Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DDK16

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DDK16 [2017] FCAFC 188

Appeal from:

DDK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2017] FCCA 353

File number: NSD 991 of 2017
Judges: GILMOUR, MARKOVIC AND O'CALLAGHAN JJ
Date of judgment: 27 November 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in finding that the second respondent had not “cumulatively assessed” the risk said to confront the first respondent if returned to Iran – whether obligation of cumulative assessment arose – whether second respondent did in fact cumulatively assess the relevant risks
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(a) and (aa), 46A
Cases cited:

Khan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2000] FCA 1478

SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 123; 140 ALD 78

W352 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 398

Date of hearing: 8 November 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 40
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr C L Lenehan and Ms K Pham
Solicitor for the Appellant: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R P V Carey
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Wotton + Kearney
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 991 of 2017
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Appellant

AND:

DDK16
First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

GILMOUR, MARKOVIC AND O'CALLAGHAN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

27 NOVEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made in SYG2895/2016 on 31 May 2017 be set aside.

3.In lieu of the orders referred to in paragraph 2, the application to review the decision of the second respondent dated 12 September 2016 be dismissed with costs.

4.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, to be agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. The appellant, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister), appeals against orders of the primary judge which quashed a decision of the second respondent, the Immigration Assessment Authority (the IAA), affirming a decision of the appellant’s delegate not to grant the first respondent (the respondent) a protection visa.

  2. The precise terms of the orders against which the Minister appeals are:

    (1)A writ of certiorari shall issue removing the record of the Immigration Assessment Authority decision made on 12 September 2016 into this Court for the purpose of quashing it.

    (2)A writ of mandamus shall issue, requiring the Immigration Assessment Authority to redetermine the review referred to it, according to law.

  3. For the reasons given below, the Minister’s appeal must be allowed, the orders of the primary judge set aside, and in lieu thereof orders made that the application…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 188
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DDK16, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia addressed an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court which had quashed a decision of the Immigration and Asylum Division (IAA) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The respondent, a national of Iran who had applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa, sought protection on various grounds including religious persecution, mental health issues, criminal history, political opinion, and reasons for departing Iran. The IAA assessed the respondent's claims but found that, when considered cumulatively, they did not give rise to a real risk of significant harm. The primary judge, however, held that the IAA had failed to adequately assess the respondent's claims cumulatively, leading to the quashing of the IAA's decision.

The legal issues before the Full Court were whether the primary judge erred in finding that the IAA had not cumulatively assessed the respondent's claims, and whether there was an obligation for such a cumulative assessment. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection argued that no obligation to make a cumulative assessment arose where individual claims had been rejected as a factual matter or did not lead to ongoing problems, and that the IAA had in fact cumulatively assessed the risks. The Court found that there was no obligation to make a cumulative assessment when individual claims had been dismissed, as such a cumulative consideration could not alter the outcome. Consequently, the Court held that the primary judge was incorrect in concluding that the IAA had not cumulatively assessed the claims.

The Full Court allowed the Minister's appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and dismissed the respondent's application to review the IAA's decision. The Court ordered that the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal, to be agreed upon or assessed. This decision reinforces the principle that a cumulative assessment obligation does not arise when individual claims have been dismissed, and highlights the importance of correctly interpreting and applying the law in the context of cumulative risk assessments.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made in SYG2895/2016 on 31 May 2017 be set aside.

3. In lieu of the orders referred to in paragraph 2, the application to review the decision of the second respondent dated 12 September 2016 be dismissed with costs.

