Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Aulakh

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Aulakh [2018] FCAFC 91

Appeal from: Aulakh & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 544
File number: VID 376 of 2017
Judges: TRACEY, MORTIMER AND MOSHINSKY JJ
Date of judgment: 19 June 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – skilled visa – where visa applicant nominated occupation of hairdresser – where visa applicant lodged assessment from Trades Recognition Australia that had been based on work reference letter from hairdressing salon in India – where Migration Review Tribunal concluded that the visa applicant failed to meet the requirements of Public Interest Criterion 4020 – where Tribunal found that the visa applicant was not employed as a hairdresser at the salon during the period claimed – where hearing before primary judge proceeded on the basis that the Tribunal had found that the visa applicant had not been employed at the salon at all – where the Minister sought to contend on appeal that the Tribunal had found that the visa applicant had not been employed as a hairdresser at the salon – whether leave should be granted to raise this contention on appeal – whether the primary judge erred in concluding that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 37M

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 65, 97, 348, 357A, 359A 359AA, 430

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Clause 886.225 of Sch 2, PIC 4020 of Pt 1, Sch 4

Migration Amendment Regulations 2011 (No. 1) (Cth), reg 5

Cases cited:

AAM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 804; 231 FCR 452

ALZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 279

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1

CPE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 591

Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 51; 250 FCR 309

Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92; 233 FCR 315

Honourable Brendan O’Connor v Adamas [2013] FCAFC 14; 210 FCR 364

Kelly v Australian Postal Corporation [2015] FCA 1064; 67 AAR 359

Lovell v Lovell [1950] HCA 52; 81 CLR 513

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZAIV [2016] FCA 251

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2017] FCAFC 33; 248 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611

Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 127

O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310

Rashid v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 25

Summers v Repatriation Commission [2015] FCAFC 36; 230 FCR 179

SZUGL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 868

SZTIS v Minister for Immigration and Border…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 91
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Aulakh involved an appeal against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which had reviewed a decision by the Migration Review Tribunal to refuse Ms Aulakh’s application for a Skilled (Residence) visa. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Federal Circuit Court had erred in its interpretation of the Migration Review Tribunal’s decision on the employment status of Ms Aulakh as a hairdresser at New Style Beauty Parlour & Coaching Centre in India. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection contended that the Tribunal had found that Ms Aulakh had not been employed as a hairdresser, rather than not employed at all, at the salon. The court held that the correct interpretation of the Tribunal’s reasons was that it had found that Ms Aulakh had not been employed as a hairdresser at the salon.

The court considered the language used in the Tribunal’s reasons and found that the Tribunal’s findings were consistent with the interpretation that Ms Aulakh had not been employed as a hairdresser. The context of the Tribunal’s reasons, including references to duties associated with hairdressing and the nature of Ms Aulakh’s work at New Style, supported this interpretation. The court also noted that the Tribunal’s finding was sufficient for the purposes of the review, as it was necessary only to determine whether Ms Aulakh had been employed as a hairdresser, not whether she had been employed at all.

The court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the primary judge, dismissing the application for the visa. The parties were required to file and serve written submissions on the issue of costs within seven days of the court’s orders. The final orders included granting the Minister leave to amend his notice of appeal, treating the notice of appeal as amended, and dismissing the application for the visa.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant have leave to amend his notice of appeal to the form of the proposed notice of appeal set out in annexure “AC-8” to the affidavit of Adam Cunynghame affirmed 31 August 2017.

2. The notice of appeal be treated as amended accordingly.

3. The appeal be allowed.

4. The orders of the primary judge be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that the application be dismissed.

