Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden

[2016] FCAFC 28

Appeal from: Eden v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 780
File number(s): QUD 679 of 2015
Judge(s): ALLSOP CJ, GRIFFITHS AND WIGNEY JJ
Date of judgment: 9 March 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review of Minister’s decision to cancel respondent’s visa on character grounds pursuant to
s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where respondent was convicted of a sexual offence and sentenced to a term of imprisonment wholly suspended – where respondent was a citizen of New Zealand but had developed ties to Australia – whether the Minister’s exercise of discretion was legally unreasonable – whether the primary judge’s decision correctly characterised the Minister’s decision as legally unreasonable – whether the Minister’s delay in cancelling the respondent’s visa could be a factor in determining unreasonableness – whether the characterisation of the offence as “very serious” amounts to unreasonableness – Appeal allowed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 4(1), 501(2), 501(6)(a), 501(7), 501G(1)(e)
Cases cited:

Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1

Brown v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 183 FCR 113

Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321

M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Moana v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 367

R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531

R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Handscomb (1988) 86 Cr App R 59

R v Zamagias [2002] NSWCCA 17

Date of hearing: 9 December 2015
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 105
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms K Stern SC with Mr P Bickford
Solicitor for the Appellant: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N Williams SC with Mr G Stapleton
Solicitor for the Respondent: MyVisa Lawyers Pty Ltd

ORDERS

QUD 679 of 2015
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Appellant

AND:

MAS EDEN

Respondent

JUDGES:

ALLSOP CJ, GRIFFITHS AND WIGNEY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

9 MARCH 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders of the primary judge be set aside and, in lieu thereof, the respondent’s application for judicial review be dismissed with costs. 

3.The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. In…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 28
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden involved a challenge to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection's decision to cancel the respondent's visa on character grounds under section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The respondent, a New Zealand citizen with ties to Australia, was convicted of a sexual offence and sentenced to a term of imprisonment which was wholly suspended. The appeal centred on whether the primary judge correctly applied the principles of legal unreasonableness in his review of the Minister’s decision and if the Minister's exercise of discretion was legally unreasonable.

The court had to determine whether the primary judge appropriately assessed the Minister's decision-making process in light of the relevant principles of legal unreasonableness and whether the primary judge’s characterisation of the Minister’s decision as legally unreasonable was correct. The court also considered whether the delay in cancelling the respondent’s visa could be a factor in determining unreasonableness and whether the characterisation of the offence as "very serious" contributed to the conclusion of unreasonableness. The appeal raised significant questions about the appropriate scope of judicial review in discretionary decisions under migration law.

The court found that the primary judge had mischaracterised the Minister's decision by essentially remaking the decision based on his own assessment of what was reasonable. The court emphasised that the legality of the decision, not its merits, was the focus of the judicial review. The primary judge’s approach failed to respect the constraints inherent in the principles governing the review of discretionary decisions. The court held that the primary judge had not correctly applied the principles relevant to determining whether the decision was legally unreasonable. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the primary judge's orders were set aside, with the respondent's application for judicial review dismissed and costs awarded to the appellant.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the primary judge be set aside and, in lieu thereof, the respondent’s application for judicial review be dismissed with costs.

