Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2017] FCAFC 33

Appeal from: SZVFW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2083
File number: NSD 1520 of 2016
Judges: GRIFFITHS, KERR AND FARRELL JJ
Date of judgment: 2 March 2017
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia under s 24 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – appeal in the nature of a rehearing – whether primary judge erred in finding that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s decision under s 426A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was unreasonable in the legal sense – whether there was an appealable error on the part of the primary judge

Held: appeal dismissed with costs

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 425, 425A, 426A, 441A, 441C

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24

Cases cited:

Australian Trade Commissioner v Solarex Pty Ltd [1987] FCA 701

AZAFBv Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1383

Branir v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1833; 117 FCR 424

Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230

Da Costa v Cockburn Salvage & Trading Pty Ltd [1970] HCA 43; 124 CLR 192

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 915; 236 FCR 393

Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 3

Lovell v Lovell 1950 HCA 52; 81 CLR 513

Malecaj v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1508

Mesa Minerals Limited v Mighty River International Limited [2016] FCAFC 16; 241 FCR 241

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28; 240 FCR 158

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZFHC [2006] FCAFC 73; 150 FCR 439

MZALO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1339

Plaintiff B9/2014 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 178; 227 FCR 494

Ponugoti v Minister for Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 67

SZUUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 123; 241 FCR 409

Date of hearing: 22 February 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 58
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P Herzfeld
Solicitor for the Appellant: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms L Andelman (Pro Bono)

ORDERS

NSD 1520 of 2016
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Appellant

AND:

SZVFW

First Respondent

SZVFX

Second Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Third Respondent

JUDGES:

GRIFFITHS, KERR AND FARRELL JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

2 MARCH 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 33
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW, the appellant, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, appealed against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which had reviewed a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The appeal was in the nature of a rehearing and focused on whether the primary judge had erred in finding that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s decision was unreasonable in the legal sense and whether there was an appealable error on the part of the primary judge.

The central legal issue was whether the primary judge correctly understood and applied the principles concerning judicial review of a statutory discretion for unreasonableness in the legal sense, as discussed in cases such as Li, Singh, and Stretton. The court examined the general principles extracted from these authorities, which included the presumption that a statutory discretionary power must be exercised reasonably, the existence of a genuinely free discretion within the bounds of legal reasonableness, the avoidance of substituting the court's view for that of the decision-maker, and the fact-dependent nature of legal unreasonableness. The court further emphasised the importance of closely evaluating the evidence and the scope and purpose of the statutory provision in question.

The court found that the appeal was without merit. The reasoning of the primary judge was sound, and the principles applied were correctly understood and appropriately applied to the circumstances of the case. The court highlighted that the appealable error alleged by the appellant did not exist, and the appeal was dismissed with the appellant ordered to pay the respondents’ costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondents costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The danger with an approach which places undue emphasis on the analysis and outcome of other first instance cases which raise unreasonableness in the legal sense, and comparing the presence or absence of particular circumstances in those cases with the case at hand, is that sight may be lost of the relevant general and overarching principles. It is apposite to recall what McHugh JA said in Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230 at 248:In Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027 at 1085, Lord Reid warned of the danger of placing reliance on the literal words of particular judgments instead of searching for the applicable principle. His Lordship said:… experience has shown that those who have to apply the decision of other cases and still more those who wish to criticise it seem to find it difficult to avoid treating sentences and phrases in a single speech as if they were provisions in an Act of Parliament. They do not seem to realise that it is not the function of noble and learned Lords or indeed of any judges to frame definitions or to lay down hard and fast rules. It is their function to enunciate principles and much that they say is intended to be illustrative or explanatory and not to be definitive. Conclusion For these reasons the appeal must be dismissed and the appellant ordered to pay the respondents’ costs, as agreed or assessed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In oral address, Ms Andelman, who appeared pro bono for the respondents, took the Court to various other cases involving legal unreasonableness in proceeding to determine a review in the absence of the review applicants. Those cases included Kaur, Malecaj, MZALO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1339 and Ponugoti v Minister for Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 67. Consideration and determination The appeal turns on the question whether the primary judge correctly understood and applied in the particular circumstances of this case the principles concerning judicial review of a statutory discretion for unreasonableness in the legal sense discussed in cases such as Li, Singh and Stretton. The following general principles may be extracted from the three leading authorities referred to immediately above (further general guidance is provided by the Full Court’s decision in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28; 240 FCR 158): ·there is a legal presumption that a statutory discretionary power must be exercised reasonably in the legal sense of that word (Li at [63] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ; Singh at [43] per Allsop CJ, Robertson and Mortimer JJ; Stretton at [4] per Allsop CJ and at [53] per Griffiths J);·nevertheless, there is an area within which a decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion, which area is bounded by the standard of legal reasonableness (Li at [66]; Stretton at [56] per Griffiths J);·the standard of legal reasonableness does not involve a court substituting its view as to how a discretion should be exercised for that of a decision-maker (Li at [66]; Stretton at [8] per Allsop CJ) and [76] per Griffiths J);·the legal standard of reasonableness is not limited to what is in effect an irrational, if not bizarre, decision and an inference of unreasonableness may in some cases be objectively drawn even where a particular error in reasoning cannot be identified (Li at [68]);·in determining whether in a particular case a statutory discretion has been exercised unreasonably in the legal sense, close attention must be given to the scope and purpose of the statutory provision which confers the discretion and other related provisions (Li at [74]; Stretton at [62] and [70] per Griffiths J);·legal unreasonableness “is invariably fact dependent” and requires a careful evaluation of the evidence. The outcome of any particular case raising unreasonableness will depend upon an application of the relevant principles to the relevant circumstances, rather than by way of an analysis of factual similarities or differences between individual cases (Singh at [48]; Stretton at [10] per Allsop CJ and at [61] per Griffiths J);·the concept of legal unreasonableness can be “outcome focused”, such as where there is no evident and intelligible justification for a decision or, alternatively, it can reflect the characterisation of an underlying jurisdictional error (Singh at [44]; Stretton at [12]-[13] per Allsop CJ);·where reasons are provided, they will be the focal point for an assessment as to whether the decision is unreasonable in the legal sense and it would be a rare case to find that the exercise of a discretionary power is legally unreasonable where the reasons demonstrated a justification (Singh at [45]-[47]).