BPA19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1139
•23 July 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
BPA19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1139
File number(s): MLG 803 of 2024 Judgment of: JUDGE D HUMPHREYS Date of judgment: 23 July 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Temporary Protection (subclass 785) visa – Immigration Assessment Authority – whether the Applicant was denied procedural fairness – whether the Authority was required to inform the applicant of ‘new issues’ – grounds of judicial review reveal no jurisdictional error – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(aa) 46A, 473CB, 473DC (3), 473DD
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 4.41
Cases cited: Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510
DBE16 v Minister for Immigration Border Protection [2017] FCA 942
Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437
Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 71 Date of hearing: 14 July 2025 Place: Perth Solicitor for the Applicant: Self-represented litigant Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms Scott, Australian Government Solicitor Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
MLG 803 of 2024 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BPA19
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
DATE OF ORDER:
23 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Application is dismissed.
2.The Applicant is to pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $6,000.00.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
INTRODUCTION
This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) dated 14 March 2024, affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the delegate) to refuse to grant the applicant a Temporary Protection (subclass 785) visa (the visa).
For the reasons set out below, the application must be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He arrived in Australia on 21 October 2012 as an “unauthorised maritime arrival.”
On 16 December 2015, the Minister ‘lifted the bar’ pursuant to s 46a of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) and invited the applicant to apply for a protection visa.
On 27 June 2017, the applicant applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV). The applicant claimed to fear harm from the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), who had previously abducted and threatened him, and who had forced the applicant’s father to sign documents transferring properties in Sri Lanka into the name of the TMVP leader. The applicant claimed to fear being subjected to serious harm, including kidnapping, extortion and death at the hands of the TMVP if he were to be returned to Sri Lanka.
On 22 March 2018, a delegate of the first respondent refused to grant the applicant the SHEV.
On 27 March 2018, the applicant applied to the Authority for review of the 22 March 2018 decision.
On 22 October 2018, a differently constituted Authority affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant the SHEV.
On 18 November 2019, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) refused to grant the applicant an extension of time to seek judicial review of the 22 October 2018 Authority decision.
On 7 August 2023, the Minister lifted the s 48B bar and invited the applicant to apply for a further protection visa.
On 17 August 2023, the applicant applied for the visa, which is the subject of the current review Application. The applicant claimed to fear harm from the TMVP, referring to previously mentioned extortion and abduction, and referred to his details being known by the TMVP as a result of a data breach.
On 27 November 2023, the delegate refused to grant the applicant the visa.
On 8 January 2024, the application for the visa was referred to the Authority.
On 14 March 2024, the Authority affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant the visa.
THE AUTHORITY’S DECISION
At [5] – [20], the Authority considered the material before it, given by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Act.
The Authority noted that in a written statement dated 29 January 2024, the applicant advanced a new claim that his sister was advised by the local Divisional Secretary in Sri Lanka that the TMVP had permanently taken control of the applicant’s properties in 2016 [10]. Further, the applicant believed that the TMVP continued to visit and harass his family in Sri Lanka, as the business licences for the businesses that operate from those properties are still issued in the name of the applicant’s family [10].
Despite not being satisfied that this material could not have been provided to the delegate, the Authority was satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering the applicant’s new claim and found that this new information satisfied both s 473DD(b)(ii) and (a) of the Act, and accordingly took the new claim for protection into account [11] – [13].
Whilst the Authority noted the applicant had requested for it to exercise the discretionary power under s 473DC(3) to invite the applicant to give oral evidence at an interview, it was not satisfied that a further interview was warranted given the multiple opportunities the applicant had already been given the opportunity to put forward his claims [21] – [23].
