FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZTUQ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2017] FCCA 3185 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where no affidavit evidence relied on to explain substantial delay in commencing proceedings – merits of application – application refused. |
| Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s.91 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.420, 422B, 425, 426A, 477 Federal Circuit Court Rules (Cth), rr.13.03C, 44.05 |
| Applicant: | SZTUQ |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 155 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Barnes |
| Hearing date: | 10 February 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 20 December 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Williams (direct access) |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Ms Francois |
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- Case
- [2017] FCCA 3185
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether to grant the applicant an extension of time under section 477(2) of the relevant Act. This required the Court to consider whether granting the extension would be in the interests of the administration of justice, and to weigh this against other relevant factors, including the applicant's explanation for the significant delay in filing the application.
Judge Barnes' reasoning was informed by previous decisions, particularly *SZUWX*. The Court affirmed that the existence of an arguable case for review does not, of itself, mandate the granting of an extension of time. Instead, the Court must balance the arguable nature of the grounds with other considerations, such as the explanation for the delay and the interests of the administration of justice. In this case, there was a complete lack of sworn evidence from the applicant or any person with knowledge of the circumstances explaining the delay of over one year and four months. While the applicant had made a section 417 application, this was not considered a sufficient explanation for the delay in seeking judicial review. Consequently, the Court was not satisfied that a satisfactory explanation for the delay had been provided.
The Court concluded that it was not in the interests of the administration of justice to grant the extension of time. The application was therefore dismissed.
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Of particular relevance to this case, Griffiths J observed at [77] in SZUWX: … even if the primary judge’s finding of “arguability” is unqualified, it remained a matter for his Honour to balance that consideration with other matters which he viewed as significant, namely the lack of a sufficient explanation for the delay and the interest of the administration of justice. Whatever standard of “unreasonableness” is applied, it was not unreasonable for the primary judge to conclude that, having regard to other relevant circumstances, the fact that the proposed grounds of review were “arguable” was insufficient of itself to warrant time being extended under s 477(2) of the Act. The applicant’s proposition that, having found that there was an arguable case, it was always in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order is untenable. (emphasis added) On appeal in SZUWX, the Full Court of the Federal Court upheld the decision of Griffiths J. Bromwich J remarked (at [11]) that no conclusion could be properly reached that “the terms of s 477(2) make any consideration mandatory other than the express test of whether the grant of the extension of time sought is ‘in the interests of the administration of justice’”. His Honour also observed (at [12]) that Parliament has deliberately set a test for granting or refusing an application for an extension of time that “accommodates a myriad of facts and circumstances” by which an application for review came to be lodged outside the 35 day time limit and that his Honour saw “no warrant” for “putting any additional gloss or qualification on the words used by Parliament”. These views do not support any contention that if there is an arguable case it is always in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time. As Griffiths J observed in SZUWX at [77], such a proposition “is untenable”. Rather, it is a question of weighing all the circumstances. This is not a case in which a weak, or less than compelling, explanation has been proffered for delay. There is no explanation for the delay in commencing the judicial review proceedings proffered in sworn evidence by or for the Applicant in support of the application for an extension of time. The “grounds” set out in the amended application in support of the application for an extension of time do not address the delay. While an affidavit of Mr Issa, the Applicant’s then solicitor, was filed with the original application, it is not read. Even if there was “technical” compliance with r.44.05, it is significant that there is no sworn evidence providing any explanation by any person with knowledge as to why the Applicant delayed in bringing his application for over one year and four months after the Tribunal decision. Insofar as the Court was asked to draw an inference from the material before it in these proceedings, it is clear that after the Tribunal decision Mr Issa made a s.417 application on behalf of the Applicant. As indicated, this is not in itself an acceptable explanation for delay in seeking review (see Vu per Jessup J at [29], MZZYC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1426 per Davies J at [4], MZZQA per Mortimer J at [11] and MZZGC per Mortimer J at [15]), at least in the circumstances of this case, where there is no explanation at all from the Applicant in relation to this or any other event which occurred from the time of the Tribunal decision to the time of the application to this court and where the Applicant is legally represented (see MZZQA at [12] and MZZGC at [15]). It is not appropriate to draw some inference as to what the Applicant’s explanation for the delay might be where there is no evidence from him in that respect. While I would not draw an adverse inference from the fact of the absence of reliance on the affidavit of the Applicant’s former solicitor, the case is (now) one in which there is no explanation in affidavit evidence from the Applicant or anyone else with knowledge of the circumstances on his behalf for the delay. I am not satisfied that the Applicant has provided any “satisfactory, let alone persuasive explanation for the delay”. The delay is significant. I note the remarks of Wigney J in Tran at [38].