Dhital v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs
[2024] FedCFamC2G 753
•21 August 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Dhital v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 753
File number(s): ADG 186 of 2020 Judgment of: JUDGE LUCEV Date of judgment: 21 August 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Judicial review application – decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal to affirm refusal of Regional Employer Nomination (Permanent) (Class RN) (Subclass 187) visa – where sponsor’s visa nomination application refused – whether denial of natural justice – whether jurisdiction to grant sponsor opportunity to resubmit visa nomination application – meaning of “position” in relevant criterion – whether remitter futile – materiality – whether material jurisdictional error
WORDS AND PHRASES – “position”
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 338, 357A, 359AA, 360(1), 363, 474, 476
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 4.10, Sch 2 cl 187.233
Cases cited: ApplicantWAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593; (2003) 75 ALD 630
Kaur v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 63
LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 98 ALJR 610; (2024) WL 1521994
Ludgero v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 1060; (2021) 358 FLR 215
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat [2006] FCAFC 61; (2006) 151 FCR 214; (2006) 231 ALR 412
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259; (1996) 70 ALJR 568; (1996) 136 ALR 481; (1996) 41 ALD 1
MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; (2015) 238 FCR 158
MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17; (2021) 273 CLR 506; (2021) 95 ALJR 441; (2021) 390 ALR 590; (2021) 177 ALD 464
Patel v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1228
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural ad Indigenous Affairs: Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1; (2003) 77 ALJR 699; (2003) 195 ALR 502; (2003) 72 ALD 613
Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; (2010) 241 CLR 252; (2010) 84 ALJR 507; (2010) 267 ALR 204; (2010) 115 ALD 493
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 105; (2017) 253 FCR 267; (2017) 156 ALD 284
Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 123; (2023) 299 FCR 464
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 31 Date of last submission/s: 15 August 2024 Date of hearing: 15 August 2024 Place: Adelaide Applicants: In Person with the assistance of an interpreter Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Kyranis Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
ADG 186 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: JYOTSNA DHITAL
First Applicant
NUNA RAJ UPADHYA
Second Applicant
AURA UPADHYA
Third Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LUCEV
DATE OF ORDER:
21 AUGUST 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The originating application filed 22 May 2020 be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LUCEV
INTRODUCTION
The applicants applied for judicial review (“Judicial Review Application”) pursuant to s 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”) in relation to a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal Decision” and “Tribunal” respectively”). The Tribunal Decision affirmed a decision of a delegate (“Delegate’s Decision” and “Delegate” respectively) of the first respondent, now the Minister for Home Affairs, Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Cyber Security and the Arts (“Minister”) to refuse to grant a Regional Employer Nomination (Permanent) (Class RN) (Subclass 187) visa (“REN Visa”) to the applicants. The Tribunal Decision appears in the Court Book (“CB”) at CB 69-74.
The Court will only refer to the first applicant, Ms Dhital, unless otherwise necessary, as the visa status of the second and third applicants, Ms Dhital’s husband and child respectively, is dependent upon Ms Dhital’s visa status.
BACKGROUND
The background to this matter is as follows:
(a)on 17 March 2018 Ms Dhital, a citizen of Nepal, applied for a REN Visa (“REN Visa Application”): CB 1-20;
(b)in the REN Visa Application Ms Dhital nominated the sponsoring employer as Himalayan Yak Pty Ltd (“Sponsor”) and the nominated position was Restaurant Manager (ANZSCO code: 141111) (“Position”). Ms Dhital’s husband and child were included in the REN Visa Application: CB 1-20;
(c)on 21 October 2019 the Delegate invited comment from Ms Dhital on the fact that the Sponsor’s nomination application for the Position (“Sponsor’s Nomination Application”) had been refused: CB 34-37, an invitation to which Ms Dhital did not respond: CB 45;
(d)on 25 November 2019 the Delegate’s Decision was to refuse to grant Ms Dhital the REN Visa on the basis that the Delegate was not satisfied that Ms Dhital met cl 187.233(3) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“Migration Regulations”) because she was not the subject of an approved nomination: CB 38-47; and
(e)on 12 December 2019:
(i)Ms Dhital applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate’s Decision: CB 48-50; and
(ii)the Tribunal:
(A)informed Ms Dhital that it was a requirement for the grant of the REN Visa “that the nomination for the position identified in … [the REN Visa Application] has been approved”: CB 55;
(B)informed Ms Dhital that:
Information before us suggests that the nomination for the position identified in your visa application was not approved, and that the decision to refuse the nomination is not the subject of an application for review. If the nomination for the position identified in your visa application was refused and there is no pending review of the decision to refuse the nomination, the decision to refuse to grant you a Subclass 187 visa must be affirmed.