At [24], the Authority summarised the applicant’s claims for protection. Relevantly, it noted the following:
·The applicant’s family owned three commercial properties on which they ran three separate businesses: Business A, B and C accordingly. The applicant claims the TMVP harassed and threatened to kill them if they did not hand over the properties. The applicant’s father signed over business A to the TMVP after the applicant was kidnapped, after which they released the applicant. In 2012, the applicant was again kidnapped and threatened with death if they did not sign over the remaining businesses. During this ordeal, the applicant witnessed the murder of two men who were also kidnapped by the TMVP. Subsequently, the applicant signed over the remaining businesses to the TMVP, and he and his father were released. The applicant then fled to Australia, arriving in October 2012.
·In 2013, the applicant continued to face harassment from the TMVP while in Australia. He claims he received phone calls notifying him that his father had been kidnapped again and demanded he sign further documents, and he did so. The applicant reported this incident to the Victorian police.
·The TMVP continued to control and operate the businesses, despite the business licenses remaining in the family’s name. In 2019 and 2021, the applicant claimed his mother and sister were facing harassment by the TMVP, who, amongst other things, sought information about the applicant.
·The applicant claimed that details about him were published online in a data breach in 2022, and had concerns about the TMVP finding out that he was in Australia and had spoken out against them.
·The applicant claimed that the TMVP did not want him to return to Sri Lanka as they did not want him to obtain control of the family businesses or report the murders witnessed by the applicant. They would come after him, seeking to silence and kill him, and he would have no protection due to the powerful nature and influence of the TMVP.
·The applicant also claimed that since he served time in detention with former LTTE members, the TMVP would seek to harm him for these links.
·More generally, the applicant also claimed he would face harm in Sri Lanka due to his Tamil ethnicity, and the data breach would put the applicant at greater risk of being subjected to the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA).
·Finally, the applicant claimed he suffered from a range of mental and physical health problems that he would not be able to access treatment for in Sri Lanka.
Whilst the Authority accepted that the applicant suffered from a range of physical and mental health problems [27], and that past economic crisis in Sri Lanka had resulted in problems for the healthcare system [120], it did not accept that the applicant would be denied access to healthcare in Sri Lanka due to a policy of persecution or discrimination [120]. The Authority was not satisfied that any delays or difficulties the applicant may face in obtaining treatment or medication would amount to the applicant facing a real chance of serious harm [120].
At [121], the Authority accepted that there was some stigma associated with mental illness in Sri Lanka, however, it found that such a stigma did not amount to serious or significant harm. Further, at [122], the Authority did not accept that the applicant’s mental health issues were so debilitating that he would be prevented from obtaining employment.
The Authority, at [34] – [35], noted that it had concerns regarding the applicant’s principal claims for protection due to the fact that he had provided inconsistent information as to these issues to both the Department and the Authority over the years he had been in Australia. Whilst the Authority accepted that some of the inconsistent information provided by the applicant pertained to relatively minor issues, it found substantial parts of the inconsistent information related to important elements of his claims and that this information was markedly different from what he said at other times [37]. In the Authority’s view, many of these differences were glaring and significant, and called into question whether the applicant had provided a true account of his life.
The Authority at [38] – [41] considered documentation and evidence before it regarding the purported ownership of the three commercial properties by the applicant’s family. The Authority accepted that the applicant’s family had owned business A. The Authority also accepted that the family owned and resided in a separate residence at the rear of the property [54].
However, the Authority did not accept that the applicant or his family ever owned businesses B and C, given that the applicant had not provided any documentary evidence to support their existence, and the delegate’s open-source research did not identify any such businesses. The Authority found this especially concerning considering the applicant’s claims that the businesses were formally transferred to him in 2012 and that formal legal advice having being sought, should leave a ‘paper trail’ of some sort [42] – [46].
Moreover, while the Authority accepted that Business A had been turned into a Pizza Hut, owned by Gamma Pizzakraft, it did not accept that the TMVP had secured control over, or owned, the business operating from those premises [47] – [54].
