Gold Coast City Council v Sunland Group Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Gold Coast City Council v Sunland Group Limited & Anor [2019] QCA 118

PARTIES:

GOLD COAST CITY COUNCIL
(applicant)
v
SUNLAND GROUP LIMITED
ACN 063 429 532
SUNLAND DEVELOPMENTS NO 22 PTY LTD
ACN 164 903 011
(respondents)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No of 5432 of 2018
P & E Appeal No 321 of 2016
P & E Appeal No 323 of 2016
P & E Appeal No 4 of 2017
P & E Appeal No 1497 of 2017
P & E Appeal No 2213 of 2017

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave Sustainable Planning Act

ORIGINATING COURT:

Planning and Environment Court at Brisbane – [2018] QPEC 22 (Kefford DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

14 June 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

14 November 2018

JUDGES:

Fraser and Morrison JJA and Crow J

ORDERS:

1.   Leave to appeal is granted.

2.   The appeal is allowed.

3.   The orders made by the Planning and Environment Court on 4 May 2018 are set aside and in lieu thereof the respondents’ application for declarations is dismissed, with costs.

4.   The respondents are to pay the appellant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING – COURTS AND TRIBUNALS WITH ENVIRONMENT JURISDICTION – QUEENSLAND – PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COURT AND ITS PREDECESSORS – OTHER MATTERS – where the applicant had issued infrastructure charge notices to the respondent – where the respondent appealed the applicant’s decision to issue the infrastructure charge notices to the Planning and Environment Court – where the Planning and Environment Court made declarations overturning the imposition of the infrastructure charge notices – whether the Planning and Environment Court erred in their decision

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHEN APPEAL LIES – OTHER CASES – where the applicant issued notices to the respondent each under s 635 of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) in order to levy charges on the respondent for trunk infrastructure – where the respondent filed an appeal against the appellant’s decision to issue the notices – where the learned primary judge held that the notices were not in accordance with s 637(2) of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) and were not infrastructure charge notices under the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) – where the applicant has sought leave to appeal against the declarations of the learned primary judge – whether the learned primary judge erred in declaring that the notices did not comply with the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) and were not infrastructure charge notices under the Act

STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – INTERPRETATION – INTERPRETATION ACTS AND PROVISIONS – where it is contended the questions raised on appeal are of specific importance to the applicant as the entity responsible for issuing infrastructure charge notices in its local government area – where it is contended that the questions raised on appeal are of importance to other local governments throughout Queensland – where the resolution…

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Details
Case
[2019] QCA 118
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Gold Coast City Council issued infrastructure charge notices to Sunland Group Ltd, which were subsequently appealed to the Planning and Environment Court. The court made declarations overturning the imposition of the infrastructure charge notices, leading the council to seek leave to appeal the court's decision. The primary issues for the court were whether the Planning and Environment Court erred in their decision and if the court's interpretation of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) was correct.

The court found that the notices were not in accordance with s 637(2) of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) and were not infrastructure charge notices under the Act, thus rendering them invalid. The council argued that the court had erred in its interpretation of the Act, and that a failure to comply with s 637(2) did not render the notices invalid. The court also considered the impact of s 344 of the Planning Act 2016 (Qld) on the appeal, with the council arguing that the section had retrospective effect, while the respondent argued that the appeal must be determined based on the law as it stood at the time of the hearing below.

The court granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders made by the Planning and Environment Court on 4 May 2018. The respondents' application for declarations was dismissed, with costs, and the respondents were ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal. The court held that the Planning and Environment Court erred in their interpretation of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) and that s 344 of the Planning Act 2016 (Qld) did not operate in a retrospective sense.

Orders

Orders of the court

Leave to appeal is granted.

The appeal is allowed.

The orders made by the Planning and Environment Court on 4 May 2018 are set aside and in lieu thereof the respondents’ application for declarations is dismissed, with costs.

The respondents are to pay the appellant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The oft-quoted authority on the difference between appeals by rehearing and strict appeals is Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan.[79] There Dixon J said:[80]“The appeal to this Court is given by sec. 73 of the Constitution, which provides that “the High Court shall have jurisdiction, with such exceptions and subject to such regulations as the Parliament prescribes, to hear and determine appeals from all judgments, decrees, orders, and sentences ... (ii) Of any ... Court exercising Federal jurisdiction.” It is governed by the provisions of sec. 39(2)(b) of the Judiciary Act 1903-1927 and Section IV. of the Appeal Rules. The procedure which determines the mode of appeal does not affect the nature of the appeal itself. It is established that upon such an appeal, it is for the Court to form its own judgment of the facts so far as it is able to do so (Bell v Stewart). For this reason an appeal to this Court is often said to be by way of rehearing. “On an appeal strictly so called, such a judgment can only be given as ought to have been given at the original hearing; but on a rehearing such a judgment may be given as ought to be given if the case came at that time before the Court of first instance” (per Jessel M.R., Quilter v Mapleson). In the English Court of Appeal “all appeals are by way of rehearing, that is by trial over again, on the evidence used in the Court below; but there is special power to receive further evidence” (per Jessel M.R., In re Chennell; Jones v Chennell). Accordingly, that Court must decide an appeal by applying to the circumstances as they exist, when the appeal is dealt with, the law which then operates to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties (Attorney-General v Birmingham, Tame, and Rea District Drainage Board; Ex parte Thomas; and compare Borthwick v Elderslie Steamship Co [No. 2]; Robinson & Co v The King). If, by a retrospective change in the law, the rights and obligations of the parties come to depend upon facts which have not been ascertained, the Court of Appeal takes the necessary steps to have the dispute between the parties decided according to the law presently in force, and it may set aside the order appealed against, and remit the cause to be reheard so that the rights of the parties may be determined as at the date of rehearing (Stovin v. Fairbrass).”[79](1931) 46 CLR 73.[80]Victorian Stevedoring at 107-108; internal citations omitted; emphasis added. More recently the High Court has referred to the approach on a strict appeal as being that the appellate court is called upon to decide whether the decision under appeal was or was not erroneous on the evidence and the law as it stood when the original decision was made.[81][81]Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172; [2000] HCA 40, at 180 [22]; Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259 [1989] HCA 35, at 267; Eastment v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 1; [2000] HCA 29, at 13 [18]; Coal & Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194; [2000] HCA 47 at [12]; Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573; [2011] HCA 10, at 596 [57]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30 at [31] per Gageler J.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established