Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Haq

Link copied
Case Copied 74 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Haq [2019] FCAFC 7

Appeal from: Haq v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 1523
File number: NSD 1179 of 2018
Judges: GRIFFITHS, GLEESON AND COLVIN JJ
Date of judgment: 31 January 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – where the respondents requested the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to defer making a decision so that the respondents could submit material in support of their application to review a decision of the delegate of the Minister refusing the respondents Temporary Work (Skilled) (subclass 457) visas – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the decision of the AAT refusing the deferral was legally unreasonable
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 2A, 7, 10B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 338, 347, 348, 349, 353, 357A, 358, 360, 363, 368, 368D, 379G

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 2 cl 457.223

Cases cited:

Andelman v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] FCA 299; (2011) 213 FCR 345

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21; (1990) 170 CLR 1

BSJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 78; (2017) 252 FCR 82

Duncan v Independent commission Against Corruption [2016] NSWCA 143

Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190

Fard v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 155

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2017] FCAFC 33; (2017) 248 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 92 ALJR 713

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259

TTY167 v Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 61

Date of hearing: 26 November 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 136
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the Appellant: Mills Oakley
Solicitor for the First, Second and Third Respondents: Mr M Newman of Newman & Associates
Counsel for the Fourth Respondent: The Fourth Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1179 of 2018
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Appellant

AND:

MAHMADUL HAQ

First Respondent

MOSAMMAT RAZIA

Second Respondent

MAHBIRUL HAQ (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

JUDGES:

GRIFFITHS, GLEESON AND COLVIN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

31 JANUARY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed. 

2.The Federal Circuit Court’s orders dated 12 June 2018 be set aside. 

3.The originating application dated 1 November 2016 be dismissed. 

4.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the proceeding below, fixed in the amount of $5,500, as…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Haq and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 7
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Haq, the primary issue before the court was whether the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to refuse the respondents' request to defer making a decision on their application to review a decision of the delegate of the Minister refusing their Temporary Work (Skilled) (subclass 457) visas was legally unreasonable. The respondents had sought a deferral to allow them to submit material in support of their application. The court was required to determine if the primary judge erred in finding that the AAT's decision was not legally unreasonable. The respondents contended that the Tribunal's decision was unreasonable because it failed to consider the relevant circumstances, including the time it took to process the nomination and the geographical challenges of the region.

The court's reasoning focused on the principles of judicial review regarding legal unreasonableness. It held that the AAT's decision was not legally unreasonable as it was based on sufficient grounds, particularly the uncertainty regarding whether Mr Haq could satisfy the visa requirements and the adequacy of the time given for obtaining the necessary evidence. The court acknowledged that while the reasons provided by the AAT could have been clearer, the decision was not devoid of logic or justified by the circumstances presented. The court also noted that the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW provided relevant guidance on assessing legal unreasonableness, emphasizing the importance of considering the statutory source of the power and the specific facts of the case.

The court concluded that the appeal should be allowed, and the Federal Circuit Court's orders were set aside. The originating application was dismissed, and the respondents were ordered to pay the appellant's costs. This decision illustrates the principle that timely action can prevent unnecessary litigation and underscores the need for careful evaluation of evidence and application of relevant legal principles in administrative law decisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The Federal Circuit Court’s orders dated 12 June 2018 be set aside.

