FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZSSC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 863
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 863
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court addressed several legal issues, primarily focusing on the principles of jurisdictional error, procedural fairness, and the obligation of the RRT to consider submissions of substance. It referenced the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and particularly sections 65, 414, 425, and 430, which outline the RRT’s review function and the requirements for written statements of decision and reasons. The court also considered the statutory obligation on the RRT to invite the applicant to present arguments and the extent to which findings by the Tribunal are capable of being reviewed for jurisdictional error on grounds of illogicality or irrationality.
The court held that the primary judge did not err in rejecting the appellant's complaints that he was not given an opportunity to comment on adverse information. It found that the appellant was provided with an opportunity to make further submissions after the Tribunal hearing. Consequently, the court rejected the grounds of appeal, which alleged that the Tribunal did not provide the appellant with an opportunity to comment on adverse information. The court concluded that the appellant had failed to establish any appellable error by the primary judge.
The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made by the primary judge, and the decision of the RRT dated 26 February 2013. It mandated the RRT to determine the appellant's application for review according to law. Additionally, it ordered the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders made by the primary judge on 1 April 2014 be set aside.
3. The decision dated 26 February 2013 of the Refugee Review Tribunal be set aside.
4. There be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Refugee Review Tribunal to determine according to law the appellant’s application for review filed on 6 December 2012.
5. The first respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As will emerge below at [57]-[74], while I accept some of those submissions, I regard others to be more problematic and I also consider that there are additional relevant principles to apply in considering the grounds of illogicality or irrationality. Consideration I accept the Minister’s submissions that the appellant has failed to establish any appellable error by the primary judge in respect of the three grounds raised in the filed notice of appeal. The first ground of appeal is to the effect that the primary judge erred in not accepting the appellant’s argument that the Tribunal did not provide him with an opportunity to comment on “adverse information” which was raised at the Tribunal hearing. In oral argument before me, the appellant was unable to identify any particular adverse information which was the subject of ground 1. This ground of appeal must be rejected in circumstances where, as noted above, the appellant was afforded an opportunity to make further submissions after the Tribunal hearing and his migration agent/solicitor took advantage of that opportunity and provided written submissions dated 20 February 2013 to the Tribunal. The migration agent/solicitor did not seek an extension of time to deal with the matters arising from the Tribunal’s oral hearing. In my view, the primary judge did not err in rejecting the appellant’s complaint that he had not been given an opportunity to comment on adverse information which was raised at the Tribunal hearing. The second ground of appeal involves an allegation that the primary judge erred in not finding that the Tribunal did not provide the appellant with an opportunity to comment on adverse country information. The relevant country information the subject of this ground of appeal appears to be that which is particularised in ground 1 of the appellant’s original application for judicial review (see [20] above). The appellant did not identify any additional material in the course of the hearing before me. However, as the Minister pointed out, it is evident from [51] to [52] of the Tribunal’s reasons that it raised with the appellant various country information, including the US Department of State report on Sri Lanka dated 24 May 2012, a Department of Foreign Affairs Trade Report No. 1446 dated 22 October 2012 (DFAT Report No. 1446) and a UK Home Office Country of Origin Information Report – Sri Lanka dated 7 March 2012, which was to the general effect that while certain groups of Tamils faced a continuing risk of harm in Sri Lanka, most Tamils were not at risk. It is also evident from [49] of the Tribunal’s reasons that it raised with the appellant during the course of the hearing the specific topic of the treatment of returnees and the elevated risk of harm if a returnee was a member of various groups, which included persons who were suspected of having links with the LTTE. I reject this ground of appeal for substantially similar reasons to those relied upon in rejecting the first ground of appeal, namely that the appellant was afforded, and took advantage of, an opportunity to make further submissions to the Tribunal after the hearing, which amounted to a proper opportunity for him to say whatever he wished in relation to the country information referred to by the Tribunal at the hearing.