Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat

Link copied
Case Copied 27 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat [2006] FCAFC 61

MIGRATION – application for Business Skills Migrant visa – failure to satisfy Regulation 131.214 - procedural fairness - opportunity to respond to critical issue on which decision likely to turn – right to comment upon adverse material from third party – whether critical issue obvious to applicant - whether issue apparent from nature or terms of statute - whether applicant knew Regulation 131.214 in issue

MIGRATION – procedural fairness - whether common law procedural fairness excluded by s 51A of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – exhaustive statement of natural justice hearing rule - proper construction of ss 51A, 357A and 422B

MIGRATION - finding by delegate that criterion in Regulation 131.214 was not satisfied – whether evidence required in order to make finding that not satisfied – effect of s 65 of Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – ss 51A, 57, 65, 357A, 422B
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – reg 131

Applicant M17 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 85 ALD 597
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Limited (1994) 49 FCR 576 referred to
Katisat v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1908 referred to
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 referred to
Moradian v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 142 FCR 170 referred to
NAMW v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 140 FCA 572 referred to
NAQF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 130 FCR 456 referred to
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212 referred to
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 referred to
SBTC v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 260 referred to
SJSB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 225 referred to
SZBDF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1493 referred to
SZEGT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1514 referred to
VXDC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 146 FCR 562 affirmed
WAID v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 220 referred to
WAJR v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 204 ALR 624 referred to
Wu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 221 referred to

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS v LAY LAT   
NSD140 of 2006

HEEREY, CONTI AND JACOBSON JJ
12 MAY 2006

SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 140 of 2006

On appeal from the Federal Magistrates…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2006] FCAFC 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat involves a Cambodian citizen who applied for an AD Business Skills (Migrant) Visa. The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs sought to overturn a decision made by the Federal Magistrate that had allowed the respondent's application for judicial review. The crux of the dispute lies in the interpretation of statutory provisions concerning the requirements for the issuance of a visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Specifically, the court examined the obligations of the decision-maker under section 65 of the Act and whether the respondent was afforded procedural fairness.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the delegate's decision to refuse the visa application was in accordance with the statutory requirements and whether the respondent was given an opportunity to address critical issues that could affect the outcome of the application. The Minister argued that the Federal Magistrate had incorrectly interpreted the statutory requirement, particularly regarding the obligation of the delegate to be affirmatively satisfied that the criteria for visa issuance had been met. Additionally, the Minister contended that the respondent was not afforded procedural fairness as he was not alerted to the possibility that his application might be refused due to a history of involvement in unacceptable business activities.

The court found that the Federal Magistrate had misconstrued the statutory obligations under section 65 of the Act. The court clarified that section 65 requires a refusal if the decision-maker is not affirmatively satisfied that the criteria for the visa have been satisfied, and that findings of fact are not necessarily required to support a state of non-satisfaction. Furthermore, the court held that procedural fairness did not require the delegate to specify the nature of the unacceptable business activities or the respondent's involvement in them. The respondent had the opportunity to present evidence or arguments to enable the delegate to reach the requisite state of satisfaction. The court concluded that the delegate's decision was not irrational or capricious, as the substantial accumulation of cash from unidentified activities strongly indicated a failure to meet the relevant criteria.

In light of these findings, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made by the Federal Magistrate, and ordered the respondent to pay the costs of the appeal and the proceeding before the Federal Magistrate.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Magistrate made on 20 December 2005 be set aside.

3. The respondent to the appeal pay the costs of the appeal and the costs of the proceeding before the Federal Magistrate.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Minister contends that his Honour in effect reversed the statutory requirement of s 65 of the Act under which findings of fact are not necessarily required to support a state of non-satisfaction. Counsel for the Minister pointed to authorities which state that s 65 requires a refusal if the decision-maker is not affirmatively satisfied that the criteria have been satisfied; see eg Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73 (“VSAF”).Background The respondent is a citizen of Cambodia. On 23 August 2002 he applied for an AD Business Skills (Migrant) Visa, described by the delegate as a sub-class 131 (Investment Linked) application. There appears to have been little or no relevant correspondence about the application until March 2004 when the case officer then allocated to the application, Mr Neville Maddock, referred it to the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh (“the Embassy”) for comment. The respondent claimed in support of his application to be a person of considerable wealth. He claimed to have assets equivalent to about AUD$12m in a Cambodian bank account. His bank statements indicated that the amount of his cash on deposit had increased by well over AUD$6m between late 2000 and 2001. He stated that the substantial funds in the bank account had been accumulated from business activities conducted on the border of Cambodia and Thailand. Mr Maddock was concerned as to the source of the respondent’s wealth. On 19 March 2004 he wrote to the Principal Migration Officer of the Embassy. The letter included the following:-“My main concern is in regards to the original source of Mr Lat’s wealth and my inclination, at this stage, is to refuse the application without further examination, on the basis that he cannot evidence that his funds were acquired legally.” It appears that attached to Mr Maddock’s letter were certain responses to questions from the Respondent, explaining how he had accumulated his considerable wealth. The answer was said to be found in the political history of Cambodia and the huge profits to be made in border trade across the Thai/Cambodian border. No further detail was given. It was said that most Cambodians accumulated their assets in the form of cash deposited in banks. In late April 2004 there was email correspondence between the respondent’s migration agent, Mr Panasbodi, and Mr Maddock about the delay in processing the application. Mr Maddock said he expected to be in touch regarding the case within the next few weeks. On 15 June 2004, Mr Panasbodi sent a follow-up email to Mr Maddock. The email elicited the following response from Mr Maddock to Mr Panasbodi:-“My main concerns with this application relate to the original source of funds to be invested. The applicant has stated that he has no documentary evidence of this. I have, initially, referred the papers to Cambodia to seek expert advice before proceeding further and I am waiting for a response.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

