AIU16 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AIU16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 2104
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Protection visa – application for review of Tribunal’s decision affirming delegate’s decision not to grant visa – need to avoid resort to transcript on judicial review – whether Tribunal made adverse credibility findings that are not logical or rational ­ whether Tribunal misunderstood or misconstrued evidence – Tribunal’s conclusions reasonably open – whether Tribunal failed to comply with ss 424AA and 424A – whether Tribunal failed to draw applicant’s attention to an issue in the review – grounds of review not made out – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Evidence Act1995 (Cth), s.144

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 65, 414, 424, 424A, 424AA, 425, 476

Cases cited:

ABV16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 184
ALE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 115

AMT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 366

AYX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 103

BJP15 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCA 613
BRF18 v The Republic of Nauru (2017) 91 ALJR 1197
Comcare v Wuth [2018] FCFCA 13
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaphone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
CQG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Chamnam You [2008] FCA 241

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DDK16 [2017] FCFCA 188
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Aulakh [2018] FCAFC 91
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALJR 992
Minister for Immigration v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

NABE v Minister for Immigration (2004) 144 FCR 1

NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs & Anor (2005) 135 FCR 567
Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 396

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

SAAP vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1679
SRFB vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 252
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609
SZHKA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2008) 172 FCR 1
SZTGV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 318 ALR 450
Tin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1109 VEAJ of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 132 FCR 291
WAGP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 124 FCR…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 2104
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an application for judicial review of a decision by the Migration Review Tribunal. The applicant, AIU16, argued that the Tribunal had failed to provide her with adequate notice that adverse credibility findings would form part of the basis for affirming the delegate's decision to refuse her visa. The application was heard by Judge A Kelly in the Federal Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Tribunal was obliged under section 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to provide the applicant with notice that information relating to her credibility, or inconsistencies and gaps in her evidence, would be a reason for affirming the delegate's decision. The applicant contended that the Tribunal's failure to do so breached her right to a fair hearing.

The Court reasoned that, in accordance with established authority such as *SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship* and *VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs*, the term "information" for the purposes of section 424A does not encompass the Tribunal's subjective appraisals, thought processes, or conclusions derived from weighing evidence, including identified inconsistencies or gaps. The Court noted that such an interpretation would effectively require the Tribunal to foreshadow its entire reasoning process. The Tribunal's question to the applicant regarding her failure to disclose reasons for her father's lack of financial support was characterised as an inquiry into an absence of evidence or a matter where detail was lacking, rather than "information" requiring advance notice. The Court also considered the principles from *NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs* regarding the Tribunal's obligation to address claims that arise clearly from the material, but affirmed that the Tribunal is not required to undertake an independent analytical exercise to discover potential claims.

