Sanaee v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs
[2022] FedCFamC2G 841
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 2)
Sanaee v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 841
File number(s): MLG 4266 of 2020 Judgment of: JUDGE HUMPREYS Date of judgment: 12 October 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Partner visa – whether Tribunal acted unreasonably – whether Tribunal failed to complete its statutory task – whether applicants denied procedural fairness – whether Tribunal demonstrated bias. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 109, 359, 375A, 477
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Cases cited: AMB19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 439
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 929
Manna v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 400
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Haq (2019) 267 FCR 513
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 53 Date of last submission/s: 4 October 2022 Date of hearing: 4 October 2022 Place: Parramatta Counsel for the Applicants: Dr McBeth of Counsel Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Johnson SC and Mr Hosking of Counsel ORDERS
MLG 4266 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: MAH GUL SANAEE
First Applicant
MOHAMMAD RAZA
Second Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIPA AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE HUMPREYS
DATE OF ORDER:
12 OCtoBer 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be quashed.
2.A writ of mandamus directed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal requiring them to determine the Applicant’s application according to law.
3.An order for costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE HUMPHREYS
Introduction
This matter has a somewhat complex history. The first applicant, Ms Sanee, is an Australian permanent resident. On 30 January 2013, the second applicant, Mr Mohammed Raza applied for a Subclass 309 Partners visa (‘Partners visa’) on the basis that he was the spouse of, or in a de facto relationship with the Ms Sanee.
On 1 July 2013, the Migration Legislation Amendment Regulation 2013 (No 3) (Cth) amended
cl 309.225 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (‘the Regulations’). This amendment applied to any application for a Subclass 309 application that was made but not finally determined. The amendment included that, at the time of the decision, the applicant must satisfy Public Interest Criterion 4020 (‘PIC 4020’): cl 309.225 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations.
On 15 February 2016, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration (‘the delegate’) refused the second applicant his Partner visa on the basis that Mr Raza did not satisfy PIC 4020(2A), which required the applicant to satisfy the Minister of Immigration of his identity.
On 26 February 2016, Ms Sanee applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) for merits review of the decision in relation to Mr Raza.
On 23 March 2016, a delegate certified, for the purposes of s 375A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’) that the disclosure of certain information would be contrary to the public interest.
On 19 October 2017, a delegate decided, under s 109 of the Act, to cancel Ms Sanee’s Subclass 155 (Five Year Return Resident) visa (‘Subclass 155 visa’). Ms Sanee then applied to the Tribunal for a merits review of the cancellation decision in relation to her visa on 30 October 2017.
On 21 May 2018, the Tribunal decided to affirm the delegate’s refusal decision in relation to Mr Raza. The Tribunal found that Mr Raza did not satisfy the criterion in cl 309.221 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations in that, at that time, he was not sponsored by an Australian citizen, Australian permanent resident or eligible New Zealand citizen.
The Tribunal did not deal with the substantive issue of whether or not Mr Raza satisfied
PIC 4020. It is conceded by the first respondent that, as at the time of the decision in relation to Mr Raza, the Tribunal was aware that Ms Sanee had sought review of the decision to cancel her Subclass 155 visa.
A consequence of the Tribunal deciding to affirm the delegate’s decision is that it triggered PIC 4020(2B). That subclause provides that any person who has been refused a visa because of a failure to satisfy PIC 4020(2A) cannot be granted a visa for the next 10 years, nor can any member of the family unit of that person.
On 9 August 2019, the Tribunal, constituted by different member to the member who considered Mr Raza’s case, set aside the cancellation decision and substituted a decision not to cancel Ms Sanee’s Subclass 155 visa. Thus, the entire basis for the Tribunal’s prior decision to refuse Mr Raza’s visa, being that he was not sponsored at that time by an Australian citizen or permanent resident, was rendered null and void.
On 14 December 2020, Ms Sanee applied to the Court for judicial review of the decision to refuse Mr Raza’s Partner visa. That application included an application for an extension of time in which to file the application.
Extension of Time Consideration
The applicant filed her application approximately two and one half years out of time. Given the 35 day time limit prescribed by s 477(1) of the Act, the first respondent opposes leave being granted.
The considerations for whether or not a court should extend time are well-settled. They include the following: Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 [18]-[22]:
1. Applications for extension of time are not to be granted unless it is proper to do so. The legislative time limits are not to be ignored;
2. There must be some acceptable explanation for the delay;
3. Any prejudice to the respondent in defending the proceeding;
4. The mere absence of prejudice to the respondent is not enough to justify the grant of an extension; and
5. The merits of the substantial application.
To the above, the Court would add the extent of the delay. The greater the delay in lodging an application, the greater the level of persuasion that will be required to explain the delay: Manna v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 400 at [14].
