FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2017] FCAFC 33
ORDERS
NSD 1520 of 2016 BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Appellant
AND: SZVFW
First Respondent
SZVFX
Second Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Third Respondent
JUDGES:
GRIFFITHS, KERR AND FARRELL JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
2 MARCH 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant…
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- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 33
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the primary judge correctly understood and applied the principles concerning judicial review of a statutory discretion for unreasonableness in the legal sense, as discussed in cases such as Li, Singh, and Stretton. The court examined the general principles extracted from these authorities, which included the presumption that a statutory discretionary power must be exercised reasonably, the existence of a genuinely free discretion within the bounds of legal reasonableness, the avoidance of substituting the court's view for that of the decision-maker, and the fact-dependent nature of legal unreasonableness. The court further emphasised the importance of closely evaluating the evidence and the scope and purpose of the statutory provision in question.
The court found that the appeal was without merit. The reasoning of the primary judge was sound, and the principles applied were correctly understood and appropriately applied to the circumstances of the case. The court highlighted that the appealable error alleged by the appellant did not exist, and the appeal was dismissed with the appellant ordered to pay the respondents’ costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondents costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In oral address, Ms Andelman, who appeared pro bono for the respondents, took the Court to various other cases involving legal unreasonableness in proceeding to determine a review in the absence of the review applicants. Those cases included Kaur, Malecaj, MZALO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1339 and Ponugoti v Minister for Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 67. Consideration and determination The appeal turns on the question whether the primary judge correctly understood and applied in the particular circumstances of this case the principles concerning judicial review of a statutory discretion for unreasonableness in the legal sense discussed in cases such as Li, Singh and Stretton. The following general principles may be extracted from the three leading authorities referred to immediately above (further general guidance is provided by the Full Court’s decision in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28; 240 FCR 158): ·there is a legal presumption that a statutory discretionary power must be exercised reasonably in the legal sense of that word (Li at [63] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ; Singh at [43] per Allsop CJ, Robertson and Mortimer JJ; Stretton at [4] per Allsop CJ and at [53] per Griffiths J);·nevertheless, there is an area within which a decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion, which area is bounded by the standard of legal reasonableness (Li at [66]; Stretton at [56] per Griffiths J);·the standard of legal reasonableness does not involve a court substituting its view as to how a discretion should be exercised for that of a decision-maker (Li at [66]; Stretton at [8] per Allsop CJ) and [76] per Griffiths J);·the legal standard of reasonableness is not limited to what is in effect an irrational, if not bizarre, decision and an inference of unreasonableness may in some cases be objectively drawn even where a particular error in reasoning cannot be identified (Li at [68]);·in determining whether in a particular case a statutory discretion has been exercised unreasonably in the legal sense, close attention must be given to the scope and purpose of the statutory provision which confers the discretion and other related provisions (Li at [74]; Stretton at [62] and [70] per Griffiths J);·legal unreasonableness “is invariably fact dependent” and requires a careful evaluation of the evidence. The outcome of any particular case raising unreasonableness will depend upon an application of the relevant principles to the relevant circumstances, rather than by way of an analysis of factual similarities or differences between individual cases (Singh at [48]; Stretton at [10] per Allsop CJ and at [61] per Griffiths J);·the concept of legal unreasonableness can be “outcome focused”, such as where there is no evident and intelligible justification for a decision or, alternatively, it can reflect the characterisation of an underlying jurisdictional error (Singh at [44]; Stretton at [12]-[13] per Allsop CJ);·where reasons are provided, they will be the focal point for an assessment as to whether the decision is unreasonable in the legal sense and it would be a rare case to find that the exercise of a discretionary power is legally unreasonable where the reasons demonstrated a justification (Singh at [45]-[47]).