Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Iyer v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 929

IMMIGRATION – whether error of law by Refugee Review Tribunal – whether fresh arguments should be permitted

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 430(1), 476(1)(a), 476(1)(b), 476(1)(c), 476(1)(e)

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469 referred to
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs;  ex parte Duraraijasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 referred to
H v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1348 referred to
Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788 referred to
Sidhu v Holmes [2000] FCA 1653 referred to
Wimalaratne v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1737 referred to
Wu Shan Liang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1996) 185 CLR 259 referred to
Ibrahim v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 175 ALR 585 referred to
Perampalam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 84 FCR 274 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 referred to
Iyer v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1567 referred to

RAVISHANKER PATHMANATHAN IYER v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 1263 OF 2000

HEEREY, MANSFIELD AND GYLES JJ
SYDNEY
20 JULY 2001


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1263 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

RAVISHANKER PATHMANATHAN IYER
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HEEREY, MANSFIELD AND GYLES JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

20 JULY 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the costs of the respondent.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1263 OF 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

RAVISHANKER PATHMANATHAN IYER
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HEEREY, MANSFIELD AND GYLES JJ

DATE:

20 JULY 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HEEREY J:

  1. The appellant appeals from a decision of a judge of this Court dismissing an application for review under Pt 8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister refusing the appellant’s application for a protection visa.

  2. The nature of the appellant’s claims and the reasons of the Tribunal and the primary judge are set out in the judgments of the other members of this Court.

  3. In my opinion the appellant’s claim to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the ground of membership of a particular social group, namely young Tamil males in Colombo who come from the north and east of Sri Lanka, was adequately addressed by the Tribunal.  I agree substantially with the reasons of Gyles J on this issue.

  4. It is fair…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 929
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the appellant, a Sri Lankan national, appealed against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) which had refused his application for a protection visa. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had erred in its review of his claim to a protection visa and sought to rely on fresh grounds of appeal that were not ventilated at first instance. The Federal Court of Australia was required to determine whether the appellant should be permitted to present these new grounds of appeal and, if so, whether they were valid and should lead to a rehearing of his application.

The Court held that the appellant should not be permitted to raise the new grounds of appeal as they were not raised at first instance and would result in prejudice to the respondent, primarily the loss of costs ordered on the unsuccessful application at first instance if the costs order were to be varied on appeal. The Court considered that the appellant had been legally represented at all material points and that the fresh points were not significant without considering the merits of the points the appellant now wanted to raise. The Court found that where the appellant wished to raise on appeal a matter which was expressly conceded by experienced counsel at the hearing as not giving rise to reviewable error on the part of the Tribunal, and where no explanation for why that concession should now be permitted to be withdrawn, the Court should be very cautious before permitting the appellant to raise the point on appeal.

The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the decision of the Tribunal of 22 September 1999. The Court held that the appellant had succeeded in demonstrating that the Tribunal had erred in its review of his claim to a protection visa. The Court remitted the appellant’s application for review of the decision of the delegate of the respondent to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant costs of the appeal to be taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the respondent.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, Iyer, applied for a protection visa in Australia on 23 April 1998, having arrived in Australia on 8 March 1998 on an Australian student visa. Iyer was born in 1966. He was represented by a solicitor when he applied for the protection visa and the same solicitor prepared and lodged the application for review with the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). Iyer's application for a protection visa was subsequently refused by the RRT on 22 September 1999. Another firm of solicitors acted for Iyer during the review by the RRT, submitting various arguments and materials on Iyer's behalf. Iyer then appealed to the court against the RRT's decision. An amended application for an order of review was filed by Iyer's solicitors on 3 August 2000, the same day as the hearing before the primary judge. The primary decision was handed down on 8 November 2000.

Iyer applied for a protection visa in Australia and the application was refused by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). He then appealed the RRT's decision to the court. An amended application for an order of review was filed on the day of the hearing before the primary judge. Iyer was represented by counsel instructed by the solicitors on the record. The primary decision was given on 8 November 2000. The appeal against the primary decision was heard, and the judgment in this appeal was given thereafter.

