HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
KIEFEL CJ,
GAGELER AND NETTLE JJDWN027 APPELLANT
AND
THE REPUBLIC OF NAURU RESPONDENT
DWN027 v The Republic of Nauru
[2018] HCA 20
16 May 2018
M145/2017ORDER
1.Leave to adduce the additional document produced by affidavit dated 27 April 2018 refused with costs.
2.Leave to amend the notice of appeal refused with costs.
3.Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of Nauru
Representation
C M Harris SC with M L L Albert for the appellant (instructed by Phi Finney McDonald)
G R Kennett SC with A Aleksov for the respondent (instructed by Republic of Nauru)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
Migration – Refugees – Appeal as of right from Supreme Court of Nauru – Where Secretary of Department of Justice and Border Control of Nauru ("Secretary") determined appellant not refugee under Refugees Convention Act 2012 (Nr) – Where Secretary determined Nauru did not owe appellant complementary protection under Refugees Convention Act – Where Refugee Status Review Tribunal ("Tribunal") affirmed Secretary's determinations on basis appellant could reasonably relocate within country of origin – Where Supreme Court of Nauru affirmed Tribunal's decision – Whether appellant's ability reasonably to relocate within country of origin relevant to claim for complementary protection – Whether Tribunal failed to take into account factors relevant to appellant's ability reasonably to relocate – Whether Tribunal required under Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) to give primary consideration to best interests of appellant's child.
Words and phrases – "best interests of children", "best interests of the child", "complementary protection", "internal relocation", "reasonable internal relocation", "reasonable relocation", "refugee", "well-founded fear of persecution".
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), Arts 2, 3(1).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).
Nauru (High Court Appeals) Act 1976 (Cth), s 5.
Refugees Convention Act 2012 (Nr), ss 4, 43.
KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER AND NETTLE JJ. This is an appeal as of right, pursuant to s 5 of the Nauru (High Court Appeals) Act 1976 (Cth), from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Nauru (Khan J). The Supreme Court dismissed the appellant's appeal brought under s 43 of the Refugees Convention Act 2012 (Nr) ("the Refugees Act") against a decision of the Refugee Status Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal"). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of the Secretary of the Department of Justice and Border Control, made pursuant to s 6 of the Refugees Act, to reject the appellant's application to be recognised as a refugee in accordance with the Act or as a person to whom the Republic of Nauru ("Nauru") owes complementary protection under the Act.
The facts
As appears from the Tribunal's reasons, at the time of the hearing before the Tribunal the appellant was a 31 year old Sunni Muslim man of Pashtun ethnicity, and the sixth of nine siblings. He was born in the Hashtnagri neighbourhood…
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- Case
- [2018] HCA 20
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court included whether the Refugee Status Review Tribunal erred in applying a "reasonable relocation" test to the appellant's claim for complementary protection, and whether the Tribunal failed to consider Nauru's international obligation to give primary consideration to the best interests of the appellant's child when assessing the possibility of internal relocation within Pakistan. The appellant also argued that the Tribunal failed to consider his objection that any relocation within Pakistan would compel him to return to the original area of persecution.
The Court reasoned that the appellant had not raised the issue of the best interests of his child before the Tribunal, nor had he adduced persuasive evidence that his child's interests would be adversely affected by the refusal of his claim. The Court emphasised that while tribunals have an inquisitorial role, they are generally bound to respond to the case articulated by the applicant, and the obligation to investigate unarticulated claims is confined to those apparent on the face of the material. Consequently, the Court refused leave to adduce an additional document and refused leave to amend the notice of appeal.
The appeal was dismissed. The Court found that the Tribunal had not erred in applying a reasonable internal relocation test to the appellant's claim for complementary protection, nor had it failed to take into account the interests of the appellant's child, as these matters were not properly raised or evidenced before the Tribunal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to adduce the additional document produced by affidavit dated 27 April 2018 refused with costs.
2. Leave to amend the notice of appeal refused with costs.
3. Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER AND NETTLE JJ
After the hearing of the appeal, the appellant filed an affidavit providing to the Court an advance unedited version of General Comment No 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, released by the United Nations Committee against Torture, which is said to have replaced CAT General Comment No 1: Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22 (Refoulement and Communications)[5]. The appellant did not attempt to explain the relevance of this document to the issues that arose in the appeal, and, given its status as an advance, rather than a final, document, it is not apparent whether it has any force or effect. Accordingly, leave to adduce the document is refused.Ground 2: Failure to take into account Nauru's international obligation to give primary consideration to best interests of children in actions concerning children[5]16th sess, UN Doc A/53/44, annex IX, (1997). Section 4(2) of the Refugees Act provides that Nauru must not expel or return any person to the frontiers of territories in breach of Nauru's international obligations. Relevantly, Art 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) ("the CRC") provides:"In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by ... courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration." The nub of the appellant's argument in support of Ground 2 was that the Tribunal erred in their determination of the appellant's claim for complementary protection by failing to have regard to the best interests of his child. More specifically, it was submitted that, as a party to the CRC, Nauru is bound by the international obligation in Art 3(1) to make the best interests of the child a primary consideration in all actions concerning children and, therefore, that it would be contrary to s 4(2) of the Refugees Act for Nauru to expel a non-resident contrary to the best interests of his or her children. Accordingly, it was contended, the Tribunal were bound to determine the appellant's claim for complementary protection according to the best interests of his young child, but had failed to do so. The argument raises questions as to the construction of both the CRC and the Refugees Act which it is unnecessary to address. The appellant did not contend before the Tribunal that the Tribunal were bound to decide his claim for complementary protection by reference to the best interests of his child, and, consequently, he did not adduce any persuasive evidence that his child's best interests would be adversely affected by the refusal of his claim. In the circumstances of this case, that must be regarded as determinative of the issue. Although an administrative tribunal's process is to some extent inquisitorial and, depending on the nature and circumstances of a given application, a tribunal may be obligated to go beyond the case articulated by the applicant, the obligation to do so is confined to unarticulated claims which are apparent on the face of the material before the tribunal[6]. As Kirby J emphasised in Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[7] in relation to the tribunal in that case:"The Tribunal acts in a generally inquisitorial way. This does not mean that a party before it can simply present the facts and leave it to the Tribunal to search out, and find, any available basis which theoretically the [statute creating the Tribunal] provides for relief. This Court has rejected that approach to the Tribunal's duties. The function of the Tribunal, as of the delegate, is to respond to the case that the applicant advances. A fortiori this is the function of the [appellate court] in determining any application to it for judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal." (footnotes omitted)[6]See, in particular, NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 at 18-19 [58], [60].[7](2003) 77 ALJR 1088 at 1100 [78]; 197 ALR 389 at 405; [2003] HCA 26.