FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| FDQ18 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2020] FCCA 83 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review – Safe Haven Enterprise Visa refused by the Immigration Assessment Authority – whether IAA failed to consider an integer of the applicant’s claim in not considering separately whether he was a Christian and an apostate from Islam – whether irrational and/or illogical decision with respect to applicant’s real risk of serious harm and/or a real chance of significant harm – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5J(6), 414. |
| Applicant: | FDQ18 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTERFOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | DNG 33 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Young |
| Hearing date: | 15 November 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 15 November 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Darwin |
| Delivered on: | 17 January 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Guo |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | HIV/AIDS Legal Centre |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr Liveris |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |
| Counsel for the Second Respondent: | Mr Liveris |
| Solicitors for the Second Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or, failing agreement, as taxed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT DARWIN |
DNG33/2018
| FDQ18 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTERFOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR |
First Respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(As Corrected)
This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the Authority”) made on 19 September 2018 to affirm a decision of the Minister’s delegate made on 16 April 2018 to refuse the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (“SHEV”).
The applicant is a citizen of Iran. He arrived in Australia in 2013. He is 41 years old.
The applicant’s protection claims can be summarised as follows:
·He was a convicted drug user in Iran and prisoner which constantly brought him to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities.
·He has seven or eight tattoos, including an image on his right forearm which he claims displays Christian iconography. He said he was lashed by the Iranian authorities when they discovered this tattoo seven or eight months before he left Iran.
·Before leaving Iran he was…
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- Case
- [2020] FCCA 83
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the IAA's decision was legally unreasonable or illogical, constituting jurisdictional error. Specifically, the applicant contended that the IAA erred by disregarding his conduct in Australia, which he argued formed a substantial evidentiary basis for his claim of apostasy and proselytising. Furthermore, the applicant alleged that the IAA failed to lawfully determine whether he faced a real risk of serious harm or a real chance of significant harm, considering the cumulative impact of various factors including his claimed Christianity and apostasy. The applicant also argued that the IAA made a decision no rational decision-maker could make by giving undue weight to its finding that he was not a genuine practising Christian, failing to draw reasonable inferences from his Facebook activity, not considering the potential perception of his Christianity and apostasy by Iranian authorities, and failing to account for his renunciation of Islam.
Judge Young dismissed the application, finding that the IAA's decision was not legally unreasonable or illogical. The court accepted the IAA's findings that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the applicant's claims regarding his Facebook activity, the identification of his profile, and the corroboration of his religious practices. The IAA's assessment of the applicant's explanation for ceasing church attendance was also found to be reasonable. The court concluded that the IAA had adequately considered the relevant factors and that its decision was open to it on the evidence presented. The applicant's argument that the IAA should have considered the potential perception of his Christianity and apostasy by Iranian authorities was not accepted as a basis for overturning the IAA's assessment of the actual risk.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicant's conduct in Australia included posting overtly religious content on his Facebook page, which he claimed would make his identity easily identifiable to Iranian authorities. However, the IAA found that there was no evidence to support this claim, including that the screenshots provided by the applicant did not contain any religious text and merely showed images. Additionally, the IAA found that the applicant's explanation for why he stopped attending church was incongruous and not included in his SHEV application. The IAA also found that there was no evidence that the applicant was seeking treatment for a mental health issue at the time he stopped attending church.
The applicant argued that the IAA's decision to disregard his conduct in Australia was legally unreasonable or illogical, amounting to jurisdictional error and practical injustice. The applicant also argued that the IAA failed to lawfully carry out their statutory task to determine whether he faced a real risk of serious harm or a real chance of significant harm as a result of his claimed Christianity and apostasy. The applicant contended that the IAA gave too much weight to its finding that he was not a genuine practising Christian and failed to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence he submitted. The applicant also argued that the IAA failed to take into account that even if his claimed Christianity and apostasy were not genuine, they may be perceived as genuine by the Iranian authorities, particularly given his long-standing tattoo.
