Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210

Appeal from: CRY16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 1549
File number: VID 831 of 2017
Judges: ROBERTSON, MURPHY AND KERR JJ
Date of judgment: 14 December 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – judicial review by that Court of decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse to grant the respondent a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) Subclass 790 visa but on the different basis of relocation – that Court found jurisdictional error on the part of the Authority to be established – whether appellable error on the part of the primary judge in concluding that the Authority had acted unreasonably in not considering whether to give the respondent an effective opportunity to address the issue of relocation which the Authority found dispositive
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J, 36(2B), 65, Pt 7AA

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) r 4.43

Cases cited:

BMB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 169

DBE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 942

DZU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 851; 321 FLR 306

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332

SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40; 233 CLR 18

SZBELv Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152

SZQPYv Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1133

Yasmin v Attorney-General of Commonwealth of Australia [2015] FCAFC 145; 236 FCR 169

Date of hearing: 8 November 2017
Date of last submissions: 29 November 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 88
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr GR Kennett SC with Mr BD Kaplan
Solicitor for the Appellant: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr CJ Horan QC with Ms C Symons
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Victoria Legal Aid

ORDERS

VID 831 of 2017
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Appellant

AND:

CRY16

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

ROBERTSON, MURPHY AND KERR JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

14 DECEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

Introduction

  1. This appeal is from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia given on 6 July 2017 quashing the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) made on 16 August 2016. The Authority had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse to grant to CRY16 (the respondent), a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) Subclass 790…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 210
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court involved the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection as the appellant and CRY16, the respondent, in an appeal concerning the refusal of a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) Subclass 790 visa. The Federal Circuit Court had previously reviewed the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) affirming the delegate's refusal to grant the respondent a visa, finding that the Authority had committed a jurisdictional error. The central issue in this appeal was whether the primary judge of the Federal Circuit Court had erred in concluding that the Authority had acted unreasonably by not considering whether to give the respondent an effective opportunity to address the issue of relocation, which the Authority found to be dispositive.