The Court found that the Tribunal had considered the applicant's circumstances, including the risk of harm from the wider Punjabi community, even though this was not an expressly articulated claim by the applicant. By addressing this issue, the Tribunal had provided the applicant with an opportunity to be heard on the relevant considerations. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Tribunal had not erred in law.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant’s complaint was that the Tribunal was obliged to put her on notice that information relating to her credibility would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the delegate’s decision to refuse the visa. It is settled that inconsistences or gaps in evidence do not comprise information for the purposes of s 424: SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ). In SZBYR, the plurality stated at [18]:. . . if the reason why the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review was the Tribunal’s disbelief of the appellants’ evidence arising from inconsistencies therein, it is difficult to see how such disbelief could be characterised as constituting “information” within the meaning of par (a) of s 424A(1). Again, if the Tribunal affirmed the decision because even the best view of the appellants’ evidence failed to disclose a Convention nexus, it is hard to see how such a failure can constitute “information”. Finn and Stone JJ correctly observed in VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs that the word “information”:[5]. . . does not encompass the tribunal’s subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations … nor does it extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps, etc . . .If the contrary were true, s 424A would in effect oblige the Tribunal to give advance written notice not merely of its reasons but of each step in its prospective reasoning process. However broadly “information” be defined, its meaning in this context is related to the existence of evidentiary material or documentation, not the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence . . . (emphasis added)See also, SZTGV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 318 ALR 450, [99], [103], [134], (Perram, Jagot and Griffiths JJ); ALE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 115, [29] (Griffiths J).[5](2004) 206 ALR 471 at 476‑477, citing Tin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1109 at [54]; Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 396 at 428; Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1679 at [25]; WAGP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 124 FCR 276 at 282‑284. The question put to the applicant upon which reliance was placed for the purposes of Ground 3 made an enquiry of her as to why she had not made disclosure to the earlier Tribunal of the reason why her father had not provided further financial support to her. Although the question might be characterised in a number of ways, I consider that the Tribunal’s question addressed an absence of evidence or constituted a doubt or inquiry into a matter where detail was lacking. As the authorities make clear, a Tribunal is not obliged to provide particulars by way of information as to inconsistencies for an applicant to comment upon.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In support of this Ground, the applicant relied upon NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695 where Allsop J (as his Honour then was), stated at [15]:The Full Court in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 263 at [55]–[63] dealt with the question of what claims must be dealt with by the Tribunal to complete its statutorily required task (its jurisdiction) even though they may not be expressly articulated. See also Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389, 394 [24], 408 [95] and Applicant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 203 ALR 112. From NABE I take it that the Tribunal is not required to consider a claim that is not expressly made or does not arise clearly on the materials before it: NABE at [61]. As the Full Court said at [63] much depends on the circumstances. Whatever adverb or adverbial phrase is used to describe the apparentness of the unarticulated claim, it must, it seems to me, either in fact be appreciated by the Tribunal or, if it is not, arise sufficiently from the material as to require a reasonably competent Tribunal in the circumstances to appreciate its existence. A practical and common sense approach to everyday decision-making requires the unarticulated claim to arise tolerably clearly from the material itself, since the statutory task of the Tribunal is to assess the claims by reference to all the material, not to undertake an independent analytical exercise of the material for the discovery of potential claims which might be made, but which have not been, and then subjecting them to further analysis to assess their legitimacy. (emphasis added) Reliance was also placed upon the reasoning in ABV16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 184 in which Bromberg J held at [21] that s 425 did not operate in a “once-and-for-all fashion” such that any new issues arising after a Tribunal hearing may also generate new obligations on the Tribunal to hold a further hearing: citing SZHKA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2008) 172 FCR 1 at [100]-[103] (Besanko J). I accept that the obligation to review the delegate’s decision included an obligation to allow the applicant a real and genuine opportunity to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. However, to adapt the reasoning in NAVK, taking a practical and common sense approach to the role of an administrative decision-maker, the Tribunal was obliged to deal with the claim expressly made and to deal also with an unarticulated claim that rose in a tolerably clear way on the materials. The Tribunal was not obliged to undertake an independent analytical consideration of the matter or to assess the legitimacy of such claims as it might have divined from the material for itself. While it was not obliged to do so, the Tribunal at [74] proceeded to consider the position of the applicant and whether she was a risk of harm from the Punjabi community more widely, stating:While the applicant did not claim that she will face harm from the community in Punjab because she now has the status of a separated/divorced single woman, the Tribunal has considered this aspect of her circumstances. In this consideration, the Tribunal has had regard to the country advice cited above in relation to separated/divorce. The Tribunal has also taken account of its finding above that the applicant is not estranged from her family and finds that she will therefore have the shelter and protection of her family. While the Tribunal accepts that attitudes in the Punjab toward separated women may lead to disapproval of her, the Tribunal is satisfied that there is not more than a remote chance that her family or community or anyone else will harm the applicant for this reason. (emphasis added)By addressing the issue in [74], the Tribunal considered the question of the risk of harm to the applicant, not merely from her father or brother, but in the wider context of a risk of harm from the Punjabi community.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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