The applicant further argued that the IAA's decision was irrational and/or illogical with respect to his real risk of serious harm and/or a real chance of significant harm. The applicant claimed that the IAA failed to consider the cumulative impact of his claims, including his criminal history, history of drug use, HIV status, Christianity/apostasy (real or perceived), tattoos and/or 'returnee' status. The applicant also argued that the IAA erred by relying on an interview conducted with the assistance of a Farsi speaking interpreter, which he claimed was inadequate due to the interpreter's inability to accurately translate his responses. The applicant contended that the IAA was able to take reasonable action to rectify the situation, such as having the recording fully translated or re-interviewing him.
The case of FDQ18 v Minister for Immigration originated from a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to refuse the applicant's application for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. This refusal prompted the applicant to seek judicial review of the IAA's decision, arguing that the authority failed to consider certain aspects of the applicant's claim, particularly the applicant's status as a Christian and an apostate from Islam. The application for judicial review was subsequently dismissed. In the proceedings leading to the dismissal, the applicant filed amended grounds of review, asserting that the IAA's decision to disregard certain conduct in Australia was legally unreasonable and amounted to jurisdictional error. These grounds included criticisms of the IAA's findings regarding the applicant's Facebook activity and religious conduct in Australia, as well as the weight given to the applicant's claims of Christianity and apostasy. The case proceeded through various procedural steps, including the filing of the amended grounds of review, responses from the respondents, and submissions on the adequacy of the interpretation services provided during the interview with the applicant. The court considered the procedural fairness and legal soundness of the IAA's decision-making process, particularly focusing on whether the IAA's findings were based on erroneous or illogical conclusions and whether the decision was made in a manner that no rational decision-maker could have made.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) fail to consider an integer of the applicant’s claim by not separately considering whether he was a Christian and an apostate from Islam?
2. Was the IAA's decision to disregard the applicant’s conduct in Australia legally unreasonable or illogical, amounting to jurisdictional error and a practical injustice?
3. Did the IAA err in failing to lawfully determine whether the applicant faced a real risk of serious harm and/or a real chance of significant harm due to the cumulative impact of his claims?
4. Was the IAA's decision irrational and/or illogical with respect to the applicant's real risk of serious harm and/or a real chance of significant harm on the basis of his claimed Christianity and apostasy?
5. Was the IAA's decision influenced by an inadequate interpretation service during the interview with the applicant, rendering the findings against the applicant legally unreasonable?
6. Was the IAA's reliance on the interview findings legally unreasonable given the apparent inadequacy of the interpreting services provided?
Held
1. The court held that the IAA did not fail to consider an integer of the applicant’s claim by not separately considering whether he was a Christian and an apostate from Islam. The court concluded that the IAA appropriately assessed the applicant's claims as a whole.
2. The court held that the IAA's decision to disregard the applicant's conduct in Australia was not legally unreasonable or illogical, amounting to jurisdictional error or practical injustice. The court concluded that the IAA's findings were supported by evidence and rational.
3. The court held that the IAA did not err in failing to lawfully determine whether the applicant faced a real risk of serious harm and/or a real chance of significant harm due to the cumulative impact of his claims. The court concluded that the IAA's assessment of the risk was reasonable.
4. The court held that the IAA's decision was rational and logical with respect to the applicant's real risk of serious harm and/or a real chance of significant harm based on his claimed Christianity and apostasy. The court concluded that the IAA appropriately weighed the evidence and drew reasonable inferences.
5. The court held that the IAA's decision was not influenced by an inadequate interpretation service during the interview with the applicant. The court concluded that the interpreting services were adequate for the purposes of the interview.
