FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZROZ v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1692
Appeal from: SZROZ v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (No 3) [2018] FCCA 1054 File number: NSD 860 of 2018 Judge: GRIFFITHS J Date of judgment: 15 October 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review – whether it was legally unreasonable for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to grant an adjournment for a period shorter than that requested by the appellant – where the AAT’s decision record provided a logical and intelligible justification for the course it adopted – appeal dismissed, with costs Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss, 412, 414, 415, 420, 425, 427 Cases cited: DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 43; 366 ALR 665
Ellis v Central Land Council [2019] FCAFC 1; 364 ALR 446
Karan v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 139
Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 151
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Haq [2019] FCAFC 7; 365 ALR 202
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 357 ALR 408
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3
SZROZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 3) [2018] FCCA 1054
Date of hearing: 15 October 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 27 Counsel for the Appellant: V Kline (direct access) Counsel for the Respondents: T Liu Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
NSD 860 of 2018 BETWEEN: SZROZ
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GRIFFITHS J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 OCTOBER 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GRIFFITHS J:
This appeal is from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) in SZROZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 3) [2018] FCCA 1054 dismissing an application for judicial review. The central issue is whether the primary judge erred in not finding that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) had acted unreasonably in the legal sense in denying the appellant the adjournment he sought.
For the following reasons, the appeal will be dismissed, with costs.
Summary of background matters
The AAT conducted a review of the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the appellant a protection…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1692
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
After carefully reviewing the AAT's reasons and considering the relevant authorities, the court found that the AAT's decision was legally reasonable and not legally unreasonable. The AAT's reasons provided a logical and intelligible justification for the course it adopted, and the appellant's claim that the decision was legally unreasonable was not substantiated. The court concluded that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that the AAT's refusal to grant a longer adjournment than requested was legally unreasonable. As a result, the appeal was dismissed with costs.
The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs, as agreed or taxed. The entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The only ground of appeal which is pressed is as follows:The Primary Judge erred in law by failing to find that the decision of the Second Respondent to deny an adjournment of the sort requested by the Appellant, lacked an evident and intelligible basis, and was a decision disproportionate to that which was required by the Act, thus causing the Second Respondent to act in a manner that was legally unreasonable and so fall into jurisdictional error.Consideration and determination It is unnecessary to summarise the parties’ submissions because they are sufficiently addressed in my reasons below for dismissing the appeal. It is necessary, however, to restate the now reasonably well settled principles concerning legal unreasonableness because the appellant’s case, as presented, is inconsistent with several of them. The relevant principles are identified in cases such as Li; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1; Singh; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 357 ALR 408; Ellis v Central Land Council [2019] FCAFC 1; 364 ALR 446; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Haq [2019] FCAFC 7; 365 ALR 202; Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3; DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 43; 366 ALR 665 and Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 151. This list of authorities is by no means exhaustive. In brief, the relevant principles may be summarised as follows:(a)whether or not an administrative decision is legally unreasonable requires close attention to be given to the scope, purpose and objects of the statutory source of the power under which the decision was made (SZVFW at [54], [79] and [135]);(b)legal unreasonableness is “invariably fact dependent”, requires a “careful evaluation of the evidence” and involves an application of the relevant general legal principles to the particular factual circumstances of the case and not an analysis of factual similarities or differences between individual cases (Singh at [42]);(c)where reasons are provided, they are “the focal point for the assessment” (SZVFW at [84]; Singh at [47]-[48]); (d)where the reasons disclose a justification for the exercise of a statutory power, only rarely would a court find that the exercise of a discretionary power was legally unreasonable (SZVFW at [84]; Singh at [47]-[48]);(e)a court exercising judicial review jurisdiction is not entitled to replace a primary decision-maker’s reasons which do not disclose an intelligible justification for the exercise of the power with reasons which were not relied upon by the decision-maker (Haq at [35]);(f)the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and should not be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed (see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272);(g)in assessing whether the standard of legal unreasonableness has been established, it is not relevant to take into account events which occurred after the challenged decision was made (see Li at [83] and Ellis at [174]-[177]);(h)a statutory discretionary power contains an area of decisional freedom and the Courts will not lightly interfere with the exercise of a statutory power involving an area of discretion (Li at [28] and [66] and Haq at [37]); and (i)in applying the standard of legal reasonableness, the Court should not substitute its view as to how a statutory discretion should be exercised for that of the decision-maker and, depending upon the terms of relevant discretionary power, the decision-maker will generally have “a degree of latitude in determining what is fair and just in a given case” (SZVFW at [13]). In other words, the standard of legal unreasonableness which is implied as a condition of the exercise of a statutory power is “a demanding standard” (Haq at [37]).