Decision

Reasons for decision

HEEREY, MANSFIELD AND GYLES JJ
The consideration of those final three grounds of appeal means that it is not necessary to formally rule on whether, as grounds of review not ventilated at first instance, the appellant should now be permitted to present them.CONCLUSION For the above reasons, this appeal should be allowed. The appellant has succeeded in demonstrating that the Tribunal erred in its review of his claim to a protection visa. The ground upon which he has succeeded is one which has echoes of what was argued at first instance. However, it appears that the precise argument which has been accepted is not one which was developed before the learned Judge at first instance. In that circumstance, I consider it appropriate that the appellant should have the costs of this appeal, but that the order for costs made at first instance should not be disturbed. Accordingly, I would order that the appeal be allowed and the decision of the Tribunal of 22 September 1999 should be set aside. The appellant’s application for review of the decision of the delegate of the respondent should be remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law. The respondent should pay to the appellant costs of the appeal to the taxed. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of Mansfield J in draft, which relieves me of the necessity to explain the issues or the background to them. Application to rely upon fresh grounds In my opinion, the appellant should not be permitted to raise any of the grounds that are now proposed. The appellant made an application for a protection visa on 23 April 1998, having arrived in Australia on 8 March 1998 being the holder of an Australian student visa obtained by him in Colombo. He was born in 1966. The material in the appeal book shows that the appellant was assisted by a solicitor in connection with his application for a protection visa, and the same solicitor prepared and lodged the application for review in the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”), where the application was refused. Another firm of solicitors acted for the appellant during the course of the review by the RRT. Those solicitors made various submissions and provided a good deal of material to the RRT on the appellant’s behalf. The RRT decision was made on 22 September 1999. The appeal book does not contain the original application to this Court for an order of review. It does contain an amended application for an order of review, filed by the same solicitors who had acted for the appellant during the RRT review and filed on 3 August 2000, which was the date of hearing before the primary judge. In other words, the amended application was filed on the day of the hearing. The appellant was represented by counsel instructed by the solicitors on the record. The primary decision was given on 8 November 2000, some two years and eight months after the appellant’s arrival in Australia on a student visa and over two and a half years after making application for a protection visa. The appellant had been legally represented at all material points.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HEEREY, MANSFIELD AND GYLES JJ

Counsel for the respondent very fairly acknowledged that the correct approach in this instance is to determine whether it expedient in the interests of justice to allow those fresh points now to be raised. At a practical level, the prejudice to the respondent if they are allowed to be raised would be the loss of the costs ordered to be paid on the unsuccessful application at first instance if, on appeal, that costs order were to be varied. That prejudice can be met by not disturbing the order for costs. The prejudice to the appellant, if any of his new grounds of appeal are correct, is the loss of the opportunity to have his application before the Tribunal re-heard and determined by a differently constituted Tribunal according to law. In this instance, it is difficult to assess the significance of that prejudice without considering the merits of the points the appellant now wants to raise. However, where the appellant wishes to raise on appeal a matter which was expressly conceded by experienced counsel at the hearing as not giving rise to reviewable error on the part of the Tribunal, and where no explanation for why that concession should now be permitted to be withdrawn, the Court should be very cautious before permitting the appellant to raise the point on appeal.CONSIDERATION OF GROUNDS OF APPEAL The appellant contends that the first issue was before the Tribunal because, in his initial statement in support of his application for a protection visa, he said :“… I cannot go back to Jaffna because if by some chance the authorities get to know that our property was given over to the Tigers I would be treated as a Tiger supporter and persecuted.”Subsequently, in a long letter from the appellant’s solicitors to the Tribunal dated 25 June 1999, they identified his claims to be a refugee in the following terms : “E. Nexus to Convention reasonsThe Convention nexus is established on two grounds :(a) race - as a Tamil, and(b) imputed political opinion, as a suspected supporter of the LTTE,The first and second are interlinked as set out in the statement. It is submitted that the country information objectively supports his fear of persecution.” The Tribunal recited in its reasons a long statutory declaration of the appellant received on 4 May 1999 in which he claimed that it was not safe for him to return to Jaffna because of his background, and that he feared returning to Colombo as he may be accused of helping the LTTE because of what happened to him. He said that he feared that he would be regarded as an LTTE supporter. It also recorded that, after the hearing, on 21 July 1999 the Tribunal had received a further submission from the appellant expressing a fear of Convention-based persecution in Colombo as a young man from Jaffna, because he might be seen as a suspected LTTE supporter and that he was also at risk of arrest for the purposes of extortion as a Tamil with family overseas. It described his principal claim as being “from an affiliation with the LTTE which he says would be presumed by the Sri Lankan authorities because he is a young Tamil man from Jaffna”.