6. The court held that the IAA's reliance on the interview findings was not legally unreasonable given the apparent adequacy of the interpreting services provided. The court concluded that the IAA's decision was supported by the interview and other evidence.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The (second) amended grounds of review were as follows:1. The Second Respondent’s decision to disregard the applicant’s conduct in Australia was legally unreasonable or illogical amounting to jurisdictional error and gave rise to a practical injustice.Particulars(i) The Second Respondent made a decision pursuant to s 5J(6) of the Migration Act to disregard the applicant’s conduct in Australia (“the decision”) and therefore did not take into account material information in considering whether or not the applicant was a refugee. The decision is recorded at paragraph 35 of the Second Respondent’s reasons for decision (“the reasons”);(ii) In making the decision the Second Respondent relied upon (inter alia) the following conclusions or findings(a) A finding that there was no evidence to substantiate the applicant’s claim that he posted overtly religious posts on his Facebook wall over the past year (at paragraph 34 of the reasons);(b) A finding that there was no evidence to substantiate the applicant’s claim that his Facebook page is easily identifiable due to his name (at paragraph 34 of the reasons)(c) A finding that none of the screenshots provide corroborative evidence that the Facebook profile does in fact belong to the applicant (at paragraph 34 of the reasons)(d) A finding that the screenshots provide no evidence of the applicant’s identity, lack any religious text and merely contain images as opposed to actual postings on his wall (at paragraph 34 of the reasons)(e) A finding that there is no evidence to support the claim that Iranians have been informed of the applicant’s baptism (at paragraph 34 of the reasons)(f) A finding that the applicant’s explanation as to why he stopped attending church was incongruous having regard to the fact that he was baptised more than a year after he became aware of his (HIV) diagnosis and that the applicant did not include that explanation in his SHEV application lodged 2 months after he stopped attending church (at paragraph 34 of the reasons)(g) A finding that there was no evidence that indicates that the applicant was seeking or undertaking any treatment for a mental health issue at the time he stopped attending church, or at any other time in Australia(iii) The findings or conclusions set out at (ii) above were erroneous in the sense that they were contrary to the evidence and/or were illogical(iv) The erroneous or illogical findings or conclusions led to a legally unreasonable or illogical decision to disregard the applicant’s conduct in Australia (v) The applicant’s conduct in Australia that was disregarded formed the substantial evidentiary basis for an integer of his claim that he was a refugee, namely that he had been engaged in apostasy and proselytising.2. The Second Respondent erred by failing to lawfully carry out their statutory task to determine whether the Applicant faced a real risk of serious harm and/or that there was a real chance that the Applicant would suffer significant harm as a result of the cumulative impact of his claims, including: criminal history, history of drug use, HIV status, Christianity/apostasy (real or perceived), tattoos and/or ‘returnee’ status.3. The Second Respondent made a decision which no rational and/or logical decision maker could make with respect to the question as to whether the Applicant faced a real risk of serious harm and/or that there was a real chance that the Applicant would suffer significant harm on the basis of his claimed Christianity and apostasy. Particularsa. The Second Respondent gave too much weight to its own finding that the Applicant was not a genuine practising Christian;b. The Second Respondent failed to draw a reasonable inference that was open to it to draw on the evidence submitted by the Applicant, namely, that the Applicant had been active on Facebook whilst residing in Australia and that such activity evidenced his Christianity and his apostasy and was accessible to the Iranian authorities, particularly having regard to the admitted data breach;c. The Second Respondent failed to take into account that even if the Applicant’s claimed Christianity and/or apostasy was not genuine, it may be perceived as genuine by the Iranian authorities, particularly given his long-standing tattoo.d. The Second Respondent failed to take into account that the Applicant renounced Islam and the views of the Iranian authorities with respect to this fact. 4. The Second Respondent erred making a decision which no rational and/or logical decision maker could make. Particularsa. The interview with the Applicant conducted by the delegate of the First Respondent was conducted with the assistance of a Farsi speaking interpreter. b. The audio recording of the interview was a document before the Second Respondent;c. The audio recording of the interview on its face demonstrates that the interpreting services which were provided were inadequate. d. The second respondent was able to take reasonable action to rectify the situation that existed namely by having the recording fully translated or by re-interviewing the applicant;e. It was legally unreasonably for the Second Respondent to have made critical findings against the Applicant relying upon the interview. Consideration