5. Within seven days from the date of these orders, the parties file and serve written submissions (of no more than three pages in length) on the issue of costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the appeal should be allowed.BACKGROUND In November 2006, Ms Aulakh, while living in India, made an offshore application for a Skilled – Independent (Migrant) (Class BN) subclass 136 visa. As part of this application, she had previously obtained, in August 2006, a skills assessment issued by Trades Recognition Australia (TRA). TRA assessed Ms Aulakh under the category of hairdresser. Ms Aulakh’s visa application was refused in October 2007, apparently based on findings arising from a site visit conducted by the officers of the Australian High Commission in May 2007, to which I refer below. She subsequently entered Australia on a student visa. On 29 June 2010, in Australia, Ms Aulakh made an onshore application for a Skilled (Residence) (Class VB) subclass 886 (Skilled – Sponsored) visa, including in that application the third and fourth respondents, her daughter and her partner respectively. She applied again in the category of hairdresser. Her son, the second respondent, was born in February 2012, and was subsequently included in the application in May 2013, following a request from the respondents’ migration agent. As part of this application, Ms Aulakh supplied the Department with (amongst other documents) customer references, a work reference dated 10 October 2007 and the August 2006 skills assessment issued by TRA. The October 2007 work reference had been used by Ms Aulakh for her previous visa application. A replacement skills assessment, identical to the first, was issued by the TRA on 10 June 2010, and this was also included in her application. It appears from the evidence that the first skills assessment was misplaced by Ms Aulakh. The work reference and both TRA skills assessment were based on Ms Aulakh’s claim that she worked at an establishment called New Style Beauty Parlour & Coaching Centre in a town in the Punjab in India. The Department sought confirmation from the TRA that the skills assessment letters were authentic, which the TRA confirmed on 20 June 2013. As I have noted, in connection with her offshore visa application in 2006, officers of the Australian High Commission in New Delhi had made a site visit to New Style on 7 May 2007, to conduct checks on Ms Aulakh’s claims There was a substantial delay in processing Ms Aulakh’s visa application. Although it was lodged in June 2010, it was not “referred” to a delegate until mid-2013, a period of three years. The explanation given to Ms Aulakh’s migration agent was:Departmental records indicate that Ms Aulakh’s application was first allocated to a case officer on 20 May 2013. As this application has only recently come before a delegate of the Minister·for assessment against the relevant legislative criteria, including PIC 4020; the claims and supporting evidence provided by the applicant against these criteria had yet to be tested.As you may be aware priority processing directions issued by the Minister and· programme limitations on the number of available places have meant that many applications have experienced considerable delays before their applications are assessed by the department. I can confirm that these factors have impacted the department’s ability to allocate and assess Ms Aulakh’s application prior to 20 May 2013.Whilst I understand your concern regarding the delay between when the previous information uncovered by the department was presented to Ms Aulakh. The invitation to comment issued by the Visa Processing Officer on 18 October 2013 explains in considerable detail why PIC 4020 has been enlivened in this instance, despite the age of the information on which this finding relies.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It was not necessary before the Federal Circuit Court, and it was not necessary on this appeal, to go beyond the Tribunal’s reasons, as it set out the basis for its conclusion (as it was required to do) in sufficient detail. Resort on judicial review to the transcript of the Tribunal’s review hearing, and to the primary evidence or material before the Tribunal, for the purposes of supplementing, interpreting, or bolstering its reasons as set out in its decision, should be avoided. The review transcript may be necessary for some grounds of review, such as procedural fairness or (possibly) no evidence. It should not be used as an interpretative tool for the Tribunal’s reasons. I respectfully agree with Griffiths J in Kelly v Australian Postal Corporation [2015] FCA 1064; 67 AAR 359 at [51]-[53], and I have previously expressed my agreement in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZAIV [2016] FCA 251 at [33].Ground 2: No basis to infer Ms Bajaj’s evidence had not been considered by the Tribunal Ground 2 of the Minister’s appeal arises from several passages in the Federal Circuit Court reasons. Having noted at [38] that Ms Bajaj gave evidence Ms Aulakh had worked for her at New Style, the Federal Circuit Court emphasised this aspect of the evidence before the Tribunal with the following passage (at [39]):When asked by the Tribunal whether the applicant worked for her, Ms Bajaj said —Yes. Yes. Definitely, she worked for me and she was one of the brilliant staff for me. Then, at [44], in its consideration of ground two the Federal Circuit Court found the Tribunal had “ignored” Ms Bajaj’s evidence. The Minister contended that there was no basis to infer that the evidence of Ms Bajaj had not been considered by the Tribunal. It will be apparent that I accept that submission. It is clear from the summary I have given above that the Tribunal was also sceptical about Ms Bajaj’s evidence. The Minister relied on Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 127 at [59], but that passage is really about the failure of a decision-maker to advert to evidence contended to be significant. Here, the Tribunal set out why it had difficulties with Ms Bajaj’s evidence, as I have summarised above. Ground 2 succeeds.Ground 3: No breach of ss 348 and 357A of the Migration Act I also accept the Minister’s submissions on ground 3. At [48] of its reasons, the Federal Circuit Court concluded the Tribunal had conducted the review in a “peculiar manner”. The Federal Circuit Court found that the Tribunal did not make the “precise information obtained or supplied by the Australian High Commission officers” available to Ms Aulakh and her migration agent. The Federal Circuit Court found that, instead, the Tribunal had paraphrased the report. The Federal Circuit Court found this meant the Tribunal had conducted the review unfairly, and not in accordance with ss 348 and 357A of the Migration Act. There was no analysis by the Federal Circuit Court about how this was so: rather, a conclusion was expressed.