(C)requested that Ms Dhital confirm whether the position identified in the REN Visa Application was the subject of an approved nomination: CB 55, a request to which Ms Dhital did not respond;
(f)on 16 April 2020 Ms Dhital was invited to attend a hearing before the Tribunal (“Tribunal Hearing”) on 5 May 2020: CB 58-60; and
(g)on 5 May 2020:
(i)Ms Dhital (and the other applicants) attended the Tribunal Hearing: CB 64; and
(ii)the Tribunal Decision was to affirm the Delegate’s Decision: CB 69-74.
TRIBUNAL DECISION
In the Tribunal Decision the Tribunal:
(a)noted that it had put certain information to Ms Dhital at the Tribunal Hearing in accordance with s 359AA of the Migration Act, namely, that Ms Dhital would not be able to meet cl 187.233(3) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations because the Sponsor’s Nomination Application had been refused by a delegate and the Sponsor had not sought to have the Tribunal review the refusal of the Sponsor’s Nomination Application: CB 72 at [19]-[21];
(b)summarised Ms Dhital’s response which was that she:
(i)was aware that the Sponsor had not sought to have the Tribunal review the refusal of the Sponsor’s Nomination Application and that she understood what the Tribunal had said as to the effect of cl 187.233(3) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations: CB 72 at [22]; and
(ii)had sought assistance from a migration agent and that migration agent had also advised her that she required an approved Sponsor’s nomination application linked to the Position in order to be granted the REN Visa: CB 72 at [24]; and
(c)found that as the Sponsor’s Nomination Application had not been approved, Ms Dhital did not meet cl 187.233(3) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations: CB 72 at [26]-[28], and therefore affirmed the Delegate’s Decision: CB 73 at [29].
JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION
Material jurisdictional error
For present purposes it suffices to observe that the Court may set aside a decision of the Tribunal upon judicial review if it is affected by material jurisdictional error: Migration Act, ss 474 and 476; MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17; (2021) 273 CLR 506; (2021) 95 ALJR 441; (2021) 390 ALR 590; (2021) 177 ALD 464 at [2] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ. In LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 98 ALJR 610; (“LPDT”) at [15]-[16] per Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ the High Court said that:
15.What must be shown to demonstrate that an established error meets the threshold of materiality will depend upon the error. In some cases, it will be sufficient to show that there has been an error and that the outcome is consistent with the error having affected the decision. Where the error is a denial of procedural fairness arising from a failure to put the applicant on notice of a fact or issue, the court may readily be able to infer that, if fairly put on notice of that fact or issue, the applicant might have addressed it by way of further evidence or submissions, and that the decision-maker would have approached the applicant's further evidence or submissions with an open mind. In those cases, it is “no easy task” for the court to be satisfied that the loss of such an opportunity did not deprive the person of the possibility of a successful outcome. Importantly, a court called upon to determine whether the threshold has been met must be careful not to assume the function of the decision-maker: the point at which the line between judicial review and merits review is crossed may not always be clear, but the line must be maintained. This case affords an example.
16.In sum, unless there is identified a basis on which it can be affirmatively concluded that the outcome would inevitably have been the same had the error not been made, once an applicant establishes that there has been an error and demonstrates that there exists a realistic possibility that the outcome of the decision could have been different had that error not been made, the threshold of materiality will have been met (and curial relief will be justified subject to any issue of utility or discretion).