As to the first consideration, the reason for the delay, Ms Sanee claims that she never received a copy of the Tribunal’s decision and was therefore unaware that the Tribunal had finalised the matter. Ms Sanee, who was self-represented that the time, claims that she was having difficulty communicating with the Tribunal in writing and preferred to have contact with the Tribunal by telephone or in person through a Dari Interpreter.
The first applicant claims that it was only when she engaged her current legal representatives to lodge a new Partner visa application that they were able to obtain all relevant documents and to ascertain the precise history of the matter. The remainder of the time of the delay before the application was filed on 14 December 2020 is attributable to the time it took to the applicant to raise sufficient funds for her legal fees.
It was submitted that the context of the matter is an unsophisticated client who was self-represented at the Tribunal. Further, she relied on an Interpreter and had demonstrable difficulty in interacting with the legal system in writing.
The first respondent submits that the claim that Ms Sanee did not receive a copy of the Tribunal decision record is at odds with the fact that the Tribunal’s decision record was sent on 22 May 2018 to the same email address to which the Tribunal sent an invitation to comment on matters pursuant to s 359 of the Act, which Ms Sanee admits to having received. Further, Ms Sanee had previously used the same email address to contact the Tribunal on other occasions.
Second, it is not clear why Ms Sanee would have engaged her current legal representatives to lodge a new application for Subclass 309 Visa, if she was not aware that the previous visa application of been refused. Third, the Affidavit by her solicitor, Ms Anderson, does not identify when Ms Sanee first engaged them and when the first Freedom of Information (‘FOI’) request was made, when a response to various FOI requests was received or why there was a delay of five months between July and December 2020 before Ms Sanee filed an application for an extension of time.
In the Courts view, the delay is extensive. The Court is not satisfied that all aspects of the delay had been properly explained. This consideration mitigates against an extension of time being granted.
In relation to the next consideration, being prejudice to the first respondent, Counsel submits that the first respondent would not suffer any prejudice of the application for an extension of time was granted. That, however, is not the end of the matter.
There is a significant public interest in the timely and effective disposal of litigation, particularly in public law where delays in dealing with applications for visas are to be avoided if possible: Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 929 at [62]. Further, the lack of any prejudice is not of itself a reason for granting an extension of time. The Court considers this consideration to be neutral in relation to the granting of an extension of time.
The last matter concerns the merits of the substantive application. The Court is not required to undertake a substantive consideration of the grounds of judicial review, rather they should be viewed at an impressionistic level. If grounds lack merit at this stage, there would be no point in granting an extension of time if the substantive grounds were doomed to failure.
On behalf of the applicants, it is broadly submitted that the actions of the Tribunal in finalising the application of Mr Raza, in circumstances where there was an application for review in relation to the cancellation of Ms Sanee’s permanent residency visa, was unreasonable. The decision in relation to Mr Raza was based on the fact that Ms Sanee did not have a permanent residency visa and was thus ineligible to sponsor Mr Raza. The Tribunal ultimately overturned the cancellation of Ms Sanee’s visa. Thus, the factual basis of which Mr Raza’s visa was refused by the Tribunal was rendered otiose.
Other grounds of judicial review are relied upon, including an admitted failure to draw to the attention of Ms Sanee of the existence of a certificate purportedly issued under s 375A of the Act. The first respondent conceded that this was a denial of procedural fairness but that the error was not material. In the Court’s view, this is issue can only be properly considered if leave is granted.
The Court has considered the very long delay in the filing of the application. Normally, this length of delay might be a compelling reason to refuse leave. The explanation for the delay is less than satisfactory.
The Court considers however, in the unique factual circumstances of this matter, including the legal consequences of a 10 year ban under PIC 4020(2B) should leave not be granted, that it is in the interests of justice that leave pursuant to s 477(1) of the Act be granted. In so doing, the Court has taken into account the concessions made by first respondent that the Tribunal was aware that Ms Sanee had lodged an application for review of the decision to cancel her visa and that the Tribunal breached a procedural fairness requirement.
Grounds of Judicial Review
The grounds of judicial review relied upon are contained in a Further Amended Initiating Application filed with the Court on 1 June 2022. Leave was previously granted by the Court for the filing of this Further Amended Application. The grounds of judicial review now relied upon are as follows:
1. The Tribunal unreasonably failed to adjourn the hearing pending the determination of the review of the decision to cancel the First Applicant’s visa, or unreasonably proceeded to a decision without enquiring as to the status of the cancellation decision.
