FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210
Appeal from: CRY16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 1549 File number: VID 831 of 2017 Judges: ROBERTSON, MURPHY AND KERR JJ Date of judgment: 14 December 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – judicial review by that Court of decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse to grant the respondent a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) Subclass 790 visa but on the different basis of relocation – that Court found jurisdictional error on the part of the Authority to be established – whether appellable error on the part of the primary judge in concluding that the Authority had acted unreasonably in not considering whether to give the respondent an effective opportunity to address the issue of relocation which the Authority found dispositive Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J, 36(2B), 65, Pt 7AA
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) r 4.43
Cases cited: BMB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 169
DBE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 942
DZU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 851; 321 FLR 306
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332
SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40; 233 CLR 18
SZBELv Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152
SZQPYv Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1133
Yasmin v Attorney-General of Commonwealth of Australia [2015] FCAFC 145; 236 FCR 169
Date of hearing: 8 November 2017 Date of last submissions: 29 November 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 88 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr GR Kennett SC with Mr BD Kaplan Solicitor for the Appellant: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr CJ Horan QC with Ms C Symons Solicitor for the First Respondent: Victoria Legal Aid ORDERS
VID 831 of 2017 BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Appellant
AND: CRY16
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
ROBERTSON, MURPHY AND KERR JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
14 DECEMBER 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
Introduction
This appeal is from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia given on 6 July 2017 quashing the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) made on 16 August 2016. The Authority had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse to grant to CRY16 (the respondent), a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) Subclass 790…
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- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 210
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the principles of procedural fairness and whether they applied to the Authority, even though the statutory framework did not explicitly provide for them. The court considered whether the statutory discretions of the Authority must be exercised reasonably, as held by Driver J in DZU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor. The court found that the Authority's failure to consider giving the respondent an opportunity to address the relocation issue constituted a failure to exercise its statutory discretion reasonably. The court held that the primary judge's conclusion that the Authority acted unreasonably in this respect was justified, as it was essential for the respondent to have an opportunity to comment on the relocation to Beirut to avoid any potential injustice.
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the respondent, as agreed or taxed. The decision underscored the importance of procedural fairness and the reasonable exercise of statutory discretions by the Authority, even in the context of limited review processes.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Division 5 of Part 7AA was in the following terms:Division 5—Exercise of powers and functions by Immigration Assessment Authority 473FA How Immigration Assessment Authority is to exercise its functions (1)The Immigration Assessment Authority, in carrying out its functions under this Act, is to pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of limited review that is efficient, quick, free of bias and consistent with Division 3 (conduct of review). Note:Under section 473DB the Immigration Assessment Authority is generally required to undertake a review on the papers. (2)The Immigration Assessment Authority, in reviewing a decision, is not bound by technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence. 473FB Practice directions (1)The President may, in writing, issue directions, not inconsistent with this Act or the regulations as to: (a) the operations of the Immigration Assessment Authority; and (b) the conduct of reviews by the Authority. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), the directions may: (a)relate to the application of efficient processing practices in the conduct of reviews by the Immigration Assessment Authority; or (b)set out procedures to be followed by persons giving new information to the Authority in writing or at interview. (3)The Immigration Assessment Authority must, as far as practicable, comply with the directions. However, non-compliance with any direction does not mean that the Authority’s decision on a review is an invalid decision.(4)If the Immigration Assessment Authority deals with a review of a decision in a way that complies with the directions, the Authority is not required to take any other action in dealing with the review. (5)The Immigration Assessment Authority is not required to accept new information or documents from a person, or to hear or continue to hear a person at an interview, if the person fails to comply with a relevant direction that applies to the person. The decision of the Authority As we have said, the Authority found that the respondent may face a real chance of harm from “sectarian violence” in his place of habitual residence (cf s 5J(1)(a), (b)). However, the Authority also found that respondent’s fear of harm from sectarian violence did not relate to all areas of Lebanon. The Authority found that the respondent could relocate to Beirut where he would not face a real chance of persecution for any Refugees Convention reason (cf s 5J(1)(c)). This, in turn, meant that the respondent was not a refugee: s 5H(1). In relation to the respondent’s claims for complementary protection, the Authority found that the respondent faced a real risk of significant harm in his place of habitual residence but that he could reasonably relocate to Beirut where there would not be a real risk that he would suffer significant harm (cf s 36(2B)(a)). The decision of the Federal Circuit Court The essential reasons of the primary judge were as follows. First, the primary judge noted that the Authority made a decision adverse to the respondent, but on a different basis to the decision made by the delegate. While the delegate found that the respondent was not at risk, the Authority concluded, at [29]: “I accept the applicant may face a real chance of harm from sectarian violence in his home neighbourhood.” As the Authority had accepted that there was a real chance of serious harm to the respondent it was also required to determine whether or not the chance of harm related to all areas of the country (as required by s 5J(1)(c) of the Migration Act), and whether or not it was reasonable for the respondent to relocate, within the meaning of s 36(2B).