3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The issues raised by this appeal revolve around two central questions. First, in quashing the Minister’s decision on the basis of jurisdictional error, did the primary judge correctly apply the principles relevant to determining whether a decision is “legally unreasonable” and therefore beyond power? Or did his Honour simply remake the decision on the basis of his own view of what was reasonable? Second, if the primary judge did apply the correct principles, was he correct to find that the Minister’s decision was legally unreasonable? Was it open to the primary judge to conclude, in effect, that the objective facts and circumstances of Mr Eden’s case were such that the decision to cancel Mr Eden’s visa was outside the range of legally permissible and justifiable outcomes given the subject matter, scope and purpose of the cancellation power in s 501(2) of the Act? BACKGROUND FACTS Mr Eden was born in Iran, but is a citizen of New Zealand. He travelled to Australia in October 2007 and has effectively resided here since that time. The visa most recently granted to him permitted him to remain in Australia so long as he continued to be a New Zealand citizen. In 2011, Mr Eden was joined in Australia by his wife and his son who, at that time, was about a year old. On 16 May 2011, in the Queensland District Court in Brisbane, Mr Eden pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault. That offence was committed on 5 December 2009, before Mr Eden’s wife and child had arrived in Australia. By the time of his plea, Mr Eden’s wife and child had joined him. Mr Eden was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for twelve months, but the whole of that period of imprisonment was suspended. An order was also made requiring Mr Eden to be of good behaviour for two years, failing which he was liable to serve the suspended period of imprisonment. The nature of Mr Eden’s offending conduct is best described by reproducing the sentencing judge’s brief remarks on sentence. On December 5, 2009, you were working as a taxi driver with B & W Cabs. The complainant, a 20 year old woman, had walked from the Valley to Kangaroo Point on her way home to Hawthorne. She’d been with friends in the Valley that night and had a few drinks but was unable to catch a taxi in the Valley so she started walking.You picked her up in your taxi at Kangaroo Point. You were 45 years old at the time. As you drove towards Hawthorne, you groped the complainant. You groped her breast under her bra and you also rubbed her groin under her underwear. You did that a couple of times. You thought that the girl was consenting and you were hoping for consensual sex. The complainant, however, did not consent but did not ever say no to you although she did ask you to stop the car at various places because she told that that’s where she lived [sic].I’ve seen the stills of the video footage taken in the car. I think they are equivocal. They do not, to me, indicate that your assault on a female complainant was consensual or non-consensual but I accept from your plea that you accept that your understanding that the complainant passenger was consenting to sexual activity with you was one which was not reasonable. You are a refugee from Iran and you now work as a truck driver. You voluntarily left taxi driving after this incident. You have a wife and a young child who are at Court today to support you. It is encouraging for you that your wife is standing by you, having regard to what occurred on the day concerned.A victim impact statement from the complainant was tendered. It satisfies me that your actions have had a traumatic effect upon her and that she is now very wary of catching taxis.Actions can often be misinterpreted and I think this is probably a case like that. When you started fondling the girl, I think you got the impression that she was happy for you to do that but that was not so.I’ve considered all of the submissions which were made, both by Mr Bain for the Director of Public Prosecutions and Mr Wilson on your behalf and also, of course, your plea of guilty. I note that you have, through your counsel, apologised to the victim for your actions. I’m not sure if the DPP can convey that to the complainant, but if that is possible I think that that would be appropriate.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Minister’s decision to cancel Mr Eden’s visa ultimately turned on the Minister’s conclusion that the risk to the Australian community of permitting Mr Eden to continue to reside in Australia outweighed the competing considerations. The Minister’s conclusion was expressed in the following terms (at [51]-[56]):51.Mr EDEN has committed a serious crime that of Sexual Assault, which is of a sexual nature, and Mr EDEN should expect to forfeit that privilege of staying in Australia. Mr EDEN’s offending is contrary to the expectation of the Australian community that non-citizens respect and abide by Australian law. The community expects that a non-citizen who has committed a serious offence should generally expect to forfeit the privilege of remaining in Australia52.I find that the Australian community could be exposed to great harm should Mr EDEN reoffend in a similar fashion. I could not rule out the possibility of further offending by Mr EDEN and the Australian community should not tolerate any further risk of harm.53.I find the above consideration outweighed the countervailing considerations in Mr EDEN’s case including the best interests of the child, his employment and social/family ties to Australia, and that visa cancellation will cause some emotional and financial hardship to his family, especially to the wellbeing of his son. 54.I have also considered the length of time Mr EDEN has made a positive contribution to the Australian community and the consequences of my decision for minor children and other family members.55.The Australian community has a low tolerance for any criminal or other serious conduct by non-citizens who have lived in Australia for a short period of time, and who commence offending soon after arriving. Mr EDEN has lived in Australia for a relatively short period, namely seven years. I note he committed the sexual crime some two years after he commenced residence in this country, which in my view is after a relatively short duration of residence in Australia. 56.In reaching my decision I concluded that Mr EDEN represents an unacceptable risk of harm to the Australian community and that the protection of the Australian community outweighed any countervailing considerations above. THE JUDGMENT OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE Mr Eden’s sole ground for reviewing the Minister’s cancellation decision was that there was a jurisdictional error resulting from the unreasonable exercise of the Minister’s discretion. It would appear that the primary judge was aware of the constraints of this ground of judicial review. His Honour referred (at Judgment [9]) to two “overarching principles” applicable to the judicial review of discretionary powers. The first principle was that, in considering such a ground, the Court is concerned with the legality of the decision under review, not its merits. His Honour cited, in relation to that principle, the well-known decisions in Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 and Minister forAboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24. The second principle was that where reasons for the decision are given, those reasons must never be read critically with an eye for error. His Honour cited, in relation to that principle, the equally well-known decision in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259.