SZROZ v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZROZ v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1692

Appeal from: SZROZ v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (No 3) [2018] FCCA 1054
File number: NSD 860 of 2018
Judge: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 15 October 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review – whether it was legally unreasonable for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to grant an adjournment for a period shorter than that requested by the appellant – where the AAT’s decision record provided a logical and intelligible justification for the course it adopted – appeal dismissed, with costs
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss, 412, 414, 415, 420, 425, 427
Cases cited:

DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 43; 366 ALR 665

Ellis v Central Land Council [2019] FCAFC 1; 364 ALR 446

Karan v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 139

Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 151

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Haq [2019] FCAFC 7; 365 ALR 202

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 357 ALR 408

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3

SZROZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 3) [2018] FCCA 1054

Date of hearing: 15 October 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 27
Counsel for the Appellant: V Kline (direct access)
Counsel for the Respondents: T Liu
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 860 of 2018
BETWEEN:

SZROZ

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 OCTOBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GRIFFITHS J:

  1. This appeal is from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) in SZROZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 3) [2018] FCCA 1054 dismissing an application for judicial review. The central issue is whether the primary judge erred in not finding that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) had acted unreasonably in the legal sense in denying the appellant the adjournment he sought. 

  2. For the following reasons, the appeal will be dismissed, with costs.

    Summary of background matters

  3. The AAT conducted a review of the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the appellant a protection…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1692
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a citizen of India, appealed against the Federal Circuit Court of Australia's decision to dismiss his application for judicial review. The appellant sought a review of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's (AAT) decision to deny his application for a protection visa, which was based on his fear of harm due to his membership in the Communist Party of India and witnessing a murder by an activist in the Dalit Human Rights Movement. The AAT had previously dismissed the appellant's application for review on 25 February 2016. The primary issue in this appeal was whether the AAT was legally unreasonable in granting an adjournment for a period shorter than that requested by the appellant. The court considered the principles of legal unreasonableness, the scope, purpose, and objects of the statutory source of the power under which the decision was made, and the need to closely evaluate the evidence and apply relevant legal principles to the particular factual circumstances of the case.