The court examined the principles of procedural fairness and whether they applied to the Authority, even though the statutory framework did not explicitly provide for them. The court considered whether the statutory discretions of the Authority must be exercised reasonably, as held by Driver J in DZU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor. The court found that the Authority's failure to consider giving the respondent an opportunity to address the relocation issue constituted a failure to exercise its statutory discretion reasonably. The court held that the primary judge's conclusion that the Authority acted unreasonably in this respect was justified, as it was essential for the respondent to have an opportunity to comment on the relocation to Beirut to avoid any potential injustice.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the respondent, as agreed or taxed. The decision underscored the importance of procedural fairness and the reasonable exercise of statutory discretions by the Authority, even in the context of limited review processes.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In relation to the respondent’s claims for complementary protection, the Authority found that the respondent faced a real risk of significant harm in his place of habitual residence but that he could reasonably relocate to Beirut where there would not be a real risk that he would suffer significant harm (cf s 36(2B)(a)). The decision of the Federal Circuit Court The essential reasons of the primary judge were as follows. First, the primary judge noted that the Authority made a decision adverse to the respondent, but on a different basis to the decision made by the delegate. While the delegate found that the respondent was not at risk, the Authority concluded, at [29]: “I accept the applicant may face a real chance of harm from sectarian violence in his home neighbourhood.” As the Authority had accepted that there was a real chance of serious harm to the respondent it was also required to determine whether or not the chance of harm related to all areas of the country (as required by s 5J(1)(c) of the Migration Act), and whether or not it was reasonable for the respondent to relocate, within the meaning of s 36(2B). The primary judge then said there was no discussion in the decision of the delegate as to the potential relocation of the respondent within Lebanon. In short, the primary judge said, there was nothing in the material in the Court Book to indicate that at any time the respondent was on notice that the decision-maker would be considering whether or not he could relocate within Lebanon in order to avoid the harm that he feared. The primary judge said, at [13], two points arose in the case. The first was whether or not the respondent should have been given notice of the location to which it was thought that he may relocate, in order to enable him to comment upon it; and secondly how (if at all) this could be achieved within the strictures of Pt 7AA. The primary judge concluded first, at [15], that if an applicant was expected to prove a negative, that is that they cannot relocate to anywhere else in a country or region, then it would place an applicant in an almost impossible situation if they were not given any notice of where the decision-maker was considering that they could relocate. The primary judge was therefore persuaded that the respondent had not been accorded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in the context of this particular case, based upon the principles underpinning the decision in SZBELv Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152, as applied in SZQPYv Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1133. The primary judge then noted that the rules of procedural fairness do not apply to the Authority, save to the extent provided for in the statute. Nonetheless, it had been held by Driver J that the statutory discretions of the Authority must be exercised reasonably: DZU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCCA 851; 321 FLR 306 (at [120]), relying upon Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332. Thus, his Honour found, “it was unreasonable for the Authority not to consider giving the applicant an effective opportunity to address the issue that it found dispositive” (at [122]). As a result, the primary judge concluded that the Authority had acted unreasonably in the relevant sense.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Division 5 of Part 7AA was in the following terms:Division 5—Exercise of powers and functions by Immigration Assessment Authority 473FA How Immigration Assessment Authority is to exercise its functions (1)The Immigration Assessment Authority, in carrying out its functions under this Act, is to pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of limited review that is efficient, quick, free of bias and consistent with Division 3 (conduct of review). Note:Under section 473DB the Immigration Assessment Authority is generally required to undertake a review on the papers. (2)The Immigration Assessment Authority, in reviewing a decision, is not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence. 473FB Practice directions (1)The President may, in writing, issue directions, not inconsistent with this Act or the regulations as to: (a) the operations of the Immigration Assessment Authority; and (b) the conduct of reviews by the Authority. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), the directions may: (a)relate to the application of efficient processing practices in the conduct of reviews by the Immigration Assessment Authority; or (b)set out procedures to be followed by persons giving new information to the Authority in writing or at interview. (3)The Immigration Assessment Authority must, as far as practicable, comply with the directions. However, non-compliance with any direction does not mean that the Authority’s decision on a review is an invalid decision.(4)If the Immigration Assessment Authority deals with a review of a decision in a way that complies with the directions, the Authority is not required to take any other action in dealing with the review. (5)The Immigration Assessment Authority is not required to accept new information or documents from a person, or to hear or continue to hear a person at an interview, if the person fails to comply with a relevant direction that applies to the person. The decision of the Authority As we have said, the Authority found that the respondent may face a real chance of harm from “sectarian violence” in his place of habitual residence (cf s 5J(1)(a), (b)). However, the Authority also found that respondent’s fear of harm from sectarian violence did not relate to all areas of Lebanon. The Authority found that the respondent could relocate to Beirut where he would not face a real chance of persecution for any Refugees Convention reason (cf s 5J(1)(c)). This, in turn, meant that the respondent was not a refugee: s 5H(1). In relation to the respondent’s claims for complementary protection, the Authority found that the respondent faced a real risk of significant harm in his place of habitual residence but that he could reasonably relocate to Beirut where there would not be a real risk that he would suffer significant harm (cf s 36(2B)(a)). The decision of the Federal Circuit Court The essential reasons of the primary judge were as follows. First, the primary judge noted that the Authority made a decision adverse to the respondent, but on a different basis to the decision made by the delegate. While the delegate found that the respondent was not at risk, the Authority concluded, at [29]: “I accept the applicant may face a real chance of harm from sectarian violence in his home neighbourhood.” As the Authority had accepted that there was a real chance of serious harm to the respondent it was also required to determine whether or not the chance of harm related to all areas of the country (as required by s 5J(1)(c) of the Migration Act), and whether or not it was reasonable for the respondent to relocate, within the meaning of s 36(2B).