BGO17 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BGO17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2019] FCCA 947
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – protection (subclass 866) visa – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth).

Cases cited:

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; 253 FCR 496; 70 AAR 413; 253 FLR 496
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; 92 ALJR 780; 359 ALR 1

Huynh & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Anor [2006] FCAFC 122; 152 FCR 576; 232 ALR 1

NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1; 219 ALR 27
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210; 253 FCR 475

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431; 136 ALD 547

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259; 70 ALJR 568; 136 ALR 481; 41 ALD 1

WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; 236 FCR 593; 75 ALR 630; 75 ALD 630

Applicant: BGO17
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: MLG 595 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Mercuri
Hearing date: 6 September 2018
Date of Last Submission: 6 September 2018
Delivered at: Dandenong
Delivered on: 15 April 2019

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr White
Solicitors for the Applicant: Lander & Rogers Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Aleksov
Solicitors for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

  1. The applicant’s application for judicial review filed on 24 March 2017, amended on 9 August 2018 and further amended on 13 September 2018 be dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in a sum to be fixed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 595 of 2017

BGO17

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application filed by the applicant on 24 March 2017, amended on 9 August 2018 and further amended on 13 September 2018, for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the tribunal”) dated 15 March 2017. 

  2. In its decision the tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister, the Department for Immigration and Border Protection (“the Minister”) made on 18 April 2016 refusing to grant the applicant a Protection (subclass 866) visa (“the visa”).

  3. In the applicant’s amended application, the applicant raises six grounds of review. At the hearing however, counsel for the applicant indicated that the applicant was no longer pressing ground four and no submissions were made in respect of that ground.

  4. It is not in dispute that at the time of the hearing before the tribunal on


    2 March…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCCA 947
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal by BGO17 against a decision of the Minister for Immigration, which had dismissed an application for a protection (subclass 866) visa. The case was heard by Judge Mercuri.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had made a jurisdictional error in its assessment of the applicant's eligibility for the visa, specifically concerning the definition of a "dependent child" and the timing of the application. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had misapplied relevant regulations and failed to consider the applicant's actual situation regarding reliance on his parents.

Judge Mercuri considered the principle that a failure to comply with a condition is generally not material unless compliance could have led to a different decision. This principle was informed by the High Court's decision in *Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection*, which held that an error does not constitute jurisdictional error if another valid ground exists for affirming the original decision. While acknowledging that the Tribunal may not have applied the correct version of regulation 1.12 or expressly considered the definition of a dependent child under regulation 1.03, the court found that the Tribunal's factual conclusions, particularly regarding the applicant's long-term care by his aunt, would have precluded any other outcome. The court also addressed the applicant's argument that the Tribunal erred by focusing on the applicant's capacity to work rather than his actual reliance on his parents, noting that the Federal Court in *Huynh & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Anor* had established that necessity is not a requirement for establishing "reliance" under the relevant regulations.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Their Honours went on to say:…the threshold of materiality would not ordinarily be met in the event of a failure to comply with a condition if complying with the condition could have made no difference to the decision that was made in the circumstances in which that decision was made. …Ordinarily… breach of a condition cannot be material unless compliance with the condition could have resulted in the making of a different decision.[31][31] Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; 92 ALJR 780; 359 ALR 1 at [30]-[31]. In Hossain’s case, it was held that although the tribunal made an error in misapplying the criterion which related to the timing of the making of the application, this error did not “rise to the level of jurisdictional error” because, the tribunal also found that the public interest criterion was also not met and this finding alone required the tribunal to affirm the delegate’s decision.[32][32] Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; 92 ALJR 780; 359 ALR 1 at [35]-[37]. Whilst it is clear that the tribunal did not apply the correct point in time version of regulation 1.12 and did not expressly have regard to the definition of dependent child in (b) of regulation 1.03, its factual conclusions set out above, which were reasonably open to it on the evidence before it, would have precluded any other conclusion had it applied these provisions. This is particularly so given the conclusion reached that the applicant’s aunt had been his primary carer and guardian for many years prior to his arrival in Australia. Moreover, to the extent that the tribunal focussed on the concept of the applicant’s capacity to work as a factor in determining the issue of “dependence”, it was argued on behalf of the applicant that regulation 1.05A requires the tribunal to consider the applicant’s actual situation rather than any “need”: to rely upon his parents. It was said that in accepting that “the applicant is materially (reliant) on his parents who are working in Australia”[33], that should have been determinative of the issue. [33] Court book page 143 at paragraph [65]. It was conceded by counsel for the Minister that the Full Court of the Federal Court decision in Huynh & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Anor [2006] FCAFC 122; 152 FCR 576; 232 ALR 1 (“Huynh”) stands for the proposition that necessity is not a touchstone or test for “reliance” in the context of regulation 1.03 or 1.05A. In Huynh’s case, Lander and Rares JJ relevantly said:In our opinion, the words of the regulations, on their proper construction, do not carry with them any implication of there being a necessity to provide the relevant support by the parent for the child to qualify as a ‘dependent child’.[34][34] Huynh & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Anor [2006] FCAFC 122; 152 FCR 576; 232 ALR 1 at [39].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established