4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, to be agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons given below, the Minister’s appeal must be allowed, the orders of the primary judge set aside, and in lieu thereof orders made that the application to review the decision of the IAA dated 12 September 2016 be dismissed with costs.BACKGROUND The following facts are summarised in the reasons of the primary judge. The respondent is a national of Iran. He entered Australia by boat in September 2012. On 11 October and 2 December 2012, the applicant took part in an Arrival Interview and an Irregular Maritime Arrival Entry Interview. On 13 August 2015, the respondent was told that the Minister had decided to exercise his power under s 46A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) to permit the respondent to make an application for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV). The respondent applied for a SHEV on 4 January 2016. As part of his application, he provided a statement in which he made his claims for protection under the Act. In summary, the respondent claimed to fear harm by reason of the following:(1)Religion: The respondent was raised a Shia, converted to Christianity in Australia in 2013, but has since become disillusioned with all religions.(2)Mental health condition: The respondent has previously been diagnosed as having a personality disorder and is volatile as a result of his mental health condition. He claimed that he did not fit within the norms of Iranian society and was a member of the particular social group comprising resistant, defiant, young and “Bolshi” individuals. He also claimed that he suffered from Attention Deficit Disorder.(3)Previous arrests: The respondent claimed to have been arrested on a number of occasions. In 2003, he was charged and imprisoned for 12 days for drinking alcohol and engaging in immoral behaviour; in 2004, he was arrested after an altercation with a police officer, having been accused of armed robbery (but the case was later dismissed on account of a lack of evidence); in 2007, the respondent was arrested for drinking alcohol and disturbing the peace, and was, following an appeal, sentenced to a three-year good behaviour bond and 80 lashes; and, in 2009, he was implicated in an altercation that took place at one of his father’s shops and was sent to prison for 29 days.(4)Political opinion: The respondent claimed to have participated in anti-government demonstrations on about four or five occasions in Shiraz, Iran in 2009 and 2010. He also claimed to have attended a demonstration against the Iranian government in Sydney in 2014. During the interview with the delegate, however, he said that he attended about three or four demonstrations in Sydney but could not remember the dates on which they took place. The applicant claimed that he was against the Iranian government and has shared videos on his Facebook page critical of Islam. During the interview with the delegate, the applicant’s then representative argued that he has “an anti-regime political opinion and he is anti-Sharia Law as he drank alcohol”.(5)Reasons for departing Iran: The respondent claimed that, in 2012, some men in plain clothes ransacked his father’s house and were looking for the respondent and demanded that he report to the police station. He claimed that he did not know why people were looking for him but feared that, if he were to remain in Iran and be arrested for a third time, he could face the death penalty.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The IAA then said (at [53]-[54]):I have considered the applicant’s claims cumulatively and I do not find that he will face a real risk of significant harm. I have taken into account that he previously converted to Christianity and does not believe in Shi’a Islam and currently has no religion, his political opinion, his attendance at the 2009 demonstrations in Iran and demonstrations against the Iranians government in Australia, his criminal history, mental health, Facebook posts and that he will be returning to Iran as a failed asylum seeker. Assessing his claims cumulatively I find they do not give rise to a real risk of significant harm.…There are not substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being returned from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm. The applicant does not meet s 36(2)(aa) [of the Act].DECISION OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE The primary judge quashed the IAA decision on the sole ground that, although there was “no doubt” that the IAA had demonstrated “active intellectual engagement” with each of “the various risks confronting [the respondent], should he return to Iran”, it was “not apparent” that the IAA had demonstrated such an engagement when it came to deal with what the primary judge described as the “rolled up cumulative assessment” of those risks ([103]). The primary judge reasoned as follows (at [103]):Taken individually, the [IAA’s] assessment of the various risks confronting the applicant, should he return to Iran, involved assessments that his activities would either not become known to the authorities or would not be repeated. The [IAA’s] rolled up cumulative assessment at the end of its reasons does not expressly deal with the possibility that, when considered cumulatively, these risks might become significant. In a case like the present, where the applicant faces multi-faceted risks which may interact and interrelate, particularly when considered with his mental health condition, the bland assertion that the claims were considered cumulatively does not satisfy me that this was anything more than the application of a verbal formula. If the [IAA] was wrong on any one of its assessments, it would seem logically to follow that the applicant may well encounter a real risk of significant harm. The cumulative assessment of the claims needed to address the possibility of the interaction of the applicant’s condition, activities and circumstances leading him to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities. To put it another way, the assertion of a cumulative assessment, in a complex case such as this, requires a demonstration of an active intellectual engagement with the issues when considered cumulatively. There is no doubt that there was active intellectual engagement with the issues considered individually. It is not apparent, however, that there was any active intellectual engagement in the cumulative assessment.THE MINISTER’S GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submits that the primary judge erred in so concluding because:(1)in such circumstances, no obligation of cumulative assessment arose; and(2)the IAA had in fact cumulatively assessed those risks in any event. CONSIDERATION Both of those submissions are correct, and the appeal must be allowed. Counsel appearing for the respondent ultimately, and quite properly, did not seriously dispute the Minister’s submission that no obligation to make a “cumulative assessment” arises where individual claims have been rejected as a factual matter, or have been the subject of findings that they did not or would not lead to ongoing problems for the visa applicant were he or she to return to a receiving country (and no claim is made that any of those individual findings were the subject of appellable error): see SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 123; 140 ALD 78 at [135]-[136]; W352 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 398 at [21]; Khan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2000] FCA 1478 at [31]. Counsel for the respondent adopted as correct the following submissions made on behalf of the Minister:Broadly speaking, it can be accepted that there is an obligation to consider the parts of a Visa applicant’s claim for protection cumulatively. It can also be accepted that the same principles as to whether a visa applicant meets the criteria for protection as a refugee apply, by analogy, to the complementary protection criteria in s 36(2)(aa) of the [Act] [citing MZZUG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2015] FCA 1151 at [47]].The obligation to give cumulative consideration to a visa applicant’s claims arises as part of the decision-maker’s obligation to consider the case before them. In that context, a decision-maker is required to consider each integer of a visa applicant’s claims, whether they are raised expressly or arise clearly on the material [citing Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136 at 139 [7]]. Further, as part of the decision-maker’s duty to address the case raised by the material before them, the decision-maker must consider the whole of the case put forward by the visa applicant [citing Khan vMinister for Immigration and Citizenship [2000] FCA 1478 at [31]]. There may be a combination of factors that create the profile of the person who meets (relevantly here) the complementary protection criteria [citing MZZUG at [47]], or causative factors that may not give rise to the relevant risk on their own, but may do so collectively [citing W352v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 398 at [21]]. In our view, however, such considerations have no application in a case such as this and are of no assistance to the respondent. It seems to us, as a matter of inexorable logic, that if, as is common ground here, all individual claims or bases for establishing an entitlement to a visa are dismissed (here, dismissed as not giving rise a real or significant risk of harm upon return to the country of nationality or receiving country), then no amount of “cumulative consideration” of those rejected claims is capable of producing a different result. It follows, in our respectful view, that the primary judge was wrong to hold otherwise.