Particulars
a)The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse a partner visa to the Second Applicant on the ground that the First Applicant no longer met the permanent residency requirements for a sponsor, because the First Applicant’s visa had been cancelled (‘Cancellation Decision’) between the date of the delegate’s decision and the date of the Tribunal’s decision.
b)The First Applicant had lodged an application in the Tribunal for review of the Cancellation Decision in October 2017.
c)The Tribunal, differently constituted, set aside the Cancellation Decision on 9 August 2019, meaning that the First Applicant in fact satisfied the permanent residence requirement for a sponsor.
d)It was unreasonable for the Tribunal to fail to adjourn the matter until after the review of the Cancellation Decision had been determined.
e)Alternatively, it was unreasonable for the Tribunal Member to make a decision based entirely on the cancellation of the First Applicant’s visa without making a simple enquiry of the Tribunal’s own registry as to the status of the review of the Cancellation Decision.
2. The Tribunal failed to complete its statutory task, or alternatively, acted unreasonably in the circumstances, in failing to review the delegate’s finding that the Second Applicant did not meet Public Interest Criterion 4020(2A).
Particulars
a)The delegate refused the Second Applicant’s partner visa application on the basis that the delegate was not satisfied that the Second Applicant met Public Interest Criterion 4020(2A).
b)A finding that an applicant did not meet Public Interest Criterion 4020(2A) carries its own legal consequence, separate from non-satisfaction of the visa criteria, namely the prohibition in cl 4020(2B) of sch 4 of the Migration Regulations on granting any Australian visa to the applicant or any member of the family unit of the applicant for ten years.
c)The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision, including by implication the finding regarding Public Interest Criterion 4020(2A), on an entirely different basis, namely that the First Applicant did not meet the criteria for sponsorship as her visa had been cancelled.
d)The Tribunal did not consider the issue of whether Public Interest Criterion 4020(2A) was met and made no finding on that issue.
e)The Tribunal failed to complete its statutory task of review by failing to review a finding that had independent legal consequences.
f)Alternatively, it was unreasonable for the Tribunal not to consider and make a finding on the issue of whether Public Interest Criterion 4020(2A) was met in circumstances where the failure to do so imposed a ten year ban on the applicants and all other members of their family unit being granted a visa.
g)In the further alternative, the applicants seek a declaration that the Tribunal’s decision did not constitute a decision to refuse a visa because of a failure to satisfy Public Interest Criterion 4020(2A) and that Public Interest Criterion 4020(2B) therefore does not apply to the applicants.
3. The Tribunal denied the applicants procedural fairness by failing to disclose the existence of a certificate purportedly made under s 375A of the Migration Act, failing to invite submissions on the validity of the certificate, and/or failing to disclose the information that was behind the certificate to the applicants.
Particulars
a)The Tribunal failed to notify the applicants of the existence of the certificate and failed to give an opportunity to the applicants to make representations regarding the certificate.
b)The s 375A certificate was invalid on its face, in that it did not disclose a reason that could reasonably make disclosure of the information behind the certificate contrary to the public interest.
c)The information was potentially relevant to the issue of the identity of the Second Applicant and his family members, which was a matter that was properly the subject of review in the Tribunal.
d)The denial of the opportunity to comment on the validity of the certificate and, if the certificate was invalid, the failure to disclose the documents behind the certificate, materially affected the opportunity for the applicants to make submissions affecting an issue in the review.
4. The decision of the Tribunal was affected by a reasonable apprehension of bias.
Particulars
a)The Tribunal had before it, under cover of a purported s 375A certificate, information that was prejudicial to the applicants.
b)Neither the existence of the certificate nor the information behind the certificate were disclosed to the applicants or put to them for comment.
c)A reasonable observer might have apprehended that the prejudicial material might have influenced the Tribunal’s decision-making, including but not limited to the decision to issue a notice under s 359 of the Act and/or the decision not to adjourn the review until the Cancellation Decision was determined.
The Applicant’s submissions
On behalf of the Ms Sanee, it was submitted that at the time of the decision to refuse the Mr Raza’s application, the Tribunal had been seized of an application for the review of the cancellation decision in relation to Ms Sanee. It was submitted that it was self-evident that if Ms Sanee was successful in her application, then the sole basis on which the Tribunal made its adverse decision would fall away. Indeed, that is precisely what happened on 9 August 2019.
