SZQPY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZQPY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1133

Citation: SZQPY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1133
Appeal from: SZQPY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor [2012] FMCA 263
Parties: SZQPY v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 548 of 2012
Judge: KENNY J
Date of judgment: 31 October 2013
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – Appeal from decision of Federal Magistrate upholding decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal to refuse a protection visa – Whether the Refugee Review Tribunal failed to comply with s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – Appeal allowed.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for leave to amend notice of appeal – Leave granted – Application for leave to adduce new evidence on appeal pursuant to s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – Leave granted.

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migrations Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Cases cited:

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZQPY v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2012] FMCA 263
NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 147 FCR 51
Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788
Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 192 ALR 71
SZNSC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) FCA 1436
SZKMS v Minister for immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 499
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158
Uelese v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 86
Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68
NASB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 24
Reece v Webber (2011) 192 FCR 254
MZYSU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1073
Sobey v Nicol (2007) 245 ALR 389
MZYPW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 99
SZATV vMinister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18
Randhawav Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437
MZYQU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 206 FCR 191
AZABQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 127 ALD 314
Perampalum v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 84 FCR 273
Modh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1865
Al-Amidi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 177 ALR 506
SZRKY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 132 ALD 525
SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 174 FCR 415
SZQEN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 514
SZQZN v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2012] FMCA 939
SZRKY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 352
Januzi v Secretary of State for Home Department [2006] 2 AC 426
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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 1133
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZQPY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, sought a protection visa after arriving in Australia in 2010 on a Temporary Business visa. The Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) and the Federal Magistrate had both rejected his application. The primary issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had failed to comply with section 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant argued that the Tribunal did not afford him an opportunity to give evidence and present arguments on procedural fairness, specifically regarding the reasonableness of his relocation within Bangladesh.

The court examined the evidence and submissions to determine if the Tribunal had indeed failed to comply with the statutory requirement for procedural fairness. The appellant's arguments centred on the Tribunal's failure to disclose to him that the reasonableness of his relocation within Bangladesh was in issue. The court noted that the Tribunal found it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate to unspecified areas where there was no real chance of the perpetration of harm against Barua Buddhists, which was contrary to the appellant's evidence. The court concluded that the Tribunal did not properly consider the appellant's evidence regarding his reasons for not relocating.

The court further found that the Tribunal's failure to adequately address the issue of relocation constituted a breach of procedural fairness under section 425 of the Migration Act. As a result, the appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court was set aside. The court ordered the Tribunal to review the delegate's decision according to law and mandated that the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection pay the appellant's costs for both the Federal Magistrates Court and the Federal Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant have leave to amend the amended notice of appeal to the effect proposed by the draft further amended notice of appeal annexed to the appellant’s written submissions filed on 5 November 2012.

2. The appellant have leave to adduce in evidence on the appeal the affidavit of Sue Archer filed on 28 September 2012 and its annexure “SA-1”.

3. The title of the first respondent in the further amended notice of appeal be amended from Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.

4. The appeal be allowed.

5. The orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 26 March 2012 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, order:

(a) there be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the second respondent made on 12 August 2011 and notified to the appellant under cover of letter dated 15 August 2011;

(b) there be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the second respondent to review according to law the decision of the delegate of the first respondent to refuse the protection visa sought by the appellant;

(c) the first respondent pay the costs of the appellant in the Federal Magistrates Court.

6. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons stated below, I would grant leave to further amend the notice of appeal and adduce in evidence the affidavit of Sue Archer filed on 28 September 2012 and its annexure “SA-1”, and I would allow the appeal.BACKGROUND The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia in 2010 as the holder of a Temporary Business (Class UC sub-class 456) visa to attend a conference. Shortly after his arrival here, he applied for a protection visa.Visa application before the delegate The statutory declaration (‘the declaration’) that accompanied his visa application set out the circumstances in which the appellant sought a protection visa. For this reason, I describe its contents in some detail. In the declaration, the appellant said that he was born and spent his infancy and early childhood in a minority Buddhist village mostly surrounded by the majority Muslim population, near the city of Chittagong in Bangladesh. The appellant stated that he had been a victim of persecution by “Muslim terrorism and aggression” since his childhood, particularly citing the death of his father as a result of a violent assault by neighbouring Muslim men, as a consequence of which his mother was compelled to flee her home, taking the appellant, then aged four, to the home of a relative some kilometres away and allowing the Muslim neighbours to take possession of her home and land. In the declaration, the appellant further stated that his uncle was “so poor” that he could not “bear the excess cost for us” and, in consequence, in 1988, his mother placed him in the care of the abbot of a Buddhist monastery and orphanage in the village where he had been born. He lived there while he completed his schooling. The declaration went on to say that, in 2000, the appellant and his mother arranged for legal proceedings (naming his mother as plaintiff) to be brought against their former Muslim neighbours for the murder of the appellant’s father and the dispossession of their land. Subsequently, after a group of Muslim boys attacked him one day on his way back to the orphanage and threatened to kill him if the case was not withdrawn, the abbot advised him that he did not consider it safe for him to continue to stay at the orphanage. Several months later, with the abbot’s financial support, the appellant left for Sri Lanka where he undertook religious study and practice. Also, during this period in Sri Lanka, he travelled to other countries in the region in order, so his visa application indicated, to visit (Buddhist) holy places. In the declaration the appellant further said that it was not until May 2007 that he returned to Bangladesh, in expectation of greater safety following the installation of a national caretaker government. Shortly thereafter, the appellant revived the case against his mother’s former Muslim neighbours, although the police were unsuccessful in taking action against them. Rather, the appellant received threats to have him withdraw the case and, on one occasion, he was attacked and stabbed. The appellant went into hiding and his mother became worried for his life, in consequence of which, in December 2007, he returned to Sri Lanka and to the same monastery where he had formerly lived. As already noted, he travelled to Australia in 2010 and has not returned to Bangladesh since 2007.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is clear from the comments of the Court in VAUX and other authorities that no single feature, for example, prejudice, the adequacy of an explanation or even merit, can in every case determine whether leave to amend should be granted “in the interests of justice”. Whether or not a court will consider that it is in the “interests of justice” to grant such leave will depend on the particular circumstances of the case and the combined force of all the relevant factors. In this case, I would not regard the appellant’s further application to adduce in evidence an uncontroversial transcript of the proceeding before the Tribunal as a factor weighing heavily against the grant of leave: see below. Having regard to the combined force of the relevant factors in this case, I consider it “expedient in the interests of justice” to grant the leave to amend that the appellant has sought. I would grant the appellant leave to amend the notice of appeal in the form proposed at the hearing and annexed to his written submissions filed on 5 November 2012.Leave to adduce new evidence As already indicated, relying on s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (‘the Federal Court Act’), the appellant also sought leave to adduce in evidence the transcript of the Tribunal hearing, which was annexed to the affidavit of Sue Archer filed on 28 September 2012. The authenticity and accuracy of the transcript was undisputed. In written submissions, counsel for the Minister contended that this leave should be refused because the appellant had provided “no explanation as to why [he] could not with reasonable diligence have obtained legal representation and led evidence below”. The Minister did not claim that he would suffer any prejudice if leave to adduce the transcript were given. The Minister’s reference to “reasonable diligence” was responsive to the test set forth in such authorities as NASB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 24 (‘NASB’). In NASB at [42] a Full Court stated:In order for this Court to receive further evidence, generally speaking (cf : Cottrell v Wilcox [2002] FCAFC 53; [2002] FCA 232 at [18]-[21], citing CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 at 184-186 per Gaudron J, 199-201 per McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ and 230-238 per Kirby J) it will be found that two conditions must be satisfied: first, the party seeking to adduce the evidence must show that it could not, with reasonable diligence, have been adduced at the trial; and, secondly, the evidence must be such that very probably the result would have been different: see, for example, Orr v Holmes (1948) 76 CLR 632 at 635-636 per Latham CJ. The second condition has been variously expressed in the cases, but the point made in all of them is that it is not enough that the new evidence was relevant and otherwise admissible, and may have affected the result. … The Minister’s submissions, both written and oral, made repeated reference to the transcript in support of the Minister’s contention that the ground of appeal raised by the further amended notice of appeal lacked merit. It may readily be inferred from this that the Minister also contended that, if the evidence of the transcript had been adduced before the Federal Magistrate, then the result would very probably have been the same.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate on 12 August 2011.The Tribunal decision The appellant was not assisted by a migration agent in making his review application to the Tribunal. Nonetheless, he filed various items in support of his claim, including a statement and items of country information, a further copy of the letter from the abbot connected with the orphanage where he had earlier resided, a letter from a religious leader in Sri Lanka, and a 2007 medical report. In his statement dated 1 August 2011, the appellant sought to drawn attention to the position of minority religious groups in predominantly Muslim Bangladesh, noting that “the Buddhist Minority who is from Bengali ethnic, mostly living in Chittagong [plain] area has no other alternative … than [to be] persecuted regularly by surround[ing] Muslim majority”. He added:In recent time, it has become so common that any influential Muslim individual can claim the possession of any minority’s land property. And it is obvious that such a situation can cost the life of a minority individual. So, these days the minority people are fearful to buy any land property.In my case, I was the victim of violent Muslim since my childhood. I lost my father because of Muslim aggression. My homestead was forcibly occupied. I passed my childhood in misery. My mother had been passing a hard time since my father was killed. My life was in danger when I looked for justice. At the Tribunal hearing, in answer to the Tribunal’s questions, the appellant gave further information in connection with his application. First, according to the Tribunal’s reasons for decision, at the Tribunal hearing, in response to the Tribunal’s questioning about whether he had experienced any intimidation between May and September 2000, the appellant stated that in this period he had stayed within the orphanage for fear of being seen and assaulted, and did not go to college regularly. Second, according to the Tribunal’s reasons, the appellant stated that, at some more recent time (which the reasons do not clearly specify) (Muslim) people had come looking for his mother at her relative’s house “but when his mother sees strangers, she moves to a different house” and “later returns … when she feels safe”. Third, according to the Tribunal’s reasons, the appellant stated that he had paid a fee to re-open the court case in 2007, although he did not have a First Incident Report and had misplaced the police receipt. Fourth, the appellant claimed that while staying at a friend’s house in November 2007, “[t]he landlord told him that somebody was looking for him and he ran away”. Among other matters, the Tribunal questioned the appellant about the circumstances of the attacks on him in 2000 and 2007; how his mother had filed the First Incident Report in 2000; why he was attacked and his mother was not, although she was the initiating party for the proceeding; why he had not previously mentioned his period in hiding in 2000 or the incident at the friend’s house in 2007; why his mother had not pursued the case once he had left Bangladesh; and whether the appellant could avoid his previous difficulties by “moving” to another area.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