3. The originating application dated 1 November 2016 be dismissed.

4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the proceeding below, fixed in the amount of $5,500, as well as the appellant’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, the appeal should be allowed. Summary of background facts On 30 January 2015, the respondents applied for Temporary Business Entry (Class UC), Temporary Work (Skilled) (subclass 457) visas (457 visas). The first respondent was the primary applicant. His wife and child were also applicants as members of his family unit. One of the criteria set by cl 457.223 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations) for a 457 visa was as follows:457.223 …(4) The applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:(a) each of the following applies:(i)a nomination of an occupation in relation to the applicant has been approved under section 140GB of the Act;(ii)the nomination was made by a person who was a standard business sponsor at the time the nomination was approved;(iii)the approval of the nomination has not ceased as provided for in regulation 2.75; and… These criteria required that, at the time of the decision whether or not to grant a 457 visa, there be a current approved nomination of an occupation relating to the visa applicant by a standard business sponsor. Mr Haq was sponsored to work with an entity called A1 Hotel Group Pty Limited (A1 Hotel Group) as a hotel manager at Batlow. Mr Haq’s previous 457 visa ceased on 31 January 2015 and, in those circumstances, he lodged his new 457 visa application on 30 January 2015. He was again sponsored by A1 Hotel Group. The Minister’s delegate refused the visa application on 1 July 2015 on the basis that Mr Haq was not nominated by an approved sponsor because, as at that time, A1 Hotel Group was no longer an approved business sponsor. The AAT proceeding On 21 July 2015, the respondents lodged an application for review in the AAT of the delegate’s decision. By a letter dated 22 July 2015 from the AAT, they were told that the Department had been requested to provide the AAT with all documents and files which it considered to be relevant to the review and that if they wished to provide material or written arguments, they should do so “as soon as possible”. By a letter dated 10 August 2016, the AAT further informed the respondents that it had been unable to make a favourable decision based on the material before it and that, in those circumstances, a hearing would be conducted on 30 September 2016 to which they were invited to attend. The respondents were informed that the AAT “will only change this date if satisfied that you have a very good reason for being granted an adjournment”. Further, they were told that any additional documents or information which they wished to rely upon at the hearing should be provided to the AAT by 23 September 2016. By an email dated 18 August 2016, the respondents’ migration agent informed the AAT that the respondents and the migration agent would attend the hearing. On 29 September 2016 (i.e. the day before the scheduled hearing), the first respondent wrote to the AAT and said that his situation had changed since the review application was lodged. He said that he no longer had a sponsor or nominator and that “my application in the current situation is unlikely to be successful”. He added:I have spoken to numbers of employers and they are ready to file the nomination for me however it is taking some time to collect the documents. In the meantime, I seek the extension of the time to submit a new Nomination documents from a different Employer (sic). Kindly allow me some time (about 4 weeks) to submit documentations.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, there was no lack of logic in the AAT relying on the fact that the Haq family had been on notice since 22 July 2015 that they should provide to the AAT all the material on which they intended to rely, in circumstances where the issue of a different employer had only arisen in the past few months leading up to the AAT’s hearing on 30 September 2016. I repeat what is said in [48] above. Conclusion For these reasons, I consider that the appeal should be allowed. The FCCA’s orders dated 12 June 2018 should be set aside. In lieu thereof, should will be ordered that the originating application dated 1 November 2016 be dismissed. The respondents should pay the appellant’s costs of the proceeding below, fixed in the amount of $5,500. They should also pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed. I have had the benefit of reading the reasons of each of Griffiths J and Colvin J in draft form. Generally, I respectfully agree with the orders proposed by Griffiths J and his Honour’s reasons. I add the following reasons. This is not a case in which the result is “so unreasonable that it could not have been reached if proper reasoning had been applied in the exercise of the statutory power in the particular circumstances”: cf. Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 357 ALR 408 at [83] per Nettle and Gordon JJ. However, it is a good illustration of the proverb “a stitch in time saves nine”: if Mr Haq had been permitted the four weeks indulgence he sought in September 2016, the current litigation could well have been avoided. The Tribunal provided reasons for its decision not to delay the making of a final decision. The Tribunal set out various matters that were relevant to that question and then concluded at para 14 of its decision record that it was not “appropriate, in the circumstances of this case, to postpone making its decision”. Although the reasons could have been expressed more clearly, in essence, the Tribunal’s justification for its decision was that it was not satisfied that the circumstances warranted it acceding to Mr Haq’s request to postpone the decision. The particular circumstances, identified by the Tribunal immediately before it reached that conclusion were:(1)the uncertainty as to whether Mr Haq could place himself in a position to satisfy the requirements for the visa; and(2)the Tribunal’s conclusion that Mr Haq had been afforded “sufficient time to obtain evidence of lodgement of a nomination application by the Red Steer to justify his request for a delay”. In my view, the first of these matters provided an adequate justification for the Tribunal’s decision because it entailed the corollary that there was no particular reason to think that a postponement of the decision would enable Mr Haq to satisfy the requirements for the visa. The second matter is consistent with the Tribunal’s description of Mr Haq’s request for an extension of time, namely, that it was made for the purpose of submitting documentation to the Tribunal “evidencing lodgement of a nomination application by a prospective lawyer” (decision record para 12). In my view, the second matter did not provide an adequate justification for the Tribunal’s decision. It was not obvious that Mr Haq could only justify his request for delay by evidence of lodgement of a nomination application. For example, if Mr Haq had provided evidence of Red Steer’s intention to lodge a nomination application, the Tribunal might reasonably have agreed to postpone its decision on that basis.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Haq also submitted that the requested four weeks deferral was not unreasonable having regard to the fact that the work for which he was applying was in “western NSW ie Wagga” and that “commerce in these regions moves at a slower pace than in Sydney or Melbourne”. It was also submitted that it was relevant that Mr Haq lived in Batlow, which was described by his solicitor as being “on the outskirts of Wagga”. Consideration and disposition of the appeal As noted above, SZVFW Full Court was one of the authorities referred to by the primary judge at [37] as summarising general principles relating to the ground of judicial review of unreasonableness in the legal sense. This decision was subsequently reversed on appeal by the High Court (see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 92 ALJR 713 (SZVFW High Court).I do not consider that the High Court disapproved of any of the general principles which are set out in the extract from SZVFW Full Court at [37] of the primary judge’s reasons for judgment. Rather, the appeal succeeded on the ground that the Full Court had erred because, instead of determining for itself whether the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) in that case was legally unreasonable and whether the primary judge’s reasoning for finding to the contrary was correct, the Full Court had deferred to what the primary judge had held in the judicial review proceeding below (see at [18] per Kiefel CJ, [55]-[56] per Gageler J, [117] per Nettle and Gordon JJ and [154]-[155] per Edelman J). The High Court held that the Full Court also erred in not finding that the RRT’s decision to proceed to make a decision without taking any further action to allow the respondents to appear was not, in the particular circumstances, legally unreasonable. SZVFW High Court is relevant in the following respects. First, the decision reaffirms that the question whether or not an administrative decision is unreasonable requires close attention to be given to the scope, purpose and objects of the statutory source of the power under which the decision was made (at [54] per Gageler J, at [79] per Nettle and Gordon JJ, and at [135] Edelman J). Secondly, there is implicit affirmation of what the Full Court had said in Singh at [47] and [48] per Allsop CJ, Robertson and Mortimer JJ, namely:(1)that legal unreasonableness is “invariably fact dependent and requires a careful evaluation of the evidence”;(2)this involves applying the relevant general principles to the particular factual circumstances of the case and not an analysis of factual similarities or differences between individual cases;(3)where reasons are provided, they are “the focal point for the assessment” (noting that reasons were provided by the Tribunal in Li but were very limited in contrast with those which were provided in SZVFW High Court); and(4)where the reasons disclose a justification for the exercise of a statutory power, only rarely would a Court find that the exercise of a discretionary power was unreasonable (see at [84] per Nettle and Gordon JJ).