At [55] – [59], in relation to the applicants claim that in 2009 he was kidnapped by the TMVP, held for several days and that the TMVP threatened to kill him if the applicant’s father did not hand over control of business A, the Authority noted that in the applicant’s September and October 2023 protection visa interview, the applicant gave an entirely different account. The Authority noted that in the September interview, the applicant claimed that his father had been kidnapped by the TMVP and that they demanded the applicant surrender himself to the TMVP, which he did. In the October interview, the applicant had again indicated that he was not kidnapped, rather, he had received a call from the TMVP stating they had his father. The applicant stated that the TMVP did not detain him for any period of time, that the events occurred on a single day, and that the TMVP did not harm him. The applicant stated that his father signed a power of attorney, and they were able to leave.
At [64], the Authority did not accept that a person, even a person with a profile like the applicants, could misremember whether he was kidnapped and held for multiple days in 2009, or whether his father was kidnapped. After considering all the issues carefully, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was ever kidnapped in 2009, nor was his father. Further, the Authority did not accept that in 2009, the applicant’s father, or anybody else, signed a lease, a power of attorney, or any other document which allowed the TMVP, or any other party, to operate a business at Business A.
The Authority found inconsistencies in the applicant’s claims regarding the kidnapping, extortion and witnessing executions in 2012. The applicant, across several years, offered various accounts of these events, which varied in relation to the length of time he was kidnapped, whether he was mistreated or tortured, what he signed, whether he witnessed two men being shot, or whether he was kidnapped by the TMVP or suspected members of the LTTE. The Authority did not accept the applicant’s explanation for why the claims were inconsistent, finding that the inconsistencies were significant when considered cumulatively [75] – [76].
The Authority also noted the complaint made with the Sri Lankan Human Rights Commission by the applicant’s father in 2012. The Authority gave the complaint little weight as the document provided did not contain any details about the type of threat reported, whether the Commission considered it credible or any action that was taken [73]. The Authority also gave it little weight since it does not address the main incidents alleged by the applicant in August 2012, namely the kidnapping and extortion.
Ultimately, the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant was kidnapped and mistreated in 2012, that he signed any document transferring business licenses or property to TMVP, or that he witnessed the execution of two men by the TMVP.
At [77], in relation to the applicant’s claim that in 2013 he faced extortion by the TMVP while he was in Australia, the Authority noted that the applicant had provided several versions of this event. At [86], the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant had provided a true account of this claim. The Authority noted that the applicant had not provided consistent information about what happened to him, including information about when this incident occurred, how the TMVP found him in Australia, exactly what type of document was signed, who he signed the documents to, and when he reported the matter to police. At [89], the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant had told the truth about this claim, and was not satisfied that this event, or any event like it, occurred, nor that his father was kidnapped in 2013 or 2014, and that the applicant was ever identified in Australia by the TMVP.
The Authority considered the applicant’s assertions that the TMVP had visited his family since 2013. Having rejected the applicant’s claims to have been in a long-running and ongoing property dispute with the TMVP, the Authority was not satisfied that the TMVP had ever visited his family after he departed Sri Lanka [92] – [95].
At [99], the Authority noted that the applicant claimed that Tamils cannot live safely in Sri Lanka, due to being perceived as LTTE supporters. However, based on country information, the Authority did not accept that the applicant would be perceived to have any connection to the LTTE or would otherwise face a real chance of harm as a Tamil [103]. Whilst the applicant claimed that his status as a business owner would lead to harm, the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant would face harm, persecution or discrimination in Sri Lanka for these reasons [104]. Similarly, at [111], the Authority did not accept the applicant’s claims that he would be imputed with support of the LTTE due to his Tamil ethnicity.
Whilst the applicant raised concerns that he would be imputed with a pro-LTTE political opinion due to the fact that he had spent “five years in detention with former members of the LTTE”, the Authority did not accept that this had occurred and considered this claim to be entirely speculative [112] – [113].
