FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DDK16 [2017] FCAFC 188
Appeal from: DDK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
File number: NSD 991 of 2017 Judges: GILMOUR, MARKOVIC AND O'CALLAGHAN JJ Date of judgment: 27 November 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in finding that the second respondent had not “cumulatively assessed” the risk said to confront the first respondent if returned to Iran – whether obligation of cumulative assessment arose – whether second respondent did in fact cumulatively assess the relevant risks Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(a) and (aa), 46A Cases cited: Khan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2000] FCA 1478
SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 123; 140 ALD 78
W352 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 398
Date of hearing: 8 November 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 40 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr C L Lenehan and Ms K Pham Solicitor for the Appellant: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R P V Carey Solicitor for the First Respondent: Wotton + Kearney Counsel for the Second Respondent: Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 991 of 2017 BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
AppellantAND: DDK16
First RespondentIMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
GILMOUR, MARKOVIC AND O'CALLAGHAN JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
27 NOVEMBER 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made in SYG2895/2016 on 31 May 2017 be set aside.
3.In lieu of the orders referred to in paragraph 2, the application to review the decision of the second respondent dated 12 September 2016 be dismissed with costs.
4.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
The appellant, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister), appeals against orders of the primary judge which quashed a decision of the second respondent, the Immigration Assessment Authority (the IAA), affirming a decision of the appellant’s delegate not to grant the first respondent (the respondent) a protection visa.
The precise terms of the orders against which the Minister appeals are:
(1)A writ of certiorari shall issue removing the record of the Immigration Assessment Authority decision made on 12 September 2016 into this Court for the purpose of quashing it.
(2)A writ of mandamus shall issue, requiring the Immigration Assessment Authority to redetermine the review referred to it, according to law.
For the reasons given below, the Minister’s appeal must be allowed, the orders of the primary judge set aside, and in lieu thereof orders made that the application…
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- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 188
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Full Court were whether the primary judge erred in finding that the IAA had not cumulatively assessed the respondent's claims, and whether there was an obligation for such a cumulative assessment. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection argued that no obligation to make a cumulative assessment arose where individual claims had been rejected as a factual matter or did not lead to ongoing problems, and that the IAA had in fact cumulatively assessed the risks. The Court found that there was no obligation to make a cumulative assessment when individual claims had been dismissed, as such a cumulative consideration could not alter the outcome. Consequently, the Court held that the primary judge was incorrect in concluding that the IAA had not cumulatively assessed the claims.
The Full Court allowed the Minister's appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and dismissed the respondent's application to review the IAA's decision. The Court ordered that the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal, to be agreed upon or assessed. This decision reinforces the principle that a cumulative assessment obligation does not arise when individual claims have been dismissed, and highlights the importance of correctly interpreting and applying the law in the context of cumulative risk assessments.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made in SYG2895/2016 on 31 May 2017 be set aside.
3. In lieu of the orders referred to in paragraph 2, the application to review the decision of the second respondent dated 12 September 2016 be dismissed with costs.
4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submits that the primary judge erred in so concluding because:(1)in such circumstances, no obligation of cumulative assessment arose; and(2)the IAA had in fact cumulatively assessed those risks in any event. CONSIDERATION Both of those submissions are correct, and the appeal must be allowed. Counsel appearing for the respondent ultimately, and quite properly, did not seriously dispute the Minister’s submission that no obligation to make a “cumulative assessment” arises where individual claims have been rejected as a factual matter, or have been the subject of findings that they did not or would not lead to ongoing problems for the visa applicant were he or she to return to a receiving country (and no claim is made that any of those individual findings were the subject of appellable error): see SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 123; 140 ALD 78 at [135]-[136]; W352 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 398 at [21]; Khan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2000] FCA 1478 at [31]. Counsel for the respondent adopted as correct the following submissions made on behalf of the Minister:Broadly speaking, it can be accepted that there is an obligation to consider the parts of a Visa applicant’s claim for protection cumulatively. It can also be accepted that the same principles as to whether a visa applicant meets the criteria for protection as a refugee apply, by analogy, to the complementary protection criteria in s 36(2)(aa) of the [Act] [citing MZZUG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2015] FCA 1151 at [47]].The obligation to give cumulative consideration to a visa applicant’s claims arises as part of the decision-maker’s obligation to consider the case before them. In that context, a decision-maker is required to consider each integer of a visa applicant’s claims, whether they are raised expressly or arise clearly on the material [citing Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136 at 139 [7]]. Further, as part of the decision-maker’s duty to address the case raised by the material before them, the decision-maker must consider the whole of the case put forward by the visa applicant [citing Khan vMinister for Immigration and Citizenship [2000] FCA 1478 at [31]]. There may be a combination of factors that create the profile of the person who meets (relevantly here) the complementary protection criteria [citing MZZUG at [47]], or causative factors that may not give rise to the relevant risk on their own, but may do so collectively [citing W352v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 398 at [21]]. In our view, however, such considerations have no application in a case such as this and are of no assistance to the respondent. It seems to us, as a matter of inexorable logic, that if, as is common ground here, all individual claims or bases for establishing an entitlement to a visa are dismissed (here, dismissed as not giving rise a real or significant risk of harm upon return to the country of nationality or receiving country), then no amount of “cumulative consideration” of those rejected claims is capable of producing a different result. It follows, in our respectful view, that the primary judge was wrong to hold otherwise.