We reject this submission. As was said in VXDC at [31], the decision-maker is likely to be a person without legal qualifications. Parliament could not have intended that “the uncertainties of the common law rules were in some unspecified way and to some unspecified extent, to survive.”The “no evidence” issue We do not agree with the Federal Magistrate that the delegate’s obligation under s 65 was to be satisfied that the criteria stated in Regulation 131.214 had been met. In VSAF, Black CJ, Sundberg and Bennett JJ pointed out at [16] - [17] that s 65 of the Act, and the decision of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 274-275, make it clear that the section requires the decision-maker to refuse to issue a visa in the absence of a positive finding of satisfaction. Their Honours went on to say that there are many cases which show that findings of fact are not necessarily required to support a state of non-satisfaction. For example, in SJSB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 225 at [15] a Full Court said that s 65 of the Act requires a refusal if the decision-maker is not affirmatively satisfied that the criteria for the visa in question have been satisfied. It is true that the criteria in Regulation 131.214 are stated in the negative. But that does not alter the fundamental principle stated above. The delegate was obliged to refuse the visa in light of her failure to be affirmatively satisfied that the respondent did not have a history of involvement in unacceptable business activities. It could not be suggested that the delegate’s conclusion was in itself irrational or capricious. The accumulation of a very large amount of cash from activities unidentified beyond the vague description “border trading” pointed strongly to a conclusion of non-satisfaction of the relevant criterion. Procedural fairness did not require the delegate to identify what business or investment activities were unacceptable, nor the nature of the respondent’s involvement in such activities. In an inquisitorial process, it was for the respondent to put whatever evidence or argument he wished to the decision-maker to enable her to reach the requisite state of satisfaction.Orders It follows we would allow the appeal. The orders we will make are as follows:-1. The appeal be allowed.2. The orders of the Federal Magistrate made on 20 December 2005 be set aside.3.The respondent to the appeal pay the costs of the appeal and the costs of the proceeding before the Federal Magistrate.

Decision

Reasons for decision

HEEREY, CONTI AND JACOBSON JJ
The delegate said that without documentary evidence of the respondent’s border business activities and, given that his interest in Hero King Co Limited did not explain the increase in the size of the deposits, she could not be satisfied that the funds had been accumulated from a qualifying business or eligible activities, within the meaning of Regulation 131.222.The Federal Magistrate’s Decision The Federal Magistrate found at [47] that it was not suggested to the respondent in the course of processing his visa application that the visa might be refused on the ground that he may have a history of involvement in unacceptable business activities. His Honour considered, at [48], that this was in contravention of the well known statement of the common law natural justice hearing rule stated in Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 (“Kioa”). His Honour then observed at [49] that the question arose as to whether s 51A of the Act excluded the operation of the common law rule. His Honour then went on to refer to numerous authorities of the Court which have considered the question of the effect of s 51A and corresponding provisions elsewhere in the Act; namely ss 357A and 422B. He came to the view at [60] that common law natural justice was “not entirely excluded to an offshore applicant”. The learned Federal Magistrate then turned to the “no evidence” ground. He described as speculation the contents of the email from the Embassy dated 12 August 2004 which raised the spectre of illegal activities; see [66] – [67]. The Federal Magistrate observed that the delegate expressed herself not to be satisfied that there was evidence of compliance with Regulation 131.214. He considered that this required the respondent to prove a negative and that s 65 of the Act obliged the delegate to be satisfied that the criterion had been met; see [75] – [77].Procedural Fairness It is a fundamental principle of public law that a person affected by an administrative decision is entitled to have brought to his or her attention the critical issue or factor on which the decision is likely to turn so as to have an opportunity to deal with it; Kioa at 587. This entitlement extends to the right to comment upon adverse material from third parties which is put before the decision-maker; see Alphaone at 591-592 (per Northrop, Miles and French JJ). Their Honours continued by stating that this right:-“also extends to require the decision-maker to identify to the person affected any issue critical to the decision which is not apparent from its nature or the terms of the statute under which it is made. The decision-maker is required to advise of any adverse conclusion which has been arrived at which would not obviously be open on the known material. Subject to these qualifications however, a decision-maker is not obliged to expose his or her mental processes or provisional views to comment before making the decision in question.” This passage from the Full Court’s decision in Alphaone was referred to with apparent approval by Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212 at [22].