Not merits review
The Court’s role is not to review the merits of the Tribunal Decision: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259; (1996) 70 ALJR 568; (1996) 136 ALR 481; (1996) 41 ALD 1 (“Wu Shan Liang”). The “line between judicial review and merits review… must be maintained”: LPDT at [15] per Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ, and the reasons of the Tribunal are not to be over-zealously scrutinised in a search for error: Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ; ApplicantWAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593; (2003) 75 ALD 630 at [46] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ.
Relevant criteria for the grant of the REN Visa
As will be evident from what is set out above in relation to the Delegate’s Decision and the Tribunal Decision the relevant criteria for the grant of the REN Visa is contained in cl 187.233 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations. Clause 187.233 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations provides as follows:
187.233(1) The position to which the application relates is the position:
(a)nominated in an application for approval that seeks to meet the requirements of:
(i) subparagraph 5.19(4)(h)(ii); or
(ii)subregulation 5.19(4) as in force before 1 July 2012; and
(aa)in relation to which the applicant is identified in the application under subparagraph 5.19(4)(a)(ii); and
(b)in relation to which the declaration mentioned in paragraph 1114C (3)(d) of Schedule 1 was made in the application for the grant of the visa.
(2)The person who will employ the applicant is the person who made the nomination.
(3) The Minister has approved the nomination.
(4) The nomination has not subsequently been withdrawn.
(4A) Either:
(a)there is no adverse information known to Immigration about the person who made the nomination or a person associated with that person; or
(b) it is reasonable to disregard any adverse information known to Immigration about the person who made the nomination or a person associated with that person.
(5) The position is still available to the applicant.
(6)The application for the visa is made no more than 6 months after the Minister approved the nomination.
Clause 187.233(3) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations is the criteria which requires that there be an approval of the Sponsor’s Nomination Application.
Grounds
Under the heading “Grounds of application” in the Judicial Review Application Ms Dhital has set out 25 paragraphs in which:
(a)at paragraphs 1-6 she sets out some background as to:
(i)the procedural history of the REN Visa Application; and
(ii)the Sponsor and her ongoing work and role in the Sponsor’s restaurant;
(b)at paragraphs 6-24 she outlines the ANZSCO job description for a restaurant manager; and
(c)at paragraph 25 she states as follows:
Hence I wish to submit that the decision of AAT has had a significant impact not only in my case but also on the business. AAT has made jurisdictional error on the basis of natural justice in my case where business was struggling in past and now has the capacity and willingness to apply for review of nomination application. I should be given the opportunity to re-submit the nomination application on the basis of above-mentioned reasons.
Paragraphs 1-24
Paragraphs 1-24 go solely to factual matters and do not, and do not purport to, identify any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision.
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25 raises two issues, namely, whether:
(a)Ms Dhital was denied natural justice (more properly, procedural fairness) “in my case where business was struggling in past and now has the capacity and willingness to apply for review of … [the Sponsor’s Nomination Application”]; and
(b)an opportunity should be given to resubmit the Sponsor’s Nomination Application.
Alleged denial of procedural fairness
Section 357A(1) and (3) of the Migration Act provides as follows:
(1)This Division is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it deals with.
…
(3) In applying this Division, the Tribunal must act in a way that is fair and just.
Section 360(1) of the Migration Act provides that:
(1)The Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.
Section 363(1)(b) of the Migration Act permits the Tribunal to “adjourn the review from time to time”.
As this was a case to which s 357A of the Migration Act applied, the Tribunal was not required to afford Ms Dhital normal common law procedural fairness in relation to the matters dealt with in Div 5 of Pt 5 (including therefore ss 360(1) and 363(1)(b)) of the Migration Act: Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; (2010) 241 CLR 252; (2010) 84 ALJR 507; (2010) 267 ALR 204; (2010) 115 ALD 493 at [34]-[42] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat [2006] FCAFC 61; (2006) 151 FCR 214; (2006) 231 ALR 412). Otherwise, procedural fairness is a practical concept concerning itself with the avoidance of practical injustice: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs: Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1; (2003) 77 ALJR 699; (2003) 195 ALR 502; (2003) 72 ALD 613 at [37] per Gleeson CJ.
