BGN17 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BGN17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2019] FCCA 961
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – protection (subclass 866) visa – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5, 36(2)(b), (c), 424(1), 424A

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs. 1.03, 1.05A, 1.12

Cases cited:

DWN027 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 20

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34
Huynh & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Anor [2006] FCAFC 122

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (240) CLR 611

Minister for Immigration v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
MZZZW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 133
NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26
WAFK v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1293

Applicant: BGN17
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: MLG 594 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Mercuri
Hearing date: 6 September 2018
Date of Last Submission: 6 September 2018
Delivered at: Dandenong
Delivered on: 15 April 2019

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the applicant: Mr Stoller
Solicitors for the applicant: Lander and Rogers
Counsel for the respondents: Mr Aleksov
Solicitors for the respondents: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

  1. The applicant’s application for judicial review filed on 24 March 2017 and amended on 10 August 2018 be dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in a sum to be fixed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 594 of 2017

BGN17

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. By her amended application for judicial review filed 10 August 2018, the applicant sought relief in relation to a decision of the second respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the tribunal”) dated 15 March 2017.

  2. In its decision, the tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection


    (“the Minister”) made on 23 February 2016 refusing to grant the applicant a Protection (subclass 866) visa (“the visa”).

  3. The applicant raises four grounds of review in her amended application which are set out below. 

  4. By agreement of the parties, this application for judicial review was heard concurrently with the application for judicial review in proceeding number MLG 595 of 2017: BGO17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Anor [2019] FCCA 947 (“BGO17”), this application being heard first and BGO17 heard second.

Summary

  1. For the reasons that follow, this application for judicial review fails.

  2. I make the orders as sought by the first respondent.

Background and procedural history

  1. The applicant is a Malaysian citizen who was born on 1 May 1994 in Klang in the Malaysian state of Selagnor. The applicant arrived in Australia on a visitor visa on 2 November 2015 and lodged an application for a protection…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCCA 961
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal by BGN17 against a decision of the Minister for Immigration, which had dismissed an application for a protection (subclass 866) visa. The case was heard by Judge Mercuri.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) had made a jurisdictional error in its assessment of the applicant's eligibility for the visa. Specifically, the court had to determine if the AAT's errors in applying the relevant regulations and definitions, particularly concerning the definition of a "dependent child," were material to the outcome of the decision.

The court reasoned that a failure to comply with a condition or a misapplication of a criterion would ordinarily only be considered material if compliance or correct application could have resulted in a different decision. Drawing on the principles from *Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection*, the court noted that even if an error occurred, it would not amount to jurisdictional error if another valid ground existed for affirming the delegate's decision. In this instance, the AAT had erred by applying the incorrect version of regulation 1.12 and by failing to consider paragraph (b) of the dependent child definition. However, the AAT had also made specific factual findings regarding the applicant's age, education, employment capacity, living arrangements, and past employment, which led it to conclude that the applicant was not dependent on her parents. The court found that these factual findings, and the subsequent conclusion that the applicant was not a "dependent of the family head," would have precluded a finding that she was a "dependent child" regardless of the specific definition applied. The court observed that the test for dependence was the same for both dependent children and dependent relatives, and the tribunal had definitively found the applicant was not dependent on her parents.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Their Honours went on to say:… the threshold of materiality would not ordinarily be met in the event of a failure to comply with a condition if complying with the condition could have made no difference to the decision that was made in the circumstances in which that decision was made. …Ordinarily… breach of a condition cannot be material unless compliance with the condition could have resulted in the making of a different decision.[38][38] Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34 at [30]–[31]. In Hossain, it was held that although the tribunal made an error in misapplying the criterion which related to the timing of the making of the application, this error did not “rise to the level of jurisdictional error” because the tribunal also found that the public interest criterion was not met and this finding alone required the tribunal to affirm the delegate’s decision.[39][39] Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34 at [35], [37]. In the present case before this court, the tribunal applied the incorrect point in time version of regulation 1.12. Moreover, it incorrectly concluded that the applicant was not a dependent child because the applicant was over 18, without considering paragraph (b) of the definition of dependent child. However, the tribunal did consider the question of whether the applicant was a dependent relative of her parents and, in doing so, made the following findings:a)the applicant did not claim to have any disabilities;b)the applicant has a diploma in physiotherapy and therefore the capacity to find employment and earn money in her own right;c)the applicant has not lived with her parents since 2005; andd)as an adult, the applicant had obtained paid employment in Malaysia.[40][40] Court book pages 117 to 118 at paragraph [66]. The tribunal went on to conclude that:…the applicant is not wholly or substantially emotionally, psychologically, financially or any in manner (sic) dependent upon her biological mother and her biological father and is not usually resident in the family head’s house.[41][41] Court book pages 117 to 118 at paragraph [66]. The tribunal’s factual findings set out at paragraph 64.a) to 64.d) above and its conclusion at paragraph 65 above would have precluded a finding by the tribunal that the applicant was a dependent child of her parents, even under the extended definition. That is, the factual findings which led the tribunal to conclude that the applicant was not a “dependent of the family head” would have precluded the tribunal from making a finding that the applicant was a “dependent child”. The manner of determining “dependence” for the purpose of both categories of persons; i.e. child or dependent relative, is the same irrespective of whether the tribunal is to consider whether the applicant was a dependent child over 18 or a dependent relative. In either case, the tribunal found that the applicant was not dependent of her father or mother.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established