At [107], the Authority noted that the applicant asserted that he was affected by a 2022 data breach, and that if returned to Sri Lanka, he would be at risk of harm on this basis. Whilst the Authority accepted that the authorities in Sri Lanka may know about this material, in its view, the material released during the breach was largely information that would be immediately apparent to Sri Lankan authorities should the applicant be returned to Sri Lanka [110]. Further, as the Authority found that the applicant was not of interest to the TMVP or Sri Lankan authorities, it was not satisfied that anyone in Sri Lanka would care about this data. As such, the Authority found that the data breach would not lead to the applicant facing a real chance of harm in Sri Lanka.
At [124], the Authority noted that the applicant claimed that his illegal departure and attempt to claim asylum in Australia would lead to him facing harm in Sri Lanka. Whilst the Authority accepted that upon the applicant’s arrival in Sri Lanka, he could face questioning or potential charges, it concluded at [130] that this would amount to a small fine, and depending on his plea, possibly a period of bail upon return, but he would be otherwise free to go. At [135], the Authority concluded that the applicant would not face a real chance of persecution arising from his illegal departure or from his status as a failed asylum seeker.
Consequently, at [135], the Authority did not accept that the applicant would face a real chance of persecution arising from his illegal departure or from his status as a failed asylum seeker, or any combination of these, or his other claims. The Authority concluded that the applicant did not meet the requirements of the definition of refugee in s 5H(1) or s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
Whilst the Authority accepted that the applicant may face some social stigma and monitoring as a result of being a failed asylum seeker, it was not satisfied that this amounted to serious or significant harm [134], [141] – [142]. At [143], the Authority concluded that there were no substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being returned from Australia to a receiving country, there was a real risk that the applicant would suffer significant harm. Therefore, the applicant did not meet s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
GROUNDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The applicants advance three grounds of judicial review contained in an Originating Application filed with the Court on 3 April 2024. They are as follows:
1. The Second Respondent denied the Applicant procedural fairness in its failure to alert the applicant to new issues arising before the Authority of which the applicant was not previously aware, and in the alternative the Second Respondent denied procedural fairness because the Authority’s reasoning departed from the Department’s reasoning, resulting in a practical injustice to the Applicant.
2. The Second Respondent constructively failed to review the decision of the delegate, and failed to conduct a review as required under section 473CC(1) of the Act, by failing to inform the applicant of issues arising on review, and failing to consider its discretion under section 473DC to get new information from the applicant.
3. I have made an application for assistance through Victoria Legal Aid and am waiting for a decision.
THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
The applicant appeared before the Court unrepresented. He was assisted by an interpreter. Prior to the hearing commencing, the Court ensured that the applicant was in possession of a copy of the relevant Court books and that the first respondent’s written submissions had been translated to him. The Court also ensured the applicant had access to a pen and paper so he could take notes during the course of the hearing should he wish to do so.
At the commencement of the hearing, the Court explained it was undertaking judicial review, not merits review, and the difference between the two types of review. The Court also explained the procedure by which the hearing would be undertaken.
Despite Court orders, no written submissions or other material were provided to the Court by the applicant in support of his case. The applicant told the Court that the Authority simply did not believe him. He was not in a position to provide the Authority with more material.
He said members of the TMVP were still at large and perpetrating murders and threats.
The applicant stated that had he been asked by the Authority to elaborate further, he would have done so. The Court took the applicant through the significant number of times he had provided additional material and submissions to both the delegate and the Authority does not accept that the applicant was unable to elaborate on his claims. He had multiple opportunities to do so.
The Court took the applicant through each of his written grounds of judicial review contained in his Initiating Application. The applicant told the Court that he did not draft the grounds of review, he was helped by a friend, and he was unable to say anything in support of these written grounds.
At the conclusion of the first respondent’s oral submissions, the applicant was asked if he wished to state anything in reply. He answered “No”.
THE FIRST RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
In oral submissions, the first respondent noted all the opportunities the applicant had been provided with to elaborate on his claims and that certain matters had not been raised prior to the Tribunal hearing.
