Alexander Jason Elks v Brisbane City Council

Link copied
Case Copied 70 min read

PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COURT

OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Alexander Jason Elks v Brisbane City Council [2023] QPEC 33

PARTIES:

ALEXANDER JASON ELKS
(Applicant)

v

BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
(Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

126 of 2022

DIVISION:

Planning and Environment

PROCEEDING:

Originating Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Planning and Environment Court, Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

30 August 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

15 July 2022

JUDGE:

Kefford DCJ

ORDER:

THE APPLICATION IS DISMISSED.

CATCHWORDS:

PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT – ORIGINATING APPLICATION – DECLARATORY PROCEEDING - where the applicant seeks declaratory relief that the decision made by the assessment manager is invalid and of no effect – where the applicant alleges defects in the development assessment process – whether the confirmation notice is invalid – whether the information request is defective – whether document given out of time, in breach of the Development assessment rules, are invalid – whether subsequent stages of the development assessment process are invalidated by earlier non-compliance

PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT – ORIGINATING APPLICATION – DECLARATORY PROCEEDING - where the applicant seeks declaratory relief that the conditions imposed by the assessment manager are invalid and of no effect – where the decision was informed by weight given to an amendment to the planning scheme – whether the amendment to the planning scheme was an irrelevant consideration

PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT – ORIGINATING APPLICATION – DECLARATORY PROCEEDING - where the applicant seeks a declaration that an amendment to a planning scheme is an adverse planning change – where the applicant seeks a compensation order – whether the relief sought is in the Court’s jurisdiction

LEGISLATION:

City of Brisbane Act (Qld) s 232

Planning Act 2016 (Qld) ss 43, 44, 45, 49, 50, 51, 53, 59, 60, 63, 68, 163, 229, sch 1, sch 2

Planning and Environment Court Act 2016 (Qld) ss 7, 11

Planning Regulation 2017 (Qld) s 31, sch 24

Statutory Instruments Act 1992 (Qld) ss 6 and 7

CASES:

Australia Pacific LNG Pty Limited & Ors v The Treasurer, Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Partnerships and Minister for Sport [2019] QSC 124, applied

Brisbane City Council v Klinkert [2019] QCA 40; [2020] QPELR 579, applied

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2019] HCA 34; (2019) 268 CLR 29, applied

Development Watch Inc. v Sunshine Coast Regional Council & Anor [2022] QCA 6, applied

Ferreyra & Ors v Brisbane City Council & Anor [2016] QPEC 10; [2016] QPELR 334, approved

Flegg v Crime and Misconduct Commission & Anor [2014] QCA 42, cited

Francis v Crime and Corruption Commission & Anor [2015] QCA 218, applied

Fraser Coast Regional Council v Walter Elliott Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] QCA 19; [2017] 1 Qd R 13, applied

Gold Coast City Council v Sunland Group Limited & Anor [2019] QCA 118; [2020] QPELR 286, applied

Massie & Ors v Brisbane City Council [2007] QCA 159, applied

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW & Ors [2017] FCAFC 33; (2017) 248…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Alexander Jason Elks v Brisbane City Council and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2023] QPEC 33
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Alexander Jason Elks v Brisbane City Council, the applicant sought declaratory relief against the Brisbane City Council, arguing that the Council's decision to impose certain conditions on a development application was invalid due to defects in the development assessment process and that the imposition of certain conditions was invalid under section 65 of the Planning Act 2016. The applicant also sought a declaration that an amendment to a planning scheme constituted an adverse planning change and an order for compensation.

The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the Council's decision was invalid due to defects in the development assessment process, whether the conditions imposed were invalid under section 65 of the Planning Act 2016, and whether the Court had jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by the applicant in relation to the alleged adverse planning change and compensation.

The Court found that the applicant had not established any defects in the development assessment process that would render the Council's decision invalid. The Court also found that the conditions imposed by the Council were not invalid under section 65 of the Planning Act 2016, as the decision was informed by relevant considerations and was within the legislative authority of the assessment manager. Furthermore, the Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by the applicant in relation to the alleged adverse planning change and compensation.

The Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had not established any grounds for the relief sought. The Court held that even if the applicant had established all of his allegations, it would not exercise its discretion to grant the relief sought due to the lack of evidence of deliberate delay, manipulation of timelines, or imposition of harsh, unjust, and unreasonable conditions by the Council. The Court also noted that the applicant voluntarily participated in the development assessment process without challenge and that the Council was entitled to give weight to the version 17 of City Plan.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the application and found that the applicant had not established any entitlement to the declarations or orders sought. The Court held that the Council's decision was not invalid due to defects in the development assessment process, that the conditions imposed were not invalid under section 65 of the Planning Act 2016, and that it did not have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by the applicant in relation to the alleged adverse planning change and compensation.

Orders

Orders of the court

THE APPLICATION IS DISMISSED.

Background

Background to the litigation

In BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor,[10] Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ observed:[11]“As the recent decision in Plaintiff M47/2018 v Minister for Home Affairs[12] well enough illustrates, leaving constitutional and legislative facts aside, it is the plaintiff in an application for judicial review of administrative action who has the onus of establishing on the balance of probabilities the facts on which a claim to relief is founded. To the extent that the factual basis for a claim to relief is sought to be founded on an inference to be drawn from a decision-maker’s statement of reasons, the appropriateness of drawing the inference falls to be evaluated having regard to two settled principles. One is that such a statement of reasons must be read fairly and not in an unduly critical manner.[13] The other is that it must be read in light of the content of the statutory obligation pursuant to which it was prepared.[14]”[10][2019] HCA 34; (2019) 268 CLR 29.[11]BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2019] HCA 34; (2019) 268 CLR 29, 45 [38] (original citations, emphasis added). See also MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2021] HCA 17; (2021) 273 CLR 506 about what is a jurisdictional error, materiality, and its proof.[12](2019) 265 CLR 285. See also Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594 at 616 [67], 623 [91]–[92].[13]Minister forImmigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272; [1996] HCA 6.[14]Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594 at 606 [32], 617 [70], 623 [91]–[92]. As I have already mentioned in paragraph [13] above, the focus is on issues that relate to the legality of act, rather than its merits. The third issue is whether the alleged non-compliance or failure renders the act invalid. In Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority,[15] McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ observed:[16]“[91] An act done in breach of a condition regulating the exercise of a statutory power is not necessarily invalid and of no effect. Whether it is depends on whether there can be discerned a legislative purpose to invalidate any act that fails to comply with the condition. The existence of the purpose is ascertained by reference to the language of the statute, its subject matter and objects, and the consequences for the parties of holding void every act done in breach of the condition. Unfortunately, a finding of purpose or no purpose in this context often reflects a contestable judgment. The cases show various factors that have proved decisive in various contexts, but they do no more than provide guidance in analogous circumstances. There is no decisive rule that can be applied; there is not even a ranking of relevant factors or categories to give guidance on the issue.… [93]... A better test for determining the issue of validity is to ask whether it was a purpose of the legislation that an act done in breach of the provision should be invalid. This has been the preferred approach of courts in this country in recent years, particularly in New South Wales. In determining the question of purpose, regard must be had to ‘the language of the relevant provision and the scope and object of the whole statute’.”(emphasis added)[15][1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355.[16]Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355, 388-9 [91] and 390 [93] (citations omitted).