The Tribunal complied with its statutorily mandated procedural fairness obligations in circumstances where the Tribunal:
(a)in its letter of 12 December 2019 to Ms Dhital, to which Ms Dhital did not respond:
(i)reminded Ms Dhital of the effect of cl 187.233(3) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations; and
(ii)informed Ms Dhital that it was a requirement for the grant of the REN Visa that the Sponsor’s Nomination Application for the Position as identified in the REN Visa Application had to be approved;
(b)properly invited Ms Dhital to attend the Tribunal Hearing, which Ms Dhital then attended; and
(c)in accordance with the procedure in s 359AA of the Migration Act put to Ms Dhital at the Tribunal Hearing information concerning the Sponsor’s failure to seek review by the Tribunal of the delegate’s decision refusing the Sponsor’s Nomination Application. Ms Dhital did not seek an adjournment upon receipt of the information, and opted to respond to the information during the Tribunal Hearing. The Court notes that in the absence of approval of the Sponsor’s Nomination Application for the Position an adjournment would not have been of any utility in relation to the ultimate outcome of the Tribunal Decision.
Further, there was no denial of procedural fairness in circumstances where Ms Dhital:
(a)was on notice from the Delegate’s Decision that her ability to satisfy cl 187.233(3) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations would be the determinative issue in the Tribunal’s review; and
(b)told the Tribunal that she understood the REN Visa Application must fail because the Sponsor’s Nomination Application for the Position had not been approved.
The alleged capacity and willingness, presumably of the Sponsor, to now resubmit the Sponsor’s Nomination Application does not give rise to a want of procedural fairness in relation to the Tribunal Decision because the Tribunal Decision under review in this Court is not a review of the delegate’s refusal of the Sponsor’s Nomination Application, no such review having been initiated by the Sponsor. There can be no denial of procedural fairness in relation to a matter which was not, and in the circumstances could not have been, before the Tribunal.
For the reasons set out at [15]-[18] above, no breach of s 360 of the Migration Act by the Tribunal is apparent, and nor is it apparent that there was any other form of denial of procedural fairness by the Tribunal. The claim that there is a jurisdictional error on the basis of a want of procedural fairness in paragraph 25 therefore has no basis. The Tribunal Decision to affirm the Delegate’s Decision to not grant Ms Dhital the REN Visa was the only decision available to the Tribunal in circumstances where Ms Dhital did not meet the criteria in cl 187.233(3) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations.
Further opportunity to resubmit Sponsor’s Nomination Application
In relation to Ms Dhital’s plea for there to be a further opportunity for the Sponsor to resubmit the Sponsor’s Nomination Application for the position, that plea founders on two bases:
(a)first, the Court’s jurisdiction in this matter is limited to ascertaining whether or not there is jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision: Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ; and
(b)second, and in any event, the Sponsor can no longer apply to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision refusing the Sponsor’s Nomination Application because the time limit for the Sponsor to do so expired in November 2019: Migration Act, s 338(9); Migration Regulations, reg 4.10(1)(d).
Conclusion – paragraph 25
It follows from [11]-[20] above that paragraph 25 of the grounds of the Judicial Review Application does not establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision.
Matters raised at hearing in this Court
At hearing in this Court Ms Dhital:
(a)asked the Court to hear from the Sponsor, a representative of whom was present in Court, because the Sponsor apparently wished to renominate Ms Dhital for the Position;
(b)said she was unable to identify any “error” in the Tribunal Decision; and
(c)said she (but presumably the Sponsor, for whom she continues to work) needed a little more time to be able to submit a new nomination.
At hearing the Court declined to hear from the representative of the Sponsor on the basis that there would be no utility in doing so where the Court’s task was to identify jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision and not to engage in administrative functions related to the grant or refusal of any visa.