By ground one, the applicant contends that the Authority denied him procedural fairness in failing to alert the applicant to new issues arising, and by departing from the delegate’s reasoning.
This ground fails on a factual level. Relevantly, the Authority did not depart from the delegate’s findings nor the delegate’s reasoning. In particular:
·The delegate rejected the applicant’s claims about the events related to an alleged property dispute with the TMVP, based upon significant inconsistencies, vague and unpersuasive evidence and an absence of corroborative evidence (CB 484 – 488). The Authority rejected these claims for the same reasons [30] – [91].
·On account of the applicant’s profile and country information, the delegate did not accept that the applicant was at risk or chance of harm based on his Tamil ethnicity or by being imputed with a pro-LTTE opinion CB 495 – 496). The Authority addressed these claims in a similar manner, referring to country information to find that the applicant faced no risk or chance of harm as a Tamil and due to the absence of an LTTE profile [111] – [114].
·The delegate accepted that the applicant would be identified as having departed Sri Lanka illegally, and having unsuccessfully claimed asylum, however, found that the questioning, brief detention and fine the applicant would face upon return would not amount to serious or significant harm (CB 496 – 500). The Authority similarly found that the applicant would be identified, however, he would face a small fine following questioning and detention, and that this would not amount to serious or significant harm [124] – [135], [142].
·As the applicant no longer owned a business, and given the fact that his family continued to live at their residence without issue, the delegate concluded that the applicant did not face harm as a business owner (CB 500). Similarly, the Authority rejected the applicant’s claims about owning the business, and noted that the applicant’s mother and sister still resided at the property without incident and that there was an absence of country information to support the applicant’s claims [104].
·The delegate considered the applicant’s health issues in the context of the then economic crisis in Sri Lanka, finding that the applicant would not be denied access to medical treatment and that while there may be some social stigma, it would not amount to significant harm (CB 501 – 506). The Authority accepted that whilst there are delays and some difficulty with healthcare in Sri Lanka, this would not lead to serious or significant harm for the applicant, including any social stigma which the Authority accepted may arise [115] – [123], [140] – [141].
The Authority did not decide the review on a different basis from the delegate. The Authority’s factual findings did not greatly differ from the delegate’s. This is not a case where the Authority decided the review on a basis which the applicant had not had an opportunity to comment upon: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210. Here, the lack of corroborative evidence, the inconsistencies and the vagueness of the applicant’s claims were dispositive to the delegate’s decision. The Authority was not required to invite the applicant to address these matters.
If the applicant is suggesting that the Authority should have given him the opportunity to comment on the new claim raised in his 2024 statement, which the Authority found met the requirements under s 473DD of the Act, this misunderstands the nature of a Pt 7AA review.
The procedural fairness obligations of the Authority are narrow. The Authority is required to make a decision on the papers without accepting or requesting new information, nor inviting the applicant to attend a hearing: s 473DB of the Act. Procedural fairness does not require the Authority to seek comment from, or put to, an applicant that it is going to decide the review on a basis that differs from the delegate, or make different factual findings: DBE16 v Minister for Immigration Border Protection [2017] FCA 942 at [59]. The Authority also does not need to put to an applicant its views on new information: s 473DE(3) of the Act, reg 4.41 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). Therefore, where a claim is rejected on the basis that it lacks corroborative evidence and was unpersuasive, such a rejection cannot be said to have been unreasonable due to a failure to seek further information. Ground one discloses no error.
By ground two, the applicant contends that the Authority failed to conduct a review as required by s 473DC(1) of the Act because it failed to inform the applicant of issues arising on review and consider its discretion to get new information under s 473DC.
For the reasons given at [38]-[40], there were no ‘new issues’ which the Authority was required to inform the applicant of as a matter of procedural fairness and/or legal reasonableness.
Further, the Authority expressly considered whether to exercise its discretion to get new information at [21]-[23] of its decision. The Authority declined to do so for the cogent reasons it gave, that is, the applicant previously had multiple opportunities to present his claims, he was represented, and the ‘norm’ was not to seek further information. Ground two discloses no error.