By his application on 21 November 2012, the appellant sought to amend his notice of appeal further so that the procedural fairness rights of the appellant to which his ground referred arose in the context of compliance with s 425 of the Migration Act. The amendments proposed were as follows:1.The Court erred in the following particulars and in failing to find that the second respondent (the Tribunal) did not comply with s 425 Migration Act in that it did not afford the appellant an opportunity to give evidence and present arguments on procedural fairness to the appellant in that the Tribunal did not disclose to the appellant for comment that the reasonableness of his relocation within Bangladesh. was in issue.Particularsa.The Tribunal found it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate to unspecified areas where there was no real chance of the perpetration of harm against Barua Buddhists.b.The delegate/primary decision maker did not make her decision on the basis of whether or not the appellant could relocate in Bangladesh. Instead the delegate decided that the dispute with Muslim neighbours in 1987 in which the appellant’s family’s house was taken and his father died was not Convention related.c.The delegate did not find nor gave any indication that she did not accept that the applicant had not been physically attacked twice in attempting to reclaim the land.d.The Tribunal did not find that the dispute was not Convention related but instead found that there was no real chance of persecution by the Muslims as a result of the 1987 incident. The Tribunal came to its findings on the reasonableness of relocation in response to the appellant’s Buddhist Barua claims.e.The appellant had given evidence to the delegate about the reasons why his mother placed him in an orphanage as a child rather than have him live with her at his uncle’s place and the reasons why he now could not go to live in the same area as his mother and uncle. This latter evidence included that he did not know anyone there, that his uncle’s family would not help him and that he had nothing to do there. The appellant had given evidence that he attempted to reclaim the land so that he would have a livelihood.f.Because of the reconfiguration of issues between the delegate’s and the Tribunal assessments, procedural fairness s 425 Migration Act required that, in the course of the review of the delegate’s decision, the Tribunal should have indicated to the appellant that the reasonableness of the appellant’s proposed relocation according to the applicable test was a critical issue in his case. Instead the Tribunal limited its inquiries and disclosures about relocation to the issue of the safety of relocation and the appellant responded accordingly.g.The procedural unfairness falls within the procedural unfairness ground raised in the Amended Application before the Court below although that it was not there specifically pleaded. The appellant, by pro bono counsel, submitted that the proposed amendment “pleads non-compliance with section 425 of the Migration Act and that will allow this Court to reverse the error of the Court below at … paragraph 37” [of the Primary Judgment]. The appellant identified this error as encapsulated in his Honour’s statement that:[T]he hearing conducted by the Tribunal under s 425 exhausted its obligation in relation to affording a hearing … .