Decision

Reasons for decision

The allegations on which Mr Elks grounds his case for relief raise the following questions for consideration:1.Was the Council’s decision invalid because of defects in the development assessment process?2.Is the Council’s decision to impose conditions 7 and 8 invalid by reason of s 65 of the Planning Act 2016?3.Should the Court grant the relief sought by Mr Elks with respect to an adverse planning change and compensation?Was the Council’s decision invalid because of defects in the development assessment process? In paragraphs i) a., b. and c. of the prayer for relief in the Amended Originating Application,[8] Mr Elks seeks the following relief:“i)A declaration pursuant to Division 3, Section 11 of the Planning and Environment Court Act 2016, that the decision notice dated 22 January 2021, with reliance upon s 65 of the Planning Act 2016, make conditions 7 and 8 a nullity; for any, or all of the following reasons:a.That conditions 7 and 8 listed in the Notice, pertaining to application No A005322159, are an error at law, as they are outside the legislative authority given to the assessment manager under s 59(2), and the Development Assessment Rules Ver 1.1; and/orb.That conditions 7 and 8 listed in the Notice, pertaining to application No. A005322159 are an error at law, as they are outside of the legislative authority given to the assessment manager under s 45(7) and 59(2) of the Planning Act 2016; And/orc.That the alterations and changes made by the assessment manager upon the plans and submissions when endorsed, pertaining to environmental protection zones, tree protection fencing areas and other notations, were done so outside of any legislative basis or power, to change or alter the applicant’s submissions; and/or[8]Attachment A to Court Doc. No. 10. Other than the assertions contained in the prayer for relief, the Amended Originating Application does not identify the grounds on which Mr Elks challenges the validity of the Council’s decision. As such, it is necessary to consider Mr Elks’ written and oral submissions to obtain further detail about the grounds of challenge.[9] [9]Court Doc. No. 18, Applicants Response to Outline of Respondents Argument; Transcript of Proceedings Elks v Brisbane City Council (Planning and Environment Court of Queensland, 126 of 2022, Kefford DCJ, 15 July 2022) 2-65. Recourse to the submissions reveals that the relief sought in paragraphs i) a., b. and c. and ii) of the prayer for relief in the Amended Originating Application is founded on allegations that:(a)the Council must follow the development assessment process; and (b)there are irregularities in the development assessment process that result in invalidity of decisions made by the Council during the process and its ultimate decision to impose conditions 7 and 8. There are four issues that inform whether I should grant the declaratory relief. The first is whether the Council was obliged to follow the development assessment process. The second is whether the alleged non-compliances or failures in the development assessment process are established.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As for the other alleged defects in the development assessment process, as they have not been established by Mr Elks, it is unnecessary to consider whether, if established, such defects would have sounded in invalidity. Should the Court make the declarations sought in the exercise of its discretion? The relief Mr Elks seeks is discretionary. Even if Mr Elks had established all his allegations, before granting the relief sought the Court must still ask itself whether, in the exercise of the discretion, the declarations should be made. For the reasons explained above, Mr Elks has not established an entitlement to the declarations that he seeks in paragraphs i) a., b. and c. and ii) of the prayer for relief in the Amended Originating Application. That said, even if he had, I would not exercise the discretion to grant the relief sought for three reasons. First, Mr Elks has not persuaded me that the Council’s conduct:(a)involved deliberate delay “in an effort to capture the Applicant with the new amendment”;[125] or(b)was an “attempt to manipulate timelines, in an attempt to capture the Applicant under new legislation”; or(c)was “an authorised attempt to impose harsh, unjust and unreasonable conditions”; or (d)was contrived and involved manipulation of the development assessment process.[126] [125]Court Doc. No. 18, Applicants Response to Outline of Respondents Argument, [70(d)].[126]Court Doc. No. 18, Applicants Response to Outline of Respondents Argument, [69]. Second, even if the Council had given a confirmation notice at the first available opportunity and indicated in the confirmation notice that it did not intend to make any information request, under s 21.1 of the Development assessment rules, the Council would have not been permitted to decide Mr Elks’ development application before 29 November 2019. This is because the development application required public notification. That part of the process, at a minimum, would have taken 15 business days.[127] [127]Planning Act 2016 s 53. As such, even if the development assessment process progressed in the most expedient manner, the Council would have been entitled to give such weight as it considered appropriate to version 17 of City Plan.[128][128]Planning Act 2016 ss 45(7) and (8). Third, Mr Elks voluntarily participated in the development assessment process without challenge. Under s 13.2(c) of the Development assessment rules, Mr Elks could have responded to the information request by indicating that he did not intend to provide any of the requested information. He chose not to adopt that course. Instead, he provided the ecological report referred to in paragraph [119] above. Mr Elks also chose to amend his plans and provide further information in response to Council’s correspondence between 27 May 2020 and 22 January 2021. He was not obliged to do so. Is the Council’s decision to impose conditions 7 and 8 invalid by reason of s 65 of the Planning Act 2016? In paragraphs i) d. and e. of the prayer for relief in the Amended Originating Application, Mr Elks seeks the following relief:“i)A declaration pursuant to Division 3, Section 11 of the Planning and Environment Court Act 2016, that the decision notice dated 22 January 2021, with reliance upon s 65 of the Planning Act 2016, make conditions 7 and 8 a nullity; for any, or all of the following reasons:…d.That conditions 7 and 8, are not reasonable nor relevant to the application as required by law, under s 65 or the Planning Act 2016; and/ore.That such a decision, could not have been made by any reasonable assessment manager based upon the evidence before them and their statutory obligations under the assessment process, being the assessment of relevant consideration and not that of any irrelevant considerations.”