As to ground three, the first respondent submitted that this ground simply indicates that the applicant was seeking assistance from Legal Aid. This is not a proper ground of judicial review and was not addressed further.
CONSIDERATION
In Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3 at [17], the task of a court conducting judicial review was described in this manner:
… An application for judicial review is one in which the judicial branch of government reviews, by reference to legality or lawfulness, the decision or decisions of the executive branch of government, here in the form of a decision of the Minister. The court does not consider the merits or wisdom the decision; nor does it remake the decision. The task of the court is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality of the decision by reference to the complaints made about it.
It is well established that the Authority is not required to accept uncritically any and all claims made by an applicant: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451.
Nor does the Authority have to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out: Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348.
It is for the applicant to satisfy the Authority, being the relevant decision maker, that the applicant meets the criteria for being a refugee: Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [187].
It was for the applicant to provide his evidence and arguments in sufficient detail to enable the Authority to reach the requisite state of satisfaction: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214 at [76].
First, the Court is reasonably satisfied that the applicant had multiple opportunities, which he took advantage of, to provide both the delegate and the Authority with additional information to elaborate upon his claims. No jurisdictional error arises in relation to this claim.
Second, the only issues raised by the applicant in his oral submissions went to the merits of the decision, with the applicant expressing his disagreement with the ultimate factual outcome found by the Authority. As these matters are only related to merits review, they do not point towards any jurisdictional error on the part of the Authority.
Ground One
Ground one is a claim that the Authority committed jurisdictional error by failing to alert the applicant to new issues that arose before it, of which the applicant was not previously aware. The Court accepts the Minister’s submission that this claim must fail at a factual level, as the Authority did not depart from the delegate’s findings or the delegate’s reasoning.
This included a rejection of the applicant’s claims about events relating to an alleged property dispute, not accepting the applicant was at risk or harm based on his Tamil ethnicity, including being imputed with a pro LTTE opinion or on account of his profile. The Authority accepted that the applicant would be identified as having departed Sri Lanka illegally, however, this would not amount to serious or significant harm if he were returned. Both the delegate and the Authority rejected the claims about the applicant owning a business, and there was an absence of country information to support the applicant’s claims.
Both the delegate and the Authority also considered the applicant’s health issues.
The Court rejects the second part of ground one, that the applicant should have been given an opportunity to comment on a new claim raised in his 2024 statement, which the Authority accepted under s 473DD. The Court accepts the first respondent’s submission that under Part 7AA, the Authority did not need to put to the applicant its views on new information, nor was it required to seek comment from or put to the applicant that it was going to decide the review on a basis different from the delegate or make different factual findings. Ground one has no merit.
Ground Two
Ground Two is a claim that the Authority constructively failed to review the decision of the delegate by failing to inform the applicant of issues arising on review, and failing to consider its discretion under s 473DC to get new information from the applicant. As noted above, there were no “new issues” which the Authority was required to inform the applicant of as a matter of procedural fairness or legal reasonableness. The Court accepts the submission of the first respondent that the Authority expressly considered at [21] – [23], whether or not to exercise its discretion to get new information from the applicant. The Court is satisfied that no jurisdictional error arises in respect of any failure by the Authority to seek new information. Further, the Court notes the concession made by the applicant in his oral submissions that he had provided all evidence that was in his possession and was not able to provide any further evidence. Even if the Authority exercised its discretion, the Court is not satisfied that there was any further material that would have been gained. Ground two has no merit.
Ground Three
Ground three is not a proper ground of judicial review, merely a statement that the applicant was seeking legal assistance, which was apparently not forthcoming.
As the applicant is unrepresented, the Court has carefully reviewed the material before it but is unable to ascertain any unarticulated jurisdictional error.
DETERMINATION
In these circumstances, the application must be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding seventy-one (71) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge D Humphreys. Associate:
Dated: 23 July 2025
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