In relation to ground one, it was submitted the Tribunal’s decision record discloses no consideration of whether it was appropriate to adjourn the review, or simply delay making a decision, until the review of the cancellation decision been resolved. Indeed, there is no mention of the fact that there was a review application on foot at the Tribunal at all.
In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 (‘Li’) the High Court considered a case where the Tribunal had refused to adjourn a hearing to enable the applicant to obtain a new skills assessment, so that she could satisfy the criterion of the visa that she did not meet at the time of the hearing. The Tribunal refused to do so, instead making a decision adverse to the applicant on the basis of the failure to satisfy the skills assessment criterion. As it transpired, Ms Li subsequently obtained a positive skills assessment. Thus, the sole basis for the Tribunal’s adverse decision would have fallen away the Tribunal had waited for that outstanding matter to be resolved: Li at [21]. It was submitted the High Court found that the Tribunal’s insistence on making the decision immediately, rather than waiting, was legally unreasonable with the result that decision is affected by jurisdictional error.
It was submitted that, for analogous reasons, the Tribunal acted unreasonably the present case in making a decision, the sole basis of which was an issue for determination in another proceeding that was on foot at the Tribunal rather than waiting the outcome of that proceeding. It was further submitted that the decision record of the Tribunal reveals no enquiry by the Tribunal member as to the status of the Tribunal’s review of the cancellation decision. The simplest of enquiries with the Tribunal’s own registry, as to whether there are other pending matters in Ms Sanee’s name, would have revealed that the issue of the cancellation of Ms Sanee’s visa was in live dispute before the Tribunal. The failure of the Tribunal to member to make that simple and obvious enquiry was unreasonable in the circumstances: AMB19 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 439 at [32]-[33].
On behalf of the Minister, it was submitted that the applicant bears the onus of establishing jurisdictional error: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594 at [67].
The principal matter on which the applicant appeared to rely in support of that inferences the fact that the application for review of the cancellation decision was filed in the same registry as the Tribunal is the application for review of the refusal decision. However, there was no principle of law to the fact that a member the Tribunal has constructive knowledge of the information known to each other member of the Tribunal or the registry of the Tribunal.
The Minister relies on Affidavit of Ms Jenni Lee, a Team Leader in the case assessment team of the Tribunal. That Affidavit showed the Tribunal’s electronic case management system, “Casemate”, concerning the review of the refusal decision and the Tribunal proceeding concerning the review of the cancellation decision as “Related Cases”. Casemate, however, does not record when those two proceedings were recorded as “related cases”. Ms Lee’s evidence is that the Tribunal’s current practice is to record related cases at the time and a new case is opened in the Casemate.
The Minister submitted that the preferable inference to draw from that evidence is that the Tribunal proceeding concerning the review of the cancellation decision was recorded as a related case at or around the time Ms Sanee applied to the Tribunal for a review of the cancellation decision. Thus, the inference to be drawn from the available material, is that at the time of its refusal decision, the Tribunal was aware of the fact that Ms Sanee had sought a review of the cancellation decision.
It was submitted, however, that it does not follow that the Tribunal acted unreasonably in not deferring making a decision on the refusal application in relation to Mr Raza until after the review of the cancellation decision in relation to Ms Sanee been determined.
It was submitted the timing of the Tribunal’s decision was a matter for the Tribunal: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Haq (2019) 267 FCR 513 at [40]. It was conceded, however, that in determining when to make its decision, the Tribunal was required to act reasonably.
Whether the Tribunal in fact acted reasonably is to be assessed by reference to the relevant statutory framework (see; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [47]-[48] (‘Singh’)) and in the particular the facts of the case. The relevant question for the Court to determine is whether the Tribunal’s act was “an evident and intelligible justification” for making a decision on the review of the refusal decision without waiting until the review of the cancellation decision had been determined.
In the current case, the Tribunal did not explain in its decision record whether it had considered deferring its decision until the review of the cancellation decision had been determined. Reliance was placed on Singh at [45] where the following was said:
In the circumstances where no reasons for the exercise of power, or for a decision, are produced, all a supervising court can do is focus on the outcome of the exercise of power in the factual context presented, and assess, for itself, its justification or intelligibility bearing in mind that it is for the repository of the power, and not for the court, to exercise the power but do so according to law.
On behalf of the Minister, it was submitted there was an intelligible justification for the Tribunal making the refusal decision without waiting until the cancellation decision review had been determined.
Further, it was submitted that Ms Sanee did not respond to the s 359 invitation to comment on the fact that her Subclass 155 visa had been cancelled. In particular, she did not bring to the Tribunal’s attention the fact that she had applied for review of the cancellation decision or invite the Tribunal to defer making a decision on the review of the refusal decision, until after the review of the cancellation decision of been determined.
