SZVMA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZVMA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1058

Review of: SZVMA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 727
File number: NSD 629 of 2016
Judge: FARRELL J
Date of judgment: 31 August 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) seeking review of a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing the applicants’ application for an extension of time in which to seek judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal – where Tribunal affirmed decision of the Minister to refuse to grant protection visas
Legislation:

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 48A, 417, 476, 476A(3)(a), 477

Cases cited:

Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473; [2003] HCA 71

Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387; [2004] HCA 25

ApplicantVUAD of 2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1331

Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293; [2000] HCA 19

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163; [1995] HCA 58

Daniel v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 205 ALR 198; [2004] FCA 21

Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 14 ALD 291; [1987] FCA 457

M211 of 2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal (2004) 212 ALR 520; [2004] FCAFC 293

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; [2013] FCA 317

MZZGC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 842

Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133

SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (2013) 236 FCR 442; [2013] FCA 1284

SZUWX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 77

SZUWX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1389

SZUWX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 2151

SZVMA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 727

Vu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 101 ALD 211; [2008] FCAFC 59

Date of hearing: 12 August 2016
Date of last submissions: 24 August 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 40
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr J Williams
Solicitor for the Applicants: Russell Byrnes Solicitors
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr H Bevan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs
Counsel for the Third Respondent: The Third Respondent submitted save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 629 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZVMA

First Applicant

SZVMB

Second Applicant

SZVMC

Third Applicant

SZVMD

Fourth Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1058
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZVMA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the applicants, SZVMA, seeking a review of a decision by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) that dismissed their application for an extension of time to seek judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The RRT had affirmed the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse to grant the applicants protection visas. The applicants contended that the RRT failed to consider relevant country information and misapplied the law in determining that they did not face a real risk of significant harm if they were to return to Libya.

The central legal issues for the court to decide were whether the FCCA erred in dismissing the applicants' application for an extension of time and whether the jurisdictional errors identified by the applicants in relation to the RRT's decision were so significant that they compelled the grant of an extension of time. Specifically, the applicants argued that the RRT failed to consider relevant country information regarding the discrimination faced by the mother as a female academic in Libya and misapplied the law by not considering the risk of persecution in relation to the correct "particular social group."

The court held that the application for an extension of time should be dismissed. The court found that while the RRT had failed to consider some aspects of the country information and misapplied the law, these errors were not so significant as to compel the grant of an extension of time. The court emphasised that the RRT had considered the general situation of women in Libya and had found that the risk of harm faced by the applicants was due to generalised violence rather than persecution for a Convention reason. The court concluded that the applicants had not demonstrated that the jurisdictional errors by the RRT were such that the interests of justice required an extension of time.

The court dismissed the application, and the applicants were ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or taxed. The court's decision underscores the importance of demonstrating compelling reasons for an extension of time to seek judicial review, particularly where the jurisdictional errors identified do not fundamentally undermine the outcome of the original decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed

2. The first and second applicants pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge accurately summarised the Tribunal’s reasoning at J[6]-[7]:The Tribunal affirmed the decision under review. It found that the [father] was not a credible witness and had fabricated his evidence in relation to his core claims. In summary, the Tribunal:a)was not satisfied that the [father]’s brother served in the Gaddafi military or that the [father]’s family had a pro-Gaddafi profile. Consequently, the Tribunal found there was no real chance or real risk of the [father] being harmed as a result of his family's real or imputed political opinions; b)was not satisfied that the group called Ansar al-Sharia attempted to forcibly recruit the [father] or his cousin, or that the Ansar al-Sharia targeted males who did not agree to join them. The Tribunal did not accept that the [father] was harmed or threatened by Ansar al-Sharia, and found there was no real chance or real risk of the [father] being harmed as a result of any refusal to join; c)did not accept that the [father] had any interest in expressing in politics or expressing his political views if he was to return to Libya, and did not accept that the [father] had any kind of political profile which would bring him to adverse attention; d)was not satisfied there was a real chance or real risk the [father] would be harmed because he was a member of the Al Hassy tribe; e)was not satisfied, based on independent country information, that there was a real chance or real risk of either the [father] or the [mother] being targeted or imputed with a pro-Gaddafi political opinion because of the [mother]’s Gaddafi government sponsored scholarship to study in Australia; f)was not satisfied, based on independent country information, that there was a real chance or real risk that the [mother] would be harmed as a female academic in Benghazi. While the Tribunal accepted that there was some discrimination against women and that the [mother] may be prevented from driving a car, the Tribunal did not accept that the type of harm women in Libya faced constituted serious or significant harm; g)considered reports concerning generalised violence, however did not consider that the applicants would be targeted for harm for a Convention reason, and found that any risk of harm they would face was as a result of random violence. Therefore, the applicants did not satisfy s.91R(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act), as a Convention reason or reasons did not constitute an essential and significant motivation for the harm feared. With respect to the complementary protection criterion, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the risk to the applicants was such that the applicants personally faced a real risk of significant harm. The Tribunal noted s.36(2B)(c) of the Migration Act, which provides that there is taken not to be a real risk that an applicant will suffer significant harm if the Tribunal is satisfied that the real risk is one faced by the population generally and not by the applicant personally. The Tribunal applied this provision to find there was no real risk of harm to the applicants as a result of generalised violence in Libya, at [54].DECISION OF THE FCCA

