FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Haq [2019] FCAFC 7
Appeal from: Haq v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 1523 File number: NSD 1179 of 2018 Judges: GRIFFITHS, GLEESON AND COLVIN JJ Date of judgment: 31 January 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – where the respondents requested the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to defer making a decision so that the respondents could submit material in support of their application to review a decision of the delegate of the Minister refusing the respondents Temporary Work (Skilled) (subclass 457) visas – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the decision of the AAT refusing the deferral was legally unreasonable Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 2A, 7, 10B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 338, 347, 348, 349, 353, 357A, 358, 360, 363, 368, 368D, 379G
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 2 cl 457.223
Cases cited: Andelman v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] FCA 299; (2011) 213 FCR 345
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21; (1990) 170 CLR 1
BSJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 78; (2017) 252 FCR 82
Duncan v Independent commission Against Corruption [2016] NSWCA 143
Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190
Fard v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 155
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2017] FCAFC 33; (2017) 248 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 92 ALJR 713
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259
Date of hearing: 26 November 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 136 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the Appellant: Mills Oakley Solicitor for the First, Second and Third Respondents: Mr M Newman of Newman & Associates Counsel for the Fourth Respondent: The Fourth Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 1179 of 2018 BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Appellant
AND: MAHMADUL HAQ
First Respondent
MOSAMMAT RAZIA
Second Respondent
MAHBIRUL HAQ (and another named in the Schedule)
Third Respondent
JUDGES:
GRIFFITHS, GLEESON AND COLVIN JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
31 JANUARY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The Federal Circuit Court’s orders dated 12 June 2018 be set aside.
3.The originating application dated 1 November 2016 be dismissed.
4.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the proceeding below, fixed in the amount of $5,500, as…
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- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 7
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court's reasoning focused on the principles of judicial review regarding legal unreasonableness. It held that the AAT's decision was not legally unreasonable as it was based on sufficient grounds, particularly the uncertainty regarding whether Mr Haq could satisfy the visa requirements and the adequacy of the time given for obtaining the necessary evidence. The court acknowledged that while the reasons provided by the AAT could have been clearer, the decision was not devoid of logic or justified by the circumstances presented. The court also noted that the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW provided relevant guidance on assessing legal unreasonableness, emphasizing the importance of considering the statutory source of the power and the specific facts of the case.
The court concluded that the appeal should be allowed, and the Federal Circuit Court's orders were set aside. The originating application was dismissed, and the respondents were ordered to pay the appellant's costs. This decision illustrates the principle that timely action can prevent unnecessary litigation and underscores the need for careful evaluation of evidence and application of relevant legal principles in administrative law decisions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The Federal Circuit Court’s orders dated 12 June 2018 be set aside.
3. The originating application dated 1 November 2016 be dismissed.
4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the proceeding below, fixed in the amount of $5,500, as well as the appellant’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Haq also submitted that the requested four weeks deferral was not unreasonable having regard to the fact that the work for which he was applying was in “western NSW ie Wagga” and that “commerce in these regions moves at a slower pace than in Sydney or Melbourne”. It was also submitted that it was relevant that Mr Haq lived in Batlow, which was described by his solicitor as being “on the outskirts of Wagga”. Consideration and disposition of the appeal As noted above, SZVFW Full Court was one of the authorities referred to by the primary judge at [37] as summarising general principles relating to the ground of judicial review of unreasonableness in the legal sense. This decision was subsequently reversed on appeal by the High Court (see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 92 ALJR 713 (SZVFW High Court).I do not consider that the High Court disapproved of any of the general principles which are set out in the extract from SZVFW Full Court at [37] of the primary judge’s reasons for judgment. Rather, the appeal succeeded on the ground that the Full Court had erred because, instead of determining for itself whether the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) in that case was legally unreasonable and whether the primary judge’s reasoning for finding to the contrary was correct, the Full Court had deferred to what the primary judge had held in the judicial review proceeding below (see at [18] per Kiefel CJ, [55]-[56] per Gageler J, [117] per Nettle and Gordon JJ and [154]-[155] per Edelman J). The High Court held that the Full Court also erred in not finding that the RRT’s decision to proceed to make a decision without taking any further action to allow the respondents to appear was not, in the particular circumstances, legally unreasonable. SZVFW High Court is relevant in the following respects. First, the decision reaffirms that the question whether or not an administrative decision is unreasonable requires close attention to be given to the scope, purpose and objects of the statutory source of the power under which the decision was made (at [54] per Gageler J, at [79] per Nettle and Gordon JJ, and at [135] Edelman J). Secondly, there is implicit affirmation of what the Full Court had said in Singh at [47] and [48] per Allsop CJ, Robertson and Mortimer JJ, namely:(1)that legal unreasonableness is “invariably fact dependent and requires a careful evaluation of the evidence”;(2)this involves applying the relevant general principles to the particular factual circumstances of the case and not an analysis of factual similarities or differences between individual cases;(3)where reasons are provided, they are “the focal point for the assessment” (noting that reasons were provided by the Tribunal in Li but were very limited in contrast with those which were provided in SZVFW High Court); and(4)where the reasons disclose a justification for the exercise of a statutory power, only rarely would a Court find that the exercise of a discretionary power was unreasonable (see at [84] per Nettle and Gordon JJ).