FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Aulakh [2018] FCAFC 91
Appeal from: Aulakh & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 544 File number: VID 376 of 2017 Judges: TRACEY, MORTIMER AND MOSHINSKY JJ Date of judgment: 19 June 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – skilled visa – where visa applicant nominated occupation of hairdresser – where visa applicant lodged assessment from Trades Recognition Australia that had been based on work reference letter from hairdressing salon in India – where Migration Review Tribunal concluded that the visa applicant failed to meet the requirements of Public Interest Criterion 4020 – where Tribunal found that the visa applicant was not employed as a hairdresser at the salon during the period claimed – where hearing before primary judge proceeded on the basis that the Tribunal had found that the visa applicant had not been employed at the salon at all – where the Minister sought to contend on appeal that the Tribunal had found that the visa applicant had not been employed as a hairdresser at the salon – whether leave should be granted to raise this contention on appeal – whether the primary judge erred in concluding that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error – appeal allowed Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 37M
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 65, 97, 348, 357A, 359A 359AA, 430
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Clause 886.225 of Sch 2, PIC 4020 of Pt 1, Sch 4
Migration Amendment Regulations 2011 (No. 1) (Cth), reg 5
Cases cited: AAM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 804; 231 FCR 452
ALZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 279
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1
CPE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 591
Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 51; 250 FCR 309
Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92; 233 FCR 315
Honourable Brendan O’Connor v Adamas [2013] FCAFC 14; 210 FCR 364
Kelly v Australian Postal Corporation [2015] FCA 1064; 67 AAR 359
Lovell v Lovell [1950] HCA 52; 81 CLR 513
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZAIV [2016] FCA 251
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2017] FCAFC 33; 248 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611
Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 127
O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310
Rashid v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 25
Summers v Repatriation Commission [2015] FCAFC 36; 230 FCR 179
SZUGL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 868
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 91
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the language used in the Tribunal’s reasons and found that the Tribunal’s findings were consistent with the interpretation that Ms Aulakh had not been employed as a hairdresser. The context of the Tribunal’s reasons, including references to duties associated with hairdressing and the nature of Ms Aulakh’s work at New Style, supported this interpretation. The court also noted that the Tribunal’s finding was sufficient for the purposes of the review, as it was necessary only to determine whether Ms Aulakh had been employed as a hairdresser, not whether she had been employed at all.
The court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the primary judge, dismissing the application for the visa. The parties were required to file and serve written submissions on the issue of costs within seven days of the court’s orders. The final orders included granting the Minister leave to amend his notice of appeal, treating the notice of appeal as amended, and dismissing the application for the visa.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appellant have leave to amend his notice of appeal to the form of the proposed notice of appeal set out in annexure “AC-8” to the affidavit of Adam Cunynghame affirmed 31 August 2017.
2. The notice of appeal be treated as amended accordingly.
3. The appeal be allowed.
4. The orders of the primary judge be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that the application be dismissed.
5. Within seven days from the date of these orders, the parties file and serve written submissions (of no more than three pages in length) on the issue of costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Accordingly, we would grant the Minister leave to amend his notice of appeal to insert paragraph 1(b) and to rely on this new ground.Consideration At the hearing of the appeal, we heard full argument on proposed paragraph 1(b) of the notice of appeal. It is convenient to consider paragraph 1(b) before considering paragraph 1(a). The threshold issue is the correct interpretation of the Tribunal’s reasons. Did the Tribunal make a finding to the effect that Ms Aulakh had not been employed at New Style at all, or did the Tribunal make a finding that she had not been employed as a hairdresser at New Style? The principal paragraph for the purposes of considering this issue is [48] of the Tribunal’s reasons, which is set out above. Of course, this needs to be read in the context of the Tribunal’s reasons as a whole. For the reasons that follow, we consider the correct interpretation of the Tribunal’s reasons to be that it made a finding that Ms Aulakh had not been employed as a hairdresser at New Style. First, this is the natural meaning of the words used in [48] of the Tribunal’s reasons. The Tribunal stated that it was not satisfied that Ms Aulakh had been employed “as a hairdresser” at New Style. The Tribunal then expressly found that she had not been employed “as a hairdresser” at New Style during the period claimed. The words “as a hairdresser” also appear in the last sentence of the paragraph. Secondly, it was sufficient, for the purposes of determining the issue before the Tribunal, to decide whether or not Ms Aulakh had been employed as a hairdresser at New Style. If she had not been employed at New Style in that capacity, the work reference letter was false or misleading in a material particular. It seems unlikely that the Tribunal would have decided more than it needed to decide. Thirdly, the context of the Tribunal’s reasons as a whole tends to support the view that the Tribunal’s finding was to the effect that Ms Aulakh had not been employed as a hairdresser at New Style. In particular:(a)At [13], the Tribunal discussed evidence about whether Ms Aulakh performed certain other duties “rather than duties associated with hairdressing”.(b)At [21], when discussing three customer references that had been relied on by Ms Aulakh, the Tribunal framed the issue in terms of working “as a hairdresser” at New Style during the period claimed.(c)At [23], the Tribunal stated that if the customer references were false, this raised serious concerns as to whether Ms Aulakh worked “as a hairdresser” at New Style during the period claimed. Both [21] and [23] of the Tribunal’s reasons use the words “as a hairdresser”. We consider these paragraphs to be, at least, consistent with the interpretation we favour.(d)In the last sentence of [23], the Tribunal stated that the failure by Ms Aulakh to refer to employment at New Style in her visa application raised further doubts as to whether she was employed there “as a hairdresser”. The use of these words is, at least, consistent with the interpretation we favour.(e)One of the areas of inconsistency between Ms Aulakh’s evidence and that of Ms Bajaj (the owner of New Style) concerned the percentage of Ms Aulakh’s work that was hairdressing, as discussed at [29].(f)At [30], the Tribunal referred to the fact that Ms Aulakh’s work reference stated that she was employed “as a hairdresser” and then discussed evidence concerning the nature of Ms Aulakh’s work at New Style.