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to Ground 2, the applicants submitted that even if there was no adequate explanation for the delay, the jurisdictional errors by the Tribunal identified in Grounds 2 and 3 of their further amended application in the FCCA are such that the interests of the administration of justice compelled the grant of an extension of time. In the applicants’ submission those grounds “establish clear jurisdictional errors by the Tribunal and the primary judge”. Those grounds were (as written):Ground 2: Relevant Considerations2.The second respondent failed to take into account a relevant consideration in the exercise of power or failed to give proper, genuine or realistic consideration of the [father]’s claims or integer’s of those claims.ParticularsCountry Information – Claims relating to the [mother]n)At [54] of the decision record, the second respondent found that ‘[t]he Tribunal is not satisfied on the basis of the evidence before it, that the independent country information suggests that there is a real chance or risk that she would be harmed as a female academic in Benghazi.’o)However, there was an abundance of country information before the second respondent supporting the claims of the [mother], including:a)At [47], footnore 15, ‘After Gadhafi, Libyan women now press back against rising Islamists’, Associated Press (AP), 7 March 2013, CX3 1 7709; ‘O&A: “Libyan Women Were Handed Over as Spoils of War”, Inter Press Sentence, 19 December 2013, CX318046.b)At [48], footnote 17, ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012 – Libya’, US Department of State, Section 6, [48], footnote 18 ‘Libya Status of Women Survey 2013’, International Foundation for Electoral Systems September 2013, CIS27196.d)At [48], footnote 19, ‘Libya’s Grand Mufti Wants to Veil Female Teachers’, Voice of America (VOA), 15 October 2013, CX316636.e)At [54] the Tribunal itself found that ‘the country information suggests that there is discrimination against women generally in Libya and there are religious issues in relation to female teachers and academics.’f)However, erred by not being satisfied ‘on the basis of the evidence before it, that the independent country information suggests that there is a real chance or risk that she would be harmed as a female academic in Benghazi.’Ground 3: Misapplication of law or failure to ask the correct question3.The second respondent erred by, misinterpreting, misunderstanding or misapplying the applicable law, or has otherwise failed to ask the correct question, with regard to theParticularsThe discrimination faced by the [mother]a)At [53], the second respondent ‘discussed this country information with the [father] (as the [mother] failed to attend the hearing). In response the [father] stated that she would not be permitted to drive a car and would have to wear the hijab. When the Tribunal put to him that her photograph shows her already wearing the hi jab he stated that he had no comment in relation to this.b)At [54], the second respondent observed that the ‘…country information suggests that there is discrimination against women generally in Libya and there are religious issues in relation to female teachers and academics…’c)At [54], the second respondent erred by finding that ‘the evidence before the Tribunal suggests that the [mother] currently wears a hijab which the Tribunal considers would lessen the risk of her being subject to adverse attention as the reports referred to above suggest that this is a significant issue for the fundamentalist Islamists.’d)The second respondent fell into jurisdictional error by failing to consider the issue of persecution in relation to the correct “particular social group”, that being a female academic forced to comply with the doctrines of Islamic fundamentalism. In so far as decision of the Tribunal found that the [mother] is required, or can be expected, to take reasonable steps to avoid persecutory harm, they are wrong in principle and should not be followed.