After carefully reviewing the AAT's reasons and considering the relevant authorities, the court found that the AAT's decision was legally reasonable and not legally unreasonable. The AAT's reasons provided a logical and intelligible justification for the course it adopted, and the appellant's claim that the decision was legally unreasonable was not substantiated. The court concluded that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that the AAT's refusal to grant a longer adjournment than requested was legally unreasonable. As a result, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs, as agreed or taxed. The entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, the appeal will be dismissed, with costs.Summary of background matters The AAT conducted a review of the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa. He is a citizen of India and is a Christian. He claimed to fear harm on the basis of being an active member of the Communist Party of India. He claimed that he had witnessed a murder committed by an activist in the Dalit Human Rights Movement. The AAT found him not to be a witness of truth and his application for review in the AAT was dismissed on 25 February 2016. There is no need to describe his lengthy migration history, which is outlined by the primary judge at [6] to [10] of his reasons for judgment. It is necessary to explain in more detail the circumstances surrounding the appellant’s application for the AAT hearing to be adjourned. On 25 August 2015, the AAT wrote to the applicant advising that it had considered all the material before it and was unable to make a favourable decision on that material alone. It invited the appellant to attend a hearing on 2 November 2015 to give oral evidence and present arguments in support of the protection visa application. On the scheduled hearing day, the appellant sent by facsimile to the AAT a medical certificate, a request for an MRI and a pathology request. The medical certificate stated that the appellant “was seen on 2/11/2015 and find (sic) that he is suffering from vertigo and will be unfit for normal duties on 2/11/2015” (emphasis in original). The certificate was signed by a Dr Brian Nguy. Dr Nguy filled out a form requesting a head MRI and he gave the reason as “vertigo and headaches”. Dr Nguy also completed a pathology request for the appellant. The tests requested were “Fasting lipids incl HDL; Fasting Glucose; EUC; LFT; FBC, TSH”. An AAT file note dated 2 November 2015 records that the appellant telephoned the AAT on the morning of 2 November 2015 and asked whether the medical certificate had been received. He was told by an AAT officer that it had. The appellant told the officer that he “was feeling dizzy and had been vomiting” and that the doctor had asked him to get some blood tests done that week and return for a further medical appointment on Monday, 9 November 2019. He said that the doctor would then consider requesting an MRI scan. The officer consulted the presiding member and telephoned the appellant to tell him that the hearing had been rescheduled to 12:30 pm on Friday, 6 November 2015. According to the AAT officer’s file note, the appellant was told “that if he still felt too unwell on or near that date he should seek another medical certificate which gave more detail, preferably stating he was unable to attend the hearing, which involves sitting and answering questions, rather than just refer to ‘normal duties’, and, if possible giving some indication of how long it would be before he was well enough to attend a hearing”. The note records the appellant saying that his “problem would come and go, a few days at a time” and that he would “prefer the hearing to be scheduled after his next doctor’s appointment”. The note records the AAT officer explaining to the appellant that the presiding member had been made aware of the upcoming appointment “and he wished to proceed with the hearing on Friday [6 November] in the hope that [the appellant] would be well enough to attend”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge was correct to conclude that the AAT’s reasons provide a logical and intelligible justification for the actions it took which the appellant challenges. Having regard to SZVFW, I should state that I am not persuaded that the AAT’s refusal to grant the appellant a longer adjournment than it did was legally unreasonable. Conclusion For these reasons, the appeal will be dismissed, with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The only ground of appeal which is pressed is as follows:The Primary Judge erred in law by failing to find that the decision of the Second Respondent to deny an adjournment of the sort requested by the Appellant, lacked an evident and intelligible basis, and was a decision disproportionate to that which was required by the Act, thus causing the Second Respondent to act in a manner that was legally unreasonable and so fall into jurisdictional error.Consideration and determination It is unnecessary to summarise the parties’ submissions because they are sufficiently addressed in my reasons below for dismissing the appeal. It is necessary, however, to restate the now reasonably well settled principles concerning legal unreasonableness because the appellant’s case, as presented, is inconsistent with several of them. The relevant principles are identified in cases such as Li; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1; Singh; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 357 ALR 408; Ellis v Central Land Council [2019] FCAFC 1; 364 ALR 446; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Haq [2019] FCAFC 7; 365 ALR 202; Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3; DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 43; 366 ALR 665 and Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 151. This list of authorities is by no means exhaustive. In brief, the relevant principles may be summarised as follows:(a)whether or not an administrative decision is legally unreasonable requires close attention to be given to the scope, purpose and objects of the statutory source of the power under which the decision was made (SZVFW at [54], [79] and [135]);(b)legal unreasonableness is “invariably fact dependent”, requires a “careful evaluation of the evidence” and involves an application of the relevant general legal principles to the particular factual circumstances of the case and not an analysis of factual similarities or differences between individual cases (Singh at [42]);(c)where reasons are provided, they are “the focal point for the assessment” (SZVFW at [84]; Singh at [47]-[48]); (d)where the reasons disclose a justification for the exercise of a statutory power, only rarely would a court find that the exercise of a discretionary power was legally unreasonable (SZVFW at [84]; Singh at [47]-[48]);(e)a court exercising judicial review jurisdiction is not entitled to replace a primary decision-maker’s reasons which do not disclose an intelligible justification for the exercise of the power with reasons which were not relied upon by the decision-maker (Haq at [35]);(f)the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and should not be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed (see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272);(g)in assessing whether the standard of legal unreasonableness has been established, it is not relevant to take into account events which occurred after the challenged decision was made (see Li at [83] and Ellis at [174]-[177]);(h)a statutory discretionary power contains an area of decisional freedom and the Courts will not lightly interfere with the exercise of a statutory power involving an area of discretion (Li at [28] and [66] and Haq at [37]); and (i)in applying the standard of legal reasonableness, the Court should not substitute its view as to how a statutory discretion should be exercised for that of the decision-maker and, depending upon the terms of relevant discretionary power, the decision-maker will generally have “a degree of latitude in determining what is fair and just in a given case” (SZVFW at [13]). In other words, the standard of legal unreasonableness which is implied as a condition of the exercise of a statutory power is “a demanding standard” (Haq at [37]).