The Court explained to Ms Dhital at a directions hearing on 5 March 2024 (shortly after the matter was docketed to the Court as presently constituted) that the Court’s function was to establish whether the Tribunal Decision was affected by jurisdictional error, and the Court also explained, as best it could, the nature of jurisdictional error. At hearing the Court re-iterated to Ms Dhital that she needed to establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision. In light of what the Court has said at [10]-[21] above and [27]-[28] below it is no surprise that Ms Dhital was unable to identify any error, let alone jurisdictional error, in the Tribunal Decision.
At hearing the Court indicated to Ms Dhital that it was no part of the Court’s task on judicial review to determine if additional time ought to be granted, if needed, to make a new Sponsor’s nomination application.
It follows from [23]-[25] above that nothing put by Ms Dhital at the hearing in this Court establishes jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision.
Futility and materiality
Clause 187.233(3) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations required Ms Dhital to have, at the time of the Tribunal Decision an approved nomination from a nominating employer, here, the Sponsor: Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 123; (2023) 299 FCR 464 (“Singh 2023 FCAFC”) at [99]-[100] per O’Sullivan J (with whom Raper J agreed at [205]); Kaur v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 63 at [49] per O’Bryan J; Patel v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1228 (“Patel”) at [2] and [5] per Colvin J. This criterion can only be satisfied by approval of the Sponsor’s Nomination Application. The criterion cannot be assessed against a new nomination application subsequently lodged by the Sponsor, or another prospective sponsor: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 105; (2017) 253 FCR 267; (2017) 156 ALD 284 (“Singh 2017 FCAFC”) at [82]-[90] per Mortimer J (with whom Jagot J at [1] and Bromberg J at [2] agreed); Khan v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 701 (“Khan”) at [65] per Judge Kendall. The only outcome from a further review by the Tribunal would be another decision by the Tribunal affirming the Delegate’s Decision. That is because the word “position” in cl 187.233 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations refers to a particular job with a particular employer that exists at a particular point of time: Singh 2017 FCAFC at [88]-[89] per Mortimer J; Singh 2023 FCAFC at [141] per Raper J; Patel at [7]-[8] per Colvin J, that point in time being when a sponsor nomination application is submitted for approval: Singh 2017 FCAFC at [88] per Mortimer J. The Position cannot now be the subject of an approved Sponsor’s nomination application because of the Sponsor’s earlier decision not to seek Tribunal review of the Delegate’s Decision not to approve the Sponsor’s Nomination Application. As was observed in Singh 2017 FCAFC at [89] per Mortimer J, even a new nomination in respect of the same position made by the same employer could not be relied upon to meet cl 187.233 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations (see too Patel at [8] per Colvin J).
The Sponsor not having challenged the delegate’s refusal of the Sponsor’s Nomination Application, Ms Dhital could never have satisfied the relevant criterion in cl 187.233(3) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations in relation to the REN Visa Application, and the REN Visa Application was therefore doomed to fail. Remittal of the Judicial Review Application to the Tribunal would therefore be futile: Singh 2017 FCAFC at [88]-[90] per Mortimer J; Khan at [66] per Judge Kendall. And so, even if Ms Dhital was able to demonstrate some error in the Tribunal Decision (which she cannot), having regard to [27] above any such error would not be jurisdictional because it would lack the requisite degree of materiality because there is not a realistic possibility of a different outcome if the matter were to be remitted to the Tribunal: LPDT at [9]-[16] per Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ.
Jurisdictional error otherwise
The Court is cognisant that Ms Dhital was self-represented, and that in those circumstances the Court must endeavour to remain independently alert to the possibility of a jurisdictional error having been made by the Tribunal: MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; (2015) 238 FCR 158 at [100] and [112] per Mortimer J; Ludgero v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 1060 at [26] per Judge Lucev. Save for the matters otherwise considered in these Reasons for Judgment, it is not evident to the Court that some other form of possibly arguable legal error, and in particular possibly arguable jurisdictional error, arises in relation to the Tribunal Decision.
CONCLUSION AND ORDERS
The Court has concluded that Ms Dhital has not established any material jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision. Accordingly, there will be an order dismissing the Judicial Review Application filed on 22 May 2020.
The Court will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty-one (31) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Lucev. Associate:
Dated: 21 August 2024
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