (Kioa v West) and Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 72; 225 CLR 88 at 95-96 (VEAL). As Sackville J said in O’Sullivan at [45], however, depending on the circumstances, the Tribunal’s obligation in s 39 to ensure that a party has an opportunity to inspect documents “might go further” than the common law: see also [58]-[60]. To quote Sackville J (at [45]), s 39 “reflects a clear statutory policy that a party should have an opportunity of inspecting documents that may play a part in the AAT reaching a decision and should also have the opportunity to make submissions on those documents”. As noted, the Tribunal referred in its reasons for decision to the Chambers Dictionary and the Blakiston’s Dictionary. It is common ground that none of the parties gave these dictionary extracts to the Tribunal and that the Tribunal did not inform the parties that it was proposing to have regard to them. It is clear enough that the Tribunal referred to these extracts on its own initiative. In so doing, it acted under s 33(1)(c) of the AAT Act, which provides that the Tribunal “may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks appropriate”. The question raised by this ground is whether the Tribunal was also obliged, by s 39, to afford the parties an opportunity to inspect the two dictionary extracts and to make submissions if they wished before it made its decision.