In the absence of any response to the invitation to comment, the Tribunal was entitled to take the view that Ms Sanee did not regard the cancellation of her Subclass 155 visa (or any application for review of the cancellation decision) as being relevant to the Tribunal’s decision on the review of the refusal decision. If Ms Sanee expected the Tribunal to defer making its decision on the review of the refusal decision, she should have raised it in that response the Tribunal’s invitation to comment. In these circumstances, it cannot be said there was no in evident or intelligible justification for the Tribunal to proceed to make its decision on the review of the refusal decision without waiting for the review of the cancellation decision to be determined. The decision to proceed with Mr Raza’s matter was an option that was reasonably open to the Tribunal.
Consideration
The Minister concedes that the proper inference to be drawn was that the Tribunal was aware, as at the time it made a decision on the refusal application, that there was an application for review in relation to the cancellation decision. The sole basis for the refusal decision, however, was that as a result of the cancellation of Ms Sanee’s permanent resident visa, she was unable to be a sponsor for a Partner visa. The decision did not deal with the substantive matter that had troubled the delegate, being the identity of Mr Raza. Had the Tribunal considered this issue and found against Mr Raza, then no valid complaint could be made against the decision to proceed.
The Minister’s submission that it was incumbent on the applicant by responding to the s 359 invitation to draw to the attention of the Tribunal that there was a related matter and invite the Tribunal to defer making a decision in relation to the refusal application until after her cancellation review application had been determined cannot be accepted. This requires a level of understanding of the legal system and its procedures and processes which it is apparent the applicant lacked. The Court accepts the evidence that due to her lack of English skills Ms Sanee was having difficulty in communicating with the Tribunal. She was self-represented and even if she had been represented, or had responded, her only response could have been to point out what the Tribunal already knew.
Had the Tribunal determined on any other ground that Mr Raza’s application should have been refused, including for example, a determination that the Minister was entitled to conclude that PIC4020(2A) had not been satisfied, in the Courts view there would have been a proper exercise of jurisdiction. In the current case however, by failing to delay the hearing until the cancellation refusal matter had been determined, the Tribunal deprived itself of the capacity to consider that refusal application fully. It deprived itself of being able to consider whether or not Ms Sanee was able to validly sponsor Mr Raza. As it turns out she was.
The test for legal unreasonableness is “stringent” and will only arise in rare cases. Unreasonableness is not a means for challenging a decision on the basis that the court disagrees with the consideration of matters or the evaluative judgements made by the decision-maker: Li at [30], [113]. Legal unreasonableness is invariably fact dependant. Where reasons are provided, they will be the focal point for an assessment as to whether the decision is unreasonable in the legal sense and it would be a rare case to find that the exercise of a discretionary power is legally unreasonable where the reasons demonstrated the justification: Singh at [45]-[47].
In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11 at [11] Allsop CJ said the following concerning a review of a decision for legal unreasonableness:
The task is not definitional, but one of characterisation: the decision is to be evaluated, and a conclusion reached as to whether it has the character of being unreasonable, in sufficiently lacking rational foundation, or an evident or intelligible justification, or in being plainly unjust, arbitrary, capricious, or lacking common sense having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the statutory source of the power, such that it cannot be said to be within the range of possible lawful outcomes as an exercise of that power. The descriptions of the lack of quality used above are not exhaustive or definitional, they are explanations or explications of legal unreasonableness, of going beyond the source of power.
The Court is of the view that the facts in this matter are entirely analogous to those in Li. The failure of the Tribunal to await the determination of Ms Sanee’s application for review of the cancellation decision has resulted in an unjust outcome in the sense set out above in Stretton. The sole basis for affirming the decision to refuse Mr Raza’s visa was based on the fact that Ms Sanee’s visa had been cancelled. It is conceded that the Tribunal was aware that the cancellation decision was under review. It is not apparent that the Tribunal turned its mind to the fact that Ms Sanee’s application for review could be successful.
For the reasons enunciated by the High Court in Li, the Court is satisfied it was legally unreasonable for the Tribunal not to delay the determination of the refusal application until such time as a determination had occurred in relation to the cancellation decision.
In these circumstances, it is appropriate that the orders sought by the applicant should be made and the decision of the Tribunal quashed, and the matter remitted to the Tribunal for further determination.
As the Court has found for the applicant in ground one, it is not necessary for the Court to consider grounds two, three and four.
The Court will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding fifty-three (53) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Humpreys. Associate:
Dated: 12 October 2022
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