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 23 January 2014, a delegate of the Minister refused the grant of the visa to Ms Aulakh on the basis that false or misleading information was provided in respect of the work reference, and therefore PIC 4020 was not met. The delegate placed little weight on Ms Aulakh’s 19 December 2013 response on the basis that the majority of the comments “do not address the true findings of the investigation.” As no further information had been provided, the delegate made the decision based on the information available. The delegate also refused the grant of visas to Ms Aulakh’s family members. Tribunal’s decision The respondents applied for a review of the delegate’s decision on 30 January 2014. Ms Aulakh and Mr Singh, her partner, appeared before the Tribunal on 21 May 2014 to give evidence and present arguments. Ms Bajaj, the referee from New Style, also gave evidence by telephone from Canada. During the review hearing and pursuant to s 359AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the Tribunal provided information orally to the respondents regarding the inconsistencies it saw in the material presented. At the conclusion of the hearing on 21 May 2014, and on the same day, the Tribunal sent a letter pursuant to s 359A to the respondents’ agent. The letter provided information that was relevantly the same as the information given orally, save for an additional point in relation to the opening times of New Style. The letter invited Ms Aulakh to comment on a number of particulars of information coming out of the 21 May 2014 hearing, including:·what was said to be inconsistent evidence between Ms Aulakh and Ms Bajaj as to whether the work reference was prepared in Punjabi and translated into English, or whether it was prepared in English by Ms Bajaj;·what was said to be inconsistent evidence between Ms Aulakh and Ms Bajaj as to the opening times of New Style – in particular, Ms Aulakh gave evidence that it was 10 am to 5 pm, while Ms Bajaj claimed it was 10 am to 7 pm;·what was said to be inconsistent evidence between Ms Aulakh and Ms Bajaj as to Ms Aulakh’s break times – Ms Aulakh claimed she had a break between 2 pm to 4 pm, while Ms Bajaj claimed she did not have much of a break because customers came in on a continuous basis; and·Ms Bajaj’s evidence about an employee attendance register which she kept. On 4 June 2014, following an extension of time being granted to the respondents, the respondents’ agent provided a response to the s 359A and s 359AA invitations. The agent submitted that any inconsistency in relation to the work reference was due to a “failure of recollection”, given that the reference was given eight years ago in June 2006. The agent further submitted that during the questioning of Ms Aulakh, she was not provided a copy of the written reference, and the line of questioning adopted by the Tribunal in those circumstances was therefore “not optimal”. On 30 June 2014, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse the grant of the visa. It did not accept the respondents’ submissions set out at [54] above. This was largely on the basis that the Tribunal considered that when Ms Aulakh was asked a question that she could not remember the answer to, she said so. When she answered the questions regarding the reference, she did not indicate that she could not remember, or that she was uncertain. The same finding was made in relation to Ms Bajaj. The Tribunal also considered that the submission did not address some of the inconsistencies that it had raised.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Accordingly, we would grant the Minister leave to amend his notice of appeal to insert paragraph 1(b) and to rely on this new ground.Consideration At the hearing of the appeal, we heard full argument on proposed paragraph 1(b) of the notice of appeal. It is convenient to consider paragraph 1(b) before considering paragraph 1(a). The threshold issue is the correct interpretation of the Tribunal’s reasons. Did the Tribunal make a finding to the effect that Ms Aulakh had not been employed at New Style at all, or did the Tribunal make a finding that she had not been employed as a hairdresser at New Style? The principal paragraph for the purposes of considering this issue is [48] of the Tribunal’s reasons, which is set out above. Of course, this needs to be read in the context of the Tribunal’s reasons as a whole. For the reasons that follow, we consider the correct interpretation of the Tribunal’s reasons to be that it made a finding that Ms Aulakh had not been employed as a hairdresser at New Style. First, this is the natural meaning of the words used in [48] of the Tribunal’s reasons. The Tribunal stated that it was not satisfied that Ms Aulakh had been employed “as a hairdresser” at New Style. The Tribunal then expressly found that she had not been employed “as a hairdresser” at New Style during the period claimed. The words “as a hairdresser” also appear in the last sentence of the paragraph. Secondly, it was sufficient, for the purposes of determining the issue before the Tribunal, to decide whether or not Ms Aulakh had been employed as a hairdresser at New Style. If she had not been employed at New Style in that capacity, the work reference letter was false or misleading in a material particular. It seems unlikely that the Tribunal would have decided more than it needed to decide. Thirdly, the context of the Tribunal’s reasons as a whole tends to support the view that the Tribunal’s finding was to the effect that Ms Aulakh had not been employed as a hairdresser at New Style. In particular:(a)At [13], the Tribunal discussed evidence about whether Ms Aulakh performed certain other duties “rather than duties associated with hairdressing”.(b)At [21], when discussing three customer references that had been relied on by Ms Aulakh, the Tribunal framed the issue in terms of working “as a hairdresser” at New Style during the period claimed.(c)At [23], the Tribunal stated that if the customer references were false, this raised serious concerns as to whether Ms Aulakh worked “as a hairdresser” at New Style during the period claimed. Both [21] and [23] of the Tribunal’s reasons use the words “as a hairdresser”. We consider these paragraphs to be, at least, consistent with the interpretation we favour.(d)In the last sentence of [23], the Tribunal stated that the failure by Ms Aulakh to refer to employment at New Style in her visa application raised further doubts as to whether she was employed there “as a hairdresser”. The use of these words is, at least, consistent with the interpretation we favour.(e)One of the areas of inconsistency between Ms Aulakh’s evidence and that of Ms Bajaj (the owner of New Style) concerned the percentage of Ms Aulakh’s work that was hairdressing, as discussed at [29].(f)At [30], the Tribunal referred to the fact that Ms Aulakh’s work reference stated that she was employed “as a hairdresser” and then discussed evidence concerning the nature of Ms Aulakh’s work at New Style.